Daljeet Singh Saluja vs State Of Raj And Anr on 23 January, 2018

S.B. Criminal Misccellaneous (Petition) No. 5440 / 2017
Daljeet Singh Saluja S/o Shri Mahendra Singh B/c Punjabi, Aged
About 34 Years, R/o 16/283, Chopasani Housing Board, Jodhpur
1. State of Rajasthan Through P.P.

2. Smt. Dharamveer Kaur D/o Shri Harbhajan Singh W/o Daljeet
Singh Saluja B/c Punjabi, Aged About 32 Years, R/o 780, Khawas
Ji Ka Rasta, Bakshi Hemraj Ki Gali, Chowkri Ramchandra Ji Ki,
Police Station Subhash Chowk, Jaipur.
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sudhir Jain.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. V.S. Godara, PP
Mr. Ishwar Jain – for respondent No.2.
Judgment reserved on : 12.01.2018
Judgment pronounced on : 23.01.2018

Heard learned counsel for the accused-petitioner as also

learned counsel for the complainant-respondent No.2 and learned

Public Prosecutor for the State.

This misc. petition has been preferred with a prayer to quash

and set-aside the order dated 06.02.2017 passed by learned

Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No.18, Jaipur Metropolitan,

Jaipur, whereby he proceeded to frame charge for the offence

under Sections 498A and 406 IPC against the accused-petitioner.

On preferring a criminal revision against the said order, it also
(2 of 11)

came to be rejected vide order dated 14.07.2017 passed by the

learned Additional Sessions Judge Women Atrocities Cases No.1,

Jaipur Metropolitan, Jaipur. Prayer has been made to quash and

set-aside the said order dated 14.07.2017 also.

Facts in brief, relevant for consideration of this misc. petition

are that FIR No.55/2014 came to be registered on the basis of

complaint filed by Smt. Dharamveer Kaur against her husband

Daljeet Singh and other family members of husband, wherein it

was stated inter-alia that after getting divorce from her first

husband in the year 2009, complainant remarried to Daljeet Singh

on 03.08.2013. Amount of Rs.10 lakhs, silver gold ornaments

and other items as per list enclosed were given in the dowry by

the parents of the complainant. But just after some time of

marriage, accused-persons started treating the complainant with

cruelty to pursue the demand of dowry. They harassed her, did

not give her proper food, did not get her treated on falling ill and

started teasing and taunting her for less quantity of dowry.

Demand for Rs.10 lakhs in cash and a car was raised by them to

let her stay peacefully her in-laws’ house. It has further been

stated that all the accused-persons raised their demand of dowry

after coming to the house of father of complainant situated at

Jaipur. When she was driven out of the house after being beaten,

she reached her parents house at Jaipur. Accused even reached

there for demand of dowry. All the dowry articles given to her at

the time of marriage including ornaments, are in possession of the


After investigation, charge-sheet for the offence under
(3 of 11)

Sections 498A and 406 IPC was filed. After hearing the charge

arguments, learned trial court proceeded to frame charge for the

offences under Sections 498A and 406 IPC against accused

Daljeet Singh. When Daljeet Singh preferred a criminal revision

against the said order dated 06.02.2017, it was also rejected by

the revisional court vide order dated 14.07.2017.

Learned counsel appearing for the accused-petitioner

contends that the orders dated 06.02.2017 and 14.07.2017

passed by the learned courts below are illegal and deserve to be

quashed and set-aside.

Preliminary plea raised in this regard is that the trial court

was not having territorial jurisdiction and thus, the order passed

by it is illegal. Counsel contends that all the alleged incidents of

physical and mental cruelty are said to have taken place at

Jodhpur and the complaint has been wrongly filed showing the

jurisdiction at Jaipur. To support his contention, he has placed

reliance on the following judgments :-

(I)- Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia Ors. Vs. State of

Punjab Ors., reported in 2009(7) SCC 712.

(II)- Bhura Ram Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan Anr.,

reported in 2008(11) SCC 103.

(III)- Manish Ratan Ors. Vs. State of M.P. Anr., reported

in 2007(1) SCC 262.

(IV)- Pankaj Saxena Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan, reported

in 2008(1) Cri.L.R. 64.

Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the complainant as
(4 of 11)

also learned Public Prosecutor contends that the incidents of

cruelty and demand of dowry took place not only at her in-laws’

house at Jodhpur but the accused-persons came to Jaipur also

where the parental house of the complainant is situated and raised

the demand of dowry. This fact has been specifically mentioned in

para 5,6 8 of the complainant filed by Dharamveer Kaur. On

perusal of complaint, it is found that the allegation of having come

to the parental house of complainant for raising demand of dowry

has been specifically mentioned in the complaint in aforesaid

paras. Thus, the plea of the counsel for respondent is found


In Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia’s case (supra) relied

upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, Hon’ble Supreme Court

has specifically mentioned that parties were admittedly residing at

Ontario in Canada and the offence, if any, was committed there,

but the FIR was lodged at Jalandhar only after the divorce petition

has been filed. The allegations made in the FIR regarding demand

of Rs.5 lakhs pertains to Canada only, that too has been filed after

a period of five years from the date of marriage. In such facts and

circumstances, Hon’ble Supreme Court came to the conclusion

that the territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Jalandhar was

lacking. The allegations made in the FIR were not found reliable

by the Court. Taking over all view of the matter, the criminal

appeal preferred by husband-appellant was allowed.

