Ramkuamr Sharma vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 23 October, 2017

1 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 3794 of 2015

HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
BENCH AT GWALIOR
*****************
SB:- Hon’ble Shri Justice G. S. Ahluwalia

MCRC 3787 /2015

Haricharan Sharma Anr.
Vs.
State of MP Anr.

MCRC 3791/2015

Ashok Kumar Sharma
Vs.
State of MP Anr.

And

MCRC 3794/2015

Ramkumar Sharma and Anr.
Vs.
State of MP Anr.

Shri Kuldeep Thapak, counsel for the applicants in MCRC 3787,
3791 and 3794 of 2015.
Shri SS Dhakad, Public Prosecutor for the respondent No.1/ State
in MCRC 3787, 3791 and 3794 of 2015.
Shri Pawan Singh Raghuvanshi, counsel for the respondent No.2
in MCRC 3787, 3791 and 3794 of 2015.

ORDER

(Passed on 23/10/2017)

This order shall also dispose of M.Cr.C. No. 3791/2015 and
3794/2015 filed by Ram Kumar Sharma, Smt. Shweta Sharma,
Ashok Kumar Sharma, Haricharan Sharma and Smt. Sagun Bai.

2. These applications under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. have been
filed for quashing the F.I.R. in Crime No.194/2014 registered by
Police Station Dehat, Vidisha for offence under Section 498-A/34
of I.P.C.

2 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 3794 of 2015

3. The undisputed facts are that applicants in M.Cr.C. No.
3787/2015, namely Haricharan Sharma and Smt. Sagun Bai are
the father-in-law and mother-in-law of the respondent no.2,
whereas Ashok Sharma in M.Cr.C. No.3791/2015 is uncle-in-law
(Chacha Sasur) of respondent no.2 and Smt. Shweta Sharma and
Ramkumar Sharma in M.Cr.C. No.3794/2015 are sister-in-law
(Nanad) and husband of sister-in-law (Nandoi) of the respondent
no.2.

4. It is pointed out by the Counsel for the respondent no.2, that
after filing the present applications under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., a
false statement was made by the applicants and co-accused
Dharmendra Sharma before the Trial Court, that this Court has
stayed the further proceedings and sought time to place the order
of stay before the Trial Court and the Trial Court, relying on the
statements made by the accused persons had adjourned the case
and only after the respondent no.2 filed the ordersheets of these
cases before the Trial Court, further proceedings could take place.
To buttress his contentions, the Counsel for the respondent no. 2
has provided the certified copy of the order dated 29-7-2016 and
29-8-2016, passed by the Trial Court, from which it is clear that on
29-7-2016, the Counsel for the co-accused made a statement that
interim order has been passed by this Court. The Counsel for the
respondent no. 2 appeared before the Trial Court and sought
permission to assist the prosecution and the Trial Court directed
the Counsel for the respondent no.2 to produce the copy of the
interim order passed by this Court. On 29-8-2016, the Counsel for
the accused persons after filing the copy of some orders passed in
M.Cr.C. No.3252/2015, 3794/2015, 3791/2015, and 3785/2015
before the Trial Court, made a statement that the further
proceedings have been stayed and sought for time to produce the
copy of the same. Thus, it is submitted that the applicants have
not come with a clean hands and had tried to play fraud on the
3 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 3794 of 2015

Trial Court by making false statements.

5. Orders dated 29-7-2016 and 29-8-2016 passed by the Trial
Court read as under :-

”29-7-2016 jkT; }kjk ,-Mh-ih-vks-

vkjksih gfjjpj.k lfgr vf/k- Jh larksi ‘kekZA
vkjksih euksgj e`rA
‘ks”k vkjksihx.k vuq- mudh vksj ls muds vf/k-

