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Eshan Joshi vs Suman on 23 January, 2018

Crl. Misc. M-32351-2016 -1-

IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATES OF PUNJAB AND
HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

Crl. Misc. M- 32351 of 2016 (OM)
Date of Decision: January 23, 2018

Eshan Joshi

…Petitioner
Versus
Suman

…Respondent

CORAM:- HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE JAISHREE THAKUR

Present:- Mr. Hemant Bassi, Advocate with
Mr. Kewal Singh, Advocate
for the petitioner.

Mr. Umesh Aggarwal, Advocate
for the respondent.
********
JAISHREE THAKUR, J.

The instant petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

for quashing of Criminal Complaint Case No.281 dated 23.12.2015 titled as

“Suman Joshi vs. Eshan Joshi” (Annexure P-6) under Sections 12, 17, 18,

19, 20, 22 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for

short ‘the DV Act’), as well as all subsequent and consequential proceedings

arising therefrom including order dated 08.08.2016 (Annexure P-8),

pending in the court of Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Chandigarh.

2. This is a classic case of litigation being filed by the parties

against each other after their marriage turns sour and does not survive the

test of time.

3. The facts that need to be noted to understand the pale of

controversy herein is that parties solemnized their marriage at Bangalore on

20.01.2010. For both the parties it was their second marriage, having

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children from their previous respective marriages and no children from the

instant wedlock. The petitioner herein alleges that differences arose between

the parties, on account of the respondent-wife (for short ‘the respondent’)

demanding money and transfer of his assets in her name. In May 2011, the

petitioner purchased apartment in Shobha Classic Apartments in the name

of the respondent which was sold and a sum of Rs. 60 Lakhs has been taken

by her. It is further alleged that every effort was made by the respondent

herein to extort money from the petitioner, which resulted in the petitioner

moving out of the matrimonial home and with the help of the police he was

able to get his belongings. The respondent got FIR No.1022 registered

under Sections 498-A, 506, 504 of Indian Penal Code and Sections 3/4 of

Dowry Prohibition Act at police Station HSR Bangalore, in which the

petitioner applied for and has got anticipatory bail. The respondent filed a

complaint under the DV Act at Chandigarh on 23.12.2015 without

disclosing registration of FIR No.1022 registered under Sections 498-A,

506, 504 of Indian Penal Code and Sections 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act at

police Station HSR Bangalore. The petitioner filed a divorce petition at

Bangalore on 19.03.2016 (Annexure P-9) on the ground of cruelty and also

filed a reply to the complaint under the DV Act, challenging the jurisdiction

of the Courts at Chandigarh. In the meantime, by the impugned order dated

08.08.2016, the Magistrate assessed interim maintenance @ Rs.75,000/-

p.m. and Rs.50,000/- as litigation expenses (Annexure P-8). The petitioner

herein filed a complaint at Bangalore against the respondent under Sections

420, 384, 385, 386, 389, 506 of Indian Penal Code before the Addl. Chief

Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore. The respondent then filed an

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application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. at Chandigarh, alleging that she is

unemployed and has no source of income and is dependent upon her sister

and brother-in-law. She also filed for execution of the impugned order dated

08.08.2016, which had allowed interim maintenance. The respondent

thereafter approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court seeking transfer of the

divorce petition from Bangalore to Chandigarh on 26.08.2016, which

petition was dismissed on 22.03.2017. Thereafter, the petitioner filed the

instant petition in the High Court on 14.09.2016. The mediation between the

parties was not successful. There are also other applications that have been

filed before the executing court seeking the maintenance as awarded by the

JMIC, Chandigarh, in which replies have been filed by her. It would also be

pertinent to note that a cancellation report of FIR No.1022 registered under

Sections 498-A, 506, 504 of Indian Penal Code and Sections 3/4 of Dowry

Prohibition Act at police Station HSR Bangalore, lodged by the respondent

at Bangalore, has been accepted.