In Bhura Ram’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court

held that the case could not be tried by the court where no part of

offence was committed. It was held that act of alleged cruelty was
(5 of 11)

committed while the bride was living at Punjab. It was, therefore,

found that Rajasthan Courts have no jurisdiction over the matter.

In Manish Ratan’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme

Court held that the cruelty to bride was committed at matrimonial

home at Jabalpur and Datia Court has no jurisdiction, thus, the

case was transferred to Jabalpur Court. It was also held that the

offence is not continuing one.

In Pankaj Saxena’s case (supra), it was held by the Co-

ordinate bench of this Court that the complaint does not disclose

that the offence was committed wholly or in part with the local

jurisdiction of learned Magistrate at Kota. It was, therefore, held

that cause of action did not arise in Kota and the complaint was

returned to the complainant to file it in appropriate Court at


In view of above, it is clear that the judgments relied upon

by learned counsel for the petitioner have no relevance in the

facts and circumstances of the case in hand. In the present matter

specific allegations have been made in the complaint that on

various occasions, in-laws of the complainant came to her parental

house at Jaipur and demanded money. In view of such specific

allegation, it cannot be held that the trial court was lacking in

territorial jurisdiction and on this count alone the order framing

charge against the accused-petitioner is illegal and liable to be

quashed and set-aside. The plea taken by learned counsel in this

regard is not found acceptable.

Much emphasis has been placed by learned counsel for the

petitioner on the plea that the allegation of giving Rs.10 lakhs in
(6 of 11)

cash to the accused is not sustainable in absence of proof as to

fromwhere this huge amount of money flowed to the parents of

complainant. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment

rendered by Delhi High Court in Smt. Neera Singh Vs. The

State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) Ors., reported in 2009(1)

Crimes 123. This was the case where husband was discharged

for the offence under Sections 498A IPC and Section 3 of the

Dowry Prohibition Act. The revision petition filed by the

complainant was also dismissed. Delhi High Court also rejected

the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed on behalf of petitioner-

wife Smt. Neera Singh. Looking to the nature of allegations made

on behalf of the wife and finding them wholly unreliable being

vague, whereby almost every member of the family was involved,

the Court directed that the alleged cash transaction should be

brought to the notice of the income-tax department so as to verify

source of the amount allegedly given in cash as dowry. The

observation made by Delhi High Court, for benefit, can be

reproduced below :-

“6. I consider that the kinds of vague allegations as made
in the complaint by the petitioner against every of the
family of husband cannot be accepted by any court at their
face value and the allegations have to be scrutinized
carefully by the Court before framing charge.
However, in her complaint, she made vague and omnibus
allegations against every other family members. The
statement made by her and other witnesses have been
scrutinized by me, except vague allegations and allegations
of taunting, there are no allegations of perpetuating cruelty
on her by any of the four respondents in order to compel
her to bring more dowry or any particular items.”

In my view, the facts of groundless and untrustworthy vague

allegations persuaded the Court to issue such directions while
(7 of 11)

upholding the discharge order of the accused-husband. In the

case in hand, the allegations made are not so omnibus, vague and

unreliable, which may warrant to follow the course adopted by the

Delhi High Court. This may further be observed here that the

accused will get adequate opportunity when the trial proceeds, to

put to question the allegations of giving Rs.10 lakhs in cash and

dowry, by way of availing his right to cross-examination the

prosecution witnesses and also by setting up his defence case.

However, at the juncture of framing of charge, this Court does not

feel inclined to accept the plea that the source of income of the

parents of complainant be examined at this very stage and then

only to arrived at the conclusion whether the charge is required to

be framed or not. Thus, this Court does not feel persuaded to

accept the plea raised by learned counsel for the petitioner.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on

Bhaskar Lal Sharma Vs. Monica, reported in 2009(10) SCC

604. He contends in this regard that no charge for the offence

under Section 406 IPC can be framed on the basis that any gift

made to the bridegroom or his parents can constitute an offence

under Section 406 IPC for its misappropriation or converting it to

their own use. On going through the said judgment, it appears

that the complaint itself did not show any entrustment having

been made to the husband and father-in-law. The allegations were

made only against mother-in-law that she had taken all the gifts

and cash given by the guests. In this view of the matter, the Court

came to the conclusion that case under Section 406 IPC was made

out only against mother-in-law. It appears that learned counsel
(8 of 11)

for the petitioner has missed to notice this aspect. In the case in

hand, the complaint does not reveal such facts. The allegations

made therein essentially includes the accused-husband, against

whom charge has been framed for the offence under Section 406

IPC. In my view, no assistance is rendered to the accused-

petitioner by the case cited above.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied on Jaidev

Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in 2006 WLC Raj. UC

227. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has observed that the

Court is required to examine the totality of the evidence before it,

should examine the nature of allegation made in the complaint

and the evidence, both oral and documentary, in support thereof.

Charge should not be framed in a mechanical manner without due

application of mind. It has further been observed that the

conscious and judicious approach should be adopted while framing

the charges. I express my complete agreement to the principles

stated above, but looking to the oral and documentary evidence

annexed with the charge-sheet in the case in hand, I do not feel

inclined to take a different view then that of the courts below.

The case of Dharmi Chand Vs. State of Rajasthan,

reported in 2002(2) WLN 728, relied upon by learned counsel

for the petitioner relates to the exercise of powers of trial court

under Section 91 Cr.P.C. at the time of framing of charge. This is

not the situation in the case in hand. No such prayer who was

made by the accused-petitioner before the trial court, so this case

appears to be of no assistance to the accused.

It will be apt to reproduce the principles enunciated by the
(9 of 11)

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar

Samal Anr., reported in 1979(3) SCC 4, relied upon by

learned counsel for the petitioner :-

“10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned
above, the following principles emerge:

(1) That the Judge while considering the question of
framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the
undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the
limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie
case against the accused has been made out;

(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose
grave suspicion against the accused which has not been
properly explained the Court will be, fully justified in
framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would
naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is
difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and
large however if two views are equally possible and the
Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him
while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion
against the accused, he will be fully within his right to
discharge the accused.

(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of
the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a
senior and experienced Judge cannot act merely as a Post
office or a mouth-piece of the prosecution, but has to
consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect
of the evidence and the documents produced before the
Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so
on. This however does not mean that the Judge should
make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter
and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.”

Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of this case in

hand, I find that it is a matter wherein the trial court has rightly

proceeded to frame the charge for the offences under Sections

498A and 406 IPC. Taking the evidence annexed with the charge-

sheet into consideration, I find that the material available on

record gives rise to grave suspicion against the accused, for which

the charge has been correctly framed against him.

To support his contention, learned counsel for the

complainant – respondent No.2 has placed reliance on State of

Orissa Vs. Debendra Nath Padhi, reported in (2005)1 SCC
(10 of 11)

568, in Para 8 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court

has held as under:-

“8. What is to the meaning of the expression ‘the
record of the case’ as used in Section 227 of the Code.
Though the word ‘case’ is not defined in the the Code but
Section 209 throws light on the interpretation to be placed
on the said word. Section 209 which deals with the
commitment of case to Court of Session when offence is
triable exclusively by it, inter alia, provides that when it
appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable
exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall commit ‘the
case’ to the Court of Session and send to that court ‘the
record of the case’ and the document and articles, if any,
which are to be produced in evidence and notify the Public
Prosecutor of the commitment of the case to the Court of
Session. It is evident that the record of the case and
documents submitted therewith as postulated in Section
227 relate to the case and the documents referred in
Section 209. That is the plain meaning of Section 227 read
with Section 209 of the Code. No provision in the Code
grants to the accused any right to file any material or
document at the stage of framing of charge. That right is
granted only at the stage of the trial.”

Learned counsel for the complainant-respondent No.2 has

also placed reliance on Omprakash Vs. State of Rajasthan,

reported in 2004(1) WLC (Raj.) 188. It has been held by the

Co-ordinate Bench of this Court that at the stage of framing of

charge, trial court is not required to meticulously examine and

marshal the material available on record as to whether there is

sufficient material against the accused which would ultimately

result in conviction. The Court is prima facie required to consider

whether there is sufficient material against the accused to

presume the commission of the offence. Even strong suspicion

about commission of offence is sufficient for framing the charge.

The guilt or innocence of the accused has to be determined at the

time of conclusion of trial after evidence is adduced and not at the

stage of framing of the charge.

The principles laid down in aforesaid judgments leads to the
(11 of 11)

conclusion that relevant material has been taken into

consideration by the trial court while framing charge against the

accused-petitioner and mind was judiciously applied to that

material by that Court and therefore, the order passed for framing

charge against the accused-petitioner cannot be faulted with. The

order dated 14.07.2017 passed by the learned revisional court

also appears to be justified and legally tenable in view of the facts

of the case.

In the result, there is no substance in the criminal misc.

petition and the same deserves to be and is accordingly




Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *