SUNITA JAIN Vs. PAWAN KUMAR JAIN & ORS.(498A)

CASE NO.:Appeal (crl.)  174 of 2008

PETITIONER:SUNITA JAIN

RESPONDENT:PAWAN KUMAR JAIN & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 25/01/2008

BENCH:C.K. THAKKER & D.K. JAIN

JUDGMENT:J U D G M E N T
ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 1362 OF 2004
C.K. THAKKER, J.
1.  Leave granted.

2.The present appeal is filed against
the judgment and order dated October 30, 2003
in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 1442 of 1999
passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Jabalpur. By the said order, the High Court
allowed the application filed by the
respondents-accused under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter
referred to asthe Code) and quashed criminal
proceedings initiated by the appellant.

3.To appreciate the controversy raised in the present appeal, few relevant facts may be noted.

4.The appellant herein is the wife of
Pawan Kumar Jain-respondent No.1. Respondent
Nos. 2 and 3, namely, Poolchand Jain and Smt.
Sarojbai Jain are parents of respondent No.1
and father-in-law and mother-in-law
respectively of the appellant. It is the case
of the appellant that she married to respondent
No.1 on July 8, 1989. After the marriage, she
remained with her husband for few days at
Jabalpur and during that period, her husband
and in-laws harassed her as her father had not
given sufficient amount of dowry.  They taunted
the appellant saying that had the respondent
No.1 married to any other lady, they would have
received dowry amount of Rs.8-10 lakhs. On
September 5, 1990, the appellant gave birth to
twins. According to the appellant, the greed of
the respondents for dowry was so much that in
1991, the first respondent went to the extent
of getting quality of gold ornaments given by
her father tested by a Goldsmith which were
found to be of good quality. It is also the
case of the appellant that on December 14,
1991, marriage of the appellants younger
sister was solemnized at Sagar and respondent
No.1 and his father had come to attend it. At
that time also, the respondents demanded car,
colour TV and more gold. When the demand was
not met with, the first respondent attacked the
appellant and caused injury to her. In March,
1992, the 1st respondent took the appellant
with him and kept her with his parents at
Jabalpur. Even after giving assurance that she
will not be ill-treated, she was physically and
mentally tortured for dowry. The appellant
informed her father that her husband and in-
laws were demanding dowry from her and her
husband assaulted her and her children had been
taken away and they were not allowed to see the
mother (appellant).

5.The appellant stated that Harish
Chandra and Daya Chandra Jain, who were known
to her father, learnt about the miserable
condition of the appellant and both of them
informed the father of the appellant in
September, 1993 about the plight of the
appellant at her in-laws. One Ram Ratan Jain,
who was also knowing the appellant, persuaded
the respondents to behave properly but in vain.
In May, 1995, again the appellant was assaulted
and severely beaten.  She was also compelled to
sign a document purported to be a compromise
deed between the appellant and the 1st
respondent. The appellant lodged a complaint in
Police Station Civil Lines, Raipur on May 10,
1998 which was registered as Crime No. 738 of
1998. Respondent No.1 was called at the Police
Station and he executed a writing that he would
not ill treat the appellant. The 1st respondent
also gave assurance that he will not use any
writing against the appellant said to have been
signed by her.

