Sandeep vs Rita on 22 May, 2017

CR-3719-2017(OM) 1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
129 CR-3719-2017(OM)
Date of Decision:22.05.2017

Sandeep …..Petitioner

Versus

Rita …..Respondent

CORAM: HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK.

Present: Mr.Narender Kaajla, Advocate,
for the petitioner.

****

RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK, J.(Oral)

Feeling aggrieved against the impugned order dated 12.04.2017

(Annexure P-1) passed by the learned matrimonial Court, whereby

application moved by the respondent-wife under Section 24 of the Hindu

Marriage Act (for short “the Act”), during the pendency of the divorce-

petition filed by the petitioner-husband was allowed, granting her an amount

of `8,000/- per month as maintenance pendente lite, husband has filed the

instant revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, for

setting aside the impugned order.

Placing reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in

Smt.Geeta alias Son Dai and another Versus Bhupinder Singh

Choudhary, 2014(2) PLR 355, learned counsel for the petitioner submits

that the impugned order is wholly illegal for the reasons that the respondent-

wife concealed her source of income at the time of moving her application

under Section 24 of the Act. He also submits that the respondent-wife did

not disclose her qualification also at the time of moving the application. He

prays for setting aside the impugned order.

1 of 7
07-06-2017 08:20:59 :::
CR-3719-2017(OM) 2

Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner at considerable

length, after going through record of the case and giving thoughtful

consideration to the contentions raised, this Court is of the considered

opinion that the present revision petition is without any merit and the same

is liable to be dismissed whereas the impugned order deserves to be upheld,

for the following more than one reasons.

So far as the judgment in Bhupinder Singh Choudhary’s case

(supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned,

there is no dispute about the observations made and law laid down therein.

However, on a close perusal of the cited judgment, it has been found to be

of any help to the petitioner, being distinguishable on facts.

It is the settled principle of law that peculiar facts of each case

are to be examined, considered and appreciated first, before applying any

codified or judgemade law thereto. Sometimes, difference of even one

circumstance or additional fact can make the world of difference, as held by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Padmasundara Rao (Dead) Vs. State of

Tamil Nadu and others, 2002 (3) SCC 533, Union of India Vs. Amrit Lal

Manchanda and others, 2004 (3) SCC 75, State of Orissa Vs. Md.

Illiyas, 2006 (1) SCC 275 and State of Rajasthan VS. Ganeshi Lal, 2008

(2) SCC 533.

With a view to avoid repetition and also for the sake of brevity,

the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 11 and 12 of

its later judgment in Ganeshi Lal’s case (supra), reiterating its view taken

in Amrit Lal Manchanda’s case (supra) and Mohd. Illiyas’s case (supra),

which can be gainfully followed in the present case, read as under:-

11. “12….Reliance on the decision without looking into

2 of 7
07-06-2017 08:21:00 :::
CR-3719-2017(OM) 3

the factual background of the case before it is clearly
impermissible. A decision is a precedent on its own facts.
Each case presents its own features. It is not everything
said by a Judge while giving a judgment that constitutes a
precedent. The only thing in a Judge’s decision binding a
party is the principle upon which the case is decided and
for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and
isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-
settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three
basic postulates; (i) findings of material facts, direct and
inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference
which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible
facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to
the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii)
judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A
decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What
is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every
observation found therein nor what logically flows from the
various observations made in the judgment. The
enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question
before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a
precedent. (See:
State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra
and Ors. (AIR 1968 SC 647) and
Union of India and Ors. v.
Dhanwanti Devi and Ors. (1996 (6) SCC 44). A case is a
precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no
more. The words used by Judges in their judgments are not
to be read as if they are words in Act of Parliament. In
Quinn v. Leathem (1901) AC 495 (H.L.), Earl of Halsbury
LC observed that every judgment must be read as
applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be
proved, since the generality of the expressions which are
found there are not intended to be exposition of the whole
law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of
the case in which such expressions are found and a case is
only an authority for what it actually decides. Coming to
3 of 7
::: Downloaded on – 07-06-2017 08:21:00 :::
CR-3719-2017(OM) 4

the peculiar fact situation obtaining on record of the
present case, it is unhesitatingly held that learned
Permanent Lok Adalat discussed, considered and
appreciated each and every relevant aspect of the matter,
before passing the impugned award. The only endeavour
made by the learned Permanent Lok Adalat was to do
complete and substantial justice between the parties and
this approach adopted by learned Permanent Lok Adalat
has been found well justified on facts as well as in law. Ed.
See State of Orissa Vs. Mohd. Illiyas, (2006) 1 SCC 275 at
p.282, para 12.

