Ksb Ali vs State Of A.P. . on 4 October, 2017

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 15571-15572 OF 2017
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NOS. 18755-18756 OF 2013)

KSB ALI …..APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH ORS. …..RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 15576-15578 OF 2017
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO. 27299-27301 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 15582 OF 2017
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO. 27434 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 15579-15581 OF 2017
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NOS. 27561-27563 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 15583-15585 OF 2017
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NOS. 38018-38020 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 15586-15588 OF 2017
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NOS. 38022-38024 OF 2013)

Signature Not Verified CIVIL APPEAL NO. 15589 OF 2017
Digitally signed by
NIDHI AHUJA
Date: 2017.11.01
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NOS. 38025 OF 2013)
16:18:00 IST
Reason:

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 15591-15596 OF 2017
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NOS. 9996-10001 OF 2015)

Civil Appeal Nos. 15571-15572 of 2017 Page 1 of 40
(arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 18755-18756 of 2013 – BATCH MATTERS)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 15598 OF 2017
(@ SLP (CIVIL) NO. 26494 OF 2017
@ SLP (CIVIL) NO… CC1639 OF 2016)

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 15573-15575 OF 2017
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NOS. 19156-19158 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 15597 OF 2017
(@ SLP (CIVIL) NO. 26493 OF 2017
@ SLP (CIVIL) NO….CC1132 OF 2016)

AND

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 15590 OF 2017
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO. 1298 OF 2015)

JUDGMENT

A.K. SIKRI, J.

Leave granted.

2) Nawab Nusrat Jung Bahadur-1 (Nusrat Jung-I) had purchased

1635 acres and 34 guntas of land in Kotham Kunta, also known

as Asad Nagar, which is now renamed as Kokapet village. This

land was purchased way back in 19 th Century, while sale deed

was registered sometime in the year 1852. Nusrat Jung-I died

issueless in 1895 and his widow also died thereafter on 10 th

October, 1916. Nusrat Jung-I had two cousins, Nawab Ghulam

Hussain and Nawab Mohd. Sardar. Disputes about the aforesaid
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land (hereinafter referred to as the ‘subject lands’) erupted almost

70 years ago and after protected litigation, which is having

chequered history, the said disputes have finally landed in this

Court. Hundreds of persons claiming themselves to be the

successors in interest of Nusrat Jung-I have led their claim on the

subject lands. On the other hand, the state of Andhra Pradesh

claims that it is the State which is the legal owner of the property

in-question.

3) As mentioned above, these appeals have long history which has

been taken note of, in extenso, by the High Court in its impugned

common judgment dated 18th July, 2012, whereby number of writ

appeals have been decided. As the impugned judgment records

the chronology of the relevant facts correctly and no mistake is

pointed out by any of the counsel appearing before us in regard

to factual narrative, we can conveniently and safely reproduce

these facts from the said judgment.

FACTUAL EVENTS IN BRIEF:

3.1 Under a sale deed dated 17th Rabi Awal, 1269 H (1852 A.D.)

Nusrat Jung-1 purchased the schedule property, of an extent of

Ac.1635.35 gts., from the vendors, the five sons of Mir Jouhar Ali

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khan, son of Mir Hussain Ali Khan alias Asad Nawaz Jung (late),

the wives of Mir Jouhar Ali Khan – Imtiazunissa Begum,

Hayatunissa Begum and the daughters of Riazunissa Begum (the

wife of Mir Asad Nawaj Jung) – Navrooz Begum and Moula

Begum. The property then known as Koutham Kunta and

thereafter as Asadnagar is presently Kokapet village.

3.2 Nusrat Jung-1 died issueless around 1875 leaving behind the

widow – Rahimunnisa Begum, who died on 10-10-1916. Nusrat

Jung-1 had two paternal first cousins – Nawab Gulam Hussain

and Nawab Md. Sardar.

3.3 On 16th January, 1916 the entire properties of late Nusrat Jung-1

were taken over by Sarf-e-Khas Mubarak (the private secretariat

of the Nizam) for supervision. A judicial branch of Sarf-e-Khas

Mubarak initiated succession inquiry which was later transferred

to the Court of Nazim Atiyat which was constituted under

provisions of the 1952 Act.

3.4 In 1920 the heirs of Nusrat Jung-I represented to the Nizam for

grant of Kokapet Jagir in their favour. By a Firman dated

15thJamadeeussani–1339–H, the Nizam decreed rejection of the

representation and granted only maintenance allowance, on

compassionate grounds.

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3.5 In 1949, Jagirs were abolished under the Abolition of Jagirs

Regulation and in 1359F the A.P. (T.A.) Jagirs (Commutation)

Regulation was enacted providing for interim allowance payable,

determination of commutation and abolition of Jagirs. Then

followed the 1952 Act, providing for Atiyat enquiries.

3.6 The Atiyat Court to which inquiry was transferred, as pointed out

above, by its order, dated 15-02-1954 held that lands in Kokapet

village deserve to be confirmed as Madad-e-Maash (grant-in-aid)

in favour of heirs of the late Nusrat Jung-1; that though the land

enjoyed by the holders as Madad-E-Maash was subsequently

constituted into a separate village; the Maash (the property) will

be deemed to have been continued only as Arazi (inam lands), is

confirmed as such and Kokapet was regarded as a village only

for administrative purposes.

3.7 The Atiyat Court also held that Kokapet was taken over by the

Government under the Abolition of Jagirs Regulation; this action

was not challenged by Maashadars and the question of

appointing Qabiz for lands included in the village does not arise.

In respect of the lands in Bagh-e-Asifnagar (another village

having lands of Nusurat Jung-1), the Atiyat Court held that each

of Maashadars (holders of the property) is entitled to his

respective share and the extents being small the Collector should

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formulate proposals for disposal of lands by sale or otherwise

after obtaining permission from the Government; should dispose

of the same and distribute the money among the Maashadars.

3.8 Gulam Mohammed and another, aggrieved by the decision of the

Atiyat Court dated 15th February, 1954 preferred an appeal to the

Board of Revenue, which was rejected by the order dated 24 th

September, 1954 and the order of the Atiyat Court was upheld.

The order of Atiyat Court was placed before the Revenue Minister

in the form of a note and approved by him on 22 nd December,

1954. The Muntakhab did not set out the number of Sendhi

(excise) trees on the land and the claimants were therefore

denied their consequent rights.

