Madhusudan vs Water Resources Department on 11 October, 2017

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (C) No. 3288 of 2017
­­­­­
Madhusudan, son of late Rameshwar Paswan, resident of P.O.  
P.S­Argora, District­Ranchi … … Petitioner
Versus 
1. The State of Jharkhand
2.   Principal   Secretary,   Welfare   Department,   Government   of 
Jharkhand,   P.O.     P.S.­Dhurwa,   Project   Bhawan,   Ranchi, 
Jharkhand
3.   Caste   Scrutiny   Committee   through   its   Chairman,   P.O.     P.S.­
Dhurwa, Project Bhawan, Ranchi, Jharkhand … Respondents

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
­­­­­

For the Petitioner : Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, Sr. Advocate
  Mr. Prashant Pallav, Advocate
For the respondent­State : Mr. Jai Prakash, AAG
  Mr. Rishi Pallav, JC to AAG
  Mr. Yogesh Modi, JC to AAG
  Mrs. Chaitali C. Sinha, JC to AAG
­­­­­
CAV No. 14.09.2017 Pronounced on:   11/10.2017  

The present writ petition has been filed for quashing 
the   order   dated   07.06.2017   passed   by   the   Caste   Scrutiny 
Committee (hereinafter referred to as “CSC”), State of Jharkhand, 
whereby the claim of the petitioner for Scheduled Caste status has 
been   rejected   and   the   order   was   forwarded   to   the   Principal 
Secretary, Home, Prison  Disaster Management, Government of 
Jharkhand.   The   petitioner   has   further   prayed   for   quashing   the 
enquiry report dated 29.07.2015 submitted by the three Member 
Enquiry   Committee   on   the   ground   that   the   Committee   has 
incorporated distorted facts in its report. 
2. The case of the petitioner as stated in the writ petition 
is that the petitioner was born on 21.02.1964 in a Baniya family 
(OBC) in the house of one Jadunandan Prasad. His natural father 
was a poor newspaper hawker. One Rameshwar Paswan who was 
an agricultural labourer was a close friend and neighbour of the 
natural   father   of   the   petitioner   and   was   issueless,   whereas   the 
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petitioner has four brothers. It was agreed upon by the natural 
father of the petitioner and Rameshwar Paswan that his natural 
father   would   give   the   petitioner   in   adoption   to   Rameshwar 
Paswan   and   as   such,   the   adoption   process   was   completed   on 
10.03.1978

 in the presence of the then Mukhia Shri Suresh Kumar 
Singh, villagers and family members. After the adoption, affidavits 
were executed by the natural father and adoptive father of the 
petitioner   before   the   Executive   Magistrate,   Nawada   vide   oath
nos. 913 and 514 respectively both dated 04.04.1979. Thereafter, 
in   the   School   Admission   Book   of   Government   High   School 
Kauwakol, Nawada, Bihar, the name of the father of the petitioner 
was also changed by inserting the name of the adoptive father in 
place   of   the   natural   father.  The   petitioner,   after   completing  his 
schooling, graduated from the Indian School of Mines, Dhanbad 
and   served   as   Mining   Engineer   at   BCCL,   Dhanbad   from 
September, 1986 to September, 1992. Thereafter, he appeared in 
the 37th Combined Civil Services examination as Scheduled Caste 
candidate   and   was   declared   successful   in   the   said   examination 
conducted   by   Bihar   Public   Service   Commission   and   joined   the 
Bihar   Police   Service   as   Deputy   Superintendent   of   Police. 
Subsequently,   a   show­cause   notice   was   issued   to   the   petitioner 
alleging that he secured appointment in Bihar Police Service by 
submitting false  caste certificate. The petitioner challenging the 
show­cause   notice   filed   C.W.J.C   No.   14254   of   2001   before   the 
Patna   High   Court,   wherein   it   was   held   by   the   learned   Single 
Judge that the petitioner was given in adoption for getting benefit 
in the employment, but on equitable consideration, the learned 
Single Judge allowed the petitioner to continue in service with a 
condition that he would not be entitled for benefits of reservation 
in   future.   Aggrieved   thereby,   the   State­respondents   filed   L.P.A
No.   708   of   2002   before  the  Patna High  Court   and  the   learned 
Division Bench held that the petitioner was not entitled for the 
benefit of reservation in the matter of appointment as a Scheduled 
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Caste candidate and the termination of the petitioner from service 
was justified. However, the question as to whether the petitioner 
by   virtue   of   his   marks   scored   in   the   Bihar   Civil   Services 
Examination   is   entitled   to   any   post   in   the   Bihar   Civil   Service 
under   any   category,   was   left   open   for   decision   of   the   State 
Government.   Thereafter,   the   petitioner   made   representation 
before the State of Bihar and in the meantime in the year 2003, 
his service was allocated to the State of Jharkhand. After about
10   years,   the   State   of   Jharkhand   took   a   decision   to   initiate   a 
proceeding   for   terminating   the   service   of   the   petitioner   vide 
Memo No. 4051 dated 10.08.2013 which was challenged by the 
petitioner   in   W.P.(S)   No.   440   of   2014.   In   the   meantime,   the 
Government of Jharkhand took a cabinet decision on 24.05.2014 
to verify the caste status of the petitioner by the Caste Scrutiny 
Committee (CSC) in terms of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex 
Court rendered in the case of “Kumari Madhuri Patil  Ors. Vs.  
Addl.  Commissioner, Tribal Development and Ors.” reported in 
(1994) 6 SCC 241. The petitioner filed a petition along with the 
relevant   documents   before   the   CSC,   but   the   Committee   vide 
impugned order dated 07.06.2017 held that no legal procedure 
was followed during alleged adoption of the petitioner and also 
no evidence was produced to show that the petitioner ever lived 
with his adoptive father. 

3. Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, the learned Senior Counsel for 
the petitioner submits that the order passed by the CSC suffers 
from illegality as the same is based on an enquiry report without 
applying its independent mind. The CSC has accepted the inquiry 
report without getting it proved by the maker and subjecting it to 
further cross­examination. The evidence on affidavit filed by the 
petitioner was not disputed by any authority before the CSC and, 
therefore, the CSC was not justified in not considering the said 
evidence.   It   is   further   submitted   that   there   are   glaring 
contradictions in the statements recorded in the video recording 
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and the hard copy contained in the enquiry report and the said 
contradictions were though highlighted before the CSC, but the 
CSC failed to take into consideration those facts at the time of 
passing the impugned order. It is further submitted that neither 
the enquiry report nor the impugned order was provided to the 
petitioner and he came to know about the enquiry report through 
RTI   and   the   impugned   order   through   the   media.   It   is   further 
submitted   that   the   CSC   while   adjudicating   the   issue   of   social 
status of the petitioner, has dealt with the issue of adoption of the 
petitioner   in   wrong   manner.   It   is   further   submitted   that   a 
document   which   is   more   than   30   years   old   and   issued   by   the 
competent authority shall be presumed to be legally executed. The 
petitioner had filed the entire documents in support of the fact 
that since the date of adoption i.e., 10.03.1978, he remained with 
the   adoptive   family,   but   the   CSC   while   passing   the   impugned 
order totally ignored all those documents. It is further submitted 
that   during   enquiry,   the   Committee   was   reconstituted   but   the 
petitioner  was  not  given any opportunity of hearing before the 
newly   constituted   Committee   which   is   a   clear   violation   of 
principles of natural justice. All the documents corroborating the 
facts   of   adoption   were   issued   by   the   competent   authorities 
immediately after the adoption which includes the matriculation 
certificate, School Leaving Certificate (SLC) and caste certificate, 
thus there is also no valid reason to dispute the school admission 
register.   The   CSC   of   the   State   of   Jharkhand,   being   the
quasi­judicial   body,   should   not   have   re­delegated   the   role   of 
making enquiry to the Bihar Caste Scrutiny Committee, rather it 
should   have   enquired   the   matter   of   its   own   and   should   have 
prepared   the   report.   The   learned   Senior   Counsel   relies   on   the 
judgment   rendered   by   the   Patna   High   Court   in   the   case   of 
“Parwati   Bhandar   Vs.   State   of   Bihar   and   Ors.”  reported   in 
1991   (2)   PLJR   774  and   submits   that   the   delegatee   cannot 
delegate   its  power to any other  body  or  authority. It  is further 
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submitted that enquiry committee at no point of time issued any 
notice to the petitioner nor afforded opportunity of hearing. It is 
further   submitted   that   the   age   of   the   petitioner   at   the   time   of 
adoption was wrongly considered as 15­16 years on the basis of 
evidence of witnesses Y.K Lal and R.S Lal. In fact, from the audio 
visual recording prepared by the enquiry team, it would appear 
that Y.K Lal stated that the age of the petitioner at the time of 
adoption   was  5­7   years,  whereas R.S  Lal  stated the  age   of the 
petitioner to be 10­11 years, but the same were not taken into 
consideration by the CSC. It is further submitted that the entire 
evidence given by the petitioner as well as by the enquiry team 
would   show   that   the   petitioner   was   given   in   adoption   to   late 
Rameshwar Paswan. It is further submitted that the registration of 
the deed of adoption is not mandatorily required under law. The 
learned Senior Counsel also relies on the judgment rendered by 
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Mst. Param Pal Singh  
through father Vs. M/s National Insurance Co.  Anr.” reported 
in  (2013)   3   SCC   409  and   submits   that   there   is   no   statutory 
stipulation that the registration of adoption­deed is required to be 
mandatorily done. It is further submitted that after the death of 
the adoptive father, although the funeral was not performed by 
the   petitioner   as   he   was   posted   in   the   interiors   of   Dhanbad, 
however, other rituals were performed by the him. The affidavits 
sworn   by   the   natural   father   and   the   adoptive   father   of   the 
petitioner were not accepted by the CSC on the ground that the 
office of the Executive Magistrate failed to produce the original 
register though burden was upon the State as it is the custodian of 
the said register and not the petitioner. After the adoption, the 
petitioner lived and maintained his relationship with his adoptive 
father till his life time and after the death of the adoptive father, 
the petitioner also performed his “Shradh”  karma. On perusal of 
the enquiry report, it would appear that at the time of adoption, 
the   age   of   the   petitioner   was   not   above   15   years.   Thus,   the 
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adoption is valid in terms of Section 10 of the Hindu Adoption 
and   Maintenance   Act,   1956.   The   finding   of   the   CSC   is   also 
perverse in view of the fact that the statements which have been 
taken   into   consideration   are   of   the   incompetent   and  unreliable 
witnesses.   The   learned   Senior   Counsel   relies   on   the   judgment 
rendered in the case of “L. Debi Prasad (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Smt.  
Tribeni Devi  Ors.” reported in (1970) 1 SCC 677 and submits 
that   in   judging   whether   an   adoption   pleaded   has   been 
satisfactorily proved or not, one has to bear in mind the lapse of 
time between the date of the alleged adoption and the date on 
which the concerned party is required to adduce proof in support 
of such adoption. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner 
also puts emphasis on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court 
rendered   in   the   case   of  “Kumari   Madhuri   Patil”  (supra)
[sub­para (9) of paragraph no. 13] and submits that the CSC is 
required   to   complete   the   proceeding   within   a   period   not 
exceeding two months. However, in the present case, the CSC has 
taken 3 years in concluding the proceeding and thus, the same is 
ab­initio bad in law. The learned Senior Counsel further relies on 
the   judgment   rendered   in   the   case   of  “Dayaram   Vs.   Sudhir  
Batham  Ors.” reported in (2012) 1 SCC 333 and submits that 
the judgment rendered in the case of  “Kumari Madhuri Patil”  
(supra) has substantively been affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme 
Court with certain modification. The learned Senior Counsel also 
put reliance on the judgment rendered by this court in the case of 
“The State of Bihar  Ors. Vs. Kumari Abha” reported in 2002 
(2) JLJR 627.

4. Per   Contra,   Mr.   Jai   Prakash,   the   learned   Additional 
Advocate General appearing on behalf of the respondent­State of 
Jharkhand submits that late Rameshwar Paswan was not issueless, 
rather he had a daughter who died at the age of 4 years. It is 
further   submitted   that   in   the   school   register,   the   name   of   the 
father was written as Jadunandan Prasad, but the same has been 
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changed by cutting in red ink which appears to have been done 
recently. It is further submitted that in the alleged affidavits of the 
natural   father   and   adoptive   father,   the   date   of   birth   of   the 
petitioner   is   different   and   there   is   vast   difference   in   the   serial 
numbers   of   both   the   affidavits   which   creates   doubt   over   the 
genuinity of the affidavits. It is further submitted that the original 
register   was   never   produced   by   the   Office   of   the   Executive 
Magistrate, Nawada inspite of reminders and as such, the alleged 
affidavits   cannot   be   accepted.   It   is   further   submitted   that   the 
proper procedure of adoption was not followed and no concrete 
documentary evidence in this regard has been produced by the 
petitioner before the CSC. It is also submitted that the petitioner 
failed to produce any evidence to show that the petitioner ever 
stayed with late Rameshwar Paswan in his house and his last rites 
were done by him, rather in the evidence, it has come that the 
same was done by one Suraj Paswan. It is further submitted that 
the   petitioner   was   afforded   ample   opportunity   of   hearing 
including the opportunity to produce supporting documents, but 
he failed to establish his claim as held by the CSC. The learned 
Additional Advocate General while referring to sub­para (10) of 
paragraph no. 13 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court 
in the case of “Kumari Madhuri Patil”  (supra) submits that the 
Hon’ble   Apex   Court   has   also   clarified   so   as   to   deal   with   the 
situation where the proceeding of the CSC is not concluded within 
a period of 2 months. Thus, the argument of the learned Senior 
Counsel for the petitioner that if the enquiry is not concluded and 
the report is not prepared within a period of 2 months, the CSC 
would   become  functus   officio,   is   not   correct.   So   far   as   the 
contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that the CSC of the 
State of Jharkhand could not have delegated the enquiry to the 
CSC  of  Bihar,   the   learned Additional Advocate General submits 
that paragraph no. 3 of the impugned order itself makes it clear 
that   since   the   concerned   village­Sekhodeora   is   sitauted   in   the 
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district­ Nawada (Bihar), which is out of the territorial jurisdiction 
of the State of Jharkhand, a request was made to the Government 
of Bihar to send the report on 5 points, which has been detailed in 
the impugned order itself. So far as conducting an enquiry by the 
CSC   of   Government   of   Jharkhand   is   concerned,   the   learned 
Advocate General puts reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble 
Supreme Court rendered in the case of “State of Maharashtra   
Ors. Vs. Ravi Prakash Babulalsingh Parmar  Anr.” reported in 
(2007) 1 SCC 80 (this judgment has also been relied upon by the 
learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner) and submits that the 
provisions of Indian Evidence Act is not applicable for the purpose 
of enquiry to be conducted by the CSC. The CSC may devolve its 
own procedure for making an enquiry to collect proper evidence 
so as not to cause any injustice to the concerned person, however, 
it cannot be restricted to any particular procedure. The learned 
Additional Advocate General referring to paragraph no. 5 of the 
Instructions   of   the   Government   of   India   dated   02.05.1975 
(Annexure­2/11 to the writ petition) submits that in cases where 
a person claims to be a Scheduled Caste on the ground that he has 
been adopted by a Scheduled Caste person, the validity of the said 
adoption has to be clearly established before any caste certificate 
is issued. The onus of proof is on the person who claims to be 
adopted by a Scheduled Caste person. It is further submitted that 
paragraph  no.   9   of the  impugned order itself indicates that  on 
04.03.2016, the petitioner appeared before the Chairman of the 
CSC and his statement was also recorded. The learned Additional 
Advocate General also refers to page no. 74 of the writ petition 
which   is   a   declaration   by   one   Suresh   Kumar   Singh   the   then 
Mukhia,   Village   Panchayat­Sekhodeora,   District­Nawada,   Bihar 
and submits that the petitioner has claimed his date of birth to be 
21.02.1964 and as per the statement of said Mukhia, the adoption 
was made on 04.04.1979. Thus, taking both the dates together, 
the   petitioner   was   more   than   15   years   of   age   on   the   date   of 
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adoption.   It   is   thus,   submitted   by   the   learned   AAG   that   the 
impugned order passed by the CSC is completely justified and the 
same does not warrant interference by this court.

5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and 
on going through the documents placed on record, it appears that 
the petitioner has claimed that he was born on 21.02.1964 in a 
backward   class   family,   but   subsequently   at   14   years   of   age   on 
10.03.1978, he was taken in adoption by one Rameshwar Paswan 
(a scheduled caste person) as per Hindu customary law in front of 
the   villagers.   After   the   adoption,   his   natural   father   as   well   as 
adoptive   father   executed   affidavits   before   the   Executive 
Magistrate,   Nawada   on   04.04.1979   and   thereafter,   his   father’s 
name was also changed in the school register. Subsequently, the 
petitioner   was   issued   caste   certificates   of   scheduled   caste   on 
25.04.1979, 13.08.1987 and 05.02.1992. The petitioner came out 
successful in 37th Combined Civil Services Examination conducted 
by   the   Bihar   Public   Service   Commission   as   a   Scheduled   Caste 
category candidate and was thus selected for Bihar Police Service 
and   was   posted   as   Deputy   Superintendent   of   Police   but 
subsequently   he   was   issued   show­cause   stating   therein   that   he 
secured appointment on the basis of false caste certificate. After 
the petitioner’s service was allocated to the State of Jharkhand, a 
decision   was   taken   vide   Memo   No.   4051   dated   10.08.2013   to 
start a proceeding for terminating the petitioner from service, but 
later on the Government of Jharkhand took a cabinet decision on 
24.05.2014 to get the caste status of the petitioner verified by the 
CSC   in   terms   with   the   judgment   of   the   Hon’ble   Apex   Court 
rendered in the case of “Kumari Madhuri Patil” (Supra). Finally, 
the   CSC   found   that   no   legal   procedure   was   followed   during 
alleged adoption of the petitioner and also no  evidence has been 
produced to show that the petitioner ever lived with his adoptive 
father.   In   the   case   of   “Kumari   Madhuri   Patil”  (Supra),   the 
Hon’ble   Supreme   Court   has   streamlined   the   procedure   for 
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issuance of Social Status Certificate, its scrutiny and approval. It 
has   been   held   inter   alia   that   there   would   be   a   Caste   Scrutiny 
Committee in every State, which on an application for verification 
of the caste certificate, shall get it investigated by a Vigilance Cell 
consisting of Senior Deputy Superintendent of Police in over­all 
charge   and   other   police   officers.   For   the   investigation,   the 
Inspector would go to the local place of residence and the original 
place   from  where   the  candidate  hails  and usually resides or in 
case of migration, to the place from where he originally hailed 
from. The Vigilance Officer should personally verify and collect all 
the   facts   of   the   social   status   claimed   by   the   candidate   or   the 
parents or guardian, as the case may be. He should also examine 
the   school   records,   birth   registration,   if   any.   The   said   officer 
should   also   examine   the   parents,   guardian   or   the   candidate   in 
relation   to   their   caste   etc.   or   such   other   persons   who   have 
knowledge of the social status of the candidate and then submit a 
report to the Directorate together with all particulars as envisaged 
in the proforma, in particular, of the Scheduled Tribes relating to 
their   peculiar   anthropological   and   ethnological   traits,   deity, 
rituals, customs, mode of marriage, death ceremonies, method of 
burial   of   dead   bodies   etc.   by   the   castes   or   tribes   or   tribal 
communities concerned. 