6.In July, 1995, the 1st respondent was
transferred from Raipur to Raigarh and in spite
of the request by the appellant, she was not
taken by her husband along with him. On March
8, 1996, the 1st respondent sent a notice
through advocate to father of the appellant
stating that he had filed a divorce petition. 
He further stated that he was ready to pay
maintenance to the appellant. On 17th March,
1996, the appellants father brought the
appellant to Sagar. The appellant had to go
with her father as the 1st respondent did not
take her with him and had also issued notice
for divorce. On March 20, 1996, the appellant
lodged First Information Report (FIR) in Women
Police Station which was registered as Crime
No. 6 of 1996 giving details about physical and
mental torture and dowry demands by respondent
No.1 and his family members. According to the
appellant, on July 10, 1996, non-bailable
warrants were issued. In the High Court,
however, the 1st respondent made a statement
through his advocate that parties had decided
to live together and had settled the dispute
amicably. On that statement being made, bail
was granted to respondent No.1 and his parents.
On September 28, 1996, challan was filed
against the respondents for offences punishable
under Sections 498A, 506, 406 read with Section
34 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) and also under
Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act,
1961. On January 30, 1997, charges were framed
against respondent Nos. 1 to 3 (husband,
father-in-law and mother-in-law) and also
against brother and sister of respondent No.1.
All the accused challenged the action of
framing of charge against them in the High
Court by filing a Revision Petition. The High
Court vide its order dated October 22, 1997,
partly allowed the revision and quashed charges
against brother and sister of respondent No.1.
The High Court, however, held that so far as
other respondents were concerned, charges could
not be quashed and dismissed the petition.
Being aggrieved by the said order, the
respondents approached this Court by filing
Special Leave Petition but even this Court
dismissed the SLP on February 23, 1998. The
respondents then once again filed a petition in
the High Court by invoking Section 482 of the
Code on February 23, 1999. The appellant filed
her reply to the said petition. The High Court
vide the impugned order, allowed the petition
holding that there was abuse of process of law
by the appellant in initiating criminal
proceedings. The proceedings were, therefore,
quashed. The said order is challenged in the
present appeal.

7.Notice was issued by this Court on
April 5, 2004. Several adjournments were taken
by the parties so that the matter can amicably
be settled.  The matter, however, could not be
settled and was ordered to be posted for final
hearing.

8.We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

9.  The learned counsel for the appellant
submitted that grave and serious error has been
committed by the High Court in quashing the
proceedings. He submitted that once the
proceedings had been initiated in accordance
with law and the Court was satisfied that prima
facie case was made out, charge was framed and
the said action was upheld by the High Court as
well as by this Court, it was not open to the
High Court to quash the proceedings on the
ground that there was abuse of process of
Court. Such an order could not have been made
by the High Court in the light of the order
passed by this Court.

10.  It was also submitted that the High
Court has virtually reviewed its earlier order.
There is no power of review in a Court
exercising criminal jurisdiction under the Code
and such order is illegal and without
jurisdiction. A grievance was also made that
once this Court upheld framing of charge
against respondent Nos. 1 to 3, the High Court
could not have held that the proceedings were
initiated mala fide or there was abuse of
process of Court. Such order, in the teeth of
order passed by this Court, was totally
illegal, unwarranted and must be set aside.

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11.The learned counsel for respondent
Nos. 1 to 3 supported the order of the High
Court. He submitted that considering the
totality of facts and circumstances, the High
Court passed the impugned order which is
strictly in consonance with law. It was urged
that taking into account, overall conduct of
the appellant and actions taken by her against
the 1st respondent-husband and his family
members in the light of subsequent facts which
were brought to the notice of the Court, the
Court was satisfied that it was in the interest
of justice to quash the proceedings. Such an
action cannot be said to be illegal or
improper. It was also stated that two children
were born in 1990 but she had never taken
interest nor even seen them after 1990.  Both
the children are with the respondents and they
are very happy. According to the respondents,
there was no demand of dowry either by
respondent No.1 or by his family members and a
totally false and concocted complaint was filed
against them and the Court was convinced that
the action had been taken by the appellant to
harass the respondents and the proceedings were
liable to be quashed. Finally, it was submitted
that this Court may not exercise equitable
jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
Constitution in favour of the appellant.

12.Having given anxious consideration to
the rival submissions of the parties, in our
view, the High Court was wrong in quashing the
proceedings. From the facts noted hereinabove,
it is clear that a complaint was lodged by the
petitioner against respondent Nos. 1 to 3 as
also against other accused for offences
punishable under Sections 498A, 342 and 406,
IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition
Act. The trial Court satisfied that prima facie
case was made out and accordingly charges were
framed against respondent Nos. 1 to 3 as well
as against other accused. In a petition
challenging that action, the High Court partly
allowed the petition vide its order dated
October 22, 1997 and quashed charges against
brother-in-law and sister-in-law of the
appellant herein but upheld the order of
framing of charge against the remaining
respondents i.e. respondent Nos. 1 to 3.
Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 challenged the order of
the High Court by approaching this Court. It
was registered as Special Leave Petition (Crl.)
No. 509 of 1998. On December 23, 1998, this
Court dismissed the special leave petition by
passing the following order:   We are not inclined to
interfere with the order of the High
Court dated 22.10.1997 framing charges
against the petitioner. The SLP (Crl.)
No. 509/98 is dismissed. So far as
order dated 28.11.97 is concerned
refusing to transfer the proceedings,
issue notice. Pending proceedings
before the C.J.M. Sagar, is stayed.

13.  It is thus, clear that all the Courts
including this Court were of the view that
there was prima facie case for framing of
charge against the respondents herein. It
appears that thereafter the parties tried for
amicable settlement of the matter again. The
Court was also informed that the parties had
almost settled the matter and negotiations were
going on with regard to amount to be paid to
the wife. The respondent No.1-husband offered
Rs.7.50 lakhs towards full and final
settlement.  According to the respondents, the
petitioner-wife insisted for more amount. The
efforts of settlement thus failed. It has also
come on record that appellant-wife filed a suit
against the husband for compensation of Rs.20
lakhs in the Court of First Addl. Judge, Sagar.
A Revision Petition filed by respondent Nos. 1
to 3 was allowed by the High Court and it was
held that Sagar Court had no territorial
jurisdiction to entertain the suit.  After the
order passed by this Court in August, 1998,
respondent Nos. 1 to 3 again moved the High
Court under Section 482 of the Code for
quashing of criminal proceedings. The High
Court in the impugned order noted that earlier
the respondents had approached the Court
against framing of charge and the said action
was not interfered with even by the Supreme
Court.  But observing that a Court of law
cannot be expected to remain a silent spectator
and cannot be made a tool of gratifying
personal vengeance of any party, it held that
the case in hand was a fit one to exercise
inherent power under Section 482 and
accordingly the proceedings were ordered to be
quashed. The Court, for coming to the said
conclusion, relied upon certain decisions of this Court.

14.In Madhu Limaye v. State of
Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551, an interlocutory
order was passed by a Court subordinate to the
High Court against which Revision Petition was
filed. It was contended that sub-section (2) of
Section 397 barred exercise of revisional
powers in relation to any interlocutory order
passed in an appeal, inquiry, trial or in any
other proceeding.  Since the order was
interlocutory in nature, revision petition was
not maintainable. This Court held that even
where an order cannot be challenged in
revision, inherent powers under Section 482 of
the Code could be exercised by the High Court
in appropriate cases.

15.This Court stated:
     On a plain  reading  of Section
482, however, it would follow that
nothing  in  the Code,  which  would
include sub-section(2)of Section 397
also, shall  be  deemed to limit or 
affect  the inherent powers of the
High Court.  But, if we were to say
that the said  bar is not to operate
in the exercise of the  inherent power 
at  all,  it will be setting at naught
one  of  the limitations imposed 
upon the exercise  of  the  revisional
powers.  In such a situation, what
is-the harmonious way out? In our
opinion, a happy solution of this
problem would be to say that the bar
provided in sub-section (2) of Section
397 operates only in exercise of the
revisional power of the High Court,
meaning thereby that the High Court
will have no power of revision in
relation to any interlocutory order. 
Then in accordance with one of the
other principles enunciated above,
the inherent power will come into
play, there being no other provision
in the Code for the redress of the
grievance of the aggrieved party. But
then, if the order assailed is purely
of an interlocutory character which
could be corrected in exercise of the
revisional power of the High Court
under the 1898 Code, the High Court
will refuse  to exercise its inherent
power.  But in  case  the impugned
order clearly brings about a situation
which is  an abuse  of  the process of
the Court or for the purpose  of
securing the ends of justice
interference by the High  Court is 
absolutely necessary, then nothing
contained in Section 397(2) can limit
or affect the exercise  of  the
inherent power  by the High Court. But
such cases would be few and far
between.  The High Court must exercise
the inherent power very sparingly.

