Smt.Malti Kushwaha vs State Of M.P on 8 September, 2017

1 MCRC Nos.10636/2013
10708/2013

M.Cr.C. No. 10636/2013
Smt. Malti Kushwaha Ors. vs. State of M.P. Anr.

M.Cr.C. No. 10708/2013
Mohit Kumar vs. State of M.P. Anr.
08.09.2017
Shri Prabal Pratap Singh Solanki and Shri A.R.
Shivhare, Counsel for the applicants.
Shri Prakhar Dhengula, Public Prosecutor for the
respondent No.1/State.

Shri P.S. Bhadoriya, Counsel for the respondent No.2.
This order shall dispose of M.Cr.C. No. 10636/2013
filed by Smt. Malti Kushwaha Ors. and
M.Cr.C.No.10708/2013 filed by Mohit Kumar.

This application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. has
been filed by the applicants and Mohit Kumar for quashing
the FIR in Crime No.589/2013 registered by Police Station
City Kotwali, District Morena in Criminal Case
No.3108/2013 pending in the Court of CJM, Morena for
offence under Sections 498-A, 506 Part-II of IPC.

The necessary facts for the disposal of the present
application in short are that the respondent
No.2/complainant made a written report on 12.7.2013 on
the allegation that she was married to the applicant Mohit
Kumar on 10.2.2012 as per Hindu rites and rituals and the
applicants and her husband Mohit Kumar were demanding
four wheeler vehicle, A.C. etc. and since her parents were
not in a position to give the said articles, therefore, the
applicants and her husband started harassing her mentally
as well as physically. On 9.6.2013, she was turned out of
2 MCRC Nos.10636/2013
10708/2013

her matrimonial house and from thereafter she is residing
in her parents home. On 7.7.2013 the applicants came to
her house and extended the threat to her life and
accordingly the report was made.

It is submitted by the counsel for the applicants that
the applicant Mohit Kumar has filed a petition under
Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act for dissolution of
marriage and in fact by way of counterblast the FIR was
lodged. It is further submitted that in fact the applicant
Mohit Kumar had transferred a handsome amount to the
account of the respondent No.2/complainant from time to
time and has also placed the copy of the bank statements
on record. It is submitted that in fact the parents of the
respondent No.2/complainant are poor and the applicant
Mohit Kumar had financially helped them on various
occasions. It is further submitted that the divorce petition
was filed on 17.6.2013 and the applicant No.2-Virendra
Kushwaha had already made a written complaint to the
police on 6.7.2013 expressing his apprehension of false
implication by the respondent No.2/complainant. It is
further submitted that the respondent No.2/complainant
has herself filed a petition under Section 9 of Hindu
Marriage Act on 4.9.2013 which clearly shows that she
was never harassed either mentally or physically nor there
was any demand of dowry. So far as the applicant No.3-
Smt. Nidhi and applicant No.4-Ms. Navita @ Namita in the
present case are concerned, they are the sister-in-laws of
the respondent No.2/complainant. The respondent No.3 is
a married woman residing at Bangalore whereas the
respondent No.4 who is unmarried is also residing at
3 MCRC Nos.10636/2013
10708/2013

Bagalore. It is further submitted that the respondent
No.2/complainant had resided with her husband Mohit
Kumar at Pune whereas the applicants No.1 and 2 are the
resident of Gwalior and they have nothing to do with the
family affairs of the applicant Mohit Kumar and his wife
respondent No.2/complainant. It is further submitted that
against the near and dear relatives of the husband,
omnibus and vague allegations are not sufficient to compel
them to face prosecution and unless and until any specific
allegation is made, they may not be compelled to face the
ordeal of trial. The tendency of over implicating or falsely
implicating the near and dear relatives of the husband is
increasing day by day and the Supreme Court as well as
this Court on several occasions has expressed its concern
over the misuse of Section 498-A of IPC.

Per contra, it is submitted by the counsel for the
respondents that the trial is going on and the evidence of
the parties are being recorded and, therefore, at this
stage, this petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. may not
be entertained. It is further submitted that specifically
allegations have been made against all the applicants and,
therefore, the legitimate prosecution may not be stiffled at
this stage.