6. In the present case, when the matter reached the CSC 
of the State of Jharkhand, it took a decision that since the matter 
is   related   to   a   district   situated   in   the   State   of   Bihar   which   is 
beyond its territorial jurisdiction, it would be appropriate to call 
for   a   report   from   the   Government   of   Bihar   on   five   points,   all 
related with respect to the adoption of the petitioner. Finally, the 
CSC vide impugned order dated 07.06.2017, rejected the Caste 
Certificate   of   the   petitioner   on   the   ground   that   the   petitioner 
failed to produce any legal document to show that he was legally 
adopted   by   his   adoptive   father.   It   appears   from   the   impugned 
order   that   none   of   the   witnesses   have   categorically   denied   the 
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adoption   of   the   petitioner.   However,   there   are   variance   in   the 
statements   of   the   witnesses   examined   by   the   Investigating 
Committee   of  the   State  of Bihar with regard  to the  age  of  the 
petitioner at the time of adoption. Four witnesses appear to have 
been examined by the Investigating Committee relating to the age 
of the petitioner at the time of adoption. The CSC at paragraph 
no.   13   of   the   impugned   order   has   stated   that   as   per   the   C.D. 
submitted   by   the   Investigating   Committee,   witness   Rajendra 
Prasad   stated   the   age   of   the   petitioner   as   22­25   years,   Suraj 
Paswan   stated   18­20   years,   Jugal   Kishore   Lal   stated   that   the 
petitioner   was   adopted  in   young   age  and  Ravi   Shankar   Prasad 
stated that the petitioner was 15 years at the time of adoption. 
However,   in   paragraph   no.   6   of   the   impugned   order   also,   the 
statements   of   Jugal   Kishore   Lal   and   Ravi   Shankar   Prasad   have 
been recorded where it has been mentioned that Jugal Kishore Lal 
stated that the age of the petitioner at the time of adoption was 
15­16 years and Ravi Shankar Prasad has stated that the age of 
the petitioner was 10/15 years at the time of adoption.

7. However,   in   the   Matric   certificate   produced   by   the 
petitioner which was issued in the year 1980, the name of the 
father   of   the   petitioner   has   been   mentioned   as   Rameshwar 
Paswan and at that time, the petitioner was aged about 16 years. 
The   first   caste   certificate   was   issued   to   the   petitioner   on 
25.04.1979 which is also a government document. Thus, it is hard 
to   believe   that   the   petitioner   was   adopted   after   the   age   of
15   years.   The   witnesses   namely,   Rajendra   Prasad   and   Suresh 
Paswan appear to have lack of knowledge about the exact age of 
the petitioner at the time of adoption. So far the other witnesses 
i.e., Jugal Kishore and Ravi Shankar Prasad are concerned, their 
statements   were   incorporated   at   two   places   with   two   different 
versions which also create doubt about their knowledge as to the 
date   of   adoption   of   the   petitioner.   On   the   other   hand,   the 
petitioner in support of his claim filed the affidavits of Mukhiya 
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Birendra Kumar Singh and 31 villagers who have stated that the 
petitioner was  taken in adoption at the age of 14 years as per 
Hindu Customary Law and after adoption, the petitioner came in 
the house of Rameshwar Paswan and performed all his obligation 
as the son of Rameshwar Paswan. 

8. Since,   there   is   variance   in   the   statements   of   the 
witnesses as to the age of the petitioner, the same cannot be taken 
into consideration by this court while exercising writ jurisdiction 
under   Article   226   of   the   Constitution   of   India.   Thus,   I   am 
proceeding with the case by taking into consideration the age of 
petitioner as 14 years at the time of adoption as has been claimed 
by   the   petitioner   himself.   The   CSC   rejected   the   claim   of   the 
petitioner   mainly   on   the   ground   that   the   petitioner   has   not 
produced any legal document/registered adoption deed to prove 
his adoption and the alleged affidavits of his natural father as well 
as the adoptive father have also not been proved. It has further 
been observed in the impugned order that the “Shradh”  of Late 
Rameshwar   Paswan   was   also   not   performed   by   the   petitioner, 
however,   he   had   given   money   for   performing   last   rites   of   late 
Rameshwar Paswan.

9. So far the observation of the CSC with regard to the 
necessity   of   registration   and   legal   requirement   of   adoption   is 
concerned, the judgment cited on behalf of the petitioner in the 
case of “Param Pal Singh Vs. National Insurance Co.” (supra) is 
relevant. Paragraph nos. 11 to 14 of the said judgment are quoted 
hereinbelow. 

11.  In the first instance we wish to deal with the 
issue   relating   to   validity   of   the   adoption   of   the 
appellant since if only his adoption is held to be 
valid there is scope for examining his right to claim 
compensation over the death of the deceased as his 
adopted son. 

12. In Hindu Law in the celebrated decision of this 
Court reported in Lakshman Singh Kothari (supra), 
the legal requirement for a valid adoption has been 
13

succinctly stated in  paragraph 10 which reads as 
under: 

“10.   The   law   may   be   briefly   stated   thus: 
Under   the   Hindu   law,   whether   among   the 
regenerate   caste   or   among   Sudras,   there 
cannot   be   a   valid   adoption   unless   the 
adoptive boy is transferred from one family 
to another and that can be done only by the 
ceremony of giving and taking. The object of 
the   corporeal   giving   and   receiving   in 
adoption is obviously to secure due publicity. 
To achieve this object it is essential to have a 
formal   ceremony.   No   particular   form   is 
prescribed   for   the   ceremony,   but   the   law 
requires that  the  natural  parent  shall  hand 
over   the   adoptive   boy   and   the   adoptive 
parent shall receive him. The nature of the 
ceremony   may   vary   depending   upon   the 
circumstances of each case. But a ceremony 
there shall be, and giving and taking shall be 
part   of   it.   The   exigencies   of   the   situation 
arising   out   of   diverse   circumstances 
necessitated the introduction of the doctrine 
of   delegation;   and,   therefore,   the   parents, 
after   exercising   their   volition   to   give   and 
take the boy in adoption, may both or either 
of them delegate the physical act of handing 
over  the   boy   or   receiving  him,   as  the   case 
may be, to a third party.” 

13.  The  said legal  position  has  been  consistently 
followed by this Court which can be mentioned by 
referring to a recent decision of this Court reported 
in  M. Gurudas and others V. Rasaranjan and others 
­2006   (8)   SCC   367.   Paragraphs   26   and   27   are 
relevant for our purpose which read as under: 

“26.   To   prove   valid   adoption,   it   would   be 
necessary to bring on record that there had 
been an actual giving and taking ceremony. 
Performance   of  “datta   homam”  was 
imperative, subject to just exceptions. Above 
all,   as   noticed   hereinbefore,   the   question 
would   arise   as   to   whether   adoption   of   a 
daughter was permissible in law. 

27. In Mulla’s Principles of Hindu Law, 17th 
Edn., p. 710, it is stated: 

    “488. Ceremonies relating to adoption.– 
  (1) The ceremonies relating to an adoption 
are– 

(a)   the   physical   act   of   giving   and 
receiving, with intent to transfer the boy 
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from one family into another;

(b) the  datta homam, that is, oblations 
of clarified butter to fire; and

(c)   other   minor   ceremonies,   such   as 
putresti jag (sacrifice for male issue). 
 (2) The physical act of giving and receiving 
is essential to the validity of an adoption. As 
to datta homam it is not settled whether its 
performance   is   essential   to   the   validity   of 
an adoption in every case. As to the other 
ceremonies,   their   performance   is   not 
necessary to the validity of an adoption. 
  (3)   No   religious   ceremonies,   not   even 
datta homam, are necessary in the case of 
shudras.   Nor   are   religious   ceremonies 
necessary amongst Jains or in the Punjab.”” 

14.  In this context, it will be worthwhile to note 
the   requirement   of   registration   of   an   adoption 
deed. Section 17 of the Registration Act specifically 
refers   to   the   documents   of   which   registration   is 
compulsory. The deed of adoption is not one of the 
documents mentioned in sub­section (1) of Section 
17   which   mandatorily   requires   registration.   Sub­
section   (3)   of   Section   17   only   refers   to   the 
mandatory   requirement   of   registration   of   an 
authorization that may be given for adopting a son 
executed   after   01.01.1872   if   such   authorization 
was not conferred by a will. Dealing with the said 
provision relating to authorisation, it has been held 
in the decision reported in Vishvanath Ramji Karale  
V.   Rahibai   Ramji   Karale   and   others  ­  AIR   1931  
Bombay 105 by a deed of adoption as distinguished 
from   authority   to   adopt   does   not   require 
registration.”

10. On perusal of  the aforesaid judgment, it is clear that 
registration of adoption deed is not mandatorily required. It has 
also been held that there is no such legal procedure for a valid 
adoption. For a valid adoption, it is required to be proved from 
the  fact of the case that a child has been given by the natural 
parents and taken by the adoptive parents. Thus, it appears that 
the   CSC   proceeded  to  decide   the  case  of   the  petitioner  on  the 
basis of wrong assumption. The CSC has not gone to decide a very 
important   and   crucial   issue   as   to   whether   the   petitioner   after 
adoption at the age of 14 years was entitled to the caste certificate 
15

of   ‘Scheduled   Caste’   on   the   ground   that   his   adoptive   father 
belonged to Scheduled Caste. Now, the question is as to whether 
this Court on the admitted facts available on record, can exercise 
the power of judicial review to decide the present lis. The extent 
of power of judicial review of the High Court in a similar matter 
has been   decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of 
“Kumari Madhuri Patil”  (Supra), the relevant para of which is 
quoted herein below:­
“15.  The  question  then  is whether  the  approach 
adopted   by   the   High   Court   in   not   elaborately 
considering the case is vitiated by an error of law. 
High Court is not a Court of appeal to appreciate 
the evidence. The Committee which is empowered 
to   evaluate   the   evidence   placed   before   it   when 
records a finding of fact, it ought to prevail unless 
found vitiated by judicial review of any High Court 
subject to limitations of interference with findings 
of   fact.   The   Committee   when   considers   all   the 
material   facts   and   record   a   finding,   though 
another   view,   as   a   Court   of   appeal   may   be 
possible, it is not a ground to reverse the findings. 
The   Court   has   to   see   whether   the   Committee 
considered all the relevant material placed before 
it   or   has   not   applied   its   mind   to   relevant   facts 
which have  led the  Committee  ultimately record 
the finding. Each case must be considered in the 
backdrop of its own facts.”

11.  From   the   aforesaid   judgment,   it   transpires   that   the 
power   of   judicial   review   of   the   High   Court   in   relation   to   the 
finding of fact arrived at by the Committee is limited. However, if 
the court sees that the Committee has not applied its mind to the 
relevant facts available on record which have led the Committee 
to ultimately record its finding, then the court may exercise the 
power of judicial review. It has further been held that each case is 
required   be   considered   on   its   own   fact.   In   the   case   in   hand, 
although   the   CSC   had   sufficient   factual   materials   on   record,   it 
failed in its duty to correctly apply the law and as such, I think it 
appropriate to discuss the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme 
Court, with regard to the present issue on the basis of undisputed 
16

facts emerging in the present writ petition.  

12. The   cases   where   a   SC/ST   woman   marrying   a   man 
belonging to other caste and claiming reservation, the cases where 
offspring   of   an   inter­caste   married  couple­either  of  the   spouses 
belonging to SC/ST claiming reservation and cases where children 
of   forward   caste   parents   taken   in   adoption   into   the   family   of 
SC/ST/BC   claiming   reservation   have   repeatedly   come   up   for 
consideration   before   the   courts.   In   all   the   three   categories   of 
cases, the claim was for preferential treatment either under Article 
15(4) or 16(4) of the Constitution of India. In almost all the cases 
decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court falling in these categories, 
the   test   laid   down   is   whether   the   person   claiming   reservation 
under Article 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India had 
advantageous   start   in   life  before   being   adopted   by   the 
Scheduled Caste family. With regard to the woman of a forward 
caste marrying a man of SC/ST, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the 
case of “Rameshbhai Dabhai Naika Vs. State of Gujarat  Ors.” 
reported in (2012) 3 SCC 400 held that when a woman born in a 
scheduled caste or a scheduled tribe marries a person belonging 
to a forward caste, her caste by birth does not change by virtue of 
the marriage. So far as the cases of the off­spring of inter­caste 
married   couple   where   one   of   the   spouses   belonging   to   SC/ST 
claiming reservation is concerned, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 
paragraph no. 54 of  “Rameshbhai Dabhai Naika”  (supra) held 
that the caste of the offspring is essentially a question of fact to be 
decided   on   the   basis   of   the   facts   adduced   in   each   case.   The 
determination   of   caste   of   a   person   born   out   of   an
inter­caste   marriage   or   a   marriage   between   a   tribal   and   a
non­tribal   cannot   be   determined   in   complete   disregard   to   the 
attending   facts   of   the   case.   In   an   inter­caste   marriage   or   a 
marriage   between   a   tribal   and   a   non­tribal,   there   may   be   a 
presumption   that   the   child   has   the   caste   of   the   father.   This 
presumption may be stronger in the case where in the inter­caste 
17

marriage   or   a   marriage   between   a   tribal   and   a   non­tribal,   the 
husband   belongs   to   a   forward   caste,   but   by   no   means   the 
presumption   is   conclusive   or   irrebuttable   and   it  is   open   to   the 
child of such marriage to lead evidence to show that he/she was 
brought   up   by   the   mother   who   belonged   to   the   scheduled 
caste/scheduled tribe. By virtue of being the child of a forward 
caste father, he/she did not have any advantageous start in life 
but   on   the   contrary,   suffered   the   deprivations,   indignities, 
humilities   and   handicaps   like   any   other   member   of   the 
community to which his/her mother belonged. Additionally, that 
he was always treated as a member of the community to which 
her   mother   belonged   not   only   by   that   community,   but   by   the 
people outside the community as well. The third situation, i.e., a 
child of non­tribal was transplanted to a tribal family by virtue of 
adoption, then whether he will gain the status of tribal for the 
benefit   of   reservation,   is   more   relevant   for   adjudication   of   the 
present case. Thus, it would be pertinent to deal with the said 
issue   in   detail   before   deciding   the   case.   The   judgment   of   the 
Hon’ble   Supreme   Court   in  “Valsamma   Paul   Vs.   Cochin  
University”  reported   in  (1996)   3   SCC   545  is   a   key   judgment 
which   has   been   cited   and   relied   upon   in   various   subsequent 
judgments of  the  different High Courts while deciding the said 
issue and as such, before coming to the merit of the case, I would 
like to take note of the guiding factors laid down by the Hon’ble 
Supreme Court in the case of  “Valsamma Paul”  (Supra).   The 
Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph no. 34 of the said judgment, 
held thus:

“34. In Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar v. Vishwanath 
Pandu,   (1995)   3   JT   (SC)   563   :   (1995   AIR   SCW 
2224);   and   R.   Chandevarappa   v.   State   of 
Karnataka,   (1995)7   JT   (SC)   93,   this   Court   had 
held   that   economic   empowerment   is   a 
fundamental   right   to   the   poor   and   the   State   is 
enjoined   under   Articles   15   (3),   46   and   39   to 
provide   them   opportunities.   Thus,   education, 
employment   and   economic   empowerment   are 
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some   of   the   programmes,   the   State   has   evolved 
and   also   provided   reservation   in   admission   into 
educational   institution,   or   in   case   of   other 
economic benefits under Articles 15 (4) and 46 or 
in   appointment   to   an   office   or   a   post   under   the 
State   under   Article   16   (4).  Therefore,   when   a 
member  is  transplanted into  the  Dalits,  Tribes 
and   OBCs   he/she   must   of   necessity   also 
undergo   same   handicaps,   be   subject   to   the 
same  disabilities,   disadvantages,   indignities  or 
sufferings so as to entitle the candidate to avail 
the facility of reservation. A candidate who had 
the   advantageous   start   in   life   being   born   in 
forward caste and had march of advantageous 
life   but   is   transplanted   in   backward   caste   by 
adoption   or   marriage   or   conversion,   does   not 
become   eligible   to   the   benefit   of   reservation 
either   under   Article   15   (4)   or   16(4)   of   the 
Constitution as the case may be. Acquisition of 
the status of scheduled caste etc, by voluntary 
mobility into these categories would play fraud 
on   the   Constitution,   and   would   frustrate   the 
benign   constitutional   policy   under   Articles   15 
(4) and 16 (4) of the Constitution.”

13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in a clear and explicit term 
held   that   a   person   born   in   privileged   class   and   subsequently 
transplanted   in   unprivileged   class   by   adoption   or   marriage   or 
conversion does not become eligible to the benefit of reservation. 
The Hon’ble Supreme Court further added that acquisition of the 
status   of   scheduled   caste   etc.,   by   voluntary   mobility   into   these 
categories   would   play   fraud   on   the   Constitution,   and   would 
frustrate   the   benign   constitutional   policy   enumerated   under 
Article 15 (4) and 16 (4) of the Constitution. 

14. Similar issue came before a Bench of Andhra Pradesh 
High Court in the case of  “A.S. Sailaja Vs. Principal, Kurnool  
Medical  College,   Kurnool    Ors.”  reported  in  1986  AIR  (AP)  
209, the relevant paragraphs of which are quoted as under:­ 
“40. In the light of law, we have to see whether the 
petitioner, on adoption, becomes a member of the 
Backward   Class.   As   indicated   earlier,   we   would 
always  keep  in  mind  the  constitutional   march  of 
making India secular casteless and classless State 
and   enough   leeway   would   be   allowed   for   free 
mobility   and   interaction   of   all   sections   of   the 
19

Society into an integrated class. But we should also 
keep in mind the constitutional goals set out. By 
adopting   purposive   construction   we   would 
reconcile the right of an individual as against the 
society and the society’s right. Take an illustration 
that a child belonging to a Brahmin is given and 
taken in adoption to a Shepard fairly, at an young 
age, say at first year or second year or even up to 
fifth   year   and   the   child   is   brought   up   in   the 
adoptive   family   in   the   locality   lived   by   the 
members   of   the   Backward   Class   treating   as   ours 
son/daughter, presumptive evidence furnished that 
the child is assimilated in the homogeneous group 
and   integrated   himself/herself   as   a   member   of 
such group imbibing all the traits of the group or 
undergoing   sufferings   or   subjected   to   all   the 
disadvantages   or   handicaps   ignominy   which   the 
members of the homogeneous group are subjected 
to.   In   those   circumstances,   such   a   child   may   be 
considered   to   be   a   member   of   the   homogeneous 
group though had the birth in Brahmin caste. But 
conversely, if a  boy or girl born  in the  advanced 
section   of   the   society,   had   the   advantage   of   the 
natural parental brought up in an atmosphere of 
affluence,   social;   cultural   and   educational 
advanced  start  off  up to fairly a good  age  of  15 
years or so and then taken in adoption, he or she 
cannot   be   said   to  belong  to   homogeneous  group 
into which he/she was transplanted by operation 
of   law   nor   he/she   be   said   to   be   socially   and 
educationally backward.

41.  In   Chitralekhas   case   (AIR   1964   SC   1823) 
(supra),   Subba   Rao,   J.,   (as   he   then   was)   in 
considering the distinction between the classes and 
castes,   held:   “the   juxtaposition   of   the   expression 
“backward Classes” and “scheduled Castes” in Art. 
15 (4) also leads to a reasonable inference that the 
expression “classes” is not synonymous with castes. 
It may be that for ascertaining whether a particular 
citizen or a group of citizens belongs to a backward 
class   or   not,   his   or   their   caste   may   have   some 
relevance,   but   it   cannot   be   either   the   sole   or 
dominant   criterion   for   ascertaining   the   class   to 
which he or they belong. ” (Emphasis supplied ). 
Therefore,   the   caste   as   well   as   the   social   and 
educational backwardness of a citizen who intends 
to   enter   into   the   fold   of   the   Backward   Class   or 
Scheduled   Castes   or   Scheduled   Tribes   is   also   a 
relevant   factor   and   it   must   be   established   as   of 
fact. 

42.  In   the   light   of   the   above   consideration,   the 
necessary conclusion is that an adoption under the 
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Act is personal the purpose of S. 12 is that he or 
she becomes completely a member of the adoptive 
family “for all that purposes” ­­ be it for a religious 
or   secular   purpose,   but   “for   the   purpose   of   the 
Constitution”, under Articles 14, 15 (4) and 16 (4), 
the adopted child must satisfy not only that he or 
she belongs to the particular homogeneous group 
or class or tribe but also become a member of the 
homogeneous   group   or   class   or   tribe,   also   had 
suffered   or   subjected   to   all   the   disadvantages   of 
handicaps which the members of the homogeneous 
group,   class   or   tribe,   are   subjected   to   or   have 
undergone   or   is   undergoing.   In   that   context, 
recognition   of   such   a   person   by   the   caste   or 
community   elders   to   which   the   adoptee   has 
already   been   assimilated   or   seeks   an   entry   is   a 
relevant   factor   which   has   to   be   established   as   a 
fact.   The   purpose   of   adoption   under   S.   12   is 
personal to the adoptee and is distinct and apart 
from the constitutional scheme under Articles 14, 
15  (4)  and  16  (4).  The   registration  under   S.  16 
furnishes  only  a   rebuttable   presumptive   evidence 
that the adoption was made in compliance with the 
provisions of the Act. Therefore, the presumption 
advances   thus   far   and   no   further   and   is   of   little 
avail to the benefits under Articles 15 (4) and 16 
(4) of the Constitution.”

15. This issue in no more res­integra.  The reason or the 
historical   background   under   which   the   Indian   Constitution 
provided for reservation to scheduled caste and scheduled tribe 
was rooted in the social history of such caste or community. It was 
in this background, the benefit of reservation was provided under 
the Indian Constitution and has been continued thereafter. Such 
an ethos or reasoning has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme 
Court in detail in the case of “Valsamma Paul” (supra). I am also 
in   respectful   agreement   with   the   view   taken   by   the   Andhra 
Pradesh   High   Court   in   the   case   of  “A.S   Shailaja”  (supra), 
wherein it has been held that if a child of Brahmin family was 
taken in adoption in a Shepard family in a very early age i.e., upto 
the age of 5 years and a presumptive evidence is furnished that 
the child is assimilated in the homogeneous group and integrated 
himself/herself as a member of such group imbibing all the traits 
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of   the   group   or   undergoing   sufferings   or   subjected   to   all   the 
disadvantages or handicaps/ignominy which the members of the 
said homogeneous group are subjected to, then only a child may 
be considered to be a member of the said homogeneous group 
though he/she had the birth in Brahmin caste. However, a child 
who has social, cultural and educational advantageous start in life 
upto   15   years   or   so   and   then   taken   in   adoption   by   a   Shepard 
family, he/she cannot be said to be the part of the homogeneous 
group into which he/she was transplanted. 

16.   In   the   present   case,   admittedly,   the   petitioner   was 
taken in adoption by a Scheduled Caste family at the age of about 
14  years.   The  petitioner has not been  able  to establish that he 
became part and parcel of the adoptive family for all purposes i.e., 
social, religious, cultural etc. Rather, the case  in hand discloses 
that   after   being   adopted   by   a   scheduled   caste   person,   the 
scheduled   caste   certificate   was   obtained   by   the   petitioner   and 
used   for   educational   and   employment   purposes.   The   petitioner 
has also failed to establish that after his adoption he became part 
of   the   homogeneous   group   of   scheduled   caste   community   and 
suffered  all the social sanctions, ridiculous/ignominy as well as 
the   handicaps   being   an   integral   member   of   scheduled   caste 
society. On the contrary, it is the admitted case of the petitioner 
that he after adoption, got a scheduled caste certificate and thus, 
he   certainly   stood  higher  amongst  the  other  candidates of  that 
category. Moreover, as per the assertion of the petitioner himself, 
he,   even   after   the   adoption   by   a   Scheduled   Caste   person, 
continued to study in the same school and obtained best possible 
higher education which itself indicates that he had never suffered 
any deprivation even after the adoption. The object of introducing 
the scheme of reservation is to provide proper representation to 
the   oppressed   and   underprivileged   class   of   citizens   in   public 
employment and if any person who had an advantageous start in 
life   for   a   considerable   age   (in   the   present   case   –   14   years)   is 
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allowed to compete with a person who, since the time of birth has 
suffered   social   indignities   and   deprivation,   the   object   of 
introducing the scheme of reservation is frustrated.

17. The petitioner is also not justified in contending that 
since   his   natural   father   belonged   to   Other   Backward   Class,   it 
would   have   made   no   material   difference   on   the   issue   of 
reservation after being adopted by a Scheduled Caste person, as 
the OBC (Baniya caste) itself has been notified by the Government 
to avail the benefit of reservation in public employment. In my 
considered   view,   both   caste/class   have   different   and   distinct 
historical background. The scheduled castes are those who have 
suffered the social evil of untouchability over the period of time 
by the other castes of the society, whereas the “Other Backward 
Classes” are those who have  been treated as relatively backward 
in   social,   economic   and   educational   front.   Moreover,   both   the 
caste/class have been recognized differently by the Constitution of 
India and thereby provided different protection/privileges. Thus, 
a “Scheduled Caste”, by no means, can be equated with “Other 
Backward Classes”.   

18. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has put 
much reliance upon a judgment of Division Bench of this Court in 
the case of “State of Bihar  Ors. Vs. Kumari Abha”  (supra), 
wherein it has been held as under:

14. In the present case, the writ petitioner ­Kumari 
Abha  originally born  in  a  Backward class ‘Kurmi’ 
family, she by birth was not a forward class. In this 
background,   the   State   cannot   equate   her   with   a 
member of a forward caste Hindu.

 

15.  It   is   not   in   dispute   that   Kumari   Abha   was 
adopted by (Late) Ramdin Ram, a scheduled caste 
at the age of 5 years. She was born in a family of 
backward   caste   ‘Kurmi’   and   after   her 
transplantation   in   a   Scheduled   Caste   family   by 
adoption she was brought up in a family of most 
backward class. It is also not in dispute that since 
her   5   years   age   brought   up   in   the   family   of   a 
Scheduled Caste was subjected to the disabilities, 
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disadvantages,   indignities   or   sufferings   of   a 
Backward class. In the background, there appears 
to be no reason to deny her the facility to which a 
members of SC is entitled.

16. Further, it is not the case of the appellant­State 
that   she   misrepresented   to   obtain   a   Scheduled 
Caste Certificate, nor there is anything on record to 
suggest that the certificate is forged. On the other 
hand, it is evident that the writ petitioner­Kumari 
Abha   was   granted   caste   certificate   by   the 
competent authority after an enquiry.

19. The   fact   situation   of   the   aforesaid   case   was   entirely 
different   where   the   child   was   taken   in   adoption   at   the   age   of
5   years   and   as   it   has   already   been   discussed   hereinabove   that 
when the child is adopted at a very early age and he/she suffers 
the   disadvantages   or   handicaps/ignominy,   then   he/she   would 
certainly be treated as integral part of scheduled caste community. 
However,   in   the   case   in   hand,   admittedly,   the   petitioner   was 
adopted at the age of 14 years and did not suffer disadvantageous 
start  in  life,  thus  the  ratio of  “Kumari  Abha”  (Supra) will not 
apply   to   the   case   of   the   petitioner.   In   the   matter   of   adoption 
“Advantageous start in life” is the key factor for determination of 
entitlement for the benefit of reservation on the basis of claim of 
being   a   member   of   Scheduled   Caste.   Once   it   is   evident   that   a 
person   has   advantageous   start   in   life   i.e.,   he/she   has   spent   a 
considerable  period in  the family of a non­scheduled caste and 
thereafter came into the scheduled caste family, does not entitle 
him/her   for   the   benefit   of   reservation   meant   for   that   caste. 
However,   if  a  child has been  adopted at a very early age  by a 
scheduled caste family, then he/she will be entitled to the benefit 
of reservation meant for that category as there is a high chance of 
his/her suffering with the same disability as that of the adoptive 
family.  

20.  The  argument  of the  learned Senior Counsel for the 
petitioner   that   the   enquiry   was   not   completed   within   the   time 
stipulated  by the  Hon’ble Supreme Court  in “Kumari Madhuri  
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Patil” (Supra) and as such, the same has no legal sanctity cannot 
be accepted as the time limit prescribed by the Hon’ble Supreme 
Court is directive in nature depending upon various eventualities. 
From the fact of the present case, it is evident that the matter was 
pending with the CSC of State of Jharkhand whereas the subject 
matter of inquiry was in the territorial jurisdiction of the State of 
Bihar   which   appears   to   be   one   of   the   reasons   for   delay   in 
conclusion   of   the   proceeding.   The   learned   Additional   Advocate 
General has invited the attention of this court to sub­para (10) of 
Para   13   of   the   judgment   of   “Kumari   Madhuri   Patil”  (Supra), 
which   deals   with   the   situation   where   the   proceeding   is   not 
completed   within   the   time   stipulated   by   the   Hon’ble   Supreme 
Court.   The   further   argument   of   the   learned   Senior   Counsel 
appearing   on   behalf   of   the   petitioner   that   the   CSC   being   a
quasi­judicial   authority   and     a   delegatee   itself,   could   not   have
re­delegated   the   inquiry   to   other   authority   also   cannot   be 
accepted as in the case of  “Ravi Prakash”  (Supra), the Hon’ble 
Supreme Court has held that the Caste Scrutiny Committee may 
devolve  its own procedure  for making an inquiry to collect  the 
evidences.   Since   the   CSC   has   recorded   the   situation   in   the 
impugned order itself that the place of inquiry was situated within 
the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Bihar and as such, it was 
thought appropriate to call for a report from the Government of 
Bihar, the recording of evidence cannot be said to be vitiated on 
that score. The further argument of the learned Senior Counsel for 
the petitioner to the effect that the petitioner has not been given 
opportunity to cross­examine the witnesses and also the inquiry 
was done behind his back is also not tenable as in paragraph no. 
13 of “Kumari Madhuri Patil”  (Supra), it is nowhere stipulated 
that the inquiry should be made in the presence of the candidate. 
Moreover, it could not be established by the petitioner as to what 
prejudice was caused to him in recording the statements of the 
witnesses  during   the  enquiry.  Moreover, the  record  reveals  that 
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the petitioner was given ample opportunity to adduce evidence 
before the CSC and the petitioner also produced all the evidences 
in his support, thus the said contention raised on behalf of the 
petitioner cannot be accepted.  

21.  In view of the aforesaid discussion, I see no reason to 
interfere   with  the impugned order dated 07.06.2017 passed by 
the Caste Scrutiny Committee and also the enquiry report dated 
29.07.2015. 

22. The writ petition being devoid of merit is accordingly 
dismissed. 

(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi
Dated:  11/10/2017
Manish/A.F.R.

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