16.The High Court also referred to G.V.
Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad & Ors., (2000) 3 SCC 693
wherein this Court considered the object
underlying marriage as sacred ceremony and to
end the dispute amicably between the parties by
pondering over differences and
misunderstandings. It was observed that the
parties should not litigate by instituting
criminal cases which would take long time and
in that process, lose theiryoung days in
chasing their cases in different Courts. The
Court, therefore, observed that such matters
should be settled immediately.

17.In B.S. Joshi & Ors. v. State of
Haryana & Anr., (2003) 4 SCC 675, proceedings
for offences punishable under Sections 498A and
406, IPC were quashed. It was observed that
Section 320 of the Code relating to
compounding of offences would not limit the
power of the High Court under Section 482 of
the Code and if the High Court is satisfied
that the proceedings were initiated mala fide
and there is abuse of process of law, they can
be quashed. Referring to earlier judgments, the
Court held that there are special features in
matrimonial matters and it is the duty of the
Court to encourage genuine settlement of
matrimonial disputes.

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18.Discussing the underlying object of
inserting Chapter XXA (Section 498A) in the
Indian Penal Code, the Court stated:
  There is no doubt that the object
of introducing Chapter XX-A containing
Section 498-A in the Indian Penal Code
was to prevent torture to a woman by
her husband or by relatives of her
husband. Section 498-A was added with
a view to punishing a husband and his
relatives who harass or torture the
wife to coerce her or her relatives to
satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The
hypertechnical view would be
counterproductive and would act
against interests of women and against
the object for which this provision
was added. There is every likelihood
that non-exercise of inherent power to
quash the proceedings to meet the ends
of justice would prevent women from
settling earlier. That is not the
object of Chapter XX-A of the Indian
Penal Code.

19.In spite of best efforts by the
learned counsel for the respondents, we are
unable to persuade ourselves to hold that after
the order passed by this Court dismissing
Special Leave Petition upholding framing of
charge against respondent Nos. 1 to 3, the High
Court could have exercised power under Section
482 of the Code quashing criminal proceedings
initiated by the appellant. The High Court
observed that even after dismissal of SLP by
this Court, it was open for the Court to
consider the prayer of the accused to quash
prosecution in exercise of inherent powers
because the extraordinary jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Code may be exercised at any stage.

20.To us, the learned counsel for the
appellant is right that in substance and in
reality, the High Court has exercised power of
review not conferred by the Code on a Criminal
Court. Section 362 of the Code does not empower
a Criminal Court to alter its judgment.  It
reads thus: 362. Court not to alter judgment:-
Save as otherwise provided by this
Code or by any other law for the time
being in force, no Court, when it has
signed its judgment or order disposing
of a case, shall alter or review the
same except to correct a clerical or
arithmetical error.(emphasis supplied)

21.The section makes it clear that a
Court cannot alter or review its judgment or
final order after it is signed except to
correct clerical or arithmetical error. The
scheme of the Code, in our judgment, is clear
that as a general rule, as soon as the judgment
is pronounced or order is made by a Court, it
becomes functus officio (ceases to have control
over the case) and has no power to review,
override, alter or interfere with it.

22.No doubt, the section starts with the
words Save as otherwise provided by this
Code. Thus, if the Code provides for
alteration, such power can be exercised. For
instance, sub-section (2) of Section 127.  But
in absence of express power, alteration or
modification of judgment or order is not permissible.

23.It is also well settled that power of
review is not an inherent power and must be
conferred on a Court by a specific or express
provision to that effect. [Vide Patel Narshi
Thakershi & Ors. v. Shri Pradyumansinghji
Arjunsinghji, (1971) 3 SCC 844] No power of
review has been conferred by the Code on a
Criminal Court and it cannot review an order
passed or judgment pronounced.