The Supreme Court in the case of Satish Mehra Vs.
State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2012) 13 SCC 614
has held as under:

“13. Though a criminal complaint lodged
before the court under the provisions of
Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal
Procedure or an FIR lodged in the police
station under Chapter XII of the Code
4 MCRC Nos.10636/2013
10708/2013

has to be brought to its logical
conclusion in accordance with the
procedure prescribed, power has been
conferred under Section 482 of the Code
to interdict such a proceeding in the
event the institution/continuance of the
criminal proceeding amounts to an abuse
of the process of court. An early
discussion of the law in this regard can
be found in the decision of this Court in
R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab wherein the
parameters of exercise of the inherent
power vested by Section 561-A of the
repealed Code of Criminal Procedure,
1898 (corresponding to Section 482
CrPC, 1973) had been laid down in the
following terms: (AIR p. 869, para 6) (i)
Where institution/continuance of criminal
proceedings against an accused may
amount to the abuse of the process of
the court or that the quashing of the
impugned proceedings would secure the
ends of justice; (ii) where it manifestly
appears that there is a legal bar against
the institution or continuance of the said
proceeding e.g. want of sanction; (iii)
where the allegations in the first
information report or the complaint
taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety, do not constitute the
offence alleged; and (iv) where the
allegations constitute an offence alleged
but there is either no legal evidence
adduced or evidence adduced clearly or
manifestly fails to prove the charge. 14.

The power to interdict a proceeding
either at the threshold or at an
intermediate stage of the trial is inherent
in a High Court on the broad principle
that in case the allegations made in the
FIR or the criminal complaint, as may be,
prima facie do not disclose a triable
offence, there can be reason as to why
the accused should be made to suffer the
5 MCRC Nos.10636/2013
10708/2013

agony of a legal proceeding that more
often than not gets protracted. A
prosecution which is bound to become
lame or a sham ought to interdicted in
the interest of justice as continuance
thereof will amount to an abuse of the
process of the law. This is the core basis
on which the power to interfere with a
pending criminal proceeding has been
recognized to be inherent in every High
Court. The power, though available,
being extra ordinary in nature has to be
exercised sparingly and only if the
attending facts and circumstances satisfy
the narrow test indicated above, namely,
that even accepting all the allegations
levelled by the prosecution, no offence is
disclosed. However, if so warranted, such
power would be available for exercise not
only at the threshold of a criminal
proceeding but also at a relatively
advanced stage thereof, namely, after
framing of the charge against the
accused. In fact the power to quash a
proceeding after framing of charge would
appear to be somewhat wider as, at that
stage, the materials revealed by the
investigation carried out usually comes
on record and such materials can be
looked into, not for the purpose of
determining the guilt or innocence of the
accused but for the purpose of drawing
satisfaction that such materials, even if
accepted in its entirety, do not, in any
manner, disclose the commission of the
offence alleged against the accused. 15.
The above nature and extent of the
power finds an exhaustive enumeration
in a judgment of this Court in State of
Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977) 2
SCC 699 which may be usefully extracted
below : (SCC pp. 702-03) “7. The second
limb of Mr Mookerjee’s argument is that
in any event the High Court could not
6 MCRC Nos.10636/2013
10708/2013

take upon itself the task of assessing or
appreciating the weight of material on
the record in order to find whether any
charges could be legitimately framed
against the respondents. So long as
there is some material on the record to
connect the accused with the crime, says
the learned counsel, the case must go on
and the High Court has no jurisdiction to
put a precipitate or premature end to the
proceedings on the belief that the
prosecution is not likely to succeed. This,
in our opinion, is too broad a proposition
to accept. Section 227 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 2 of 1974, provides
that: * * * This section is contained in
Chapter XVIII called “Trial Before a Court
of Session”. It is clear from the provision
that the Sessions Court has the power to
discharge an accused if after perusing
the record and hearing the parties he
comes to the conclusion, for reasons to
be recorded, that there is not sufficient
ground for proceeding against the
accused. The object of the provision
which requires the Sessions Judge to
record his reasons is to enable the
superior court to examine the
correctness of the reasons for which the
Sessions Judge has held that there is or
is not sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused. The High Court
therefore is entitled to go into the
reasons given by the Sessions Judge in
support of his order and to determine for
itself whether the order is justified by the
facts and circumstances of the case.
Section 482 of the New Code, which
corresponds to Section 561-A of the
Code of 1898, provides that: * * * In the
exercise of this wholesome power, the
High Court is entitled to quash a
proceeding if it comes to the conclusion
that allowing the proceeding to continue
7 MCRC Nos.10636/2013
10708/2013

