Jay Prakash Gupta vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh Thr on 27 November, 2017


MCRC 19421/2017
Jayprakash Gupta and Anr. vs. State of MP Another

Gwalior, dtd. 27/11/2017
Shri Ashirbad Dwivedi, Counsel for the applicants.
Shri R.K. Awasthy, Public Prosecutor for the State/
respondent No.1.

Heard on the question of admission.
This application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. has been
filed for quashing the F.I.R. in crime no. 67/2017 registered
by Police Station Sevada, Distt. Datia for offence under
Section 294, 323, 498-A, 34 of I.P.C.

The undisputed fact is that the applicants are the
parents-in-law of the complainant/respondent no.2.

The prosecution story in short is that the respondent
no. 2 was married to Salil Gupta, son of the applicants in the
month of March 2014. Her father had given Rs.7 lacs in cash
and other household articles apart from gold ornaments.
Immediately after the marriage, the applicants and other in-
laws of the respondent no.2, started demanding a four
wheeler and an amount of Rs.2 lacs. The applicants used to
harass her by passing taunts that in case their demand is not
fulfilled, then she will not be allowed to stay in her
matrimonial house. The respondent no.2 told about the
demand to her father. In spite of various attempts by her
father and brother to convince the applicants and her in-
laws, their behaviour did not improve as a result of which,
she is residing in her father’s house. On 5-5-2017, her
husband Salil Gupta and Ankit came to her house and again
asked, that whether she is bringing a four wheeler or not,
otherwise, he would marry again.

On these allegations, the police has registered the

criminal case against the applicants and other in-laws of the
respondent no.2.

Challenging the F.I.R. lodged by the respondent no.2, it
is submitted that in fact it is the respondent no.2, who
herself is not interested in living in her matrimonial house.
She has left the house without any reason. Their son has
also filed a petition under Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act
and by way of counterblast, a false F.I.R. has been lodged.

Per contra, it is submitted by the State Counsel, that
the F.I.R. prima facie discloses the commission of offence by
the applicants.

Heard the learned Counsel for the parties.
So far as the question of filing a petition under Section
13 of Hindu Marriage Act, by the son of the applicants is
concerned, it is well established principle of law that the
F.I.R. cannot be quashed merely on the ground that it was
lodged, after the institution of petition under Section 13 of
Hindu Marriage Act.

The Supreme Court in the case of Pratibha Vs.
Rameshwari Devi reported in (2007) 12 SCC 369 has
held that filing of divorce petition cannot be a ground to
quash the proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.

“16. It is pertinent to note that the complaint was filed
only when all efforts to return to the matrimonial home
had failed and Respondent 2 husband had filed a
divorce petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955. That apart, in our view, filing of a divorce
petition in a civil court cannot be a ground to quash
criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the Code as
it is well settled that criminal and civil proceedings are
separate and independent and the pendency of a civil
proceeding cannot bring to an end a criminal
proceeding even if they arise out of the same set of
facts. Such being the position, we are, therefore, of the
view that the High Court while exercising its powers
under Section 482 of the Code has gone beyond the

allegations made in the FIR and has acted in excess of
its jurisdiction and, therefore, the High Court was not
justified in quashing the FIR by going beyond the
allegations made in the FIR or by relying on extraneous

Thus, it cannot be said that merely because the son of
the applicants have filed a petition under Section 13 of Hindu
Marriage Act, for divorce, therefore, the F.I.R. has been
lodged by way of counterblast.

So far as the allegations made against the applicants of
demanding a four wheeler and a cash amount of Rs.2 lacs
and harassment by the applicants due to non-fulfillment of
the said demand is concerned, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the case is covered by a judgment passed by
the Supreme Court in the case of Taramani Parakh Vs.
State of M.P. reported in (2015) 11 SC 260.

The Supreme Court in the case of Taramani Parakh
(Supra) has held as under :

“10. The law relating to quashing is well
settled. If the allegations are absurd or do not
make out any case or if it can be held that
there is abuse of process of law, the
proceedings can be quashed but if there is a
triable case the Court does not go into
reliability or otherwise of the version or the
counter-version. In matrimonial cases, the
Courts have to be cautious when omnibus
allegations are made particularly against
relatives who are not generally concerned with
the affairs of the couple. We may refer to the
decisions of this Court dealing with the issue.

11. Referring to earlier decisions, in Amit
Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander (2012) 9 SCC 460,
it was observed (SCC pp. 482-84, para 27):

“27.1. Though there are no limits of the
powers of the Court under Section 482 of
the Code but the more the power, the more
due care and caution is to be exercised in
invoking these powers. The power of
quashing criminal proceedings, particularly,
the charge framed in terms of Section 228

of the Code should be exercised very
sparingly and with circumspection and that
too in the rarest of rare cases.

27.2. The Court should apply the test as to
whether the uncontroverted allegations as
made from the record of the case and the
documents submitted therewith prima facie
establish the offence or not. If the
allegations are so patently absurd and
inherently improbable that no prudent
person can ever reach such a conclusion
and where the basic ingredients of a
criminal offence are not satisfied then the
Court may interfere.

27.3. The High Court should not unduly
interfere. No meticulous examination of the
evidence is needed for considering whether
the case would end in conviction or not at
the stage of framing of charge or quashing
of charge.

27.4. Where the exercise of such power is
absolutely essential to prevent patent
miscarriage of justice and for correcting
some grave error that might be committed
by the subordinate courts even in such
cases, the High Court should be loath to
interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the
prosecution in exercise of its inherent

27.5. Where there is an express legal bar
enacted in any of the provisions of the
Code or any specific law in force to the
very initiation or institution and
continuance of such criminal proceedings,
such a bar is intended to provide specific
protection to an accused.

27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the
freedom of a person and the right of the
complainant or prosecution to investigate
and prosecute the offender.

27.7. The process of the court cannot be
permitted to be used for an oblique or
ultimate/ulterior purpose.

27.8. Where the allegations made and as
they appeared from the record and
documents annexed therewith to
predominantly give rise and constitute a
“civil wrong” with no “element of
criminality” and does not satisfy the basic

ingredients of a criminal offence, the court
may be justified in quashing the charge.
Even in such cases, the court would not
embark upon the critical analysis of the

27.9. Another very significant caution that
the courts have to observe is that it
cannot examine the facts, evidence and
materials on record to determine whether
there is sufficient material on the basis of
which the case would end in a conviction;
the court is concerned primarily with the
allegations taken as a whole whether they
will constitute an offence and, if so, is it
an abuse of the process of court leading
to injustice.

27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the
court called upon to hold a full-fledged
enquiry or to appreciate evidence
collected by the investigating agencies to
find out whether it is a case of acquittal
or conviction.

27.11. Where allegations give rise to a
civil claim and also amount to an offence,
merely because a civil claim is
maintainable, does not mean that a
criminal complaint cannot be maintained.
27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 228 and/or under Section
482, the Court cannot take into
consideration external materials given by
an accused for reaching the conclusion
that no offence was disclosed or that
there was possibility of his acquittal. The
Court has to consider the record and
documents annexed therewith by the

27.13. Quashing of a charge is an
exception to the rule of continuous
prosecution. Where the offence is even
broadly satisfied, the Court should be
more inclined to permit continuation of
prosecution rather than its quashing at
that initial stage. The Court is not
expected to marshal the records with a
view to decide admissibility and
reliability of the documents or records
but is an opinion formed prima facie.
27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report

under Section 173(2) of the Code,
suffers from fundamental legal defects,
the Court may be well within its
jurisdiction to frame a charge.
27.15. Coupled with any or all of the
above, where the Court finds that it
would amount to abuse of process of the
Code or that the interest of justice
favours, otherwise it may quash the
charge. The power is to be exercised ex
debito justitiae i.e. to do real and
substantial justice for administration of
which alone, the courts exist.

(Ref. State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar
Guha[(1982) 1 SCC 561 : 1982 SCC
(Cri) 283 : AIR 1982 SC 949];

Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v.
Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [(1988)
1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234];

Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4
SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36 : AIR 1993
SC 892]; Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal
Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995
SCC (Cri) 1059]; G. Sagar Suri v. State
of U.P. [(2000) 2 SCC 636 : 2000 SCC
(Cri) 513]; Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P.
[(2003) 3 SCC 11 : 2003 SCC (Cri)
703]; Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial
Magistrate [(1998) 5 SCC 749 : 1998
SCC (Cri) 1400 : AIR 1998 SC 128];
State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma [(1996) 7
SCC 705 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 497]; Ganesh
Narayan Hegde v. S. Bangarappa
[(1995) 4 SCC 41 : 1995 SCC (Cri)
634]; Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd.
v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque [(2005) 1 SCC
122 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 283]; Medchl
Chemicals Pharma (P) Ltd. v.

Biological E. Ltd. [(2000) 3 SCC 269 :
2000 SCC (Cri) 615 : AIR 2000 SC
1869]; Shakson Belthissor v. State of
Kerala [(2009) 14 SCC 466 : (2010) 1
SCC (Cri) 1412]; V.V.S. Rama Sharma v.
State of U.P. [(2009) 7 SCC 234 :

(2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 356]; Chunduru Siva
Ram Krishna v. Peddi Ravindra Babu
[(2009) 11 SCC 203 : (2009) 3 SCC
(Cri) 1297]; Sheonandan Paswan v.
State of Bihar [(1987) 1 SCC 288 : 1987

SCC (Cri) 82]; State of Bihar v. P.P.
Sharma [1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : 1992
SCC (Cri) 192 : AIR 1991 SC 1260];
Lalmuni Devi v. State of Bihar [(2001) 2
SCC 17 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 275]; M.

Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [(2001) 8 SCC
645 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 19]; Savita v.
State of Rajasthan [(2005) 12 SCC 338 :
(2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 571] and S.M. Datta
v. State of Gujarat [(2001) 7 SCC 659 :
2001 SCC (Cri) 1361 : 2001 SCC (LS)

27.16. These are the principles which
individually and preferably cumulatively
(one or more) be taken into
consideration as precepts to exercise of
extraordinary and wide plenitude and
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Code by the High Court. Where the
factual foundation for an offence has
been laid down, the courts should be
reluctant and should not hasten to
quash the proceedings even on the
premise that one or two ingredients
have not been stated or do not appear
to be satisfied if there is substantial
compliance with the requirements of the

12. In Kailash Chandra Agrawal Anr. vs.
State of U.P. (2014) 16 SCC 51, it was
observed: (SCC p. 553, paras 8-9):

“8. We have gone through the FIR and the
criminal complaint. In the FIR, the
appellants have not been named and in the
criminal complaint they have been named
without attributing any specific role to
them. The relationship of the appellants
with the husband of the complainant is
distant. In Kans Raj vs. State of Punjab
[(2000) 5 SCC 207], it was observed:-
(SCC p.217, para 5)
“5. … A tendency has, however,
developed for roping in all relations of
the in-laws of the deceased wives in the
matters of dowry deaths which, if not
discouraged, is likely to affect the case
of the prosecution even against the real
culprits. In their over enthusiasm and
anxiety to seek conviction for maximum

people, the parents of the deceased
have been found to be making efforts
for involving other relations which
ultimately weaken the case of the
prosecution even against the real
accused as appears to have happened in
the instant case.”

The Court has, thus, to be careful in
summoning distant relatives without there
being specific material. Only the husband,
his parents or at best close family
members may be expected to demand
dowry or to harass the wife but not distant
relations, unless there is tangible material
to support allegations made against such
distant relations. Mere naming of distant
relations is not enough to summon them in
absence of any specific role and material to
support such role.

9. The parameters for quashing
proceedings in a criminal complaint are
well known. If there are triable issues, the
Court is not expected to go into the
veracity of the rival versions but where on
the face of it, the criminal proceedings are
abuse of Court’s process, quashing
jurisdiction can be exercised. Reference
may be made to K. Ramakrsihna and Ors.
vs. State of Bihar [(2000) 8 SCC 547],
Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Judicial Magistrate
[(1998) 5 SCC 749], State of Haryana v.
Ch. Bhajan Lal [(1992) Supp (1) SCC 335]
and Asmathunnisa v. State of A.P.[(2011)
11 SCC 259].”

13. In the present case, the complaint is as

“Sir, it is submitted that I was married on
18.11.09 with Sidharath Parakh s/o Manak
Chand Parak, r/o Sarafa Bazar in front of
Radha Krishna Market, Gwalior according
to the Hindu rites and customs. In the
marriage my father had given gold and
silver ornaments, cash amount and
household goods according to his capacity.
After the marriage when I went to my
matrimonial home, I was treated nicely by
the members of the family. When on the
second occasion I went to my matrimonial,
my husband, father-in-law and mother-in-


law started harassing me for not bringing
the dowry and started saying that I should
bring from my father 25-30 tolas of gold
and Rs.2,00,000/- in cash and only then
they would keep me in the house
otherwise not. On account of this my
husband also used to beat me and my
father-in-law and my mother-in-law used
to torture me by giving the taunts. In this
connection I used to tell my father
Kundanmal Oswal, my mother Smt. Prem
Lata Oswal, uncle Ashok Rai Sharma and
uncle Ved Prakash Mishra from time to
time. On 2.4.2010 the members of the
family of my matrimonial home forcibly
sent me to the house of my parents in
Ganj Basoda along with my brother
Deepak. They snatched my clothes and
ornaments and kept with them. Since then
till today my husband has been harassing
me on the telephone and has not come to
take me back. Being compelled, I have
been moving this application before you.
Sir, it is prayed that action be taken
against husband Sidharath Parakh, my
father-in-law Manak Chand Parakh and my
mother-in-law Smt. Indira Parakh for
torturing me on account of demanding the

14. From a reading of the complaint, it cannot
be held that even if the allegations are taken as
proved no case is made out. There are
allegations against Respondent No.2 and his
parents for harassing the complainant which
forced her to leave the matrimonial home. Even
now she continues to be separated from the
matrimonial home as she apprehends lack of
security and safety and proper environment in
the matrimonial home. The question whether
the appellant has in fact been harassed and
treated with cruelty is a matter of trial but at
this stage, it cannot be said that no case is
made out. Thus, quashing of proceedings
before the trial is not permissible.”

If the allegations against the applicants are considered
in the light of the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in
the case of Taramani Parakh (Supra), then it would be clear

that prima facie there are sufficient allegations against the
applicants warranting their prosecution. Accordingly, this
Court is of the considered opinion that no case is made out
for quashing the F.I.R. in crime No.67/2017 registered by
Police Station Sevada, Distt. Datia for offence under Sections
498-A, 323, 294, 34 of I.P.C.

Accordingly, the application fails and is hereby

(G.S. Ahluwalia)


2017.11.28 16:54:36 +05’30’

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