Bhagwat Alias Pappu vs State Of M.P. on 26 October, 2017

1 CRA 755/2006 742//2006

SB:- Hon’ble Shri Justice G. S. Ahluwalia

Cr.A. No.755/2006

Bhagwat alias Pappu
State of MP


CRA No.742/2006

Bhagwan Singh Gurjar
State of MP

None for the appellants.
Shri RK Awasthi, Public Prosecutor for the State.


(Delivered on 26 /10/2017)
This common judgment shall also dispose of
Criminal Appeal No.742/2006 filed by appellant-
Bhagwan Singh Gurjar.

(2) These criminal appeals have been filed against the
judgment and sentence dated 29/06/2006, passed by
Special [Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act], Shivpuri in Special Case
No.15/2006,by which the appellants have been convicted
under Sections 366 and 376(2)(g) of IPC and have been
sentenced to undergo the rigorous imprisonment of five
years and a fine of Rs.300/- and the rigorous
imprisonment of ten years and a fine of Rs.300/- with
default imprisonment. Both the sentences were directed
to run concurrently.

(3) From the record, it appears that this Court by order
dated 17/06/2009 in Criminal Appeal No.755/2006 had
2 CRA 755/2006 742//2006

directed the Office to list the case for final hearing in the
week commencing 6th July, 2009. Thereafter, an
application was filed, which was registered as IA
8757/2009 for change of counsel. The said application
was rejected by this Court by order dated 06/07/2009
and the case was directed to be listed for further hearing
in the week commencing 27/07/2009. On 29/07/2005,
the case was adjourned because of non-availability of
counsel. Thereafter, a letter was received from the jail
which was registered as IA 11680/2009 in which
appellant Bhagwat alias Pappu wanted that his case
should be argued by Shri AK Jain, Advocate, therefore,
IA 11680/209 was allowed and Shri AK Jain, Advocate
was directed to argue the matter and it was directed that
Shri AK Jain, Advocate be noticed to remain present on
the next date of hearing so that his consent may also be
sought. On 23/10/2009, none appeared for the
appellant, therefore, the case was adjourned. On
09/11/2009 and 10/11/2009, the counsel for the
appellants prayed for time to argue the matter and,
therefore, the case was directed to be listed for final
hearing in due course. On 21/12/2009, the case was
directed to be listed on 22/12/2009 at the request of
parties. On 22/12/2009, 06/01/2010, 13/01/2010, case
was adjourned as the same was not argued by the
counsel. Thereafter, this Court by order dated
01/02/2010 directed that if accused- Bhagwat alias
Pappu pays the fine and furnishes a personal bond to the
tune of Rs.20,000/-, then he shall be released on bail for
his appearance before the Office of this Court on
03/03/2010. From the record, it is not clear that
whether the appellant, thereafter, has furnished his bail
bond or not. Even the record does not indicate that the
appellants on any date had appeared before the office of
3 CRA 755/2006 742//2006

this Court.

(4) Today, none appears for the appellants in spite of
the fact that it was displayed on the display board from
Yesterday that this case shall be taken up for hearing as
it is listed in ”category of accused in jail”. None appears
for the appellants even in the second round. The name
of Shri AK Jain, Advocate was also displayed in the
display board, but still none appears.
(5) The Supreme Court in the case Surya Baksh
Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2014)
14 SCC 222 has held as under:-

”24. It seems to us that it is necessary
for the Appellate Court which is
confronted with the absence of the
convict as well as his counsel, to
immediately proceed against the persons
who stood surety at the time when the
convict was granted bail, as this may
lead to his discovery and production in
Court. If even this exercise fails to locate
and bring forth the convict, the Appellate
Court is empowered to dismiss the
appeal. We fully and respectfully concur
with the recent elucidation of the law,
profound yet perspicuous, in K.S.
Panduranga v. State of Karnataka (2013)
3 SCC 721. After a comprehensive
analysis of previous decisions our learned
Brother had distilled the legal position
into six propositions:- (a) That the High
Court cannot dismiss an appeal for non-

prosecution simpliciter without examining
the merits; (b) That the Court is not
bound to adjourn the matter if both the
Appellant or his counsel/lawyer are
absent; (c) That the Court may, as a
matter of prudence or indulgence,
adjourn the matter but it is not bound to
do so; (d) That it can dispose of the
appeal after perusing the record and
judgment of the trial court. (e) That if
the accused is in jail and cannot, on his
own, come to court, it would be
advisable to adjourn the case and fix
another date to facilitate the appearance
4 CRA 755/2006 742//2006

of the Appellant-accused if his lawyer is
not present, and if the lawyer is absent
and the court deems it appropriate to
appoint a lawyer at the State expense to
assist it, nothing in law would preclude
the court from doing so; and (f) That if
the case is decided on merits in the
absence of the Appellant, the higher
court can remedy the situation.”

