Rupesh Ranjan vs State & Anr. on 23 May, 2017

Reserved on: 3rd May, 2017
Pronounced on: 23rd May, 2017
+ W.P.(CRL) 2681/2016
RUPESH RANJAN ….. Petitioner
Through: Mr. J.K. Singh, Adv. with
petitioner in person.


STATE ANR. ….. Respondents
Through: Mr. Sanjay Lao, ASC for the
State with Mr. Siddharth
Sindhu, Adv.
Mr. Praveen Kumar, Adv. for
R-2 with R-2 in person.

1. On 25.06.2016, the second respondent herein made a
complaint in writing to the Station House Officer (SHO) of Police
Station Timar Pur Delhi and since the said complaint disclosed
commission of certain acts constituting a cognizable offence
punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)
within the meaning of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.), First Information Report (FIR)
No.300/2016 was registered thereupon.

2. In the said FIR, the petitioner herein is referred to as the
perpetrator of the above said offence. The petitioner has come up
with the writ petition invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of
W.P. (Crl.) 2681/2016 Page 1 of 8
India read with Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of the said
FIR on the ground, inter alia, that the parties have settled all their
disputes with each other.

3. Notice was issued on the writ petition by order dated
15.09.2016. In response, the second respondent has appeared and
has indicated that she is agreeable to the prayer made by the
petitioner. The State has filed its response in the form of status

4. At the hearing, the learned Additional Standing Counsel
submitted that in a case where allegations have been made about the
commission of such grave crime as of rape, the recourse to the
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution or
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would not be proper or desirable.

5. Submissions on all sides have been heard against the
backdrop of the facts alleged in the FIR and stated in these
proceedings. It is noted that in the FIR the second respondent had,
inter alia, alleged that the petitioner had made certain advances
towards her indicating his abiding love and proposing marriage and
in that course having persuaded her to be in live-in relationship with
him during which period he subjected her to sexual intercourse on
the promise of marriage. She also made allegations about he having
subjected her to physical assault causing physical violence resulting
in hurt and certain acts of commission constituting offence of
criminal intimidation. She stated that she had been cheated and
sexually exploited. In these proceedings it has been stated that the

W.P. (Crl.) 2681/2016 Page 2 of 8
parties entered into a marriage in Arya Samaj Mandir on

6. In State of Karnataka Vs. M. Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC 89,
a bench of three Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court had
examined the width and scope of the jurisdiction of the High Court
for bringing to an end a criminal action by quashing the case, inter
alia, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., in light of past precedents and
observed that such jurisdiction emanated from its inherent power to
bring about justice, explaining it thus:-

“6. … It envisages three circumstances under which the
inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to
give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent
abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise
secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor
desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would
govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No
legislative enactment dealing with procedure can
provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts,
therefore, have inherent powers apart from express
provisions of law which are necessary for proper
discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by
law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the
section which merely recognises and preserves inherent
powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or
criminal possess, in the absence of any express
provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such
powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a
wrong in course of administration of justice on the
principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere
videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest (when the
law gives a person anything it gives him that without
which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under
the section, the court does not function as a court of
appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the
section though wide has to be exercised sparingly,
W.P. (Crl.) 2681/2016 Page 3 of 8
carefully and with caution and only when such exercise
is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the
section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to
do real and substantial justice for the administration of
which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for
advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to
abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court
has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of
process of the court to allow any action which would
result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In
exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash
any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it
amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of
these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of

(emphasis supplied)

7. In Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2012) 10
SCC 303, while dealing with identical issues, another bench of three
Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court observed thus :-

“55. In the very nature of its constitution, it is the
judicial obligation of the High Court to undo a wrong in
course of administration of justice or to prevent
continuation of unnecessary judicial process. This is
founded on the legal maxim quando lex aliquid alicui
concedit, conceditur et id sine qua res ipsa esse non
potest. The full import of which is whenever anything is
authorised, and especially if, as a matter of duty,
required to be done by law, it is found impossible to do
that thing unless something else not authorised in
express terms be also done, may also be done, then that
something else will be supplied by necessary intendment.
Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt in such exercise; the whole
idea is to do real, complete and substantial justice for
which it exists. The power possessed by the High Court
under Section 482 of the Code is of wide amplitude but
requires exercise with great caution and circumspection.