24.In Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh
Bajwa & Ors., (2001) 1 SCC 169, this Court held
that a High Court has no jurisdiction to alter
or review its own judgment or order except to
the extent of correcting any clerical or
arithmetical error. It deprecated the practice
of filing Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions
after disposal of main matters and issuance of
fresh directions in such petitions.

25.The Court said;Section 362 of the Code mandates
that no court, when it has signed its
judgment or final order disposing of a
case shall alter or review the same
except to correct a clerical or an
arithmetical error. The section is
based on an acknowledged principle of
law that once a matter is finally
disposed of by a court, the said court
in the absence of a specific statutory
provision becomes functus officio and
disentitled to entertain a fresh
prayer for the same relief unless the
former order of final disposal is set
aside by a court of competent
jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by
law. The court becomes functus officio
the moment the official order
disposing of a case is signed. Such an
order cannot be altered except to the
extent of correcting a clerical or an
arithmetical error.

26.In the case on hand, charges were
framed against respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and the
said order was affirmed by the High Court and
by this Court. It is no doubt true that
thereafter there was a talk of settlement
between the parties which could not be
materialised. It is also true that the
appellant filed a suit for compensation of
Rs.20 lakhs against the husband and in-laws. In
our considered opinion, however, that would not
confer jurisdiction on the High Court to quash
criminal proceedings when the action of framing
of charge against the respondents had been
upheld by this Court.  The order impugned in
the present appeal is thus clearly illegal,
improper, contrary to law and deserves to be set aside.

27.The learned counsel for the appellant
contended that virtually the High Court sat
over the decision of this Court and exercised
appellate power by upsetting the order of the
Court of framing charge against the
respondents. The counsel, in this connection,
referred to Jharia s/o Mania v. State of
Rajasthan & Anr., (1983) 4 SCC 7. In that case,
the accused was convicted by a Sessions Court
for an offence punishable under Section 302
read with Section 34, IPC.  The order of
conviction and sentence was confirmed by the
High Court as well as by this Court.
Thereafter, a substantive petition under
Article 32 of the Constitution was instituted
by the accused for issuance of a Writ of
Mandamus directing the State to forbear from
giving effect to the judgment of all Courts
including this Court. A declaration was also
sought that the conviction was illegal and his
detention in jail was without the authority of
law and violative of Fundamental Rights.

28.Dismissing the petition, this Court observed:
We fail to appreciate the
propriety of asking for a declaration
in these proceedings under Article 32
that conviction of the petitioner by
the High Court for an offence
punishable under Section 302 read with
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code is
illegal, particularly when this court
has declined to grant special leave
under Article 136. Nor can the
petitioner be heard to say that his
detention in jail amounts to
deprivation of the fundamental right
to life and liberty without following
the procedure established by law in
violation of Article 21 read with
Articles 14 and 19. When a special
leave petition is assigned to the
learned Judges sitting in a Bench,
they constitute the Supreme Court and
there is a finality to their judgment
which cannot be upset in these
proceedings under Article 32.
Obviously, the Supreme Court cannot
issue a writ, direction or order to
itself in respect of any judicial
proceedings and the learned Judges
constituting the Bench are not
amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this court.

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29.Even if we may not go to the extent
that the High Court ventured to sit over the
order passed by this Court in quashing the
proceedings, in our considered opinion, on the
facts and in the circumstances of the case, the
High Court was not justified in invoking
Section 482 of the Code and in quashing
prosecution against the respondents.

30.Moreover, it is well-settled that
inherent power under Section 482 of the Code
must be exercised in rarest of rare cases.
Before more than four decades in the leading
case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, (1960) 3
SCR 388, this Court stated:
It is well-established that the
inherent jurisdiction of the High
Court can be exercised to quash
proceedings in a proper case either to
prevent the abuse of the process of
any court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal
proceedings instituted against an
accused person must be tried under the
provisions of the Code, and the High
Court would be reluctant to interfere
with the said proceedings at an
interlocutory stage. It is not
possible, desirable or expedient to
lay down any inflexible rule which
would govern the exercise of this
inherent jurisdiction. However, we may
indicate some categories of cases
where the inherent jurisdiction can
and should be exercised for quashing
the proceedings. There may be cases
where it may be possible for the High
Court to take the view that the
institution or continuance of criminal
proceedings against an accused person
may amount to the abuse of the process
of the Court or that the quashing of
the impugned proceedings would secure
the ends of justice. If the criminal
proceeding in question is in respect
of an offence alleged to have been
committed by an accused person and it
manifestly appears that there is a
legal bar against the institution or
continuance of the said proceeding the
High Court would be justified in
quashing the proceeding on that
ground. Absence of the requisite
sanction may, for instance, furnish
cases under this category. Cases may
also arise where the allegations in
the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at
their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not constitute the
offence alleged; in such cases no
question of appreciating evidence
arises; it is a matter merely of
looking at the complaint or the first
information report to decide whether
the offence alleged is disclosed or
not. In such cases it would be
legitimate for the High Court to hold
that it would be manifestly unjust to
allow the process of the criminal
court to be issued against the accused
person. A third category of cases in
which the inherent jurisdiction of the
High Court can be successfully invoked
may also arise. In cases falling under
this category the allegations made
against the accused person do
constitute offence alleged but there
is either no legal evidence adduced in
support of the case or evidence
adduced clearly or manifestly fails to
prove the charge. In dealing with this
class of cases it is important to bear
in mind the distinction between a case
where there is no legal evidence or
where th ere is evidence which is
manifestly and clearly inconsistent
with the accusation made and cases
where there is legal evidence which on
its appreciation may or may not
support the accusation in question. In
exercising its jurisdiction under
Section 561-A the High Court would not
embark upon an enquiry as to whether
the evidence in question is reliable
or not. That is the function of the
trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it
would not be open to any party to
invoke the High Courts inherent
jurisdiction and contend that on a
reasonable appreciation of the
evidence the accusation made against
the accused would not be sustained. (emphasis supplied)

31.Yet, in another important decision in
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992) Supp 1
SCC 355, the Court referred to a number of
leading decisions on the point and laid down
the following principles for exercising power
of quashing criminal proceedings.
(1)   Where the allegations made in
the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at
their face value and accepted in
their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a
case against the accused.
(2)   Where the allegations in the
first information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the
FIR do not disclose a cognizable
offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section
156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted
allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected
in support of the same do not
disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4)   Where, the allegations in the
FIR do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation
is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5)   Where the allegations made in
the FIR or complaint are so absurd
and inherently improbable on the
basis of which no prudent person can
ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6)   Where there is an express legal
bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the
concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7)   Where a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala fide
and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance on the accused and with a
view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

32.Speaking for the Court, Pandian, J.
stated:(T)he power of quashing a
criminal proceeding should be
exercised very sparingly and with
circumspection and that too in the
rarest of rare cases; that the Court
will not be justified in embarking
upon an enquiry as to the reliability
or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR or the
complaint and that the extraordinary
or inherent powers do not confer an
arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to
act according to its whim or caprice.
33.We are in respectful agreement with
the above observations. On the facts and in the
circumstances of the case, in our judgment, the
High Court was clearly in error in exercising
power under Section 482 of the Code and in
quashing criminal proceedings. The said order,
hence, deserves to be set aside. The matter
will now be decided in accordance with law by
an appropriate Court.

34.Before parting with the matter, we may
clarify that we have not entered into merits of
the matter or allegations and counter
allegations by the parties and we may not be
understood to have expressed any opinion one
way or the other. All observations made by us
hereinabove have been made only for the limited
purpose of deciding the issue before us.  As
and when the matter will come before the Court,
it will be considered on its own merits without
being inhibited or influenced by the
observations made by the High Court or by us in
the present order.

35.The appeal is accordingly disposed of.

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