4. Mr. Hemant Bassi, learned counsel for the petitioner appearing

along with Mr. Kewal Singh, Advocate, argues that courts at Chandigarh do

not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the very complaint itself and

therefore, all proceedings thereunder are illegal and non-est. It is submitted

that the respondent is neither a permanent resident of Chandigarh nor is

temporarily residing here and the instant complaint has been preferred only

to harass the petitioner. It is argued that in the complaint itself it is

mentioned that her minor son (from her earlier marriage) is studying at

Bangalore, and therefore, it cannot be said that the respondent is a resident

of Chandigarh and can invoke the jurisdiction of the courts here. It is further

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submitted that no cause of action arose at Chandigarh and there is no report

of the Protection Officer available on the record. It is argued that before

passing of an order on any application under the DV Act, the Magistrate has

to take into consideration the domestic incident report received from the

Protection Officer or Service Provider as envisaged under Section 12 of the

DV Act. Moreover, divorce petition is also pending at Bangalore and the

transfer petition filed by the respondent in the Hon’ble Supreme Court has

been dismissed. Learned counsel further argues that the respondent was

duty bound to disclose the material fact that she had got an FIR No.1022

registered under Sections 498-A, 506, 504 of Indian Penal Code and

Sections 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act at police Station HSR Bangalore,

and non -disclosure would disentitle her to any relief. It is also submitted

that once aforesaid FIR lodged by the respondent at Bangalore under

Sections 498-A, 506, 504 of Indian Penal Code and Sections 3/4 of Dowry

Prohibition Act stood cancelled, the instant complaint filed under the DV

Act per se would not be maintainable. It is also submitted that the

respondent would be entitled to maintenance only if she can prove that she

is unable to support herself, but statement of account shows that she has

been earning substantially and has enough funds to sustain herself as she

also has received a sum of Rs 60 lakhs from the sale of a flat which was

bought by the petitioner in her name.

5. Per contra, Mr. Umesh Aggarwal, learned counsel appearing on

behalf of the respondent argues that the petition itself is not maintainable,

on account of the fact that the petitioner has not availed of the remedy of

filing an appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act. It is submitted that the

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proceedings under the DV Act have been initiated after filing of the written

statement therein and therefore, the petitioner, at this juncture, is not entitled

to seek quashing of the same. It is also argued that the respondent can avail

of the remedy available under Sections 498-A, 506, 504 of Indian Penal

Code and Sections 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act as well as under the DV

Act. Under the FIR, the respondent had alleged cruelty on account of

demand of dowry, whereas under the DV Act, the relief sought is for

maintenance etc. It is further argued that the maintenance as awarded is only

interim maintenance based on the financial capacity of the petitioner, which

is not on the excessive side. It is also submitted that the courts at

Chandigarh would have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint, since the

petitioner is residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts at

Chandigarh, along with her sister and brother-in-law. Her son is now

admitted in a local school herein within the tricity of Chandigarh. It is

further submitted that dismissal of the transfer application, seeking transfer

of the divorce petition from Bangalore to Chandigarh, could not be read as a

bar to the proceedings being instituted here within the jurisdiction of the

courts at Chandigarh.

6. I have heard learned counsel for both the parties and with their

assistance have gone through the complaint and the numerous applications

filed therein along with case law relied upon.

7. Admittedly, a marriage has been performed between the parties

and out of this wedlock, there is no issue. A perusal of the pleadings shows

that there is bitter litigation between the parties with each filing various

complaints and lodging FIRs against each other at various places.

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8. This court is seized of the following questions;

i) Whether the instant petition is maintainable in its present

form?

ii) Whether the courts here at Chandigarh would have

territorial jurisdiction to entertain the instant complaint under

the DV Act?

iii) Whether there has been concealment of facts regarding

the pendency of FIR No.1022 registered under Sections 498-A,

506, 504 of Indian Penal Code and Sections 3/4 of Dowry

Prohibition Act at police Station HSR Bangalore by the

respondent and whether such concealment would dis-entitle the

respondent to any relief ?

iv) Whether the proceedings under the DV Act could be

initiated without a report of Protection Officer?

9. An argument has been raised by the counsel for the respondent

that the present petition is not maintainable in its present form since, the

petitioner has not availed of his remedy of appeal under Section 29 against

the impugned order dated 08.08.2016. The argument as raised, might be

sustainable in case the petitioner had challenged only the order qua

maintenance, whereas the petitioner has in fact challenged the very

complaint itself along with consequential proceedings including the

impugned order, on the grounds of territorial jurisdiction of the courts at

Chandigarh to entertain the complaint, concealment of material fact and

issuance of notice without first calling for a report on domestic violence.

10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dhariwal Tobacco Products

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Limited and others vs. State of Maharashtra and another, (2009) 2

Supreme Court Cases 370, was seized of the question whether an

application under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for

short ‘the Code’) can be dismissed on the grounds that an alternative remedy

of filing a revision petition under Section 397 of the Code is available. In

the aforesaid case, company and its Directors were summoned by the JMIC

Akkalkot, Solapur under the provisions of Prevention of Food Adulteration

Act. An application was filed under Section 482 of the Code against the said

summoning order, which was dismissed by the High Court on the ground

that there was an alternative remedy of filing a revision petition under

Section 397 of the Code. That order was challenged before the Apex Court

and after taking note of settled case law, it was held that the High Court has

inherent power under Section 482 of the Code, even though there is an

alternative remedy available. Similarly in Krishnan vs. Krishnaveni and

another, 1997(1) RCR (Criminal) 724, it has been held that a High Court

under its inherent powers under Sections 482 and 483 of the Code, is

justified in interfering with an order, which would lead to miscarriage of

justice and can interfere, even though remedy of appeal/revision has not

been availed of. Since the petitioner is seeking to challenge the very

complaint, itself being without jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the

High court with its vast inherent powers would be able to entertain this

petition to ensure there is no abuse of the process of law. Therefore, this

question is answered against the respondent.

11. Section 27 of the DV Act reads as under:-

“Jurisdiction – (1) The Court of Judicial Magistrate of

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the first class or the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case
may be, within the local limits of which —

(a) the person aggrieved permanently or temporarily
resides or carries on business or is employed; or
(b) the respondent resides or carries on business or is
employed; or
(c) the cause of action has arisen,

shall be the competent court to grant a protection order
and other orders under this Act and to try offences under
this Act.

(2) Any order made under this Act shall be enforceable
throughout India.”

Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner argues

that a bare reading of the said Section would show that only such courts are

competent to entertain a complaint where the aggrieved person/respondent

permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed, or

where cause of action arises. It is argued that merely on account of the fact

that the respondent herein is temporarily residing with her sister, the court at

Chandigarh would not have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. In this

regard, reliance has been placed upon judgment rendered by the Apex Court

in Advocate Ramesh Mohanlal Bhutada and another vs. State of

Maharashtra and others, 2012(1) RCR (Cr.) 461, in which it has been

held that meaning of expression “resides” in Section 12 implies something

more than a causal stay and implies some concrete intention to stay at a

particular place, and not merely to pay a casual or flying visit. It is argued

that the complaint itself would reveal that the son of the respondent is

studying at Bangalore, therefore, there is no occasion for her to invoke the

jurisdiction of the courts at Chandigarh.

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12. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

respondent argued that the parties were residing at Bangalore, when a

matrimonial dispute arose and at that time the son of the respondent was

studying at Bangalore and in order not to disrupt his studies, he was allowed

to continue the study at Bangalore. As of now, he is studying within the

local jurisdiction of the tricity of Chandigarh.

13. The question regarding territorial jurisdiction has been raised

before several High Courts in Hima Chugh vs. Pritam Ashok Sadaphule

Ors, 2013(19) RCR (Criminal) 161, Sharad Kumar Pandey vs.

Mamta Pandey, 2010(7) RCR (Criminal) 1389, Rabindra Nath Sahu

and anther vs. Smt. Susila Sahu, 2017(1) RCR (Criminal) 312, Vikas

Rastogee vs. State of U.P. and another, 2014(16) RCR (Criminal) 73. In

Hima Chugh and Sharad Kumar Pandey( supra), Delhi High Court has

held that temporary residence means where an aggrieved person is

compelled to take shelter or to take job or do some business, in view of

domestic violence within her matrimonial home. However, temporary

residence does not include residence in a lodge or hostel or an inn or taking

up residence at a place only for filing a domestic violence case. It must not

be a fleeting residence, where a woman comes only for contesting the case

and otherwise does not reside there. In Rabindra Nath Sahu and another

(supra) Orissa High Court has held that temporary residence includes a

place where an aggrieved person was compelled to reside in view of

commission of domestic violence, where she may not have decided to reside

permanently or for a considerable length of time, but for the time being. In

Vikas Rastogee (supra) Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has held that

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aggrieved person can initiate proceedings from temporary residence and that

question of temporary residence is a mixed question of law and fact and

cannot be decided by Revisional Court.

14. Section 27 of the DV Act permits a Court to entertain a

complaint of a person residing temporarily within its jurisdiction. Needless

to say that after being subjected to domestic violence, it may not be possible

for a woman to reside within the same jurisdiction as where the incident of

domestic violence occurred and would shift and relocate to a place where

she can reside/pick up a job or has some support, be it with her parents of

near kith and kin. In the instant case, the respondent is residing with her

sister, a close kith and kin after she left Bangalore and her matrimonial

home. The son of the respondent is now studying within the tricity of

Chandigarh, as would be evident from the school fee receipts that have been

annexed. The argument raised that son of the respondent was studying in

Bangalore and residence in Chandigarh is fleeting, is not sustainable. The

minor child was studying and stayed in Bangalore only to complete his

session and not be shifted midterm. Therefore it cannot be said that the

respondent is residing with her sister only on account of filing of complaint

under the DV Act and courts at Chandigarh would not have jurisdiction to

entertain the complaint.

15. The third question that would arise for consideration is whether

concealment of fact regarding pendency of the FIR at Bangalore would dis-

entitle the respondent to any relief under the proceedings initiated under the

DV Act?

16. Section 498-A of Indian Penal Code was incorporated in the

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Indian Penal Code in the year 1983 when there arose a need to protect

women against cruelty inflicted upon her, by her husband and member of

his family, on account of bringing inadequate dowry. Despite the protection

granted to women on account of inadequate dowry, a woman is subjected to

various other abuses within the home, which necessitated introduction of

The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. As per

Section 3, the term ‘domestic violence’ is wide enough to include physical

abuse, sexual abuse, verbal abuse, emotional abuse or even economic abuse

within the matrimonial home. The scope and ambit of domestic violence is

much wider than cruelty as envisaged under Section 498-A of IPC. At this

juncture, it would be pertinent to take note of the fact that the reliefs sought

for under the DV Act as provided under Sections 12, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22

of the DV Act are reliefs, which are not available under Sections 498-A of

Indian Penal Code. In the instant case, an FIR had been instituted under

Sections 498-A, 506, 504 of Indian Penal Code, which provisions would not

have provided respondent with the right to get relief of residence,

maintenance, compensation, custody etc. Therefore, this court is of the

opinion that non-mentioning of the aforesaid FIR does not amount to

concealment of material fact, which would dis-entitle the respondent to

claim relief under the DV Act, as the relief claimed is entirely different.

Therefore, this question is answered against the petitioner.

17. An another argument has been raised by counsel for the

petitioner that the Magistrate at Chandigarh could not have issued notice,

without taking into consideration any domestic incident report by him from

the Protection Officer or the Service Provider. It is argued that on receipt of

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a complaint, the Magistrate was duty bound to send for a report of any

domestic incident before issuing notices.

18 Section 12 of the DV Act is reproduced as under;-

“12. Application to Magistrate.–

1. An aggrieved person or a Protection Officer or any
other person on behalf of the aggrieved person may present
an application to the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs
under this Act:

Provided that before passing any order on such
application, the Magistrate shall take into consideration
any domestic incident report received by him from the
Protection Officer or the service provider.

2. The relief sought for under sub-section (1) may
include a relief for issuance of an order for payment of
compensation or damages without prejudice to the right of
such person to institute a suit for compensation or damages
for the injuries caused by the acts of domestic violence
committed by the respondent:

Provided that where a decree for any amount as
compensation or damages has been passed by any court in
favour of the aggrieved person, the amount, if any, paid or
payable in pursuance of the order made by the Magistrate
under this Act shall be set off against the amount payable
under such decree and the decree shall, notwithstanding
anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5
of 1908), or any other law for the time being in force, be
executable for the balance amount, if any, left after such set
off.

3. Every application under sub-section (1) shall be in
such form and contain such particulars as may be
prescribed or as nearly as possible thereto.

4. The Magistrate shall fix the first date of hearing,

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which shall not ordinarily be beyond three days from the
date of receipt of the application by the court.

5. The Magistrate shall endeavour to dispose of every
application made under sub-section (1) within a period of
sixty days from the date of its first hearing.”

Chapter IV of the DV Act pertains to the procedure as to be

followed by the Magistrate to grant relief to an aggrieved person. Under

Section 12 of the DV Act, an application has to be presented by an

aggrieved person, either by the person herself or a Protection Officer or any

other person on behalf of the aggrieved person to the Magistrate, seeking

relief as provided under the DV Act. A proviso has been added to Section

12(1) of the Act, that before passing any such order on any application

received, the Magistrate shall take into consideration any domestic incident

report received by him from the Protection Officer or the Service Provider.

Section 9 of the DV Act entails the duties and functions of a Protection

Officer, whose primary duty is to assist the Magistrate in the discharge of

his functions under the Act, to make a domestic incident report to the

Magistrate in the form prescribed, upon receipt of a complaint of domestic

violence, while forwarding copies of the complaint to the Police Officer in

charge of the Police Station within the local limits of whose jurisdiction,

domestic violence is alleged to have been committed, as well as to the

Service Provider. Section 9(2) of the DV Act further provides that the

Protection Officer shall be under the control and supervision of the

Magistrate and shall perform the duties imposed on him by the Magistrate

and the Government. Moreover, Section 4 of the DV Act provides that any

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person, who has reasons to believe that an act of domestic violence has

been, or is being, or is likely to be committed, may give information about it

to the concerned Protection Officer.

19. On a conjoint reading of Sections 9 and 12 of the DV Act it is

manifestly clear that it is duty of the Protection Officer to work under the

control and supervision of the Magistrate and to perform duties imposed

upon him by the Magistrate and in case, he has received a complaint on

domestic violence then, to make a domestic incident report and submit it to

the Magistrate, as well as to forward copies of the complaint to the Police

Officer in charge of the police station within local limits of whose

jurisdiction, domestic violence is alleged to have been committed. The

proviso added to Section 12(1) of the DV Act is only to the effect that in

case a domestic incident report has been received by the Magistrate, the

same shall be considered before passing any order on an application

received. Section 12 of the DV Act per se does not hold that a Magistrate on

receipt of complaint is obligated to call for a domestic incident report,

before passing any order on an application.

20. In the case of Abhiram Gogoi vs. Rashmi Rekha Gogoi,

(2011) 4 Gau LR 276, it was held by Hon’ble Gauhati High Court that it is

not mandatory for a Magistrate to obtain a domestic incident report before

the Magistrate passes a maintenance order under Section 18 of the DV Act.

A similar view was taken by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of

Shambhu Prasad Singh vs. Manjari, 2012 SCC Online Del 1371, that

receipt of domestic incident report is not a pre-requisite for issuing a notice

to the respondent. Insistence to take into consideration the domestic incident

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report of protection officer would not apply at the stage of initiation of

enquiry under Section 12 of the DV Act, because a Magistrate, on the basis

of an application supported by affidavit, on being satisfied can even grant

ex parte orders in favour of the aggrieved person under Sections 18, 19, 20,

21 or 22 of the DV Act. Even this High Court in the case Jagdish Kumar

Bakhri vs. Manju Bakhri, 2012 SCC Online PH 395, observed that a

bare perusal of Section 12 of the DV Act would signify that it is not

mandatory for the Court to call for domestic incident report on each and

every date of hearing, before passing any order. If no domestic report is

received in the court, then in such eventuality, there is no bar for the court to

pass an order under Section 12 of the DV Act. The judgment relied upon by

the counsel for the respondent in the case of Dharmendra and others vs.

State of M.P. and another, 2014 SCC Online MP 5388, is contrary to the

judgments referred to by this court. On a reading of the judgment, this court

is not inclined to concur with the same. In the said case, it has been held as

under;-

“On bare perusal of the aforesaid provision, it becomes

clear that before passing an order on application, the

Magistrate has to take into consideration the domestic

incident report received from Protection Officer or Service

Provider. The order reveals that learned Magistrate

before issuing notice to the petitioners did not even

consider the contents of the application. Section 12 of the

Act clearly provides for obtaining domestic incident

report. The domestic incident report proforma is given in

form 1 of the schedule 2 of Domestic Violence Rules. This

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proforma is in detailed analytical form wherein the

details of each incident of domestic violence are to be

entered with date, time and place of violence and person

who caused domestic violence. The object is that all

allegations made in application must be specific and the

Court should not exercise jurisdiction without considering

domestic incident report since it is necessary for the Court

to know before issuing any notice to petitioners as to who

were the petitioners who caused domestic violence and

what was the nature of violence and when it was

committed. The proforma specifies different heads of

physical violence, sexual violence, verbal and emotional

abuse, economic violence, dowry related harassment and

other forms of violence. The proforma also provides for

filing of documents in support of the application like

medico-legal certificate, list of stridhan and other

documents. This domestic incident report has to be signed

by the aggrieved person. The application under Section 12

is required to be made in form 2 of the Rules wherein the

details of various kinds of reliefs and expenses are to be

given. Section 27 of the Act provides which judicial

Magistrate Court can have jurisdiction to entertain an

application under Section 12 of the Act.”

As already discussed above, proviso to Section 12(1) only

stipulates that the Magistrate shall take into consideration any domestic

incident report received by him from the Protection Officer or the service

provider. Section 12(1) does not directly stipulate that a report ‘shall’ be

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called for, before any relief can be granted. The judgment as relied upon

does not interpret the proviso to Section 12(1).

21. Admittedly, in this case, no Domestic Incident Report either

from the Protection Officer or from the Service Provider was received by

the learned Magistrate. In such circumstances, when there was no report

before the learned Magistrate to consider, then there was no illegality,

impropriety or irregularity in passing the said impugned order. Moreover,

courts cannot lose sight of the fact that these legislations have been enacted

as a measure of social legislation and to provide succor to an aggrieved

person. At times, considerable length of time may lapse before a report is

received, when the domestic incident took place in a different state.

Waiting in the interim before granting of relief might frustrate the object of

the Act to provide instant interim relief. Accordingly, this question is also

answered against the petitioner.

22. It is also argued that the maintenance as awarded vide order

dated 8.8.2016 is on the higher side, since the petitioner is unemployed. It is

also submitted that the petitioner had purchased a flat in the name of the

respondent, which was subsequently sold and in fact respondent has already

received a sum of Rs.60 lakhs, which is more than adequate to meet daily

expenses. It is urged that she has also worked as would be reflected in her

statement of accounts which fact has not been disclosed.

23. The order dated 08.08.2016 has assessed interim maintenance

at Rs.75,000/- per month. No doubt, under the DV Act, the Magistrate is

competent to award maintenance to a wife as an interim measure till the

final disposal of the case. Needless to say, final maintenance is yet to be

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assessed, which would be dependent on various factors. The Magistrate is

duty bound to consider the financial status of the petitioner, whether he is

employed, his liabilities, as well as whether the respondent is financially

supporting herself, before any final orders are issued. These factors will be

taken into consideration based on evidence adduced by either party. The

income tax returns that have been furnished in these proceedings would

reflect that the petitioner is a person of adequate means and therefore at the

present moment this court is not inclined to interfere in the impugned order.

24. The argument raised that the respondent has received Rs. 60

lakhs after sale of property and has adequate means to support herself is an

argument not sustainable at the present moment. The respondent has

submitted that the amount is lying in a bank account untouched. It still has

to be considered by the courts below, as to whether the sale of property and

receipt of the sale consideration would be barred under The Benami

Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988?

25. In view of the foregoing discussion, the petition in hand is

hereby dismissed, being devoid of any merits. Before parting with this

judgment, it is made clear that any observation made by this court

hereinabove is only for the purpose of deciding the instant petition and shall

have no affect on the merits of the case.

(JAISHREE THAKUR)
January 23, 2018 JUDGE
vijay saini

Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether reportable Yes/No

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We handle Women centric biased laws like False 498A, Domestic Violence(DVACT), Divorce, Maintenance, Alimony, Child Custody, HMA24, 125 CrPc, 307, 313, 376, 377, 406, 420, 506, 509 etc

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