(emphasis supplied)
W.P. (Crl.) 2681/2016 Page 4 of 8

8. Pertinent to note, in Gian Singh (supra), the Supreme Court
held as under:-

“61. The position that emerges from the above
discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the
High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or
complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is
distinct and different from the power given to a criminal
court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of
the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no
statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord
with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to
secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the
process of any court. In what cases power to quash the
criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be
exercised where the offender and the victim have settled
their dispute would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no category can be
prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the
High Court must have due regard to the nature and
gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of
mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity,
etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim
or victim’s family and the offender have settled the
dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have
a serious impact on society.

(emphasis supplied)

9. The petitioner has relied upon Narinder Singh Ors. vs.
State of Punjab Anr
., (2014) 6 SCC 466 and judgment dated
24.03.2017 of a learned Single Judge of this Court in
Crl.M.C.2454/2016, titled Mohit Nagar vs. State Anr. to contend
that it is a fit case where the court must exercise its extraordinary
jurisdiction to bring an end to the criminal action through the FIR in

W.P. (Crl.) 2681/2016 Page 5 of 8

10. It may be mentioned here that the case of Narinder Singh
(supra) involved allegations, inter alia, about the offence of attempt
to murder. After tracing the development of jurisprudence on the
subject, while drawing a distinction between the power conferred
on the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and the general power
of a criminal court to allow compounding of an offence under
Section 320 Cr.P.C., the Supreme Court held that the guiding factor
in the former jurisdiction would be as to whether the quashing of
criminal proceedings would secure the ends of justice or prevent the
abuse of process of court. It does appear that in the said discourse,
the Supreme Court, inter alia, observed that criminal cases having
overwhelming and predominantly civil character, particularly those
arising out of commercial transactions or “matrimonial
relationship” or family dispute should be quashed when the parties
have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. But, in a
case where allegations of rape, physical assault and criminal
intimidation have been leveled, it cannot be said that the case is one
of family dispute or one arising out of matrimonial relationship or is
civil in nature. The FIR may have been registered only under the
label of Section 376 IPC but the allegations made therein seem to
indicate commission of other offences as well.

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11. The case of Mohit Nagar (supra), decided by a learned Single
of this Court, was in an entirely different backdrop. The narration of
facts in the said judgment would show that the petitioner had
successfully shown to the court that the FIR had been lodged with
mala fide intention of extorting money, the prosecutrix having
married twice in the past and having a subsisting marriage when she
W.P. (Crl.) 2681/2016 Page 6 of 8
entered into physical relationship with the person she accused of
having subjected her to the offences including of rape.

12. In this context, it may be added, as pointed out by learned
Additional Standing Counsel that the same learned Single Judge as
has authored judgment in Mohit Nagar (supra), in background
similar to the one brought before this court, in Crl.M.C. 3356/2016,
titled Dharmendra Kumar Neeraj vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi),
decided on 09.09.2016 declined to quash the FIR on the basis of a
similar compromise, referring in this context to the decision of the
Supreme Court in Gian Singh (supra).

13. In the fact situation at hand, the following observations of the
Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Madan Lal, (2015)
7 SCC 681, provide further guidance:-

“18. … We would like to clearly state that in a case of
rape or attempt to rape, the conception of compromise
under no circumstances can really be thought of. These
are crimes against the body of a woman which is her own
temple. These are the offences which suffocate the breath
of life and sully the reputation. And reputation, needless
to emphasise, is the richest jewel one can conceive of in
life. No one would allow it to be extinguished. When a
human frame is defiled, the “purest treasure”, is lost.
Dignity of a woman is a part of her non-perishable and
immortal self and no one should ever think of painting it
in clay. There cannot be a compromise or settlement as it
would be against her honour which matters the most. It is
sacrosanct. Sometimes solace is given that the
perpetrator of the crime has acceded to enter into
wedlock with her which is nothing but putting pressure in
an adroit manner; and we say with emphasis that the
courts are to remain absolutely away from this
subterfuge to adopt a soft approach to the case, for any
kind of liberal approach has to be put in the
W.P. (Crl.) 2681/2016 Page 7 of 8
compartment of spectacular error. Or to put it
differently, it would be in the realm of a sanctuary of

(emphasis supplied)

14. In view of the above, this court is of the opinion that having
regard to the nature of offences involved, it would not be proper to
exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India or Section 482 Cr.P.C. to stop or quash the
investigation into the FIR No.300/2016, registered initially under
Section 376 IPC by Police Station Timar Pur (North).

15. The petition is thus dismissed.

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MAY 23, 2017

W.P. (Crl.) 2681/2016 Page 8 of 8

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