Jh us mi- gksdj gktjh ekQh vkosnu izLrqr fd;k] ckn fopkj
LohdkjA
iz- vkjksi rdZ gsrq fu;r gSA
izdj.k esa vkjksihx.k dh vksj ls mifLFkr fo}ku
vf/k- Jh larks”k ‘kekZ us O;Dr fd;k fd ekuuh; mPp
U;k;ky; ls bl izdj.k dh dk;Zokgh LFkfxr fd;s tkus dk
vkns’k gks pqdk gS] muls vkns’k izLrqr djus gsrq dgs tkus ij
mUgksus crk;k fd nwjHkk”k ij lwpuk izkIr gqbZ gS] vkns’k dqN
gh fnu es izkIr gksxkA
blh izdze ij izdj.k dh Qfj;knh ehuw ‘kekZ dh
vksj ls vf/k- Jh jkeukjk;.k }kjk /kkjk 301 na-iz-la- ds varxZr
vfHk;kstu ds leFkZu dh vuqefr pkghA
izdj.k dk voyksdu fd;k x;kA
mHk; i{k dks lquk x;kA
viuh ilan ds vf/k- ls iSjoh djkus dk vf/kdkj
,d laoS/kkfud vf/kdkj gS] fadrq nkafMd ekeyksa es ;g /kkjk
301 na-iz-la- es of.kZr lhekvksa ds v/khu gS] ckn fopkj vkosnu
varxZr /kkjk 301 na-iz-la- Lohdkj dj vfHk;kstu dh lgk;rk
gsrq vuqefr iznku dh tkrh gSA
cpko i{k dks funsZf’kr fd;k tkrk gS fd og
vkxkeh fu;r fnukad dks ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ds LFkxu
vkns’k dks izekf.ke izfr is’k djs vU;Fkk lHkh vkjksihx.k vkjksi
dh dk;Zokgh gsrq mifLFkr jgsaA
iz-vkjksi rdZ gsrq fn- 29-8-2016 dks j[kk tk;sA”

”29-8-2016 jkT; }kjk ,-Mh-ih-vks-

vkjksih gfjjpj.k lfgr vf/k- Jh larks”k ‘kekZ A
vkjksih euksgj e`rA
‘ks”k vkjksihx.k vuq- mudh vksj ls muds vf/k-

Jh us mi- gksdj gktjh ekQh vkosnu izLrqr fd;k] ckn fopkj
LohdkjA
iz- vkjksi rdZ gsrq fu;r gSA
vkjksih ds vf/k- us mifLFkr gksdj ekuuh; mPp
U;k;ky; esa yafcr ,e-lh-vkj-lh- uEcj 3252@2015 ,oa
ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ds vkijkf/kd izdj.k 3794/2015,
3791/2015 ,oa 3785/2015 ds U;k;ky; ds vkns’k
dh izfr;ka is’k dhA
vkjksih ds vf/k- }kjk O;Dr fd;k x;k fd izdj.k
es ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ls dk;Zokgh LFfxr fd;s tkus dk
vkns’k gks pqdk gSa] fdarq mUgs vkns’k dh izfr;ka izkIr ugh gqbZ gS
4 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 3794 of 2015

le; iznku fd;k tk;sA
cpko i{k dks funsZf’kr fd;k tkrk gS fd og
vkxkeh fu;r fnukad dks ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ds LFkxu
vkns’k dks izekf.kr izfrfyfi izLrqr djs vU;Fkk lHkh vkjksihx.k
vkjksi dh dk;Zokgh esa mifLFkr jgsaA
iz- fn- 29-9-2016 dks j[kk tk;sA”

6. It is submitted that only when the Counsel for the respondent
no.2 filed the order-sheets of the High Court to show that there is
no interim order, the further proceedings for framing of charges
were taken up. Thus, from the order-sheets dated 29-7-2016 and
27-8-2016, it is clear that false statements were made before the
Trial Court with regard to the interim orders passed by this Court
and the case was got adjourned. At this stage, the Counsel for the
applicants submit that as they were absent therefore, they were not
aware of any statement made by the Counsel for the co-accused
Dharmendra. Be that as it may. The fact is that, on two occasions,
statement was made before the Trial Court to the effect that the
further proceedings have been stayed by this Court, which was
factually incorrect.

7. It is further submitted by the Counsel for the respondent no.2
that during the pendency of this application, charges were framed
and some of the prosecution witnesses have also been examined
and thus, the Trial has reached to an advance stage and therefore,
at this stage, the legitimate prosecution of the applicants may not
be stifled. Further it is submitted by the Counsel for the
respondent no.2 that the applicants had an opportunity to challenge
the order framing charge which has not been done, therefore,
where a specific remedy is available to a party, then the provision
under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. should not be resorted to. It is further
submitted that the applicants had sought the quashment of F.I.R.
and did not pray for quashment of the charge sheet as the same
was already filed, therefore, on that ground also, the present
petition is not maintainable.

5 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 3794 of 2015

8. The necessary facts for the disposal of the present
applications in short are that the respondent no.2, on 4-4-2014,
made a written complaint to the S.H.O.,. Police station Civil Lines,
Vidisha on the allegation that She was married to Dharmendra on
29-5-2012 as per Hindu Rites and Rituals at Vidisha. Several
household articles, ornaments and cash amount of Rs. 50,000 was
given at the time of marriage. The marriage was fixed by keeping
the respondent no.2 in dark that Dharmendra is in job whereas he
was unemployed. Immediately after the marriage, the applicants
and Dharmendra started demanding Rs. 5 lacs for starting business
and also demanded a diesel car in place of Alto car. When the
respondent no.2 refused to accept the demands of the applicants,
then the applicants started instigating Dharmendra and in his turn,
Dharmendra started assaulting the respondent no.2. Ramkumar
Sharma and Shweta who are residing at Vidisha, were also
instigating Dharmenda as a result of which, She was beaten by
Dharmendra. The respondent no.2 was also forced to do the entire
household work and proper treatment was not provided during her
pregnancy as a result of which, her son is not well and his
treatment is going on in Delhi. The applicants used to pressurize
the respondent no.2 to bring the amount which was spent on the
treatment of her son. The co-accused Dharmendra also used to
beat her under the influence of liquor. An amount of Rs. 2 lacs
was once again demanded at the time of marriage of her younger
sister-in-law Ritu, by co-accused Dharmendra. On 22-12-2013,
the applicants and co-accused, by keeping the respondent no.2 in
dark, left her in her parent’s home and did not take her son to Delhi
for treatment. Now a threat is being extended by the applicants
and co-accused Dharmendra, that they would not keep the
respondent no. 2 with them unless and until, an amount of Rs.
5,00,000/- a diesel car and expenses for the treatment of son, is
brought by the respondent no.2 from her parents. The police on
6 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 3794 of 2015

the basis of the written complaint, lodged the F.I.R. and after
recording the statements of the witnesses and completing
remaining formalities, filed a charge sheet for offence under
498A/34 of I.P.C.

9. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties.

10. It is submitted by the Counsel for the applicants, that in
order to prosecute the near and dear relatives, specific allegations
should have been made and in the present case, only vague
allegations have been made which are not sufficient to prosecute
them. It is further submitted that the co-accused Dharmendra had
filed an application under Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act, for
restitution of conjugal rights which has been allowed and a decree
for restitution of conjugal rights has been passed but still the
respondent no.2 has not joined the company of the co-accused
Dharmendra, which clearly shows that it is the respondent no.2
who is not interested in living with the co-accused Dharmendra
and is residing separately without any reasonable reason. To
buttress his contentions, the Counsel for the applicants has also
relied on the judgment of Supreme Court passed in the case of
Geeta Mehrotra Anr. vs. State of U.P. Ors. reported in
(2012) 10 SCC 741.

11. Per contra, it is submitted by the Counsel for the respondent
no.2, that the findings of the Civil Court are not binding on the
Criminal Court and the Criminal proceedings are to be decided on
its own merits. There are specific allegations against the
applicants. The Counsel for the respondent no.2 also relied upon
the judgment passed by the the Supreme Court in the case of
Taramani Parakh v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in
(2015) 11 SCC 260.

12. So far as the judgment passed in a petition under Section 9
of Hindu Marriage Act is concerned, suffice it to say that the
findings recorded by the Civil Court are not binding on the
7 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 3794 of 2015

Criminal Court and therefore, the proceedings under Section 498A
of I.P.C. cannot be quashed on the said ground. The Supreme
Court in the case of Pratibha v. Rameshwari Devi and Ors.
reported in (2007) 12 SCC 369 has held as under:-

“16. It is pertinent to note that the complaint
was filed only when all efforts to return to the
matrimonial home had failed and Respondent 2
husband had filed a divorce petition under
Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
That apart, in our view, filing of a divorce
petition in a civil court cannot be a ground to
quash criminal proceedings under Section 482
of the Code as it is well settled that criminal and
civil proceedings are separate and independent
and the pendency of a civil proceeding cannot
bring to an end a criminal proceeding even if
they arise out of the same set of facts. Such
being the position, we are, therefore, of the view
that the High Court while exercising its powers
under Section 482 of the Code has gone beyond
the allegations made in the FIR and has acted in
excess of its jurisdiction and, therefore, the
High Court was not justified in quashing the
FIR by going beyond the allegations made in
the FIR or by relying on extraneous
considerations.”

13. Furthermore, in the present case, the written complaint was
made by the respondent no. 2 on 4-4-2014 and the petition under
Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act was also filed on 4-4-2014 itself,
therefore, it cannot be said that the F.I.R. was counterblast of the
Petition filed under Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act.

14. So far as the allegations against the applicants Haricharan
and Smt. Sagun bai are concerned, the Supreme Court in the case
of Taramani Parakh (Supra) has held as under :

“10. The law relating to quashing is well
settled. If the allegations are absurd or do not
make out any case or if it can be held that there
is abuse of process of law, the proceedings can
be quashed but if there is a triable case the
Court does not go into reliability or otherwise
of the version or the counter-version. In
8 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 3794 of 2015

matrimonial cases, the Courts have to be
cautious when omnibus allegations are made
particularly against relatives who are not
generally concerned with the affairs of the
couple. We may refer to the decisions of this
Court dealing with the issue.

11. Referring to earlier decisions, in Amit
Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander (2012) 9 SCC
460, it was observed (SCC pp. 482-84, para

27):

“27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers
of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but
the more the power, the more due care and
caution is to be exercised in invoking these
powers. The power of quashing criminal
proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in
terms of Section 228 of the Code should be
exercised very sparingly and with
circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare
cases.

27.2. The Court should apply the test as to
whether the uncontroverted allegations as made
from the record of the case and the documents
submitted therewith prima facie establish the
offence or not. If the allegations are so patently
absurd and inherently improbable that no
prudent person can ever reach such a
conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a
criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court
may interfere.

27.3. The High Court should not unduly
interfere. No meticulous examination of the
evidence is needed for considering whether the
case would end in conviction or not at the stage
of framing of charge or quashing of charge.
27.4. Where the exercise of such power is
absolutely essential to prevent patent
miscarriage of justice and for correcting some
grave error that might be committed by the
subordinate courts even in such cases, the High
Court should be loath to interfere, at the
threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise
of its inherent powers.

27.5. Where there is an express legal bar
enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or
any specific law in force to the very initiation
or institution and continuance of such criminal
proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide
9 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 3794 of 2015

specific protection to an accused.

27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the
freedom of a person and the right of the
complainant or prosecution to investigate and
prosecute the offender.

27.7. The process of the court cannot be
permitted to be used for an oblique or
ultimate/ulterior purpose.

27.8. Where the allegations made and as they
appeared from the record and documents
annexed therewith to predominantly give rise
and constitute a “civil wrong” with no “element
of criminality” and does not satisfy the basic
ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may
be justified in quashing the charge. Even in
such cases, the court would not embark upon
the critical analysis of the evidence.
27.9. Another very significant caution that the
courts have to observe is that it cannot examine
the facts, evidence and materials on record to
determine whether there is sufficient material
on the basis of which the case would end in a
conviction; the court is concerned primarily
with the allegations taken as a whole whether
they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an
abuse of the process of court leading to
injustice.

27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court
called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to
appreciate evidence collected by the
investigating agencies to find out whether it is a
case of acquittal or conviction.

27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil
claim and also amount to an offence, merely
because a civil claim is maintainable, does not
mean that a criminal complaint cannot be
maintained.

27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under
Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the
Court cannot take into consideration external
materials given by an accused for reaching the
conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that
there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court
has to consider the record and documents
annexed therewith by the prosecution.
27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to
the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the
offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court
10 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 3794 of 2015

should be more inclined to permit continuation
of prosecution rather than its quashing at that
initial stage. The Court is not expected to
marshal the records with a view to decide
admissibility and reliability of the documents or
records but is an opinion formed prima facie.
27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under
Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from
fundamental legal defects, the Court may be
well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge.
27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above,
where the Court finds that it would amount to
abuse of process of the Code or that the interest
of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the
charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito
justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for
administration of which alone, the courts exist.
(Ref. State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha
[(1982) 1 SCC 561 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 283 : AIR
1982 SC 949]; Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v.
Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [(1988) 1
SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234]; Janata Dal v.
H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305 : 1993
SCC (Cri) 36 : AIR 1993 SC 892]; Rupan Deol
Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC
194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059]; G. Sagar Suri v.
State of U.P. [(2000) 2 SCC 636 : 2000 SCC
(Cri) 513]; Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. [(2003) 3
SCC 11 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 703]; Pepsi Foods
Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate [(1998) 5
SCC 749 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1400 : AIR 1998 SC
128]; State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma [(1996) 7
SCC 705 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 497]; Ganesh
Narayan Hegde v. S. Bangarappa [(1995) 4
SCC 41 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 634]; Zandu
Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful
Haque [(2005) 1 SCC 122 : 2005 SCC (Cri)
283]; Medchl Chemicals Pharma (P) Ltd. v.
Biological E. Ltd. [(2000) 3 SCC 269 : 2000
SCC (Cri) 615 : AIR 2000 SC 1869]; Shakson
Belthissor v. State of Kerala [(2009) 14 SCC
466 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1412]; V.V.S. Rama
Sharma v. State of U.P. [(2009) 7 SCC 234 :
(2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 356]; Chunduru Siva Ram
Krishna v. Peddi Ravindra Babu [(2009) 11
SCC 203 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1297];

Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar [(1987) 1
SCC 288 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 82]; State of Bihar
11 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 3794 of 2015

v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : 1992
SCC (Cri) 192 : AIR 1991 SC 1260]; Lalmuni
Devi v. State of Bihar [(2001) 2 SCC 17 : 2001
SCC (Cri) 275]; M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh
[(2001) 8 SCC 645 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 19];

Savita v. State of Rajasthan [(2005) 12 SCC
338 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 571] and S.M. Datta
v. State of Gujarat [(2001) 7 SCC 659 : 2001
SCC (Cri) 1361 : 2001 SCC (LS) 1201]).
27.16. These are the principles which
individually and preferably cumulatively (one
or more) be taken into consideration as precepts
to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude
and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code
by the High Court. Where the factual
foundation for an offence has been laid down,
the courts should be reluctant and should not
hasten to quash the proceedings even on the
premise that one or two ingredients have not
been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if
there is substantial compliance with the
requirements of the offence.”

12. In Kailash Chandra Agrawal Anr. vs.
State of U.P. (2014) 16 SCC 51, it was
observed: (SCC p. 553, paras 8-9):

“8. We have gone through the FIR and the
criminal complaint. In the FIR, the appellants
have not been named and in the criminal
complaint they have been named without
attributing any specific role to them. The
relationship of the appellants with the husband
of the complainant is distant. In Kans Raj vs.
State of Punjab [(2000) 5 SCC 207], it was
observed:- (SCC p.217, para 5)
“5. … A tendency has, however, developed for
roping in all relations of the in-laws of the
deceased wives in the matters of dowry deaths
which, if not discouraged, is likely to affect the
case of the prosecution even against the real
culprits. In their over enthusiasm and anxiety to
seek conviction for maximum people, the
parents of the deceased have been found to be
making efforts for involving other relations
which ultimately weaken the case of the
prosecution even against the real accused as
appears to have happened in the instant case.”
The Court has, thus, to be careful in
summoning distant relatives without there
12 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 3794 of 2015

being specific material. Only the husband, his
parents or at best close family members may be
expected to demand dowry or to harass the wife
but not distant relations, unless there is tangible
material to support allegations made against
such distant relations. Mere naming of distant
relations is not enough to summon them in
absence of any specific role and material to
support such role.

9. The parameters for quashing proceedings in a
criminal complaint are well known. If there are
triable issues, the Court is not expected to go
into the veracity of the rival versions but where
on the face of it, the criminal proceedings are
abuse of Court’s process, quashing jurisdiction
can be exercised. Reference may be made to K.
Ramakrsihna and Ors. vs. State of Bihar
[(2000) 8 SCC 547], Pepsi Foods Ltd. v.
Judicial Magistrate [(1998) 5 SCC 749], State
of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal [(1992) Supp (1)
SCC 335] and Asmathunnisa v. State of A.P.
[(2011) 11 SCC 259].”

13. In the present case, the complaint is as
follows:

“Sir, it is submitted that I was married on
18.11.09 with Sidharath Parakh s/o Manak
Chand Parak, r/o Sarafa Bazar in front of Radha
Krishna Market, Gwalior according to the
Hindu rites and customs. In the marriage my
father had given gold and silver ornaments,
cash amount and household goods according to
his capacity. After the marriage when I went to
my matrimonial home, I was treated nicely by
the members of the family. When on the second
occasion I went to my matrimonial, my
husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law
started harassing me for not bringing the dowry
and started saying that I should bring from my
father 25-30 tolas of gold and Rs.2,00,000/- in
cash and only then they would keep me in the
house otherwise not. On account of this my
husband also used to beat me and my father-in-
law and my mother-in-law used to torture me
by giving the taunts. In this connection I used to
tell my father Kundanmal Oswal, my mother
Smt. Prem Lata Oswal, uncle Ashok Rai
Sharma and uncle Ved Prakash Mishra from
time to time. On 2.4.2010 the members of the
13 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 3794 of 2015

family of my matrimonial home forcibly sent
me to the house of my parents in Ganj Basoda
along with my brother Deepak. They snatched
my clothes and ornaments and kept with them.
Since then till today my husband has been
harassing me on the telephone and has not
come to take me back. Being compelled, I have
been moving this application before you. Sir, it
is prayed that action be taken against husband
Sidharath Parakh, my father-in-law Manak
Chand Parakh and my mother-in-law Smt.
Indira Parakh for torturing me on account of
demanding the dowry.”

14. From a reading of the complaint, it cannot
be held that even if the allegations are taken as
proved no case is made out. There are
allegations against Respondent No.2 and his
parents for harassing the complainant which
forced her to leave the matrimonial home. Even
now she continues to be separated from the
matrimonial home as she apprehends lack of
security and safety and proper environment in
the matrimonial home. The question whether
the appellant has in fact been harassed and
treated with cruelty is a matter of trial but at
this stage, it cannot be said that no case is made
out. Thus, quashing of proceedings before the
trial is not permissible.”

15. So far as the allegations against Ashok Sharma, Ramkumar
Sharma and Shweta Sharma are concerned, in the F.I.R., it is
alleged that they were also demanding Rs. 5,00,000/- and a diesel
Alto Car in place of Petrol Car. Further, it was alleged that the
marriage was fixed by keeping the respondent no.2 and her family
in dark by projecting that the co-accused Dharmendra is in job
whereas he was unemployed. Thus, fixing the marriage by making
false statements with regard to the employment of the bride
groom may also amount to cruelty or fraud. These are the highly
disputed questions of fact which are required to be proved at the
Trial and cannot be decided at this stage. Furthermore, as already
submitted, some of the witnesses have already been examined in
14 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 3794 of 2015

the Trial Court and the Trial has reached to an advance stage
therefore, interference in the Trial at this stage is not warranted.
Further, the applicants have filed the present application for
quashment of the F.I.R., although by that time, the charge sheet
was already filed and they could have prayed for quashment of
charge sheet which was not done. It is well established principle
of law that when the allegations made in the complaint makes out
a cognizable offence, then it is obligatory on the part of the police
to register the F.I.R. The Supreme Court in the case of Lalita
Kumari Vs. Govt. of U.P. reported in (2014) 2 SCC 1 has held as
under :

”120. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we
hold:

120.1. The registration of FIR is mandatory
under Section 154 of the Code, if the
information discloses commission of a
cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry
is permissible in such a situation.
120.2. If the information received does not
disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the
necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry
may be conducted only to ascertain whether
cognizable offence is disclosed or not.
120.3. If the inquiry discloses the commission
of a cognizable offence, the FIR must be
registered. In cases where preliminary inquiry
ends in closing the complaint, a copy of the
entry of such closure must be supplied to the
first informant forthwith and not later than one
week. It must disclose reasons in brief for
closing the complaint and not proceeding
further.

120.4. The police officer cannot avoid his duty
of registering offence if cognizable offence is
disclosed. Action must be taken against erring
officers who do not register the FIR if
information received by him discloses a
cognizable offence.

120.5. The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to
verify the veracity or otherwise of the
information received but only to ascertain
whether the information reveals any cognizable
15 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 3794 of 2015

offence.

120.6. As to what type and in which cases
preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will
depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case. The category of cases in which
preliminary inquiry may be made are as under:

(a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes

(b) Commercial offences

(c) Medical negligence cases

(d) Corruption cases

(e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches
in initiating criminal prosecution, for example,
over 3 months’ delay in reporting the matter
without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for
delay.

The aforesaid are only illustrations and not
exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant
preliminary inquiry.

120.7. While ensuring and protecting the rights
of the accused and the complainant, a
preliminary inquiry should be made time-bound
and in any case it should not exceed 7 days. The
fact of such delay and the causes of it must be
reflected in the General Diary entry.
120.8. Since the General Diary/Station
Diary/Daily Diary is the record of all
information received in a police station, we
direct that all information relating to cognizable
offences, whether resulting in registration of
FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be
mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the
said diary and the decision to conduct a
preliminary inquiry must also be reflected, as
mentioned above.”

16. Thus, where the allegations contained in the F.I.R., prima
facie makes out an offence, then neither the F.I.R. can be quashed
nor the consequential proceedings can be quashed.

17. Accordingly, the applications i.e., M.Cr.C. Nos. 3787/2015,
3791/2015 and 3794/2015 fail and are hereby dismissed.

(G.S. Ahluwalia)
Judge
/10/2017
*MKB*

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