12. 15….Courts should not place reliance on decisions
without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in
with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance
is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read
as Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of the statute and
that too taken out of their context. These observations
must be read in the context in which they appear to have
been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed
as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions
of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to
embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is
meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret
statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret
words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted
as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. V. Horton
(1951 AC 737 at p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed:
(AII ER p. 14 C-D)
“The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely
by treating the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J as
though they were part of an Act of Parliament and
applying the rules of interpretation appropriate
thereto. This is not to detract from the great
weight to be given to the language actually used
by that most distinguished judge.”

4 of 7
::: Downloaded on – 07-06-2017 08:21:00 :::
CR-3719-2017(OM) 5

16. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970 (2) All ER

294) Lord Reid said (at All ER p.297g-h), “Lord Atkin’s
speech…..is not to be treated as if it was a statute
definition. It will require qualification in new
circumstances.” Megarry, J in Shepherd Homes Ltd. V.
Sandham (No.2) (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: (AII ER
p. 1274d-e) “One must not, of course, construe even a
reserved judgment of Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of
Parliament.” And, in Herrington v. British Railways
Board (1972 (2) WLR 537) Lord Morris said: (AII ER p.
761c)
“There is always peril in treating the words of a
speech or judgment as though they are words in a
legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered
that judicial utterances made in the setting of the
facts of a particular case.”

17. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different
fact may make a world of difference between
conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly
placing reliance on a decision is not proper.

15. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter
of applying precedents have become locus classicus:
(
Abdul Kayoom v. CIT, AIR 1962 SC 680
“Each case depends on its own facts and a close
similarity between one case and another is not
enough because even a single significant detail
may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such
cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide
cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour
of one case against the colour of another. To
decide therefore, on which side of the line a case
falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not
at all decisive.”

“Precedent should be followed only so far as it
marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead
5 of 7
::: Downloaded on – 07-06-2017 08:21:00 :::
CR-3719-2017(OM) 6

wood and trim off the side branches else you will find
yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep
the path to justice clear of obstructions which could
impede it Ed. See Union of India VS. Amrit Lal
Manchanda, (2004) 3 SCC 75, pp. 83-84, paras 15-18.”

So far as, the alleged source of income of the respondent-wife

is concerned, petitioner has placed on record two FDRs as Annexure P-4

(Colly.) for an amount of `5 lakhs, which were got prepared by her father

in her name at the time of her marriage. It is not in dispute that the

petitioner-husband did not contribute even a single penny. Even if the

respondent-wife did not mention about those FDRs, it would never amount

to any concealment on her part. Further, the income on account of interest

on the above-said FDRs would be hardly any income, which cannot be said

to be sufficient for maintaining the respondent-wife. Having said that, this

Court feels no hesitation to conclude that the learned matrimonial Court was

well within its jurisdiction to pass the impugned order and the same

deserves to be upheld.

Again, about the alleged concealment of her qualification by

the respondent-wife is hardly of any consequence. Even if she is accepted

to be qualified, learned counsel for the petitioner has fairly conceded that

she is not working anywhere. Non-disclosure of alleged qualification

without any employment would also not amount to any concealment on the

part of the respondent-wife. In this view of the matter, it can be safely

concluded that the learned matrimonial Court committed no error of law,

while passing the impugned order and the same deserves to be upheld, for

this reason also.

So far as the impugned order on merits is concerned, learned

6 of 7
07-06-2017 08:21:00 :::
CR-3719-2017(OM) 7

counsel for the petitioner has fairly conceded that the petitioner is not

challenging the impugned order on its merits. It is also not in dispute that

the petitioner is serving as Sub-Inspector of Police. In this view of the

matter, an amount of `8,000/- per month as maintenance pendente lite

cannot be said to be on higher side under any circumstances. This would be

the bare minimum amount for the sustenance of the respondent-wife. Thus

on merits as well, no fault can be found with the impugned order and the

same deserves to be upheld, for this reason as well.

No other argument was raised.

Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case

noted above, coupled with the reasons aforementioned, this Court is of the

considered view that the present revision petition is misconceived, bereft of

merit and without any substance, thus, it must fail. No case for interference

has been made out.

Resultantly, with the above-said observations made, the instant

revision petition stands dismissed, however, with no order as to costs.

May 22, 2017 (RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK)
seema JUDGE

Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether Reportable: Yes/No

7 of 7
07-06-2017 08:21:00 :::

READ  Dr.Santosh Kumar Samanta vs In Re:- Amit Chowrasia on 15 May, 2017

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *