Sampati vs Dilip Choudhary & Anr on 28 August, 2017

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Transfer Appl. No. 75 / 2017
Sampati W/o Dilip Choudhary, D/o Sh. Maniram Godara, Aged
About 34 Years, B/c Jat (Choudhary), R/o 1-D-5, Jahawar Nagar,
Shri Ganganagar (Raj.) At Present R/o Village Beenjbhayla, Distt.
Shri Ganganagar (Raj.)

—-Petitioner
Versus

1. Dilip Choudhary S/o Sh. Prehlad Ram Choudhary, B/c Jat, R/o
Village- Jerthi (Subhash Nagar), Teh. Distt. Sikar (Raj.)

2. Shri L.D. Kiradu, RHJS, the Learned Judge Family Courty, Sri
Ganganagar (Raj.)

—-Respondents
__
For Petitioner(s) : Dr A.A. Bhansali
For Respondent(s) : Mr B.L. Choudhary, Mr Kshamendra Mathur
__
HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE VIRENDRA KUMAR MATHUR
Judgment
Date of Pronouncement: (28)/08/2017

This Transfer Application under sec.24 CPC has been filed for

transfer of Civil Original Case No.153/2015 (Dilip Choudhary v.

Sampati Godara), filed by the respondent No.1 against petitioner

under sec.13A of the Hindu Marriage Act, pending before Family

Court, Sriganganagar, to any other court.

Briefly stated, marriage between the parties was solemnized

on 16.02.2010. The respondent No.1 filed a divorce petition

against the petitioner on the ground of cruelty under sec.13(i-a)

on 17.05.2014 before Family Court, Sikar. That case was ordered

to be transferred to Family Court, Sri Ganganagar by order of this

Court in Transfer Petition No.86/2014.

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[CTA-75/2017]

The petitioner filed her reply in the divorce petition. The

Family Court, on the basis of pleadings, framed issues on

19.09.2015. Thereafter, the respondent filed an affidavit on

19.12.2015 for the purpose of recording evidence before the trial

court. The petitioner had filed an application under sec.9 of the

Hindu Marriage Act before the trial court for restitution of conjugal

rights, in which respondent No.1 Dilip filed reply on 25.04.2014.

Thereafter, an application under sec.21-A of the Hindu

Marriage Act was filed by the petitioner for consolidation of both

proceedings, under sec.13 and under sec.9 of the Act, which was

allowed by the trial court on 11.01.2016. After passing of the

order for consolidation of both cases, the trial court re-framed

issues on 10.02.2016.

After consolidation of both cases, the respondent No.1 again

filed an affidavit on 06.02.2016 for the purpose of recording

evidence, along with certain documents. After filing of affidavit by

the respondent No.1, an application under sec.151 CPC was filed

on behalf of petitioner on 05.03.2016 before the trial court,

alleging that prior to filing of documents, no permission was

sought and therefore, said documents could not be taken on

record and the party should not be allowed to mark exhibits on

said documents. The application was replied.

The trial court, after hearing arguments, dismissed

petitioner’s application vide order dated 04.04.2016, against which

petitioner filed S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.5555/2016 (Sampati v.

Dilip Choudhary anr) and an interim order dated 19.05.2016

was passed by the High Court by which further proceedings before
(3 of 18)
[CTA-75/2017]

the trial court were stayed. The writ petition was later on

dismissed vide order dated 03.03.2017. It was observed by the

High Court that:

“Needless to say that the documents produced by the
respondent having been taken on record, the petitioner
cannot be denied an opportunity to produce the evidence in
rebuttal. Further, the petitioner is not precluded from raising
the objection regarding admissibility of the documents
produced in evidence on account of the same being beyond
the pleadings or otherwise inadmissible in evidence.”

Thereafter, the case was listed before the trial court on

12.04.2017, on which date the trial court decided application filed

under sec.24 of the Hindu Marriage Act and the case was fixed for

03.05.2017. On that day, an application under Order 6 rule 17

CPC was filed by the petitioner. No reply to said application was

filed by the respondent. On the same day arguments on said

application were heard by the trial court. The trial court allowed

the application on 03.05.2017 but at the same time case was fixed

to 05.05.2017 for the purpose of filing amended application under

sec.9 of the Act. It was also ordered by the trial court that if the

respondent wants to file reply to the amended application then he

may do so on the next day i.e. 06.05.2017. The trial court also

observed that both cases are pending for long time and an

application under O.6 r.17 CPC has been filed today with intention

to delay the proceedings when the witnesses are present for

cross-examination and cost of Rs.5000/- was imposed upon the

petitioner, payable on the next date.

In this respect, it was alleged that on one hand, when

application for amendment was allowed on 03.05.2017 then in no
(4 of 18)
[CTA-75/2017]

case evidence could be adduced and cross-examination could take

place until unless amendment application is taken on record and

reply, if any, is filed by the opposite side. On the other hand, the

trial court ignoring this aspect of the matter, ordered that since

witnesses could not be cross-examined, therefore, cost of

Rs.5000/- was imposed. If the amendment application was not

allowed then granting time at a cost could be justified. Not only

this, on 03.05.2017 itself the trial court even fixed next dates as

11.05.2017 and 12.05.2017 for the purpose of evidence. Though,

the proceedings on 05.05.2017 and 06.05.2017 were yet to take

place. From the facts mentioned above, it has borne to mind of

the petitioner that the court is proceeding in haste manner in

fixing dates in the cases a step ahead, without there being

completion of proceedings in pursuance of the order on

05.05.2017 and 06.05.2017.

It was also alleged that the respondent No.2 called the

petitioner in Chamber and directed her that the respondent No.1

has decided to marry with someone else who he had already

chosen, therefore, the petitioner should take divorce from him.

The respondent No.2 also told to petitioner that since she could

not give birth to any child, therefore, on this count also she should

give divorce to the respondent No.1. When the petitioner heard

such directions from the respondent No.2, she was surprised that

how the respondent No.2 could give such directions as judge of

the court, without there being any evidence and without passing

any order of the court. When petitioner came out of Chamber of

the respondent No.2, the respondent No.1 also told to petitioner
(5 of 18)
[CTA-75/2017]

that now nothing remains in the case and it will be decided soon,

which is evident in the manner in which dates have been fixed by

the court and divorce petition will be allowed by the court.

All these facts go to show that the respondent No.2 is

prejudiced and biased against the petitioner. It was also alleged

that the respondent No.2, who is Presiding Officer of the court, is

taking personal interest in favour of respondent No.1, further

respondent No.2 is biased prejudiced with the petitioner, for the

reasons best known to both respondents.

It was contended that the manner in which the proceedings

are being conducted by the respondent No.2, makes it clear that

there is hardly any chance of getting justice by petitioner from the

court of respondent No.2. If that would be so then the petitioner

would be deprived of justice. On basis of these averments,

transfer of the cases was sought from the Family Court, Sri

Ganganagar to any other appropriate court.

A reply to Transfer Application was filed by the respondent

No.1. It was stated that after consolidation of respondent’s divorce

petition and petitioner’s petition under sec.9 of the Act, date was

fixed for 25.01.2016 and on the next date 06.02.2016, the

answering respondent submitted 03 witnesses’ affidavits and filed

some documents but on same day, the petitioner filed an

application under Order 14 rule 5 CPC, stating that as both the

petitions were consolidated, the issues were required to be re-

framed and the answering respondent did not raise objection. The

trial court re-framed issues on the same day and fixed date

05.03.2016 for cross-examination. On that day, three witnesses of
(6 of 18)
[CTA-75/2017]

respondent were present but the petitioner did not cross-examine

the witnesses and sought adjournment, then trial court imposed

cost of Rs.3000/- and fixed next date as 28.03.2016.

On that day, all three witnesses appeared but petitioner did

not cross-examine but moved three applications; one under

sec.151 CPC, in which she stated that said documents filed by the

answering respondent in support of affidavits being without

permission of the court, the same may not be taken on record;

the second application was filed under Order 6 rule 2 CPC, in

which the petitioner stated that the answering respondent filed

affidavit but para 15 thereof is not part of pleadings and the same

may be deleted; the third application filed under sec.151 CPC

stated that the plaintiff filed affidavit in support of his evidence on

19.12.2015 and another affidavit on 06.02.2016 and stated that

affidavit of witnesses filed on 06.02.2016 may not be taken on

record and the petitioner may be permitted to cross-examine on

affidavits filed on 19.12.2015. Those applications were dismissed

by the trial court on 04.04.2016 after hearing both the parties.

Thereafter, the answering respondent filed an application

under sec.21(b) of the Hindu Marriage Act read with order 17(1)

CPC and the matter was fixed to 18.05.2016 for filing reply and

arguments and also for cross-examination. On 04.06.2016, the

petitioner moved an application and also submitted stay order

granted by the High Court on 19.05.2016 and the matter was

adjourned. Dates were fixed as 16.07.2016, 17.09.2016,

15.10.2016, 19.11.2016, 23.12.2016, 28.01.2017, 10.02.2017

and 08.03.2017.

(7 of 18)
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It was also contended that the petitioner is a lawyer and she

very well know how to delay the matter, therefore, the petitioner

has moved several applications on false grounds and without

being any reason. Said applications were not filed as per law. The

applications were filed only to delay the proceedings.

In his reply, the respondent No.1 denied the averments of

the transfer petition and stated that the facts are concealed by the

petitioner concerned to 12.04.2017 when the trial court decided

application under sec.24 of the Hindu Marriage Act. In this regard,

it was stated that said application was decided by the trial court

on 12.04.2017 separately. On 12.04.2017, the answering

respondent submitted order dated 03.03.2017 passed by the High

Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.5555/2016 but the petitioner

did not cross-examine the witnesses though said witnesses were

present before the trial court and intentionally, for delaying

tactics, one application was filed on fabricated grounds. The

answering respondent produced documents and photographs and

voice-recordings. After hearing the arguments, said application

was dismissed by the trial court on the same day. The trial court

granted time to the petitioner for examination of said witnesses on

the count that she is lady. The trial court also observed that on the

next date if the witnesses are not cross-examined then the

opportunity may be closed. On this observation, the petitioner

gave consent before the trial court and next date was fixed as per

her convenience on 03.05.2017.

Three witnesses were present before the trial court for cross-

examination but the petitioner intentionally filed an application for
(8 of 18)
[CTA-75/2017]

delaying the matter and she again moved an application under

Order 6 rule 17 CPC for amendment of her application and reply.

The trial court allowed said amendment application without any

cost but the petitioner wrongly mentioned in said para that the

trial court allowed the application at the cost of Rs.5000/-. This

fact was wrongly mentioned but three witnesses personally

appeared before the trial court and expenses were borne by the

answering respondent then the trial court imposed cost upon

petitioner for the purpose of expenses of witnesses.

The trial court also fixed next date for filing of amended

application on 05.05.2017 and 06.05.2017 and also date was fixed

for cross-examination of witnesses on 11.05.2017 and

12.05.2017. On that date, as per request of the petitioner

reconciliation was made by the court but the same failed and the

matter was fixed for 05.05.2017.

In the reply, averments contained in para 15 of Transfer

Petition were also denied and on the basis of the reply, the

Transfer Petition was sought to be dismissed.

An additional affidavit was also filed by petitioner Sampati

and it was alleged that right from the beginning, from joining of

the present Presiding Officer, from bare perusal of order-sheets of

the matter pending before the trial court, it is crystal clear that he

is in pressure or conspired with respondent Dilip Choudhary. Even

though when he draws the order-sheets on the file, he always

writes statements which give favour to respondent Dilip

Choudhary and what she states is never taken on record. Looking

to behaviour of the Presiding Officer of the Family Court, she filed
(9 of 18)
[CTA-75/2017]

an application before the Presiding Officer and drew his attention

towards his behaviour then the Presiding Officer called her in

Chamber and threatened for initiating contempt proceedings. It

was also alleged that again when she went to court from dais the

Presiding Officer mount pressure on her to give divorce to

respondent Dilip Choudhary but she refused to act on suggestion

by the Presiding Officer and stated that she is going to High Court

against him and thereafter present Transfer Petition was filed.

It was also contended that 02.06.2017 she personally

appeared before this Court, the respondent No.1 also appeared

and she requested for interim relief because lawyers were not

appearing in the Court. In absence of the counsel, the Court

stated that unless the counsel will not remain present till then the

Court can not pass any interim order. The petitioner made request

to the Court that the next date before the trial court is fixed as

12.06.2017 and the Presiding Officer is taking favour of

respondent. On this request, the Court gave her liberty to file an

application for adjournment before the trial court and on this, the

respondent No.1 also gave consent that till vacation, he will not

pursue the matter before the trial court. Upon oral consent, the

Court adjourned the matter on 02.06.2017 with the observation –

“List on 05th July 2017.

The appellant is on liberty to prefer application for obtaining
time before the trial court, since application seeking interim
relief is not being taken up for hearing because learned
Advocates for both the sides are not appearing today.”

It was also contended that on 12.06.2017, an application

along with order of the High Court dated 02.06.2016 was placed
(10 of 18)
[CTA-75/2017]

before the trial court and petitioner requested to adjourn the

matter till 05.07.2017. Copy of the application was served on

respondent No.1 also. After receiving the copy, respondent No.1

surprisingly denied that he never gave oral consent before the

High Court on 02.06.2017. Upon this statement of the respondent

No.1, the Presiding Officer refused to adjourn the matter and

passed a detailed order against her while disobeying order of the

High Court and the matter was fixed for petitioner’s evidence.

It is relevant to mention that on 02.06.2017, due to non-

working of Advocate her counsel was not present before the High

Court and specific direction by the High Court to file application for

seeking time clearly shows intention that upon filing the

application, the trial court should stop proceeding further till

05.07.2017 but the order of the High Court was ignored by the

Presiding Officer and the next date was fixed as 19.06.2017 and

gave her warning that if on that day she does not present then he

will close the evidence and pass divorce decree.

It was also contended that on 12.06.2017, copy of the

application along with copy of order of the High Court was sent

through her counsel for submitting before the trial court because

on that the petitioner was suffering from pain in stomach. When

petitioner’s counsel filed the application then the Presiding Officer

intentionally refused to accept the same and asked her counsel

that this application and copy of the order will be taken on record

only when it will be filed by the petitioner herself. When the

petitioner appeared before the Presiding Officer then again she

was threatened that – “rqe ,y-,y-ch- gks] rqEgsa irk gksuk pkfg;s fd ,Iyhds’ku dSls
(11 of 18)
[CTA-75/2017]

nh tkrh gS] igys esjs lkeus qdks] vkSj mlds ckn ekQh ekaxks vkSj izkFkZuk i is’k djks”. It

was also contended that due to health problem the petitioner was

admitted in hospital on 18.06.2017 and 19.06.2017 as per

petitioner’s instructions her counsel submitted an application for

adjournment and informed that as petitioner was admitted in the

hospital, she could not appear before the court. The trial court

adjourned the matter and fixed on 27.06.2017 for arguments on

adjournment application and evidence of non-applicant.

It was further contended that on 25.06.2017 the petitioner

was again admitted in hospital in Orthopedic department due to

pain in backbone and also suffering from cervical pain. On

27.06.2017 an application along with hospital documents was

submitted before the trial court through her counsel. A detailed

order was passed on 27.06.2017 while discussing detail of facts. It

was also alleged that the Presiding Officer conspired with the

respondent Dilip Choudhary and he always takes favour of

respondent Dilip Choudhary. The conduct of the Presiding Officer

as well as fourth-class employee of the Family Court is unethical

and amounts to misconduct.

A reply to the Additional Affidavit was also filed on behalf of

respondent No.1, denying the facts of the additional affidavit.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused order-

sheets of the trial court placed on record.

Initially the respondent No.1 filed a Divorce Petition against

the petitioner on the grounds of cruelty before the Family Court,

Sikar. At the instance of petitioner, in S.B. Civil Transfer Petition

No.86/2014, the High Court transferred respondent’s divorce
(12 of 18)
[CTA-75/2017]

petition to the Family Court, Sriganganagar. The petitioner filed an

application under sec.9 of the Hindu Marriage Act against the

respondent for restitution of conjugal rights. Both these petitions

were consolidated. On perusal of order-sheet dated 03.05.2017, it

is clear that an application under Order 6 rule 17 CPC was filed,

which was alleged to be filed at belated stage but looking to

subsequent events, that application was allowed and it was

ordered by the trial court that on 05.05.2017, amended petition

may be filed i.e. just after two days and it was also mentioned

that on 06.05.2017, reply to amended petition may be filed, if so

desired by the respondent-husband. It was also alleged that the

respondent No.2 called the petitioner in Chamber and told her that

respondent No.1 has decided to marry with someone else who he

had already chosen, therefore, the petitioner should take divorce

from him. The respondent No.2 also told to petitioner that since

she could not give birth to any child, therefore, on this count also

she should give divorce to the respondent No.1.

This Court sought explanation from the respondent No.2.

Perused the explanation. It was submitted by the respondent No.2

that the present case was placed before for first time on

17.05.2014 and three years have passed. During this period,

evidence of the husband is complete and the case is fixed for

evidence of petitioner-wife for first time. The petitioner did not

mention any reason for non-presence of witnesses nor did he file

any affidavit. She only mentioned that she is to file a transfer

petition before the High Court. It was admitted that a Transfer

Petition was filed before the High Court and on 02.06.2017 this
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[CTA-75/2017]

Court passed order that “the applicant is on liberty to prefer

application for obtaining time before the trial court because

learned Advocates for both sides are not appearing today” and the

case was directed to be listed on 05th July 2017.

This was sufficient reason for the trial court to adjourn the

case and wait for order of this Court but the trial judge in his

explanation submitted that without sufficient cause last

opportunity was granted to counsel for the petitioner.

Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon judgment of

this Court passed in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No.626/2010 (United

India Insurance Company Ltd v. Smt Prem others) decided on

07.09.2011, wherein it was observed:

“Once the Tribunal was aware that appeal challenging the
impugned award is pending before this Court and the
process has already been issued for the same, then the
learned Tribunal could have waited for further orders of this
Court in appeal/stay application filed with the said appeal”.

In view of the ratio of decision in that case, there was

sufficient reason for the petitioner to seek time before the trial

court in pursuance of order of this Court dated 02.06.2017.

The counsel for the petitioner, arguing on grounds of bias,

has placed reliance on judgment of Apex Court reported in 2012

AIR SCW 207 (State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar

ors etc WITH Sumedh Singh Saini v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar

ors.) and argued that allegations of judicial bias are required to be

scrutinized taking into consideration the factual matrix of the case

in hand. Actual proof of prejudice is not required. What is relevant
(14 of 18)
[CTA-75/2017]

is the reasonableness of apprehension in that regard in mind of

the party.

The counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on

observation made by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Justice P.D.

Dinakaran v. Hon’ble Judges Inquiry Committee: (2011) 8

SCC 380 and contended that Hon’ble Apex Court has observed in

that case that:

“The first requirement of natural justice is that the Judge
should be impartial and neutral and must be free from
bias. He is supposed to be indifferent to the parties to the
controversy. He cannot act as Judge of a cause in which
he himself has some interest either pecuniary or
otherwise as it affords the strongest proof against
neutrality. He must be in a position to act judicially and to
decide the matter objectively. A Judge must be of sterner
stuff. His mental equipoise must always remain firm and
undetected. He should not allow his personal prejudice
to go into the decision-making. The object is not merely
that the scales be held even; it is also that they may not
appear to be inclined. If the Judge is subject to bias in
favour of or against either party to the dispute or is in a
position that a bias can be assumed, he is disqualified to
act as a Judge, and the proceedings will be vitiated. This
rule applies to the judicial and administrative authorities
required to act judicially or quasi-judicially.”

Thus, it is evident that the allegations of judicial bias
are required to be scrutinised taking into consideration the
factual matrix of the case in hand. The court must bear in
mind that a mere ground of appearance of bias and not
actual bias is enough to vitiate the judgment/order. Actual
proof of prejudice in such a case may make the case of
the party concerned stronger, but such a proof is not
required. In fact, what is relevant is the reasonableness of
the apprehension in that regard in the mind of the party.
However, once such an apprehension exists, the
(15 of 18)
[CTA-75/2017]

trial/judgment/order etc. stands vitiated for want of
impartiality. Such judgment/order is a nullity and the trial
“coram non-judice”.

In the present case, it was alleged by the petitioner that the

respondent No.2 Presiding Officer called petitioner in Chamber and

directed her that the respondent No.1 had decided to marry with

someone else, whom he had already chosen, therefore, the

petitioner should take divorce from him and also told her that

since she can not give birth to a child, therefore also she should

give divorce to respondent No.1. There is no evidence as to what

actually happened in the Chamber of respondent No.2 and nothing

has been stated regarding this allegation in the explanation

submitted by the respondent No.2. In view of this, actual proof of

such statement is not required. It creates a reasonable

apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that the respondent

No.2 is prejudiced and biased against the petitioner.

Reliance has also been placed on decision rendered by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Kulwinder Kaur @ Kulwinder Gurcharan

Singh v. Kandi Friends Education Trust Others: AIR 2008

SC 1333, in which it was observed:

“14. Although the discretionary power of transfer of cases
cannot be imprisoned within a strait-jacket of any cast-iron
formula unanimously applicable to all situations, it cannot
be gainsaid that the power to transfer a case must be
exercised with due care, caution and circumspection.
Reading Sections 24 and 25 of the Code together and
keeping in view various judicial pronouncements, certain
broad propositions as to what may constitute a ground for
transfer have been laid down by Courts. They are balance of
convenience or inconvenience to plaintiff or defendant or
(16 of 18)
[CTA-75/2017]

witnesses; convenience or inconvenience of a particular
place of trial having regard to the nature of evidence on the
points involved in the suit; issues raised by the parties;
reasonable apprehension in the mind of the litigant that he
might not get justice in the court in which the suit is
pending; important questions of law involved or a
considerable section of public interested in the litigation;
interest of justice demanding for transfer of suit, appeal or
other proceeding, etc. Above are some of the instances
which are germane in considering the question of transfer of
a suit, appeal or other proceeding. They are, however,
illustrative in nature and by no means be treated as
exhaustive. If on the above or other relevant considerations,
the Court feels that the plaintiff or the defendant is not
likely to have a fair trial in the Court from which he seeks to
transfer a case, it is not only the power, but the duty of the
Court to make such order.”

Counsel for the respondent No.1 while opposing the transfer

application placed reliance on 2008 (2) CCC 427 (Raj.):

Virendra Bhushan v. Rajendra Kumar Verma and argued that

witnesses of plaintiff were not cross-examined despite several

opportunities, the counsel sought time for cross-examination,

judge lost his temper and made some observation against

defendant. The defendant made an application for transfer of his

case as he had an apprehension of not getting justice. The Court

held that it is not a ground to transfer the case.

He also placed reliance on judgment of the Apex Court in

Criminal Appeal No.222/2015 (Arising out of SLP (Cr)

No.881/2014): Kanaklata v. State (NCT) of Delhi ors and

argued that any casual observation made by a Presiding Officer of

trial court would not be a sufficient ground for transfer, for the

reason that the trial courts work in a charged atmosphere and
(17 of 18)
[CTA-75/2017]

they do not have the benefit of a detached atmosphere of the

higher courts so as to think cooly and decide patiently.

Reliance has also been placed on judgment in Transfer

Application No.511/2014 (Ram Prakash v. District Judge, Ballia

16 others) to argue that mere suspicion by the party that he will

not get justice would not justify transfer. There must be a

reasonable apprehension to that effect. A judicial order made by a

Judge legitimately can not be made foundation for a transfer of

case. Mere presumption of possible apprehension should not and

ought not be the basis of transfer of any case from one court to

another. It is only in very special circumstances, when such

grounds are taken, the Court must find reasons exist to transfer a

case, not otherwise.

Perused the judgments cited by the parties. When there is

allegation of judicial bias, the allegations are required to be

scrutinized taking into consideration the factual matrix of the case

in hand. Although actual proof of prejudice is not relevant but

what is relevant is reasonable apprehension in that regard in the

mind of the party. The cause of reasonable apprehension as

contained in para 15 of the Transfer Application, wherein the

petitioner mentioned that- the respondent No.2 called her in

Chamber and directed that the respondent No.1 had decided to

marry with someone else, whom he had already chosen,

therefore, the petitioner should take divorce from him and also

told her that since she can not give birth to a child, therefore also

she should give divorce to respondent No.1; is sufficient to create
(18 of 18)
[CTA-75/2017]

reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner. Justice

should not only be done but it should seem to have been done.

It is important to note that in spite of interim order of this

Court passed on 02.06.2017, the learned trial judge did not find

the same sufficient reason to adjourn the case as prayed. Under

these circumstances, the present transfer petition deserves to be

allowed. Accordingly, this Transfer Application is allowed and the

Civil Original Case No.153/2015 (Dilip Choudhary v. Sampati

Godara) pending before the Family Court, Sri Ganganagar is

transferred to the court of District Judge, Sri Ganganagar.

(DR. VIRENDRA KUMAR MATHUR), J.

mma/27

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