would be an abuse of the process of the
Court or that the ends of justice require
that the proceeding ought to be
quashed. The saving of the High Court’s
inherent powers, both in civil and
criminal matters, is designed to achieve
a salutary public purpose which is that a
court proceeding ought not to be
permitted to degenerate into a weapon
of harassment or persecution. In a
criminal case, the veiled object behind a
lame prosecution, the very nature of the
material on which the structure of the
prosecution rests and the like would
justify the High Court in quashing the
proceeding in the interest of justice. The
ends of justice are higher than the ends
of mere law though justice has got to be
administered according to laws made by
the legislature. The compelling necessity
for making these observations is that
without a proper realisation of the object
and purpose of the provision which seeks
to save the inherent powers of the High
Court to do justice, between the State
and its subjects, it would be impossible
to appreciate the width and contours of
that salient jurisdiction.” 16. It would
also be worthwhile to recapitulate an
earlier decision of this court in Century
Spinning Manufacturing Co. vs. State
of Maharashtra (1972) 3 SCC 282
noticed in L. Muniswamy’s case (Supra)
holding that: (SCC p. 704, para 10)
“10 …. the order framing a charge
affects a person’s liberty substantially
and therefore it is the duty of the court
to consider judicially whether the
materials warrant the framing of the
charge. It was also held that the court
ought not to blindly accept the decision
of the prosecution that the accused be
asked to face a trial.”

The Supreme Court in the case of Umesh Kumar
8 MCRC Nos.10636/2013
10708/2013

vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2013) 10
SCC 591 has held as under:-

“20. The scope of Section 482 CrPC is well
defined and inherent powers could be exercised
by the High Court to give effect to an order under
CrPC; to prevent abuse of the process of court;
and to otherwise secure the ends of justice. This
extraordinary power is to be exercised ex debito
justitiae. However, in exercise of such powers, it
is not permissible for the High Court to
appreciate the evidence as it can only evaluate
material documents on record to the extent of its
prima facie satisfaction about the existence of
sufficient ground for proceedings against the
accused and the Court cannot look into materials,
the acceptability of which is essentially a matter
for trial. Any document filed along with the
petition labelled as evidence without being tested
and proved, cannot be examined. The law does
not prohibit entertaining the petition under
Section 482 CrPC for quashing the charge-sheet
even before the charges are framed or before the
application of discharge is filed or even during
the pendency of such application before the court
concerned. The High Court cannot reject the
application merely on the ground that the
accused can argue legal and factual issues at the
time of the framing of the charge. However, the
inherent power of the Court should not be
exercised to stifle the legitimate prosecution but
can be exercised to save the accused from
undergoing the agony of a criminal trial. (Vide
Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Judicial Magistrate [(1998) 5
SCC 749], Ashok Chaturvedi v. Shitul H.
Chanchani [(1998) 7 SCC 698], G. Sagar Suri v.
State of U.P. [(2000) 2 SCC 636] and Padal
Venkata Rama Reddy v. Kovvuri Satyanarayana
Reddy [(2011) 12 SCC 437].”

In the case of Ravikant Dubey and Others Vs.
State of M.P. and another reported in 2014 Cr.L.R.
(M.P.) 162 has held as under :

“8. In view of the above, the questions of
law which requires consideration are as
follows:

9 MCRC Nos.10636/2013

10708/2013

(i) Whether petition preferred by the
petitioners under Section 482 of the Code
for quashing the FIR can be entertained,
when trial has been started and evidence of
some witnesses have also been deposed
before the Trial Court ?

(ii) Whether evidence recorded by Trial
Court during trial can be considered for
quashing the FIR ?