3.9 The claimants applied to the Assistant Nazim Atiyat for

amendment of the Muntakhab (for inclusion of Sendhi trees). The

application was rejected. Claimants then approached the Atiyat

Court which also rejected their claim. They unsuccessfully

approached the Board of Revenue and thereafter filed W.P.No.

227 of 1960. On 1st April, 1963 this Court allowed the writ petition

and declared the claimants entitled to inclusion of income from

Sendhi trees in the Muntakhab, directed the respondents to

amend the Muntakhab and awarded Rs.3,980-4-0 as maash. In

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the judgment in W.P.No.227 of 1960 the High Court however

declined to grant the relief of restoration of the property.

3.10 One Mr. K.S.B. Ali (Mr. Ali) (claiming to represent 203 legal heirs

of Nusrat Jung-1) approached the Government several times

seeking release of lands covered by the Muntakhab in favour of

the legal heirs.

3.11 Firoz Khan and another filed O.S.No.512 of 1973 (originally

O.S.No.10 of 1967) for a declaration that they are the owners of

the plaint schedule properties in survey Nos.41, 42 and 43 of

Kokapet Village. J.H. Krishna Murthy and four others were

impleaded as defendants in this suit. Krishna Murthy was

impleaded as the GPA of the heirs of Nusrat Jung – I. Krishna

Murthy through his written statement claimed entitlement to the

lands on the strength of the GPA granted by the heirs of late

Nusrat Jung – I and relied on the Muntakhab in support of the

case of the defendants. The plaintiffs also prayed for a permanent

injunction or in the alternative for recovery of possession of the

suit lands.

3.12 By the judgment dated 30th June, 1976, the Trial Court considered

the entire evidence and by an elaborately reasoned order

decreed the suit. The Trial Court concluded that the stand taken

by the defendants was incorrect and observed that the two

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Firmans clearly established that the lands in question (Kokapet

lands) were Jagir lands; that the legal heirs of Nusrat Jung – I had

also admitted in cross-examination that some of them had filed

applications for restoration of the Jagir lands to the Nizam which

was rejected; that the first defendant (Krishna Murthy) had not

produced any evidence to establish that the suit lands were

acquired by Nusrat Jung – I under any purchase; and that the

legal heirs of Nusrat Jung – I were entitled only to commutation

amounts. This judgment became final as the appeal thereagainst

by the defendants was dismissed by this Court by the judgment

dated 11-12-1985 in C.C.C.A.No.142 of 1976.

3.13 170 persons claiming to be heirs of Nusrat Jung-1 filed

W.P.No.20298 of 1993 for implementation of the Muntakhab as

confirmed by the Revenue Minister’s order dated 24 th December,

1954 and for mutation of their names in respect of the lands in

Kokapet village. Reliance was placed by the petitioners

(apparently during oral hearing of the writ petition) on a letter

dated 21-06-2000 addressed by the CLR to the Government

expressing an opinion that the Muntakhab must be implemented.

By the judgment dated 09-07-2001 a learned single Judge

disposed of the writ petition directing the Government to consider

the report of the CLR and take further action in accordance with

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law, within six months. Thereafter several representations were

made, including by Mr. Ali.

3.14 On 15th April, 2002 the Principal Secretary to Government,

Revenue Department, considered the order of this Court (dated

09-07-2001 in W.P.No. 20298 of 1993) and rejected (by an

elaborately reasoned order) the request of Mr. Ali for release of

the lands as per the Muntakhab. By a subsequent Memo dated

6th May, 2004, however, the order dated 15 th April, 2002 was

withdrawn, again by the Principal Secretary to the Government.

The Memo dated 6th May, 2004 records no reasons whatsoever

for rescinding the earlier elaborate order and was issued pursuant

to representation of Mr. Ali for reconsideration of his request, for

implementing the Muntakhab. The Memo dated 6 th May, 2004

merely states: Government after careful examination of the issue

as per the Act and Rules in force, hereby withdraw the orders

issued in the Government Memo 1stcited and the CCLA was

directed to instruct the Collector, Ranga Reddy District and the

concerned authorities to implement the orders of Atiyat Court

issued in Muntakhab No. 57 of 1955.

3.15 A Memo dated 31-07-2004 reiterated the order dated 06-05-2004

and the CLR was directed to implement the earlier Memo dated

06-05-2004. In turn, the CLR on 07-10-2004 directed the

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Collector, Ranga Reddy District to ensure communication of the

Memo dated 31-07-2004 to the Mandal Revenue Officer,

Rajendranagar for handing over possession of the open land as

per the M.R.O.’s report dated 28-08-1984 and report compliance.

3.16 Vide Memo dated 21st May, 2005 and G.O. Ms. No. 1084 dated

6th June, 2005 the whole issue was revisited and the earlier

memos dated 6th May, 2004 and 31st July, 2004. In this order

(setting out elaborate reasons) it was concluded that the finding

of the Atiyat Court (in its order dated 15-02-1954) (that Kokapet

village was taken over by the Government under the Abolition of

Jagirs Regulation and the said action was not challenged by the

Maashadars and appointment of Qabiz for the lands included in

the village does not arise), destroys the claim of the

representationists, of the lands being Arazi Maktha; that

according to provisions of the Abolition of Jagirs Regulation read

with the Jagir (Commutation) Regulations 1359-F,

Jagirdar/Makthadar or his successor on the date of taking over of

Jagirs were entitled to only commutation amounts, excepting

lands which were under direct and personal cultivation of the

Jagirdars or their successors as home farm lands under Section

17 of the Abolition of Jagirs Regulation; that there are no home

farm lands in the name of the claimants as per the revenue and

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survey settlement records maintained from 1355-F (1945 AD);

that open land would not fall within the definition of ‘Home Farm

Lands’ as per provisio to Section 17 of the Regulation; that the

Muntakhab was issued and acted upon by drawing commutation

from the Nizam-e-Atiyat; and therefore there was no basis for any

further claim in the matter. This Memo also concluded that the

issue was finally decided by the 15-04-2002 order issued with

approval of the competent authority; and that as the matter was

finally decided, the subsequent orders dated 06-05-2004 and

31-07-2004 were without jurisdiction and competence.

3.17 Thereafter, tenders were issued by the Hyderabad Urban

Development Authority for sale of Ac.100-00 in Kokapet village

which was part of the subject lands and Mr. Ali filed W.P. No.

14439 of 2006 challenging the said tenders and sought a

declaration that the said authority had no right in the property of

the petitioners and the auction and sale process was illegal.

3.18 A learned single Judge on 14 th July, 2006 dismissed the writ

petition ruling that under Article 226 of the Constitution an inquiry

as to questions of title in immoveable property cannot be

considered and observed that the petitioner may approach the

Civil Court for appropriate declaration and injunction.

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3.19 Thereagainst W.A.No. 887 of 2006 was filed by Mr. Ali. This

appeal was dismissed by a learned Division Bench of the High

Court, by orders dated 26-10-2007, after contest. Though, SLP

was filed thereagainst in this Court, the writ petitioner/appellant –

Mr. Ali sought leave to withdraw W.P.No.14439 of 2006, W.A.No.

887 of 2006 and for rescinding the order in the writ petition and

writ appeal. This request was granted by this Court with liberty to

Mr. Ali to pursue “appropriate remedy”, leaving the issues open.

3.20 However, after the aforesaid order of this Court (dated 13 th

December, 2007) several writ petitions were filed seeking reliefs

already adverted to and these were tagged on to W.P.No. 10084

of 2006, earlier filed by Mr. Ali and were disposed of by the

common judgment dated 02-06-2009 by a Single Judge of the

High Court.

4) By the aforesaid common judgment dated 2 nd June, 2009, the

learned single Judge invalidated the memo dated 2 nd May, 2005

on the ground that it was in violation of principles of natural justice

and directed the State to pass fresh orders after issuing notice to

the writ petitioners enabling the petitioners to urge all the grounds

before the State. The order in G.O.Ms.No.1084, dated

06-06-2005 was upheld with a caveat that as and when rights of

the petitioners in respect of the property in question are
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determined in their favour they may pursue remedies in this

behalf. It was clarified that the judgment shall not be treated as a

pronouncement or adjudication of any dispute or question

involved in the matter and the legal representatives of Late

Nawab Nusrat Jung Bahadur-I or their authorized agent are at

liberty to pursue the matter with the Government; and that that

disputes, if any, among them (the legal representatives) could be

agitated before a competent forum.

5) Challenging the aforesaid judgment of the learned Single Judge,

writ appeals were filed primarily by the State of Andhra Pradesh

as well as Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority

(HMDA). It is significant to mention that as far as appellants in

these appeals, who claim themselves to be the legal heirs of

Nusrat Jung-I and rightful owner of the subject lands, are

concerned, they did not challenge the order of the Single Judge in

respect of those findings which had been rendered against them.

Before we take note of the salient features of the decision

rendered by the Division Bench it would also be apposite to

remark that the core issues is as to whether the subject lands in

Kokapet village belong to the State or it is the purported legal

heirs of Nusrat Jung who are entitled thereto. The chronology of

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events narrated above would also make it clear that the claimants

have primarily rested their claim on the basis of the order dated

15th February, 1954 passed by the Atiyat Court 1 which held that

the subject lands deserved to be confirmed as Madad-e-Maash

(grant-in-aid) in their favour. They also argued that the aforesaid

order had been approved by the Revenue Minister on 22 nd

December, 1954 and, thus, rights in their favour had got

crystalised. As per them, it is the Atiyat Court which was

competent to decide such a dispute and once the rights of the

appellants were recognised by the Atiyat Court, the State

Government was bound thereby. Further submission of the

appellants was that memos dated 21 st May, 2005 and G.O. dated

6th June, 2005, no opportunity of hearing was given to the

appellants and, therefore, the said memo and G.O. were violative

of principle of natural justice (which contention was accepted by

the learned Single Judge as well).

ISSUE BEFORE THE HIGH COURT:

6) In the aforesaid circumstances, the Division Bench noted that the

generic issue which fell for consideration was as to whether the

learned Single Judge was right in invalidating the said Memo and

1 . Through Mr. Raghupati, Advocate appearing for some of the appellants
has taken different stance before us, which is noted later at an appropriate stage.

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G.O., thereby directing the Government to reconsider the issue

after affording an opportunity to the appellants herein. It was

because of the reason that insofar as that part of the decision of

the learned Single Judge, rejecting substantive reliefs, namely,

implementation of the Muntakhab, mutation of their names in the

Revenue records; restoration of possession of the subject lands

and declining to invalidate G.O. dated 6 th June, 2005 are

concerned, the appellants herein never challenged that part of the

order.

THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT :

7) After taking note of the aforesaid generic issue which arose for

consideration, the High Court, at the outset, discussed the validity

of the direction issued by the learned Single Judge directing the

Government to reconsider the issue after giving opportunity of

hearing to the appellants. In this behalf, it noted that the seminal

dispute was as to whether land in-question belonged to the legal

heirs of Nusraj Jung-I or the State. Having regard to this nature

of dispute, the High Court has concluded that such a dispute

cannot be decided by the Government inasmuch as deciding the

aforesaid lis between the parties is a judicial function and such a

judicial power, as per our constitutional scheme, rests with the

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courts and not the Executive. Therefore, order of the learned

Single Judge remanding the matter to the Government for de

novo consideration was of no legal consequence.

8) Thereafter, the High Court delineated various other issues which

arose for consideration and discussed those issues at length and

answered the same. A perusal of the judgment shows that

deliberations were undertaken on the following questions:

(i) What is the ‘appropriate remedy’ for Mr. Ali to pursue?

(ii) Whether the impugned memo dated 21 st May, 2005 is

unsustainable for violation of principles of natural justice?

(iii) What was the import and effect of memos dated 15 th April,

2002, 6th May, 2005 and 31st July, 2004 as well as

impugned memo dated 21st May, 2005?

(iv) Who are the appellants?

9) Insofar as question no. (i) is concerned, in essence, it touched

upon the locus standi of Mr. Ali to file the writ petition. The High

Court noted that this Court vide orders dated 13 th February, 2007

had disposed of the Special Leave Petition filed by Mr. Ali

permitting him to withdraw the writ petition No. 14439 of 2006

filed by him in the High Court thereby setting aside the judgments

of the High Court in the said writ petition as well as in the writ

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appeal no. 887 of 2006 preferred thereagainst and had accorded

permission to Mr. Ali ‘to take appropriate remedy’. The High

Court thereafter proceeded to discuss what would be meant by

such ‘appropriate remedy’ which was accorded to Mr. Ali. In this

process, the High Court referred to and relied upon judgment of

this Court in BSNL vs. Telephone Cables Ltd.2l and made the

following remarks on the said issue:

“In the light of the above facts and circumstances: the
substantial similarity of the two writ petitions
(W.P.No.10084 of 2006 and 14439 of 2006); the
conduct of Sri Ali in having withdrawn the writ petition
while obtaining effacement of the elaborate and
painstaking judgment in the writ appeal, without
determination of the merits of that judgment by the
Supreme Court; and then pursuing W.P.No.10084 of
2006 (a writ petition filed earlier to W.P.No.14439 of
2006), constitutes in our considered view an abuse of
the process of law; wanton litigative behaviour,
pejorative to the larger public interest, involving casual
and reckless commandeering of scarce judicial time.

In the light of the observations of the Supreme Court
in BSNL, Sri K.S.B. Ali must be held disentitled to
pursue remedies under Article 226 of the Constitution
in respect of the grievances presented in his earlier
writ petition (W.P.No.14439 of 2006 and W.A.No.887
of 2006). We hold accordingly.”

10) Insofar as question no. (ii) is concerned, which discussed

the validity of the judgment of the Single Judge holding impugned

memo to be unsustainable for violation of principles of natural

justice, the High Court pointed out that through this memo the

earlier memos dated 6th May, 2004 and 31st July, 2004 were
2 (2010) 5 SCC 213
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rescinded. However, there was no question of giving any

opportunity of hearing to the appellant because of the reason that

memos dated 6th May, 2004 and 31st July, 2004 remained

uncommunicated and, thus, did not confer or create any rights in

favour of the appellants. Consequently, these could be withdrawn

without notice, since no rights flew from uncommunicated order.

For arriving at this conclusion, the High Court has extensively

dealt with the provisions of Article 166(1) of the Constitution and

the manner in which the aforesaid provision is dealt with by this

Court in the following judgments:

(i) Dattatreya Mareshwar Pangarkar vs. State of Bombay3

(ii) John vs. State of T.C.4

(iii) MRF Ltd. vs. Manohar Parrikar and others5

11) Relying upon the aforesaid judgments, the High Court held

that Business Rules framed under the provisions of Article 166(3)

of the Constitution are mandatory in nature and have to be strictly

adhered to. The High Court also took note of another judgment

of this Court in Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab and

another6 , on the basis of which it concluded that merely writing

something on the file did not amount to an order and, therefore,

3 AIR 1952 SC 181
4 (1955) 1 SCR 1011
5 Vol IX(2010)SLT580
6 AIR 1963 SC 395
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noting in the file by the Revenue Minister, without further action

thereupon or issuing another order in the name of the Governor,

as required by Article 166(1) of the Constitution, did not have any

force in law. In the process, reference was also made to another

judgment of this Court in Shanti Sports Club and another v.

Union of India and others7 wherein this Court held that notings

recorded in official files by officers of the Government at different

levels even of Ministers, do not become decisions of the

Government unless same are sanctified and acted upon by

issuing an order in the name of the President or the Governor as

the case may be, authenticated in the manner provided in Articles

77(2) and 166(2); and communicated to affected persons. The

High Court also referred to many other judgments in support of its

aforesaid finding.

12) Treating the aforesaid principle of law as binding precedents

contained in the aforesaid judgments, the High Court concluded

that none of the memos dated 15 th April, 2002, 6th May, 2004, 31st

July, 2004 and 21st May, 2005 would lawfully be considered as

constituting Executive decisions/order of the State Government

since they were not authenticated in the manner mandated by

Article 166 of the Constitution. Further letter dated 6 th April, 2004

7 (2009) 15 SCC 705
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and memo dated 31st July, 2004 were, in any event, inoperable or

inexecutable as they created no rights in favour of the appellants.

13) At the end, the High Court considered the status of the

appellants while answering the question ‘who are the appellants?’

Pointing out that all the aforesaid memos as well as impugned

memo, flow out of representations made by Mr. Ali who claimed

himself to be the sole representative of the legal heirs of Nusrat

Jung-I, the High Court has examined the locus of Mr. Ali to

espouse the cause of others and found that he could not produce

anything on record to show as to how he was authorised to plead

the case of the purported legal representatives or the heirs of

Nusrat Jung-I. The High Court further noted that other writ

petitions were filed, by other appellants, for implementation of

memos dated 6th May, 2004 and 31st July, 2004 which memos

were issued only on the basis of Mr. Ali’s representation.

Therefore, none of the other appellants could legitimately assert a

grievance that impugned memo was issued without notice or

opportunity to them. According to the High Court, there was

absence of clarity as to whether Mr. Ali and or the other writ

petitioners were even the legal heirs of Nusrat Jung-I or were

lawfully authorised to represent any legal heirs and, therefore,

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none of the appellants had any locus to litigate.

14) After answering the questions in the manner stated above,

the High Court has summarised the position as under:

“SUMMARY OF OUR CONCLUSIONS:

(a) Neither the State nor any Officer of the State,
including the Principal Secretary or the Special
Chief Secretary to the Government, Revenue
Department is conferred judicial or quasi judicial
jurisdiction, power or authority, either as Court, a
Tribunal or a persona designata, to adjudicate
disputed questions of title to immovable property,
even where one of the competing claimants to
such title is the State;

(b) Consequent on conclusion (a) supra, none of the
instruments/decisions/orders dated 15-4-2002;
6-5-2004; 31-7-2004, or the impugned Memo
dated 21-5-2005 (impugned in the writ petitions),
could be considered as having efficacy or
operative force as determinative or deprivatory of
title in or entitlement to possession of immovable
property of an extent of Ac.1635-34 guntas in
Kokapet village of Ranga Reddy District, in favour
of the State itself or any other private individual or
individuals, including the writ petitioner and/or the
non-official respondents in this batch of writ
appeals;

(c) The decision/order in Memos dated 06-5-2004
and 31-7-2004 were not formally communicated to
any of the writ petitioners including Sri K.S.B.Ali,
the representationist at whose instance and on
whose representation these Memos were issued;

(d) In the light of conclusion (c) above, the Memos
dated 6-5-2004 and 31-7-2004, being
uncommunicated administrative orders, are
inoperative, inexecutable and sterile;

(e) The instruments/decisions/orders dated
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15-4-2002; 6-5-2004; 31-7-2004 or the impugned
Memo dated 21-5-2005 not having been
expressed or authenticated in the manner
ordained by Article 166 (1); or established to have
been decisions taken at the specified level of
authority, in accordance with the Rules of
Business issued by the Governor of the State
under Article 166 (2) and (3), cannot be regarded
as orders issued by the State in exercise of its
executive power under Article 162 of the
Constitution;

(f) Consequent on conclusions (a) to (e) above, the
impugned Memo dated 21-5-2005 is not
susceptible to invalidation by this Court in
exercise of its power of judicial review under
Article 226 of the Constitution. Since the
impugned Memo rescinds uncommunicated and
inoperative Memos dated 6-5-2004 and
31-7-2004, violation of the audi alterem partem
principle (even if applicable in the facts and
circumstances of the case), is of no legal
consequence and would not result in resuscitation
of the unauthorized and sterile memos dated
6-5-2004 and 31-7-2004;

(g) Having withdrawn W.P.No.14434 of 2006 and
obtained invalidation of the judgment in the said
writ petition and in W.A.No.887 of 2006, in SLP
(Civil) No. 23392 of 2007, by the order of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 31-7-2007, while
obtaining permission “to take appropriate
remedy”, Sri K.S.B.Ali is disentitled either to file
another writ petition for the same relief as in
W.P.No. 14434 of 2006 or to pursue the pending
writ petition No. 10084 of 2006, as this would not
be an appropriate remedy; and pursuit of public
law remedy by Sri K.S.B.Ali, for substantially the
same grievance as in the earlier abandoned
proceedings constitutes an abuse of process of
the Court; and

(h) Neither has Sri K.S.B.Ali established by specific
pleadings nor by due authorization on record that
he is authorized to represent the cause of 203
legal heirs of Nusrat Jung-I; nor have the other
petitioners pleaded or established the basis for
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their claims, to be the heirs of Nusrat Jung-I.

(i) In view of the foregoing analyses, for the
afore-stated reasons and in the light of our
conclusions supra, the common judgment dated
02.06.2009 in W.P.Nos.10084 of 2006; 22619 of
2007; 3421, 7747, 8761 and 12928 of 2008; 3750
and 6425 of 2009 is set aside and the several writ
appeals are allowed, with costs; and for reasons
alike W.P.No.29063 of 2009 is dismissed and with
costs.”

15) On behalf of the appellants, arguments were mainly

advanced by Mr. Ali, who appeared in-person and Mr. V.N.

Raghupathy, Advocate who argued on behalf of some other

appellants. The entire thrust of Mr. Ali’s argument was on the

order passed by the Atiyat Court and his submission was that as

per these orders, the appellants were held to be owners of the

subject lands, as legal heirs of Nusrat Jung-I. Atiyat Court was

having requisite jurisdiction to decide this lis and its decision had

not only attained finality, it was accepted by the Finance Minister

as well. Therefore, the same was binding on the State

Government. Mr. Ali, in addition, submitted that special

express powers invested in this Court to go into these issues by

virtue of Article 323B of the Constitution. He, thus, contended

that this Court should enforce the order of the Atiyat Court which

was a decree under the Atiyat Act, 1952, which was a special Act

and displaced the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Number of
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judgments was cited in support of the aforesaid proposition.

16) Mr. Raghupati, on the other hand, argued that the inquiry

into succession started on 7th August, 1905. This property is a

Royal gift prior to Ashifsahi dynasty and the sale deed of 1852

contains a recitle that this property is exclusion (Kharij – jama) for

ever for themselves from every respect of control of Civil

Government of Nizam ul-mulk Asif Jah on the 14 day of

Jamadi-Al-Awal 1240 H and there is certificate for exclusion from

the Government (Diwani) i.e. Revenue Department

(Sanad-E-Mafee, i.e. Royal Waver (no PAC/CESS). After the

demise of Nusrat Jung Bahadur-I, the enquiry has started on 17 th

August, 1905 with regard to succession only. Circular 10 of 1338

Fasli came into force during the prendency of enquiry. It was also

argued that according to Section 15(b) of Atiyat Enquiry Act,

1952, it is circular 10 of 1338 that applies to pending enquiry of

Inam and Succession enquiry. Hence, the Atiyat Enquiry Act,

1952 has no application. Under Section 9 of circular 10, the

Government should have initiated action to avoid this Muntakhab.

Since it failed to do so, the Muntakhab attained finality.

Muntakhab was granted by Nazim Atiyat after obtaining approval

from Revenue Minister under Section 8(e) of circular 10 of 1338F.

Thus, the Muntakhab is valid document and its validity has not
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been contested in the writ petition. It was further submitted that

prior to Land Revenue Act, 1317, certain rules were in force

which continued to be in force under Section 1(2) of Land

Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli.

17) Mr. Raghupati also submitted that temporary attachment of

the subject lands under Section 110 of Land Revenue Act, 1317(f)

was no consequence and it could not divest the onus from their

ownership. He also laid stress on the approval granted by the

Revenue Minister on the basis of which Muntakhab was granted.

He argued that it was done after following due procedure.

Reference was made to the judgment of this Court in State of

Andhra Pradesh v. P. Hanumantha Rao (Dead) Through LRs.

and others8 wherein it was held, thus:

“33. No doubt, it was held that neither in exercise of
the power of writ under Article 226 nor in supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court will
convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in
reappreciation or evaluation of evidence. The power of
the High Court in writ jurisdiction to interfere where
important evidence has been overlooked and the legal
provisions involved are misinterpreted or misapplied
has been recognised even in the case of Sawarn
Singh [(1976) 2 SCC 868 : AIR 1976 SC 232] on
which strong reliance was placed on behalf of the
State. The relevant observations are:

“13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by
an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be
issued only if in recording such a finding, the
tribunal has acted on evidence which is
8 (2003)10SCC121
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legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit
admissible evidence, or if the finding is not
supported by any evidence at all, because in
such cases the error amounts to an error of
law.”

xxx xxx xxx

35. With the growing menace of land-grabbing, the Act
of 1982 constitutes Special Courts and ousts
jurisdiction of the regular civil courts in respect of land
alleged to have been grabbed. Where the regular
remedy provided by general law is ousted by special
law, the provisions of the latter deserve to be
construed strictly. We have examined the scheme and
object of the Act and examined its relevant provisions.

When an occupant of the land is alleged to be a
“land-grabber”, he has to justify his possession and
prove his source of title. Where source of title by an
occupant is produced, the Special Court is required to
examine it to consider whether on the basis of
evidence of title produced by him, he can be held to
be not falling in the definition of “land-grabber” under
clause (d) of Section 2 of the Act. In the present case,
the occupants had produced documents to prove their
source of title and long possession of their
predecessor-in-title being the original grantee under
a muntakhab issued by the Ruler of the erstwhile
Nizam State. This title deed with revenue entries
based on them produced by the occupants should
have been treated sufficient for the purposes of the Act
to treat the occupants of the land to be falling outside
the definition of “land-grabber”. It is not a case where
the occupants have tried to justify their possession on
the basis of a mere bona fide claim to the land. They
have produced oral and documentary evidence on
the muntakhab and justified their possession as
alienees from the heirs of the original grantees.”

18) The learned counsel appealing for the State of Telangana

and Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority (HMDA)

strongly refuted the aforesaid submissions in an attempt to

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persuade this Court to uphold the impugned judgment of the High

Court. It was his submission that the High Court had rightly

questioned the locus of Mr. Ali and even before this Court, he

could not point out as to how he was competent to espouse the

present litigation and represent the so-called legal heirs of Nusrat

Jung-I. It was also argued that the appellants had no right to

even make their submissions on merits as they had not

challenged the order of the Single Judge refusing to grant them

relief. The issue before the Division Bench, in the appeals filed by

the State and HMDA, only related to the directions given by the

Single Judge to the Government to take a view after giving

hearing to the appellants and the High Court in the impugned

judgment had considered the aforesaid aspect, accepting the

plea of the State and allowing its appeals. Therefore, argued the

learned counsel, that issue decided in the impugned judgment

could be the only subject matter of these appeals.

19) After considering the respective submissions, we find

ourselves in agreement with the contentions advanced by the

learned counsel for respondent. There are various reasons to

dismiss these appeals, which are discussed herein below:

20) In the first place, it is to be noticed that as far as Mr. Ali is

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concerned, his writ petition no. 10084 of 2006 which was filed in

the High Court after passing of the order dated 31 st July, 2007 in

SLP(C) No. 23392 of 2007 by this Court, was not maintainable.

This Court, by the said order, had permitted him to withdraw his

writ petition no. 14434 of 2006 and ‘to take appropriate remedy’.

Obviously, the remedy could not be in the form of another writ

petition on the same facts and grounds which were pleaded

earlier. The High Court has rightly held that having given up his

pursuit of public law remedy in earlier abandoned proceedings,

filing of the fresh writ petition or pursue pending writ petition no.

10084 of 2006 would constitute an abuse of the process of the

Court.

21) Secondly, the High Court is also right in holding that neither

Mr. Ali had established by specific pleadings nor by due

authorisation on record that he was authorised to represent the

case of 203 legal heirs of Nusrat Jung-I. It is clear from the

above that insofar as Mr. Ali is concerned, his appeals are not

even maintainable.

22) Thirdly, the High Court has specifically remarked, and rightly

so, that even the other appellants did not plead or establish the

basis of their claims that they are the heirs of Nusrat Jung-I.

Civil Appeal Nos. 15571-15572 of 2017 Page 28 of 40
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As pointed out above, the High Court has discussed the

locus of these appellants (writ petitioners in the High Court) under

the caption ‘who are the writ petitioners?’ At this juncture, it would

be apt to reproduce the entire discussion in this behalf which

compelled the High Court to observe that entirely chaotic and

incoherent state of facts were pleaded by all these writ petitioners

in their writ petition since we are in agreement with the High

Court’s analysis. Relevant portion of the impugned judgment, in

this behalf, is as under:

“There is another significant but piquant and
incomprehensible circumstance in this lis. The initial
order dated 15-04-2002, the subsequent orders dated
06-05-2004 and 31-07-2004 and the impugned memo,
all flow out of representations made by K.S.B. Ali
claiming to be the sole representative of the legal heirs
of Nusrat Jung – I.

The letter dated 15-04-2002 refers to W.P.No.20298 of
1993 filed by Mirza Agha Mohammed Ali and 169
others (seeking implementation of the Muntakhab).

These petitioners claimed to be the
successors-in-interest of Nusrat Jung – I. By the
judgment dated 09-07-2001, this Court declined to go
into the details of the case and directed the
Government to consider the report of the CLR and
take further action in accordance with law. The letter
dated 15-04-2002 also refers to a representation
dated 04-08-2001 by Moizuddin Mahamood (also the
petitioner in W.P.No.22619 of 2007); and another from
K.S.B. Ali, claiming to be the sole representative of the
legal heirs of Nusrat Jung – I. Qua this letter (dated
15-04-2002) the representation of K.S.B. Ali was
rejected. The memo dated 06-05-2004 was issued on
the basis of a representation dated 06-01-2003 and
further representations, only by K.S.B. Ali claiming to
be the sole representative of the legal heirs, seeking

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implementation of the Muntakhab and reconsideration
of the order dated 15-04-2002. The basis for the
memo dated 31-07-2004 is the same as it is for the
memo dated 06-05-2004, i.e., representations by
K.S.B. Ali. It is equally not clear by what authority
K.S.B. Ali claimed or continues to claim, to represent
all the legal heirs of Nusrat Jung – I; and if he is a
lawfully authorized representative, whether the 170
petitioners (in W.P.No.20298 of 1993) are persons who
additionally claim to be the heirs or these petitioners
are renegade legal heirs who have dis-associated
from K.S.B. Ali. Neither a power of attorney nor an
authorisation signed by persons asserting to be legal
heirs of Nusrat Jung – I nor the names and particulars
of the legal heirs whose representative Sri K.S.B. Ali
claims to be nor even the legal basis for the claim to
be their representative, is on record.

We have earlier in the narrative herein noticed that the
1st defendant in O.S.No.512 of 1973 was one J.H.
Krishna Murthy, who in his written statement therein
claimed to be the GPA of the heirs of late Nusrat Jung
– I. In that capacity he had also though unsuccessfully
preferred the appeal C.C.C.A.No.142 of 1976. When
Sri K.S.B. Ali supplanted J.H. Krishna Murthy, as the
authorized legal representative of the heirs and by
what authority, is neither pleaded nor clarified.

W.P.No.9551 of 2004 was also by K.S.B. Ali claiming
to be the sole representative of the heirs of Nusrat
Jung – I. The grievance in this writ petition was
non-communication of the memo dated 06-05-2004 to
the District Collector and MRO and for implementation
of the order of the Atiyat Court. This writ petition was
disposed of at the admission stage directing
communication of the memo dated 06-05-2004 to
respondents 2 to 4 therein. Sri Ali did not plead in this
writ petition that the Memo dated 06-05-2004 was
communicated to him.

W.P.No.14439 of 2006 was again by K.S.B. Ali alone
claiming that he and a large number of (203) persons
are the legal heirs of Nusrat Jung – I. The proposals
for sale of 100 acres in Kokapet village by the HUDA
was challenged in this writ petition and title to the said
extent as part of the schedule property was claimed by
the petitioner K.S.B. Ali, as the sole representative of
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the legal heirs of Nusrat Jung – I. On what basis Ali
claimed to be the heir of Nusrat Jung – I and/or to be
authorized to represent all the legal heirs is not clear.
No foundational facts are pleaded nor any material
furnished to infer with certitude the claim of Sri Ali to
represent the legal heirs of Nusrat Jung – I or the
claims of the other writ petitioners to being the legal
heirs (of Nusrat Jung – I) and hence to having a
litigable interest in the schedule property. Against the
dismissal of this writ petition (with liberty granted) to
pursue declaratory and injunctory reliefs before the
Civil Court, K.S.B.Ali preferred writ appeal No.886 of
2006. The appeal was dismissed by the judgment
dated 26-10-2007. K.S.B. Ali appealed to the Supreme
Court by Special Leave, pleaded for withdrawal of
W.P.No.14439 of 2006. By the Order of the Supreme
Court, dated 13-12-2007, the judgments in
W.A.No.887 of 2006 and W.P.No.14439 of 2006 were
set aside and writ petition dismissed as withdrawn; the
issues were left open and the appellant Ali was
preserved the liberty “to take appropriate remedy”.

Coming to the several writ petitions and the common
judgment therein (wherefrom the present appeals
arise), as already noticed, W.P.No.10084 of 2006 is
again by K.S.B.Ali, claiming to represent 203 legal
heirs of Nusrat Jung – I. W.P.No.22619 of 2007 is by
the sole petitioner Moizuddin Mahamood, one of the
representationists referred to in the order dated
15-04-2002. It does not appear that the memos dated
06-05-2004 and 31-07-2004 were issued on the basis
of the representations by this gentleman – Moizuddin
Mahamood. W.P.No.3421 of 2008 is by Malik Sultana
and 21 others; W.P.No.7747 of 2008 is by Ghouse
Mohiuddin Siddiqui; W.P.No.8761 of 2008 is by 13
petitioners; W.P.No.12928 of 2008 is by 9 petitioners;
W.P.No.3750 of 2009 is by 117 petitioners; and
W.P.No.6425 of 2009 by 20 petitioners. If K.S.B.Ali is
the sole representative of all the legal heirs of Nusrat
Jung – I, it is not clear who the other writ petitioners
are or on what basis they claim to be so. Except
K.S.B. Ali and Moizuddin Mahamood and the writ
petition filed by Mirza Agha Mohammed Ali and 169
others, there is no reference to any other claimants to
the schedule property even in the letter dated
5-04-2002, whereby the representation of K.S.B.Ali
was rejected. The subsequent memos dated
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06-05-2004 and 31-07-2004 directing implementation
of the Muntakhab were issued only on the basis of
K.S.B. Ali’s representation and these orders rescinded
by the impugned memo dated 21-05-2005. Neither the
170 petitioners (whose W.P.No.20298 of 1993 was
referred to in the letter dated 15-04-2002) or
Moizuddin Mahamood whose representation dated
04-08-2001 was also referred to in this letter (rejecting
K.S.B.Ali’s representation for implementation of the
Muntakhab and restoration of possession of the
schedule property), have ever challenged the decision
dated 15-04-2002. Neither did Sri K.S.B. Ali.

Since neither the memos dated 06-05-2004 and
31-07-2004 nor the re-calling of the orders in these
memos by the impugned memo dated 21-05-2005 is
at the instance of any other person except K.S.B. Ali,
none of the other petitioners could legitimately assert
a grievance that the impugned memo was issued
without notice or opportunity to them and on the
ground that any rights accrued to them under the
memos dated 06-05-2004 and 31-07-2004 were
extinguished by the impugned memo.

In the chaotic and incoherent state of facts adverted to
above and absent any clarity as to whether K.S.B.Ali
and/or the writ petitioners are the legal heirs of Nusrat
Jung – I or lawfully authorized to represent any legal
heirs; and since the writ petitions are founded on the
assertion that the reliefs claimed are on the basis that
the several petitioners (being successors-in-interest of
Nusrat Jung – I) are entitled to restoration of
possession of the schedule property; we do not
consider it prudent or pragmatic that reliefs should
have been granted to petitioners who have failed to
plead and establish any litigative interest in the subject
matter of the writ petitions; and therefore to a locus to
litigate.

23) Fifthly, as pointed out above, the judgment of the learned

Single Judge insofar as it was against the appellants, was never

challenged by them by filing any writ appeal(s). It would be

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pertinent to reproduce hereunder the conclusions of the learned

Single Judge in its judgment dated 2nd June, 2009.

“The writ petitions were allowed with the following
directions:

(a) the impugned memo dated 21-05-2005, is set aside,
as violative of principles of natural justice;

(b) the Government, in its Revenue Department, shall
pass fresh orders, after issuing notice to the
petitioners. It shall be open to the petitioners to urge
all the grounds before the Government.

(c)G.O.Ms.No. 1084, dated 06-06-2005, is upheld,
however, with a rider that as and when the rights of
the petitioners vis–vis the lands are determined in
their favour, it shall be open to them, to pursue their
remedies, in this regard;

(d)This judgment shall not be treated as a
pronouncement or adjudication of any dispute, or
question, involved in the matter; and

(e)It shall be open to the legal representatives of late
Nawab Nursat Jung Bahadur-1, or their authorized
agent, to pursue the proceedings before the
Government, and the dispute, if any, among them,
may be agitated before a competent forum.

As is clear from the observations set out in direction

(d) above, there was no adjudication or determination
of any of the substantive disputes between the parties,
particularly with regard to the vitality of the Muntakhab.
These disputes are relegated for de novo
consideration by the Government, and after notice to
the petitioners.”

The learned Single Judge had specifically clarified that his

judgment was not to be treated as a pronouncement for

adjudication of any dispute or questions involved in the matter

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and disputes, if any, among them could be adjudicated before a

competent forum. In view of the above, in the appeals filed by the

State against the judgment of the Single Judge, the Division

Bench was only called upon to decided as to whether the

direction to relegate the matter to the State Government was

proper or not. The High Court has decided that aspect in the

impugned judgment. It is obvious that the appellants cannot rake

up those issues in these appeals which are not decided either by

the learned Single Judge or the Division Bench.

24) Sixthly, Insofar as the decision of the Division Bench on the

issue raised before it is concerned, no arguments were even

advanced by the appellants questioning the validity thereof. Even

otherwise, having gone through the said judgment minutely, we

are in complete agreement with the impugned judgement on

those aspects, decided by the High Court. To recapitulate in brief

it is stated that even the writ petition filed by the petitioners herein

(writ petition no. 3421 of 2008) which inter alia sought to

challenge memo dated 21st May, 2005 issued by the Revenue

Department as illegal and also sought to implement Muntakhab

No. 55 of 1955 dated 7th May, 1955, by mutating the names of the

petitioners in the Revenue Records and return the custody of the

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property was clearly not maintainable for two reasons. Insofar

the memo dated 21st May, 2005, was concerned, the main

grievance of the writ petitioners appears to be that the same had

been passed without giving any notice to the writ petitioner and

that the same could not have reviewed/rescinded the memos

dated 6th May, 2004. The said arguments are not tenable on

account of the fact that the impugned memo dated 21 st May,

2005, only sought to reinforce the memo dated 15 th April, 2002,

issued by the Government in response to the representation

made by Mr. Ali. Therefore, when the impugned memo dated 21 st

May, 2005 was admittedly not issued at the instance of the writ

petitioners there could not have been any question of hearing

them prior to the same. Further, neither the impugned memo nor

the memo dated 6th May, 2004 (purporting to create rights in

favour of the legal heirs of Nawab Nusrat Jung-I) was

communicated to the writ petitioners. Hence, insofar as the

memo dated 21st May, 2004 is concerned, no cause of action

accrued in favour of the writ petitioners to have approached the

High Court and, therefore, the only person, if any, who could have

challenged the same was Mr. Ali. As far as Mr. Ali, is concerned,

as already pointed above, he could not maintain the writ petition

as it was not ‘appropriate remedy’ as granted by this Court.

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25) For all these reasons, these appeals are dismissed.

However, in the facts and circumstances of this Court, we may

refrain from awarding any costs.

………………………………………J.

(A.K. SIKRI)

………………………………………J.

(ASHOK BHUSHAN)
NEW DELHI;

OCTOBER 4, 2017

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(REVISED)
ITEM NO.1501 COURT NO.5 SECTION XII-A
(For Judgment)
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (C)Nos. 18755-18756/2013

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated
18-07-2012 in WA No. 1164/2009 and WA No. 1311/2009 passed by
the High Court of A.P. at Hyderabad)

KSB ALI Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH ORS. Respondent(s)

WITH

SLP(C) No. 19156-19158/2013
SLP(C) No. 27561-27563/2013
SLP(C) No. 27299-27301/2013
SLP(C) No. 38018-38020/2013
SLP(C) No. 38022-38024/2013
SLP(C) No. 27434/2013
SLP(C) No. 38025/2013
SLP(C) No. 9996-10001/2015
SLP(C) No. 1298/2015
S.L.P.(C)…CC No. 1132/2016
S.L.P.(C)…CC No. 1639/2016

Date : 04-10-2017
These matters were called on for pronouncement of
judgment today.

For Petitioner(s)
Mr. Shakil Ahmed Syed, AOR
Mohd. Parvez Dabas, Adv.

Mr. Uzmi Jameel Husain, Adv.

Petitioner-in-person

Mr. V. N. Raghupathy, AOR
Mr. V. Sridhar Reddy, Adv.

Mr. Aniruddha P. Mayee, AOR

Mr. Venkateswara Rao Anumolu, AOR

For Respondent(s)
M/s. Venkat Palwai Law Associates, AOR

Civil Appeal Nos. 15571-15572 of 2017 Page 37 of 40
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Mr. D. Mahesh Babu, AOR

Mr. S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, AOR
Mr. Mrityunjai Singh, Adv.

Mr. P. N. Puri, AOR

Mr. G. N. Reddy, AOR

Mr. Manju Jetley, AOR

Mr. T. V. Ratnam, AOR

Hon’ble Mr. Justice A. K. Sikri pronounced the
judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan.

Permission to file special leave petition is
granted.

Delay condoned.

Leave granted.

The appeals are dismissed in terms of the signed
reportable judgment.

Application for substitution is allowed.
Pending applications stand disposed of.

(NIDHI AHUJA) (MALA KUMARI SHARMA)
COURT MASTER COURT MASTER

[Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file.]

Civil Appeal Nos. 15571-15572 of 2017 Page 38 of 40
(arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 18755-18756 of 2013 – BATCH MATTERS)
ITEM NO.1501 COURT NO.5 SECTION XII-A
(For Judgment)
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (C)Nos. 18755-18756/2013

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated
18-07-2012 in WA No. 1164/2009 and WA No. 1311/2009 passed by
the High Court of A.P. at Hyderabad)

KSB ALI Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH ORS. Respondent(s)

WITH

SLP(C) No. 19156-19158/2013
SLP(C) No. 27561-27563/2013
SLP(C) No. 27299-27301/2013
SLP(C) No. 38018-38020/2013
SLP(C) No. 38022-38024/2013
SLP(C) No. 27434/2013
SLP(C) No. 38025/2013
SLP(C) No. 9996-10001/2015
SLP(C) No. 1298/2015
S.L.P.(C)…CC No. 1132/2016
S.L.P.(C)…CC No. 1639/2016

Date : 04-10-2017
These matters were called on for pronouncement of
judgment today.

For Petitioner(s)
Mr. Shakil Ahmed Syed, AOR
Mohd. Parvez Dabas, Adv.

Mr. Uzmi Jameel Husain, Adv.

Petitioner-in-person

Mr. V. N. Raghupathy, AOR
Mr. V. Sridhar Reddy, Adv.

Mr. Aniruddha P. Mayee, AOR

Mr. Venkateswara Rao Anumolu, AOR

For Respondent(s)
M/s. Venkat Palwai Law Associates, AOR

Civil Appeal Nos. 15571-15572 of 2017 Page 39 of 40
(arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 18755-18756 of 2013 – BATCH MATTERS)
Mr. D. Mahesh Babu, AOR

Mr. S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, AOR
Mr. Mrityunjai Singh, Adv.

Mr. P. N. Puri, AOR

Mr. G. N. Reddy, AOR

Mr. Manju Jetley, AOR

Hon’ble Mr. Justice A. K. Sikri pronounced the
judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan.

Permission to file special leave petition is
granted.

Delay condoned.

Leave granted.

The appeals are dismissed in terms of the signed
reportable judgment.

Application for substitution is allowed.
Pending applications stand disposed of.

(NIDHI AHUJA) (MALA KUMARI SHARMA)
COURT MASTER COURT MASTER

[Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file.]

Civil Appeal Nos. 15571-15572 of 2017 Page 40 of 40
(arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 18755-18756 of 2013 – BATCH MATTERS)

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