Anil Kumar Garg & Ors vs State & Anr. on 11 September, 2017

$~24
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decision: 11.09.2017
+ W.P.(CRL) 2159/2017
ANIL KUMAR GARG ORS ….. Petitioners
Through Mr.Sushil Shukla, Adv. with
Mr.Rachit Batra, Adv. with petitioners No.1 and 2
in person.

versus

STATE ANR. ….. Respondents
Through Mr.Ashish Negi, Adv. for Ms.Richa
Kapoor, ASC for State with W/ASI Krishna, P.S.
Vikas Puri.
Mr.Himanshu Kapoor, Adv. for R-2 along with
respondent No.2 in person.

CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD GOEL
VINOD GOEL, J. (Oral)

1. Respondent No.2 appears in person. She is being represented by her
counsel. She is duly identified by IO W/ASI Krishna.

2. The petitioners have invoked the writ jurisdiction of this court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short ‘Cr.PC’) for quashing of
the FIR bearing No.0409/2016, registered on 20.05.2016 against them
with Police Station Vikas Puri, West District, Delhi, under Sections
498/406/377/354/354(A)/506/509 IPC on the complaint of respondent
No.2.

3. The marriage of the petitioner no.3 with the respondent no. 2 was
solemnized on 05.12.2014 as per Hindu rites and ceremonies.

W.P. (Crl.) No.2159/2017 Page 1 of 8

However, out of this wedlock no child was born.

4. After solemnization of their marriage, the petitioner no.3 and the
respondent no.2 started residing together in the matrimonial home.
Due to some temperamental differences between the petitioner no.3
and the respondent no.2, they could not reconcile with each other.
Resultantly, the respondent no.2 left the matrimonial home on
27.12.2014 and started residing separately with her parents.

5. The petitioner no.3 and respondent no.2 were residing in USA. They
agreed to enter into a settlement and seek divorce decree from the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part,
County of Hudson. Accordingly, the petitioner no.3 and respondent
no.2 executed a Mutual Settlement Agreement dated 27th April, 2015
and on the basis of the same, a mutual consent petition for divorce
was filed by them before Superior Court of New Jersey. By order
dated 7th July, 2015, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery
Division, Family Part, County of Hudson, granted a decree of divorce
by which the marriage between the petitioner no. 3 and the respondent
no.2 was dissolved.

6. After grant of decree of divorce by the Superior Court of New Jersey,
the respondent no. 2 lodged a complaint with CAW Cell which
culminated into said FIR against the petitioners.

7. After the registration of the said FIR, the petitioners and respondent
no.2 had resolved and settled all their disputes in terms of
Memorandum of Understanding dated 22.05.2017. Copy of the same
is placed on record.

8. The respondent No.2 states that she had voluntarily settled and

W.P. (Crl.) No.2159/2017 Page 2 of 8
resolved all disputes with the petitioners without any force and
coercion. She submits that pursuant to the settlement she had received
all the articles as mentioned in paras 9 and 10 of MOU dated
22.05.2017. She submits that she does not want to pursue the said
FIR. She submits that the said FIR may be quashed.

9. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of learned Additional Standing
Counsel for the State submits that the State has objection to the
quashing of the said FIR in view of serious offence under Section 377
IPC. Status report dated 07.09.2017 was filed. It is mentioned in the
status report that during investigations parties had amicably settled the
matter. Learned counsel for learned Additional Standing Counsel
submits that charge-sheet has so far not been filed.

10. Here it is relevant to advert to Section 482 Cr.PC which reads as
under:-

“482. Saving of inherent power of High Court.- Nothing in
this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers
of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to
give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of
the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice.”

11. A bare reading of Section 482 Cr.PC shows that inherent powers of
this Court are not limited or affected by the Cr.PC and there are to be
exercised to (i) give effect to any order under Cr.PC (ii) prevent abuse
of the process of any Court or (iii) to secure the ends of justice.

12. The Apex Court in the judgment of Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab
Anr., 2012 (10) SCC 303, while dealing with the scope of power of
High Court under Section 482 Cr.PC observed as under: –

W.P. (Crl.) No.2159/2017 Page 3 of 8

“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can
be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing
a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its
inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power
given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under
Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide
plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be
exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such
power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent
abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to
quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be
exercised where the offender and victim have settled their
dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case and no category can be prescribed. However, before
exercise of such power, the High Court must have due
regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and
serious offences of mental depravity or offences like
murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed
even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender
have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in
nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any
compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the
offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption
Act or the offences committed by public servants while
working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for
quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But
the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-
dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the
purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from
commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such
like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony
relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the
wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the
parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category
of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in
its view, because of the compromise between the offender
and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and
bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused
to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice
would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case
despite full and complete settlement and compromise with

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the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider
whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of
justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or
continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount
to abuse of process of law despite settlement and
compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and
whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that
criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the
above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be
well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal
proceeding.”

13. The aforesaid judgment was followed recently by Hon’ble Supreme
Court in “Yogendra Yadav and Ors. Vs. State of Jharkhand
Anr.” AIR 2014 SC 3055, wherein while dealing with the power of
the High Court to quash an FIR u/s. 326 and 307 of IPC it was held as
under: –

“4. Now, the question before this Court is whether this Court
can compound the offences Under Sections 326 and 307 of
the Indian Penal Code which are non-compoundable?
Needless to say that offences which are non-compoundable
cannot be compounded by the court. Courts draw the power of
compounding offences from Section 320 of the Code. The
said provision has to be strictly followed (Gian Singh v. State
of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303). However, in a given case, the
High Court can quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of its
power Under Section 482 of the Code having regard to the
fact that the parties have amicably settled their disputes and
the victim has no objection, even though the offences are non-
compoundable. In which cases the High Court can exercise its
discretion to quash the proceedings will depend on facts and
circumstances of each case. Offences which involve moral
turpitude, grave offences like rape, murder etc. cannot be
effaced by quashing the proceedings because that will have
harmful effect on the society. Such offences cannot be said to
be restricted to two individuals or two groups. If such
offences are quashed, it may send wrong signal to the society.
However, when the High Court is convinced that the

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offences are entirely personal in nature and, therefore, do
not affect public peace or tranquility and where it feels
that quashing of such proceedings on account of
compromise would bring about peace and would secure
ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them. In
such cases, the prosecution becomes a lame prosecution.
Pursuing such a lame prosecution would be waste of time
and energy. That will also unsettle the compromise and
obstruct restoration of peace.”

14. In an another case of Hon’ble Supreme Court titled as G.V. Rao Vs.
L.H.V. Prasad Others, (2000) 3 SCC 693, it was observed in Para
12 as under: –

“12. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in
recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main
purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down
in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes
suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions
resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of
the family are also involved with the result that those who
could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are
rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the
criminal case. There are many other reasons which need
not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial
litigation so that the parties may ponder over their
defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual
agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law
where it takes years and years to conclude and in that
process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing
their “cases” in different courts.”

15. In yet another case of Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6
SCC 466, it was observed by the Apex Court in para 29 as under: –

“29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those
prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of
mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.
Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious
impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have

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been committed under special statute like the Prevention of
Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants
while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely
on the basis of compromise between the victim and the
offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character,
particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or
arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes
should be quashed when the parties have resolved their
entire disputes among themselves.”

16. In the case at hand, compromise is arrived at by both the individuals,
who are none else but husband and wife, the matter being entirely
personal in nature. It is noticeable in aforementioned cases that the
matrimonial disputes or family disputes which are resolved by parties
themselves like the case at hand should be quashed thus not
amounting to encouragement of disputes arising out of any such
relationship or the family dispute and consequent, putting an end to
the prolonged process of fighting in a Court of Law. In the present
case, marriage of petitioner No.1 with respondent No.2 was
solemnized on 5.12.2014. They could not adjust with each other and
the respondent No.2 left the matrimonial home on 27.12.2014. Even
by mutual consent divorce was granted on 07.07.2015 by Superior
Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division Family Part, County of
Hudson. Even then the disputes continued between the parties and
FIR in question was registered subsequently on 20.05.2016.
Fortunately the petitioners and respondent No.2 have amicably
resolved and settled all their disputes in terms of MoU dated
22.05.2017. Its terms and conditions had been fulfilled. Therefore, it

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would be the abuse of the process of law in case the FIR is continued
or not quashed.

17. Both the parties submit that now nothing is due and recoverable by
them against each other. Since the parties have amicably settled their
all disputes, no fruitful purpose would be served in further pursuing
the said FIR. Hence, to secure ends of justice, the FIR bearing
No.0409/2016, registered on 20.05.2016 against them with Police
Station Vikas Puri, West District, Delhi, under Sections
498/406/377/354/354(A)/506/509 IPC and proceedings arising out of
the said FIR are hereby quashed.

18. The petition is disposed of accordingly.

19. DASTI.

VINOD GOEL, J.

SEPTEMBER 11, 2017/jitender

W.P. (Crl.) No.2159/2017 Page 8 of 8

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