(iii) Whether any ground is available for
quashing the FIR in view of the facts and
laws available on record ?

Regarding question of law no. (i) :-

9. Learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioners submitted that inherent powers
can be used at any stage to prevent abuse
of process of any Court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice. It makes no
different whether trial has been started or
not and whether some evidence has been
deposed before the Trial Court or not. In
support of his contention he placed reliance
in the case of Sathish Mehra (supra) and
Joseph Salvaraja Vs. State of Gujrat and
others, (2011) 7 SCC 59.

* * * *

12. Therefore, in the considered view of
this Court this petition is maintainable also
even when trial is at advance stage. The
question is answered accordingly.”

Thus, it is held that during the pendency of the
petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., if the charges have
been framed and even if some of the witnesses have been
examined, the petition can be decided on merits.

So far as the allegations made against the applicants
are concerned, there is a specific allegation against the
applicant Mohit Kumar, that he had harassed and treated
the respondent No.2/complainant with cruelty because of
non-fulfillment of his demand of four wheeler vehicle as
10 MCRC Nos.10636/2013
10708/2013

well as A.C. and other household articles. So far as the
transfer of funds from the Bank account of the applicant
Mohit Kumar to the Bank account of the respondent
No/2complinant is concerned, the same is required to be
proved at the trial. So far as the fact that the FIR was
lodged subsequent to filing of petition under Section 13 of
Hindu Marriage Act by the applicant Mohit Kumar is
concerned, it cannot be said that the FIR was lodged by
way of counterblast. Even otherwise the FIR cannot be
quashed merely on the ground that the same was lodged
after a petition for divorce was filed.

The Supreme Court in the case of Pratibha v.
Rameshwari Devi and Ors. reported in (2007) 12 SCC
369 has held as under:-

“16. It is pertinent to note that the complaint
was filed only when all efforts to return to the
matrimonial home had failed and Respondent
2 husband had filed a divorce petition under
Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
That apart, in our view, filing of a divorce
petition in a civil court cannot be a ground to
quash criminal proceedings under Section
482 of the Code as it is well settled that
criminal and civil proceedings are separate
and independent and the pendency of a civil
proceeding cannot bring to an end a criminal
proceeding even if they arise out of the same
set of facts. Such being the position, we are,
therefore, of the view that the High Court
while exercising its powers under Section 482
of the Code has gone beyond the allegations
made in the FIR and has acted in excess of
its jurisdiction and, therefore, the High Court
was not justified in quashing the FIR by going
beyond the allegations made in the FIR or by
relying on extraneous considerations.”

Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion
that there is sufficient material against the applicant Mohit
11 MCRC Nos.10636/2013
10708/2013

Kumar warranting his prosecution and accordingly the
application filed by Mohit Kumar which has been registered
as M.Cr.C.No.10708/2013 is dismissed.

So far as the case of the applicants No.1 and 2 in
M.Cr.C.No.10636/2013 is concerned, they are the parents-
in-law of the complainant. It is the case of the applicants
No.1 and 2 that they are residing at Gwalior whereas the
respondent No.2/complainant had resided at Pune along
with the applicant Mohit Kumar. If the allegations made
against the applicants No.1 and 2 are concerned, it is clear
that the respondent No.2 has alleged that the applicants
No.1 and 2 had passed taunts for not bringing four
wheeler vehicle and A.C. and she was turned out of her
matrimonial house by the applicants No.1 2.

The Supreme Court in the case of Taramani Parakh
v. State of M.P. reported in (2015) 11 SCC 260 has held
as under:-

“10. The law relating to quashing is well
settled. If the allegations are absurd or do not
make out any case or if it can be held that
there is abuse of process of law, the
proceedings can be quashed but if there is a
triable case the Court does not go into
reliability or otherwise of the version or the
counter-version. In matrimonial cases, the
Courts have to be cautious when omnibus
allegations are made particularly against
relatives who are not generally concerned
with the affairs of the couple. We may refer to
the decisions of this Court dealing with the
issue.

11. Referring to earlier decisions, in Amit
Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander (2012) 9 SCC
460, it was observed (SCC pp. 482-84, para

27):

“27.1. Though there are no limits of the
powers of the Court under Section 482 of the
Code but the more the power, the more due
12 MCRC Nos.10636/2013
10708/2013

care and caution is to be exercised in invoking
these powers. The power of quashing criminal
proceedings, particularly, the charge framed
in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be
exercised very sparingly and with
circumspection and that too in the rarest of
rare cases.

27.2. The Court should apply the test as
to whether the uncontroverted allegations as
made from the record of the case and the
documents submitted therewith prima facie
establish the offence or not. If the allegations
are so patently absurd and inherently
improbable that no prudent person can ever
reach such a conclusion and where the basic
ingredients of a criminal offence are not
satisfied then the Court may interfere.

27.3. The High Court should not unduly
interfere. No meticulous examination of the
evidence is needed for considering whether
the case would end in conviction or not at the
stage of framing of charge or quashing of
charge.

27.4. Where the exercise of such power
is absolutely essential to prevent patent
miscarriage of justice and for correcting some
grave error that might be committed by the
subordinate courts even in such cases, the
High Court should be loath to interfere, at the
threshold, to throttle the prosecution in
exercise of its inherent powers.

27.5. Where there is an express legal
bar enacted in any of the provisions of the
Code or any specific law in force to the very
initiation or institution and continuance of
such criminal proceedings, such a bar is
intended to provide specific protection to an
accused.

27.6. The Court has a duty to balance
the freedom of a person and the right of the
complainant or prosecution to investigate and
prosecute the offender.

27.7. The process of the court cannot
be permitted to be used for an oblique or
ultimate/ulterior purpose.

27.8. Where the allegations made and
as they appeared from the record and
documents annexed therewith to
13 MCRC Nos.10636/2013
10708/2013

predominantly give rise and constitute a “civil
wrong” with no “element of criminality” and
does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a
criminal offence, the court may be justified in
quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the
court would not embark upon the critical
analysis of the evidence.

27.9. Another very significant caution
that the courts have to observe is that it
cannot examine the facts, evidence and
materials on record to determine whether
there is sufficient material on the basis of
which the case would end in a conviction; the
court is concerned primarily with the
allegations taken as a whole whether they will
constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse
of the process of court leading to injustice.

27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the
court called upon to hold a full-fledged
enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by
the investigating agencies to find out whether
it is a case of acquittal or conviction.

27.11. Where allegations give rise to a
civil claim and also amount to an offence,
merely because a civil claim is maintainable,
does not mean that a criminal complaint
cannot be maintained.

27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 228 and/or under Section 482,
the Court cannot take into consideration
external materials given by an accused for
reaching the conclusion that no offence was
disclosed or that there was possibility of his
acquittal. The Court has to consider the
record and documents annexed therewith by
the prosecution.

27.13. Quashing of a charge is an
exception to the rule of continuous
prosecution. Where the offence is even
broadly satisfied, the Court should be more
inclined to permit continuation of prosecution
rather than its quashing at that initial stage.
The Court is not expected to marshal the
records with a view to decide admissibility and
reliability of the documents or records but is
an opinion formed prima facie.

27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report
under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers
14 MCRC Nos.10636/2013
10708/2013

from fundamental legal defects, the Court
may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a
charge.

27.15. Coupled with any or all of the
above, where the Court finds that it would
amount to abuse of process of the Code or
that the interest of justice favours, otherwise
it may quash the charge. The power is to be
exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and
substantial justice for administration of which
alone, the courts exist. (Ref. State of W.B. v.
Swapan Kumar Guha [(1982) 1 SCC 561 :
1982 SCC (Cri) 283 : AIR 1982 SC 949];
Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao
Chandrojirao Angre [(1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988
SCC (Cri) 234]; Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary
[(1992) 4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36 : AIR
1993 SC 892]; Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar
Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC
(Cri) 1059]; G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P.
[(2000) 2 SCC 636 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 513];
Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. [(2003) 3 SCC 11 :
2003 SCC (Cri) 703]; Pepsi Foods Ltd. v.
Special Judicial Magistrate [(1998) 5 SCC
749 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1400 : AIR 1998 SC
128]; State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma [(1996) 7
SCC 705 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 497]; Ganesh
Narayan Hegde v. S. Bangarappa [(1995) 4
SCC 41 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 634]; Zandu
Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful
Haque [(2005) 1 SCC 122 : 2005 SCC (Cri)
283]; Medchl Chemicals Pharma (P) Ltd. v.
Biological E. Ltd. [(2000) 3 SCC 269 : 2000
SCC (Cri) 615 : AIR 2000 SC 1869]; Shakson
Belthissor v. State of Kerala [(2009) 14 SCC
466 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1412]; V.V.S. Rama
Sharma v. State of U.P. [(2009) 7 SCC 234 :
(2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 356]; Chunduru Siva Ram
Krishna v. Peddi Ravindra Babu [(2009) 11
SCC 203 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1297];

Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar [(1987)
1 SCC 288 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 82]; State of
Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp (1) SCC
222 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 192 : AIR 1991 SC
1260]; Lalmuni Devi v. State of Bihar [(2001)
2 SCC 17 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 275]; M. 8
MCRC.6606/2015 Krishnan v. Vijay Singh
[(2001) 8 SCC 645 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 19];

15 MCRC Nos.10636/2013

10708/2013

Savita v. State of Rajasthan [(2005) 12 SCC
338 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 571] and S.M. Datta
v. State of Gujarat [(2001) 7 SCC 659 : 2001
SCC (Cri) 1361 : 2001 SCC (LS) 1201]).

27.16. These are the principles which
individually and preferably cumulatively (one
or more) be taken into consideration as
precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide
plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482
of the Code by the High Court. Where the
factual foundation for an offence has been laid
down, the courts should be reluctant and
should not hasten to quash the proceedings
even on the premise that one or two
ingredients have not been stated or do not
appear to be satisfied if there is substantial
compliance with the requirements of the
offence.”

Considering the law laid down by the Supreme Court
in the case of Taramani Parakh (supra) the application
filed by the applicant No.1 namely Smt. Malti Kushwaha
and applicant No.2 Virendra Kushwaha is dismissed.

So far as the allegations against the applicant No.3
Smt. Nidhi is concerned, the applicants have filed the
documents to show that she is residing separately at
Bangalore along with her husband. The respondent
No.2/complainant had either stayed at Gwalior or at Pune
and, therefore, it can certainly be said that the applicant
No.3 Smt. Nidhi is residing separately at Bangalore along
with her in-laws as the factum of separate residence of the
applicant No.3 Smt. Nidhi has not been disputed by the
counsel for the respondent No.2/complainant. Further
more there are no specific allegation against the applicant
No.3 Smt. Nidhi except saying that she too had scolded,
harassed the respondent No.2/complainant for a four
wheeler vehicle and A.C.

16 MCRC Nos.10636/2013

10708/2013

So far as the allegations against the applicant No.4
Ms. Navita @ Namita is concerned, it is submitted by the
counsel for the applicant that she too is residing
separately at Bangalore and is a married woman.
However, this fact has been disputed by the counsel for
the respondent No.2/complainant. It is submitted that no
document has been filed by the applicants to show the
separate residence of Ms. Navita @ Namita. It is submitted
that in fact she is a spinster and is residing alongwith her
parents i.e. applicants No.1 and 2.

By relying on judgments passed by the Supreme
Court in cases of Geeta Mehrotra Vs. State of U.P.
reported in (2012) 10 SCC 741, Preeti Gupta Vs. State
of Jharkhand, reported in (2010) 7 SCC 667, it is
submitted by the Counsel for the applicants that there
should be some what specific and clear allegations against
the relatives of the husband. There is an increasing
tendency in the society to over implicate the near and
dear relatives of the husband so as to pressurize the
husband.