Therefore, both the appeals are being considered
by this Court after going through the record in detail
with the help of the Public Prosecutor.
(6) The necessary facts for the disposal of the present
appeals in short are that on 31/08/2005, a complaint of
Gum Inshan was made by Shankar Adiwasi on the
allegation that he is residing in village Hurri by
constructing a small hut. His daughter had gone to the
house of his elder brother Kalyan who was not well. On
01/09/2005, in the morning, his another brother Radhe
and other ladies of the family told him that his daughter
is missing, therefore, he, his wife and brothers tried to
search for his daughter but she could not be traced.
Thus, Gum-Inshan report of girl aged about 13-14 years
was lodged. The girl was recovered on 10/09/2005. After
getting her medically examined, she was handed over to
the custody of her father. The statements of prosecutrix
were recorded. Appellant Bhagwat alias Pappu was
arrested on 05/10/2005 whereas appellant Bhagwan
Singh Gurjar was arrested on 30/09/2005. The police
after completing the investigation filed charge sheet
against the appellants and other two accused persons by
exercising the power under Section 299 of CrPC as they
were absconding.

(7) The trial Court by order dated 13/01/2006 framed
charges under Sections 366, 376(2)(g) of IPC and under
Section 3(2)(v) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
5 CRA 755/2006 742//2006

Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.
(8) The appellants abjured their guilt and pleaded not

(9) The prosecution, in order to prove its case,
examined the prosecutrix (PW1), Shankar (PW2), Dr.
Nishar Ahmed (PW3), RK Sakya (PW4), Dr Sachitanand
Bhilwar (PW5), Tularam (PW6), Dr. Sunita Jain (PW7),
Bhagwan Singh Sandhu (PW8), Ghasiram Nai (PW9),
Jagroop Singh (PW10), KL Rahul (PW11) and Rajendra
Kumar Verma (PW12). The appellants did not examine
anybody in their defence.

(10) The trial Court by judgment dated 29th June, 2006
convicted the appellants for offence under Sections 366
and 376(2)(g) of IPC and sentenced them to undergo
the rigorous imprisonment of five years and a fine of
Rs.300/- and the rigorous imprisonment of ten years and
a fine of Rs.300/- with default imprisonment. The
appellants were acquitted for the offence under Section
3(2)(v) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

(11) The prosecutrix (PW1) has identified the
appellants who were present in the Court. She has
stated that about a month back, she was going to the
house of her uncle Kalyan where the appellants met with
her at a hand pump and threatened her in case if she
does not go along with them, then she will be killed and
by show of power, they took her to village Bagari and a
country- made pistol was also pointed towards her.
Thereafter, they took her to village Manethi and from
village Manethi they took her to Ashok Nagar in a small
bus. At Ashok Nagar, they stayed for a night in the house
of one Mahete. Mahete demanded Rs.20,000/-. As the
appellants did not get the amount, therefore, she was
taken to village Pakon where they stayed in the house of
6 CRA 755/2006 742//2006

one Khabas, relative of appellant Pappu. From Pakon,
she was taken to village Patkhedi. When she was
sleeping in a field, appellant Bhagwat @ Pappu raped on
her. Thereafter, from village Patkhedi she was brought to
Neemkhedi where they ran away after leaving her. The
prosecutrix went to the house of Sarpanch of Gram
Panchayat, Neemkhedi. The Sarpanch thereafter, took
her to the police station Ishagarh where she met with
her father. She was interrogated about the incident. She
was handed over to the custody of her father. The spot
map was prepared. It was further stated that the
appellant Bhagwan Singh Gurjar had committed rape on
her in village Bagari whereas appellant Pappu had
committed rape on her when they were going to village
Patkhedi. The prosecutrix was cross-examined. She
stated that the appellant Pappu is the resident of the
same village Hurri. He is residing in the village Hurri
along with his sister. She further admitted that the
villagers used to come at the hand pump for fetching
water but at the time of incident there was nobody at
the hand pump and she had raised an alarm but nobody
came to rescue her. From village Hurri to village Bagari
they went by walking but she did not meet with any
person, therefore, no complaint was made. When she
was sitting in village Bagari two-three persons had come
there and apart from them, no other person had come
and all the three persons were along with the accused
appellants. In village Manethi, she did not meet any
person. Thereafter, they came to Ashok Nagar by a bus
and other passengers were sitting in the bus. She did
not make any complaint in the bus because she was
under threat by the appellants. At Ashok Nagar, she had
informed Mahete that she has been brought by the
appellants but since the appellants had taken her to him
7 CRA 755/2006 742//2006

for the purpose of selling, therefore, why he would have
saved her. In village Pakon they had stayed in house of
one Khabas and since she did not make any complaint to
any neighbour and from village Pakon to Patkhedi, they
had gone by walking but since it was night, therefore,
nobody met. She further denied that she was not
kidnapped by appellant Pappu and also denied that she
was not raped by the appellants. She further stated the
she has not received any compensation from the State
and she further denied that the appellants have been
falsely implicated with an intention to get the
compensation amount from the State. She was further
cross-examined and the similar questions, which were
put to the prosecutrix in the previous cross-examination,
were put in another manner. The crux of the cross-
examination of the prosecutrix was that she was a
consenting party and she did not make any complaint to
the persons with whom she had met. The prosecutrix
has given an explanation of not informing the other
persons about her kidnapping. No straight jacket formula
can be laid down that if the prosecutrix does not make
any complaint to the strangers, then it should be
presumed that she was a consenting party. In the
present case, she has specifically stated that on some
occasions she did not meet with any person but she
admitted that in the bus there were other passengers
also, however, as she was under the threat, therefore,
she did not inform anybody. Undisputedly, other
passengers were strangers and when the prosecutrix is
under the threat to her life then she may gather an
impression that in case if she makes complaint to the
strangers, then they may save her or may not intervene
and under that circumstance, ultimately she would be at
the mercy of the accused persons and in such a
8 CRA 755/2006 742//2006

situation, if she was continuously maintaining silence,
then it cannot be inferred that she was a consenting
party. It was the prosecution’s case that the prosecutrix
is aged 14 years and is minor. No question was put to
the prosecutrix with regard to her age.
(12) Shankar (PW2) has stated that his daughter is
aged about 14 years and she had gone to the house of
his elder brother as he was not well and on the next day,
somebody informed that somebody had taken his
daughter. About 12 days of the incident, he was
informed by the police Station Ishagarh that his
daughter has been traced out. He went to the Police
Station Ishagarh and his daughter was handed over to
his custody. He was informed as to how his daughter
was kidnapped by the appellants. This witness was
cross-examined. In cross examination, a suggestion was
given to this witness with regard to enmity of the
accused persons with the appellants, which was denied.
Surprisingly, even no question was put to this witness in
his cross-examination with regard to the age of
prosecutrix. Specifically, this witness has already stated
in his examination-in-chief that the age of the
prosecutrix is 14 years.

(13) Dr. Nishar Ahmed (PW3) and Dr. Sachitananda
(PW5) had medically examined the appellants. Dr. Nishar
Ahmed (PW3) has stated that appellant- Pappu was
medically fit for sexual intercourse and his MLC report is
Ex.P1 whereas Dr. Sachitanand (PW3) has stated that
appellant Bhagwan Singh Gurjar was physically fit for
sexual intercourse and his MLC report is Ex.P5.
(14) RK Sakya (PW4) has stated that the prosecutrix
was recovered on 10/09/2005 and the recovery memo is
Ex.P2. The statement of prosecutrix was recorded on
10/09/2005 itself, which is Ex.D2. The FIR Ex.P3 was
9 CRA 755/2006 742//2006

registered. The prosecutrix was sent for medical
examination and she was handed over to the custody of
her father vide Ex.P4.

(15) Tularam (PW6) has stated that Shankar (PW2)
and his brother are his nephews. Kalyan, brother of
Shankar was not well and now he is dead. About four-
five months back as Kalyan was not well, therefore, the
prosecutrix had gone to his house for preparing meals.
On the next day, he was told by Kalyan and Radhe that
the prosecutrix had gone at the hand pump for fetching
water in the night but from thereafter, she is missing and
she was recovered after 12-15 days at Police Station
Ishagarh. He was informed by the prosecutrix that two
persons of village Bagari had taken her from the hand
pump and she had informed that the present appellants
were the persons who had kidnapped her. As this witness
is hearsay witness, therefore, it is not necessary to
consider the evidence of this witness in view of direct
evidence, which has already been mentioned above.
(16) Ghasiram Nai (PW9) has stated that about six
months back, appellant Pappu had brought a girl who
was aged about 12-13 years and had stayed for a day in
his house. When this witness enquired from appellant
Pappu about his relation with the prosecutrix, then he
informed that she is his sister-in-law (Shali). When this
witness insisted that he should leave his house, then
appellant Pappu informed that he has brought her for
selling. When this witness still insisted that appellant
Pappu should take the prosecutrix to her house then he
left the prosecutrix in his house and ran away. The
matter was informed to Bhagwan Singh (PW8), Sarpanch
who suggested him to lodge the FIR. Thereafter, he
along with Bhagwan Singh (PW8) went to police Station
for lodging the FIR. The girl was handed over to the
10 CRA 755/2006 742//2006

police. In cross-examination, this witness has stated that
he was informed by the girl that she had come for
“Ghumune Ke Liye”. This witness has stated that in the
night itself he was informed by appellant Pappu that he
had brought the prosecutrix for selling her and,
therefore, he had instructed them to immediately leave
the house and he did not go to the police station
because appellant Pappu and the girl have stated that
they are going and thereafter, when he came back in the
evening, he was informed that the girl is in his house.
Thereafter, he informed the Sarpanch Bhagwan Singh

(17) Bhagwan Singh (PW8) had supported the
evidence of Ghasiram Nai (PW9) and has stated that he
was informed by Ghasiram (PW9) that one boy has
brought the girl and on enquiry, he told that the age of
the girl is 13-14 years. Thereafter, they went to the
police station and lodged the FIR. The girl was recovered
from his house and thereafter, she was kept in the house
of lady Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat Patkheda. After two –
three days, he was informed that somebody has come to
enquire about the missing girl and therefore, the girl was
sent to the police station from the house of Laxmi Bai,
Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Patkheda.
(18) Jagroop (PW10), KL Rahul (PW11) and Rajendra
Kumar Verma (PW12) are formal police witnesses, who
had collected clothes of the prosecutrix as well as of the
accused persons. Rajendra Kumar Verma (PW12) had
conducted the investigation.

(19) Dr. Sunita Jain (PW7) had medically examined the
prosecutrix and had assessed her age at 13 years. No
external injury was found. Her hymen was found
ruptured and old healed. The girl was found to be
habitual for sexual intercourse and no opinion could be
11 CRA 755/2006 742//2006

given about the recent intercourse and for determining
her age, the case was referred to the radiologist.
(20) From the record, it is clear that the girl was
subjected to ossification test and as per ossification test
report Ex.D6, her age was assessed by the doctors in
between 16-18 years. So far as the age of the
prosecutrix is concerned, it is a case of the prosecution
that the girl was aged about 14 years. Neither the
prosecutrix (PW1) nor her father Shankar (PW2) was
cross-examined by counsel for the appellants challenging
their contentions that the age of the prosecutrix is 14
years. No questions were put to the father of the
prosecutrix, Shankar (PW2) with regard to the age of the
prosecutrix or other children. In Gum Inshan report, the
age of the prosecutrix has been mentioned in between
13-14 years. So far as the ossification test report is
concerned, it cannot be treated as an absolute report.
Under the facts and circumstances of the case, it is clear
that the prosecutrix was minor at the date of incident.
This Court has minutely gone through the evidence of
prosecutrix and nothing could be found from her cross-
examination which may indicate that her evidence is not
worthy reliable.

(21) The ossification test may provide a basis for
determination of age of an individual but the opinion of
the radiologist cannot be preferred. Although the radio-
logical examination is a guiding factor to ascertain the
age of a person but it is not conclusive and is subject to
margin of error, therefore, it has to be considered along-
with other circumstances. The prosecutrix as well as her
father has specifically stated that the prosecutrix was
about 14 years and as the prosecutrix is an illiterate girl,
therefore, she was not admitted in the school and no
school certificate could be produced.

12 CRA 755/2006 742//2006

(22) The Supreme Court in the case of Vishnu @
Undrya vs State Of Maharashtra reported in 2006(1)
SCC 283 has held as under:-

”20.It is urged before us by Mr. Lalit that the
determination of the age of the prosecutrix
by conducting ossification test is scientifically
proved and, therefore, the opinion of the
doctor that the girl was of 18-19 years of age
should be accepted. We are unable to accept
this contention for the reasons that the
expert medical evidence is not binding on the
ocular evidence. The opinion of the medical
officer is to assist the court as he is not a
witness of fact and the evidence given by the
medical officer is really of an advisory
character and not binding on the witness of

21. In the case of Madan Gopal Kakkad v.
Naval Dubey and Anr. (1992) 3 SCC 204 this
Court has considered a similar question and
pointed out in paragraph 34 at page SCC 221
as under:

“34. A medical witness called in as
an expert to assist the Court is not a
witness of fact and the evidence given by
the medical officer is really of an
advisory character given on the basis of
symptoms found on examination. The
expert witness is expected to put before
the Court all materials inclusive of the
data which induced him to come to the
conclusion and enlighten the Court on
the technical aspect of the case by
explaining the terms of science so that
the Court although, not an expert may
form its own judgment on those
materials after giving due regard to the
expert’s opinion because once the
expert’s opinion is accepted, it is not the
opinion of the medical officer but of the

22. We are of the opinion that this contention
of the counsel for the appellant will be of no
assistance in the face of evidence of fact from
the mouth of PW-1 father and PW-13 mother,
well corroborated by the register of the date
of birth of Bombay Greater Municipal
Corporation and the evidence of Dr.
13 CRA 755/2006 742//2006

Shashikant Awasare, who is one of the
proprietors of Dr. Kashibai Nursing Home,
Santa Cruz (West), Mumbai, produced by him
which shows that PW-4 Pushpa was born on
29.11.64. In the case of determination of
date of birth of the child, the best evidence is
of the father and the mother. In the present
case, the father and the mother PW-1 and
PW-13 categorically stated that PW-4 the
prosecutrix was born on 29.11.64, which is
supported by the unimpeachable documents,
as referred to above in all material
particulars. These are the statements of facts.

If the statements of facts are pitted against
the so called expert opinion of the doctor with
regard to the determination of age based on
ossification test scientifically conducted, the
evidence of facts of the former will prevail
over the expert opinion based on the basis of
ossification test. Even as per the doctor’s
opinion in the ossification test for
determination of age, the age varies. In the
present case, therefore, the ossification test
cannot form the basis for determination of the
age of the prosecutrix on the face of witness
of facts tendered by PW-1 and PW-13,
supported by unimpeachable documents.
Normally, the age recorded in the school
certificate is considered to be the correct
determination of age provided the parents
furnish the correct age of the ward at the
time of admission and it is authenticated. In
the present case, as already noted, the
parents had admitted to have given an
incorrect date of birth of their daughter,
presumably with a view to make up the age
to secure admission in the school. Apart from
this, as noticed earlier, the school certificate
collected by PW-15 S.I. Bagal was not an
authenticated document. No body was
produced to prove the date of birth recorded
in the school certificate. The date of birth
recorded in the school certificate as 29.6.63
is, therefore, belied by the unimpeachable
evidence of PWs.-1 13 and
contemporaneous documents like date of
birth register of Greater Bombay Municipal
Corporation and the register of the Nursing
Home where the prosecutrix was born and
14 CRA 755/2006 742//2006

proved by Dr. Shashikant Awasare, as noted
(23) Furthermore, the appellants did not examine the
radiologist in their evidence but since the report of the
radiologist was filed by the prosecution itself, therefore,
it was got examined as Ex.D6 from the investigating
officer Rajendra Kumar Verma (PW-12). It is not in
dispute that even an unexhibited prosecution document
can be considered if it is in favour of the accused. If two
years margin is considered taking towards the lower side
of age of the prosecutrix as assessed by radiologist, this
Court is of the view that the prosecutrix was aged 14
years at the date of incident, then it would corroborate
the ocular evidence. In view of specific ocular evidence
which remained unchallenged in the trial with regard to
the age of the prosecutrix which is corroborated by the
report of the radiologist, it is clear that the basic defence
taken by the appellants with regard to the consent of the
prosecutrix, is of no assistance to the appellants, as the
prosecutrix was minor.

(24) If the evidence of prosecutrix is worth reliable,
then the accused appellants can be convicted on the
basis of her sole testimony. It is not required that her
testimony should be corroborated by other material
particulars. Only if the Court finds it difficult to accept
the sole testimony of prosecutrix, then it may search for
other corroborative piece of evidence, which may lend
assurance to her testimony.

(25) The Supreme Court in the case of State of
Rajasthan vs. N.K. The accused, reported in (2000)
5 SCC 13 has held as under:-

’11.It is well settled that a prosecutrix
complaining of having been a victim of
the offence of rape is not an accomplice
after the crime. There is no rule of law
that her testimony cannot be acted
15 CRA 755/2006 742//2006

without corroboration in material
particulars. Her testimony has to be
appreciated on the principle of
probabilities just as the testimony of any
other witness; a high degree of
probability having been shown to exist in
view of the subject matter being a
criminal charge. However, if the court of
facts may find it difficult to accept the
version of the prosecutrix on its face
value, it may search for evidence, direct
or circumstantial, which would lend
assurance to her testimony. Assurance,
short of corroboration as understood in
the context of an accomplice would do.
Reference may be had to a long chain of
decisions, some of which are Rameshwar
1952 SCR 377, Sidheshwar Ganguly AIR
1958 SC 143, Madhoram Anr. (1973) 1
SCC 533, State of Maharashtra Vs.
Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain (1990)
1 SCC 550, Madam Gopal Kaddad (1992)
3 SCC 204 Shri Narayan AIR 1992 (3)
SCC 615, Karnel Singh 1995 (5) SCC 518,
Bodhisattwa Gautam 1996 (1) SCC 490
Gurmit Singh (supra). We may quote from
the last of the above said decisions where
the rule for appreciating the evidence of
the prosecutrix in such cases has been
succinctly summed up in the following
words :-

If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires
confidence, it must be relied upon
without seeking corroboration of her
statement in material particulars. If
for some reason the court finds it
difficult to place implicit reliance on
her testimony, it may look for
evidence which may lend assurance to
her testimony, short of corroboration
required in the case of an accomplice.

The testimony of the prosecutrix must
be appreciated in the background of
the entire case and the trial court
must be alive to its responsibility and
be sensitive while dealing with cases
involving sexual molestations.”

(26) In the present case, it has not been disputed that
the prosecutrix went missing for few days. The entire
16 CRA 755/2006 742//2006

cross-examination of the prosecutrix was on the
question of her consent. The only attempt of the
appellants was to show the conduct of the prosecutrix
that since she did not raise an alarm while she was
taken from one place to another and she did not make
any complaint to anybody, therefore,it should be
presumed that she was a consenting party.
(27) This Court has already held that non-making a
complaint to a stranger specifically when the prosecutrix
says that she was under the threat, may not indicate
that the prosecutrix was a consenting party. Further, the
prosecutrix is minor, therefore, even otherwise her
consent is immaterial. Thus, it is clear that the
prosecution has succeeded in establishing its case
beyond reasonable doubt, that the prosecutrix was
kidnapped and raped.

(28) Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the
prosecution has succeeded in establishing its case
beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecutrix was minor
and was subjected to rape as well as kidnapping and
accordingly, the appellants are held guilty for offence
under Sections 366, 376(2)(g) of IPC. Since, the
minimum sentence provided for offence under Section
376 (2)(g) of IPC is ten years, therefore, the sentence
awarded by the trial Court does not require any

(29) Accordingly, the judgment and sentence dated
29/06/2006 passed by the Special [Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act],
Shivpuri in Special Case No.15/2006 is hereby affirmed
(30) Both the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed.

(G. S. Ahluwalia)

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