The Supreme Court in the case of Kansraj Vs. State
of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207, has held as under :

“In the light of the evidence in the case we
find substance in the submission of the
learned counsel for the defence that
Respondents 3 to 5 were roped in the case
only on the ground of being close relations
of Respondent 2, the husband of the
deceased. For the fault of the husband, the
in-laws or the other relations cannot, in all
cases, be held to be involved in the
demand of dowry. In cases where such
accusations are made, the overt acts
17 MCRC Nos.10636/2013
10708/2013

attributed to persons other than the
husband are required to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. By mere conjectures and
implications such relations cannot be held
guilty for the offence relating to dowry
deaths. A tendency has, however,
developed for roping in all relations of the
in-laws of the deceased wives in the
matters of dowry deaths which, if not
discouraged, is likely to affect the case of
the prosecution even against the real
culprits. In their overenthusiasm and
anxiety to seek conviction for maximum
people, the parents of the deceased have
been found to be making efforts for
involving other relations which ultimately
weaken the case of the prosecution even
against the real accused as appears to
have happened in the instant case.”

The Supreme Court in the case Monju Roy Vs.
State of West Bengal, reported in (2015) 13 SCC 693,
has held as under :

“8. While we do not find any ground to
interfere with the view taken by the courts
below that the deceased was subjected to
harassment on account of non-fulfillment of
dowry demand, we do find merit in the
submission that possibility of naming all
the family members by way of
exaggeration is not ruled out. In Kans Raj
v. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207, this
Court observed : (SCC p. 215, para 5)
“5………A tendency has, however,
developed for roping in all relations of
the in-laws of the deceased wives in
the matters of dowry deaths which, if
not discouraged, is likely to affect the
case of the prosecution even against
the real culprits. In their over
enthusiasm and anxiety to seek
conviction for maximum people, the
18 MCRC Nos.10636/2013
10708/2013

parents of the deceased have been
found to be making efforts for involving
other relations which ultimately
weaken the case of the prosecution
even against the real accused as
appears to have happened in the
instant case.”

The Court has, thus, to be careful in
summoning distant relatives without there
being specific material. Only the husband,
his parents or at best close family
members may be expected to demand
dowry or to harass the wife but not distant
relations, unless there is tangible material
to support allegations made against such
distant relations. Mere naming of distant
relations is not enough to summon them in
absence of any specific role and material to
support such role.

9. In Raja Lal Singh vs. State of Jharkhand,
(2007) 15 SCC 415, it was observed : (SCC
p. 419, para 14)
“14. No doubt, some of the witnesses
e.g. PW 5 Dashrath Singh, who is the
father of the deceased Gayatri, and PW
3 Santosh Kr. Singh, brother of the
deceased, have stated that the
deceased Gayatri told them that dowry
was demanded by not only Raja Lal
Singh, but also the appellants Pradip
Singh and his wife Sanjana Devi, but
we are of the opinion that it is possible
that the names of Pradip Singh and
Sanjana Devi have been introduced
only to spread the net wide as often
happens in cases like under Sections
498-A and 394 IPC, as has been
observed in several decisions of this
Court e.g. in Kamesh Panjiyar v. State
of Bihar [(2005) 2 SCC 388], etc.
Hence, we allow the appeal of Pradip
Singh and Sanjana Devi and set aside
the impugned judgments of the High
Court and the trial court insofar as it
19 MCRC Nos.10636/2013
10708/2013

relates to them and we direct that they
be released forthwith unless required in
connection with some other case.”

* * * * * *

11. The Court has to adopt pragmatic view
and when a girl dies an unnatural death,
allegation of demand of dowry or
harassment which follows cannot be
weighed in golden scales. At the same
time, omnibus allegation against all family
members particularly against brothers and
sisters and other relatives do not stand on
same footing as husband and parents. In
such case, apart from general allegation of
demand of dowry, the court has to be
satisfied that harassment was also caused
by all the named members.”

The Supreme Court in the case of Chandralekha
Ors. v. State of Rajasthan Anr. reported in 2013 (1)
UC 155 has held as under:-

“8. We must, at the outset, state that the
High Court’s view on jurisdiction meets with
our approval and we confirm the view.
However, after a careful perusal of the FIR
and after taking into consideration the
attendant circumstances, we are of the
opinion that the FIR lodged by respondent 2
insofar as it relates to appellants 1, 2 and 3
deserves to be quashed. The allegations are
extremely general in nature. No specific
role is attributed to each of the appellants.
Respondent 2 has stated that after the
marriage, she resided with her husband at
Ahmedabad. It is not clear whether
appellants 1, 2 and 3 were residing with
them at Ahmedabad. The marriage took
place on 9/7/2002 and respondent 2 left
her matrimonial home on 15/2/2003 i.e.
within a period of seven months.
Thereafter, respondent 2 took no steps to
file any complaint against the appellants.

20 MCRC Nos.10636/2013

10708/2013

Six years after she left the house, the
present FIR is lodged making extremely
vague and general allegations against
appellants 1, 2 and 3. It is important to
remember that appellant 2 is a married
sister-in-law. In our opinion, such extra
ordinary delay in lodging the FIR raises
grave doubt about the truthfulness of
allegations made by respondent 2 against
appellants 1, 2 and 3, which are, in any
case, general in nature. We have no doubt
that by making such reckless and vague
allegations, respondent 2 has tried to rope
them in this case along with her husband.
We are of the confirmed opinion that
continuation of the criminal proceedings
against appellants 1, 2 and 3 pursuant to
this FIR is an abuse of process of law. In
the interest of justice, therefore, the FIR
deserves to be quashed insofar as it relates
to appellants 1, 2 and 3.”

Recently, the Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh
Sharma others Vs. State of U.P. another by
order dated 27-7-2017 passed in
Cr.A.No.1265/2017 has held as under:-

“We have considered the background of
the issue and also taken into account the
243rd Report of the Law Commission
dated 30th August 2012, 140th Report of
the Rajya Sabha Committee on Petitions
(September,2011) and earlier decisions
of this Court. We are conscious of the
object for which the provision was
brought into the statute. At the same
time, violation of human rights of
innocent cannot be brushed aside.
Certain safeguards against uncalled for
arrest or insensitive investigation have
been addressed by this Court. Still, the
problem continues to a great extent.

To remedy the situation, we are of the
21 MCRC Nos.10636/2013
10708/2013

view that involvement of civil society in
the aid of administration of justice can be
one of the steps, apart from the
investigating officers and the concerned
trial courts being sanitized. It is also
necessary to facilitate closure of
proceedings where as genuine settlement
has been reached instead of parties being
required to move High Court only for that
purpose.”
Joint residence or separate residence may be one of
the considerations for ascertaining the role played by a
near relative of the husband, for harassing the
complainant but that cannot be a sole criteria to either
disbelieve the complainant or to prosecute the relatives as
it is being realized by the courts that the provision of
Section 498-A of IPC is being misused without realizing
the implications and complications of false implications of
near relatives as it may adversely affect the possibility of
reconciliation. Even assuming that the applicant No.4 Ms.
Navita @ Namita is a spinster and is residing along with
her parents at Gwalior then unless and until a specific role
or overt act is assigned to her by the
complainant/respondent No.2, this Court is of the
considered opinion that a girl who is yet to get married
and who has to go to her matrimonial house and who may
also face the same situation would not involve herself in
demand of dowry or harassment of her sister-in-law
(Bhabhi). In the present case, even in the case diary
statements, the complainant/respondent No.2 has not
specifically stated any overt act on the part of the
applicant No.4 Ms. Navita @ Namita. The only allegations
are that she along with others was demanding a four
22 MCRC Nos.10636/2013
10708/2013

wheeler vehicle and A.C. etc. and because of that she was
harassing her continuously. Considering the allegations
made against the applicant No.4 Ms. Navita @ Namita,
this Court is of the view that the allegation against the
applicants No.3 and 4 are not sufficient to continue their
prosecution for offences under Sections 498-A, 506 Part-II
of IPC. Accordingly, the application filed by the applicant
No.3 Smt. Nidhi and the applicant No.4 Ms. Navita @
Namita are allowed. The FIR in Crime No.589/2013
registered by Police Station Kotwali, District Morena for
offence under Sections 498-A, 506-B of IPC as well as the
further proceedings in Criminal Case No.3108/2013
pending in the Court of CJM, Gwalior qua the applicant
No.3 Smt. Nidhi as well as the applicant No.4 Ms. Navita
@ Namita are hereby quashed.

The M.Cr.C.No.10636/2013 succeeds in part and is
accordingly partly allowed.

(G.S. Ahluwalia)
(alok) Judge

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *