Ratika And Ors vs State Of Rajasthan And Anr on 12 May, 2017

1

jktLFkku mPp U;k;ky; t;iqj ihB] t;iqj

ORDER

S.B.Criminal Misccellaneous (Petition) No. 3915 / 2016

1. Ratika wife of Sh. Abhishek Ojha D/o Sh. Uma
Shankar Joshi aged 26 Years, r/o Narsinghgarh, Distt.
Rajgarh (M.P.).
2. Smt. Kratika wife of sh. Dr. Ashwani aged about 28
years, R/o Flat No. 302, Kirshna Apartment, 405, Alok
Nagar, Kanodia Road, Indore (M.P.).
3. Dr. Ashwani Saxena son of Sh. Raghunandan Saxena
R/o Flat No. 302, Krishna Apartment 405, Alok Nagar,
Kanodia Road, Indore (M.P.).
—-Accused/Petitioners
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan Through P.P.
2. Ajeet Kumar Ojha son of Sh. Gopal Swaroop Ojha R/o
H.No. 56, Nivedita Path, Vivekanand Marg, C-Scheme,
Jaipur.
—-Complainant/Respondent

REPORTABLE

vkns’k fnukad % 12-05-2017
ekuuh; U;k;kf/kifr Jh cuokjhyky ‘kekZ
Jh vjfoUn dqekj xqIrk] vf/koDrk;kphx.k dh vksj lsA
Jh ,u ,l /kkdM] yksd vfHk;kstdA
Jh lqjs’k lkguh rFkk Jh lq/khj tSu] vf/koDrkx.k v;kph la[;k2 dh
vksj lsA

;kphx.k vfHk;qDrx.k jfrdk] Jherh d`frdk rFkk MkW0 v’ouh
lDlsuk us ;g ;kfpdk /kkjk 482 n.M izfdz;k lafgrk ds izko/kkuksa ds rgr
izLrqr dj muds fo:) iqfyl Fkkuk ‘kkLhuxj] t;iqj ¼mRrj½ esa ntZ izFke
lwpuk fjiksVZ la[;k 170@2016 ¼,usDlj1½ vijk/k vUrxZr /kkjk 306
Hkk-na-la- ds vuqlj.k esa izLrqr pktZ’khV ,usDlj5 ,oa pktZ’khV ij
U;k;ky; vfrfjDr eq[; egkuxj eftLVªsV dze11] t;iqj egkuxj }kjk
2

;kph vfHk;qDr v’ouh lDlsuk ds fo:) ikfjr izlaKku vkns’k fnukad
27-08-2016 ¼,usDlj6½ vijk/k vUrxZr /kkjk 306 rFkk 120ch Hkk-na-la-
,oa ;kphx.k vfHk;qDrx.k jfrdk ,oa Jherh d`frdk ds fo:) ikfjr
izlaKku vkns’k fnukad 26-10-2016 ¼,usDlj7½ tks fd vkijkf/kd izdj.k
la[;k 1261@2016 esa ikfjr fd;s x;s gaS] dks fujLr fd;s tkus dh izkFkZuk
dh gSA
izdj.k ds laf{kIr rF; bl izdkj gSa fd v;kph la[;k2 ifjoknh
vthr dqekj vksk us fnukad 27-05-2016 dks iqfyl Fkkuk ‘kkLhuxj] t;iqj
¼mRrj½ esa ,d fjiksVZ Fkkukf/kdkjh ds le{k bl vk’k; dh izLrqr dh fd
^^fuosnu gS fd esjk yMdk vfHk”ksd vksk MsfUVl FkkA
ftldh futh Dyhfud wysyky ekdsZV] ksVokMk esa jatuk
MsfUVy Dyhfud ds uke ls gSA esjs iq dk fookg fnukad
22-02-2016 dks Jherh jfrdk ds lkFk fgUnw jhfr fjokt ls
‘ks[kkokVh dsUnz t;iqj ls gqbZ FkhA Jherh jfrdk ds
ifjokjtu ewy :i ls ujflagxat ftyk jktx ¼e/;izns’k½
ds jgus okys gSaA jfrdk dh cMh cfgu d`frdk o mlds
thtk vf’ou lDlsuk gSa ,oa mlds ekrk Jherh T;ksfr ,oa
firk Jh mek’kadj tks’kh gSaA ‘kknh ds ckn djhc ,d ekg
gekjs ?kj lhLdhe esa gekjs lkFk o yMds ds lkFk jghA
mlds ckn oks vius ihgj pyh xbZA ihgj tkus ls iwoZ
jkstkuk esjs yMds ds lkFk xMk djrh Fkh o waBs ykaNu
yxkdj xMk djrh FkhA viuh futh thou dh ckrsa thtk
dks crkdj esjs yMds dks izrkfMr djrh FkhA fnukad
14-04-2016 dks esjs yMds ds ksVokMk fLFkr Dyhfud ij Hkh
waBs ykaNu yxkdj mlds lkFk xMk fd;k ,oa esjs yMds
dks lftZdy baLVªwesaV ls xys o gkFk ij xaHkhj pksV igaqpkdj
tku ysus dh dksf’k’k dhA vfHk”ksd ds vius cpko ds nkSjku
jfrdk ds Dyhfud ls Hkkxus ds nkSjku jfrdk ds Hkh pksV
vkbZaA mu nksuksa dk bZykt geus nhi gkWLihVy] [kkrhiqjk
jksM] ksVokMk esa djok;kA ?kVuk dh tkudkjh jfrdk ds
ifjokjtu dks nsus ij mlds firk] thtk ,oa cgu vkbZaA mu
yksxksa ds lkeus nksuksa dk bZykt gqvk o bu yksxksa us ge ij
ncko cukdj LVkEi ij jkthukek djus ds fy, dgk ysfdu
jkthukek ikfjokfjd lecw ls ncko esa gks x;k o /kedh
Hkh nh fd ;fn gekjs i{k esa c;ku ugha fy[ks rks ge vkids
f[kykQ ngst dk dsl yxok;saxsA blds i’pkr oks vius
ihgj pyh x;hA ihgj tkus ds i’pkr jkstkuk esjs csVs dks
Qksu ij jfrdk o mlds thtk vf’ou ,oa cMh cgu d`frdk
}kjk dsl esa Qalkus dh /kedh nsdj izrkfMr djuk ‘kq: dj
fn;kA o esjs iq vfHk”ksd dks bruh ekufld ;kruk,a nh fd
mls vkRegR;k djus ij etcwj dj fn;kA vkt budh
;krukvksa dh otg ls esjk iq bl nqfu;k esa ugha jgkA buds
3

f[kykQ l[r dkuwuh dk;Zokgh djus dh d`ik djsaA esjs
iq }kjk lqlkbZM uksV Hkh fy[k dj NksMk x;k gSA tks eSaus
ewy gh layXu fd;k gSA esjk iq esjs fe ds ?kj lqHkk”k
dkWyksuh ‘kkLhuxj esa edku ua- 111 esa vk;k gqvk Fkk] ogh
ij mlus vkRegR;k dj yhA^^

mDr fjiksVZ ij iqfyl Fkkuk ‘kkLhuxj] t;iqj esa izFke lwpuk fjiksVZ
la[;k 170@2016 vijk/k vUrxZr /kkjk 306 Hkk-na-la- esa ntZ dj vuqla/kku
izkjEHk fd;k x;kA ckn vuqla/kku fo}ku v/khuLFk U;k;ky; vij eq[;
egkuxj eftLVªsV dze11] t;iqj egkuxj esa ;kph vfHk;qDr v’ojh
lDlsuk ds fo:) /kkjk 306 Hkk-na-la- lifBr /kkjk 120ch Hkk-na-la- ds vijk/k
esa fnukad 27-08-2016 dks vkjksi i is’k fd;k] ftl ij v/khuLFk U;k;ky;
us mijksDr /kkjkvksa esa izlaKku ysdj vuU; :i ls ls’ku U;k;k/kh’k }kjk
fopkj.kh; gksus ds dkj.k izdj.k dks mlh jkst /kkjk 209 n.M izfdz;k lafgrk
ds izko/kkuksa ds rgr ls’ku U;k;k/kh’k] t;iqj egkuxj dks dfeV dj fn;kA
rRi’pkr fnukad 26-10-2016 dks iqu% frrEck pktZ’khV ;kphx.k vfHk;qDrx.k
jfrdk rFkk Jherh d`frdk ds fo:) /kkjk 306] 120ch Hkk-na-la- ds vijk/k esa
is’k dh] ftl ij Hkh fo}ku v/khuLFk U;k;ky; us fnukad 26-10-2016 dks
mijksDr /kkjkvksa esa izlaKku ysdj dehVy cgl ds fy, fnukad 04-11-2016
dks fu;r dhA izdj.k orZeku esa vij ls’ku U;k;k/kh’k] dze16] t;iqj
egkuxj esa fopkjk/khu gSA
fo}ku vf/koDrk ;kphx.k Jh vjfoUn dqekj xqIrk us fuosnu fd;k gS
fd bl izdj.k esa v;kph la[;k2 ifjoknh] e`rd vfHk”ksd dk firk gS]
ds }kjk izFke lwpuk fjiksVZ ntZ djk;h x;h gSA ;kph vfHk;qDr la[;k1]
e`rd dh iRuh] ;kph la[;k2 e`rd dh lkyh rFkk ;kph la[;k3 e`rd
dk lkMw gsA mUgksaus fuosnu fd;k gS fd izFke lwpuk fjiksVZ iqfyl us /kkjk
306 Hkk-na-la- ds vijk/k esa ntZ dh gS] ijUrq /kkjk 306 Hkk-na-la- ds rRo izFke
lwpuk fjiksVZ esa of.kZr rF;ksa ls dgha izdV ugha gksrs gSaA /kkjk 306 Hkk-na-la-
ds vijk/k ds fy, /kkjk 107 Hkk-na-la- esa ifjHkkf”kr vkRegR;k ds fy, nq”izsj.k
ds rRo gksuk vko’;d gS] ftudk gLrxr izdj.k esa iw.kZ vHkko gSA mUgksaus
fuosnu fd;k gS fd vuqla/kku vf/kdkjh us e`rd ds lqlkbZM uksV dks vkjksi
i dk vk/kkj cuk;k gS] ijUrq lqlkbZM uksV ls vkRegR;k ds fy, nq”izsj.k
izdV ugha gksrk gS rFkk uk gh vuqla/kku esa ladfyr lk{; ls nq”izsj.k ds
4

dksbZ rRo izdV gksrs gSaA fQj Hkh iqfyl us tks vkjksi i is’k fd;k gS] ml
ij fopkj fd;s fcuk gh fo}ku v/khuLFk U;k;ky; us /kkjk 306 rFkk 120ch
Hkk-na-la- ds vijk/k esa izlaKku ysdj qfV dh gSA mUgksaus fuosnu fd;k gS fd
tc izFken`”V;k vijk/k ds rRo izdV ugha gksrs gSa rks ml ifjfLFkfr esa
izdj.k dk fopkj.k ;Fkkor j[kuk vfHk;qDrx.k ds lkFk csekuh gksxk rFkk ;g
U;k;ky; /kkjk 482 n.M izfdz;k lafgrk ds izko/kkuksa ds rgr vUrfuZfgr
‘kfDr;ksa dk iz;ksx dj bl izdkj ds izdj.k esa U;kf;d izfdz;k dks jksdrs gq,
vkijkf/kd izdj.k dh dk;Zokgh dks lekIr djus ds fy, l{ke gSA
mUgksaus fuosnu fd;k gS fd /kkjk 306 rFkk 107 Hkk-na-la- ds vuqlkj
vkRegR;k ds fy, rqjUr nq”izsj.k vko’;d gSA gLrxr izdj.k esa Lohd`r :i
ls ;kph la[;k1 vfHk;qDrk tks fd e`rd dh iRuh gS] og fnukad
14-04-2016 dks e`rd ds ikl ls vius ekrkfirk ds ikl t;iqj ls bankSj
pyh x;h FkhA rRi’pkr mldk e`rd ls dksbZ lEidZ ugha jgk gSA izFke
lwpuk fjiksVZ esa VsyhQksu ij /kefd;ka nsuk crk;k gS] ijUrq bl laca/k esa
dkWy fMVsy izkIr ugha gqbZ gSA vkRegR;k ds rqjUr iwoZ nq”izsj.k gksus ds vk/kkj
ij izFken`”V;k vkjksfir vijk/k ugha ekuk tk ldrkA
fo}ku vf/koDrk ;kphx.k us vius rdksaZ ds leFkZu esa fuEu U;kf;d
n`”VkUr is’k fd;s%
(1) Mahendra Singh and Anr. vs. State of M.P. 1995 Supp.(3) SCC 731;
(2) Swamy Prahaladdas vs. State of M.P. and Anr. 1995 Supp.(3)SCC438;
(3) Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chhattishgarh, AIR 2001 SC 3837;
(4) Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh 2002
CriLJ2796;

(5) Devender Singh Vs. State of Haryana 2009 (16) SCC 396;
(6) S.S. Chheena vs. Vijay Kumar Mahajan and Anr. JT 2010(8) SC 331;
(7) M. Mohan vs. State, Represented by the Deputy Superintendent of
Police, Velmurugan and Anr. vs. State, Represented by the Deputy
Superintendent of Police AIR 2011 SC 1238;

(8) Gurucharan Singh vs. State of Punjab, 2017(1) SCC 433;
(9) Heera Lal and Ors. State of Rajasthan, Crimnial Appeal No 790/2017
tks fd ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; }kjk fnukad 24-04-2017 dks
fu.khZr dh x;h gSA
(10) Ashok Chaturvedi and Others vs. Shitul H. Chanchani and another
AIR 1998 SC 2796;

(11) Alka Grewal vs. State of M.P. 2000 CRI. L.J. 672
5

mDr rdksaZ dk fojks/k djrs gq, v;kph la[;k2 ifjoknh dh vksj ls
fo}ku vf/koDrkx.k Jh lqjs’k lkguh rFkk Jh lq/khj tSu us fuosnu fd;k gS
fd izFke lwpuk fjiksVZ esa lkf{k;ksa ds dFkuksa esa tks rF; vk;s gSa] mlds
vuqlkj ;kph vfHk;qDrk la[;k1 tks fd e`rd dh iRuh gS] dks e`rd us
;kph la[;k3 ds lkFk vkifRrtud voLFkk esa ns[k fy;k FkkA ;kph
la[;k2 vkSj 3 ds lkFk ;kph la[;k1 ifriRuh dh xksiuh; ckrsa ‘ks;j
djrh Fkh] ftlds dkj.k ;kph la[;k2 o 3] ;kph la[;k1 dks mRizsfjr
rFkk nq”izsfjr dj e`rd dks tyhy djrs FksA ;gh ugha e`rd tks fd ,d
nUr fpfdRld Fkk] tks viuk gh Dyhfud pykrk Fkk] ds Dyhfud esa mlds
ejhtksa ds lkeus gh mls tyhy djrh FkhA ,d ckj rks mlus e`rd dks nUr
fpfdRlk ds vkStkjksa ls ?kk;y dj fn;k rFkk mlds xys ij xaHkhj pksVsa Hkh
igqapk;ha FkhA e`rd ds vius cpko ds nkSjku ;kph la[;k1 Dyhfud ls Hkkx
x;h Fkh rFkk Hkkxus ds nkSjku mlds Hkh pksV vk;ha FkhaA nksuksa dks nhi
gkWLihVy] ksVokMk esa bZykt gsrq HkrhZ djk;k FkkA ogka ij Hkh ;kph
la[;k1 dh xyrh gksus ds ckotwn vfHk;qDrx.k vkSj muds ifjokjtu us
e`rd vkSj mlds ekrkfirk ds Åij waBk ykaNu yxkdj mUgsa tyhy rFkk
VkpZj fd;k rFkk tcju waBs ngst ds eqdnes esa Qalkus dh /kedh nsdj
v;kph la[;k2 ls LVkEi isij ij fy[kkih djkus dk ncko cuk;kA
rRi’pkr ;kph la[;k1 bankSj pyh x;h] ysfdu ogka ls Hkh e`rd dks
ckjckj VkpZj djrh FkhA
mUgksaus fuosnu fd;k gS fd /kkjk 107 Hkk-na-la- ds vijk/k esa vkRegR;k
ds fy, nq”izsj.k dks ifjHkkf”kr fd;k x;k gSA mlds izdk’k esa ;fn gLrxr
izdj.k ds leLr rF;ksa dks ns[kk tkos rks ekeyk ifriRuh dk gS vkSj iRuh
}kjk vius ifr dks ckjckj VkpZj djuk] tyhy djuk] mlds O;olkf;d
LFky ij tkdj mlds is’ksUV ds lkeus mldks csbZTtr djuk] mlds Åij
geyk djuk rFkk waBs ngst ds eqdnes esa Qalkus dh /kedh nsus] rRi’pkr
fcuk fdlh vk/kkj ij ngst dk waBk eqdnek ntZ djok nsuk vkRegR;k ds
fy, nq”izsj.k dh ifjHkk”kk esa vkrk gSA mUgksaus fuosnu fd;k gS fd ftl jkst
e`rd us vkRegR;k dh] ml jkst dh d`R; vkSj iwoZ ds d`R;ksa dks ,dlkFk
ns[kk tkos rks lkewfgd :i ls vkRegR;k ds fy, nq”izsj.k gh ekuk tkosxk
D;ksafd iwoZ esa ;kphx.k us ngst dk waBk eqdnek ntZ djokus dh /kedh nh]
6

mls tyhy fd;k rFkk mlds ckn bankSj esa tkdj vkijkf/kd izdj.k dh
f’kdk;r dj nhA ftldh rkbZn esa iqfyl uksfVl Hkst fn;k vkSj mlds
rqjUr ckn e`rd us vkRegR;k dj yhA mUgksaus ;g Hkh fuosnu fd;k gS fd
e`rd vius ekrkfirk ds ikl jgrk Fkk] ogka ij Hkh mldk jguk nwHkj dj
fn;k] bl dkj.k mls vius fe ds lkFk tkdj jguk iMk rFkk ogka tc
mls tkudkjh esa vk;k fd mlds fo:) eqdnek ntZ djk fn;k gS rks nwljs
fnu mlus vkRegR;k dj yhA vr% ;g ugha ekuk tk ldrk fd vkRegR;k
vfHk;qDrx.k ds d`R; o nq”izsj.k ds dkj.k ugha dh gSA
mUgksaus ;g Hkh fuosnu fd;k gS fd izFke lwpuk fjiksVZ ntZ gksus ds
ckn pktZ’khV is’k gks pqdh gSA rnuqlkj izFke lwpuk fjiksVZ] pktZ’khV esa
lekfgr gks pqdh gS vkSj pktZ’khV ds ckn izlaKku vkns’k ikfjr gks pqdk gSA
rnuqlkj pktZ’khV] izlaKku vkns’k esa lekfgr gks pqdh gS rFkk izlaKku
vkns’k ds fo:) /kkjk 397 n.M izfdz;k lafgrk ds izko/kkuksa ds rgr fuxjkuh
;kfpdk is’k djus dk oSdfYid mipkj ;kphx.k ds ikl gS] ijUrq mUgksaus
oSdfYid mipkj dk mi;ksx ugha dj bl U;k;ky; ds le{k /kkjk 482 n.M
izfdz;k lafgrk ds izko/kkuksa ds rgr ;g ;kfpdk is’k dh gS tks iks”k.kh; ugha
gSA mUgksaus ;g Hkh fuosnu fd;k gS fd /kkjk 482 n.M izfdz;k lafgrk ds
rgr ;kfpdk dk fuLrkj.k djrs gq, U;k;ky; dks iqfyl vuqla/kku ds le;
ladfyr leLr lkexzh dk lw{e foospu ugha djuk pkfg,A ;g fopkj.k
U;k;ky; ds {kskf/kdkj gS fd og fopkj.k dh LVst ij vfHk;qDr dks lqudj
mfpr vkns’k ikfjr djs vkSj ;fn fopkj.k cuuk ik;k tkrk gS rks izdj.k
dk fopkj.k djsaA fopkj.k U;k;ky; ds {kskf/kdkj esa bl U;k;ky; dks /kkjk
482 n.M izfdz;k lafgrk ds rgr vUrfuZfgr ‘kfDr;ksa dk iz;ksx dj rc rd
gLr{ksi ugh djuk pkfg, tc rd fd U;kf;d izfdz;k dk nq:i;ksx u gksA
fo}ku vf/koDRkk v;kph la[;k2 ifjoknh us vius rdksaZ ds leFkZu esa
fuEu U;kf;d n`”VkUr is’k fd;s%
(1) Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander and Another 2012(9) SCC 460;
(2) Tejender Pal Singh Sahni Alias Rimpy vs. State of Rajasthan Anr.
tks fd bl U;k;ky; }kjk fnukad 18-11-2016 dks fu.khZr dh x;h
gS rFkk
(3) Rashmi Kumar (Smt) vs. Mahesh Kumar Bhada 1997(2) SCC 397

READ  In The High Court Of Himachal ... vs Roshan Lal ... Accused/ on 23 May, 2017

fo}ku yksd vfHk;kstd Jh ,u ,l /kkdM us Hkh v;kph la[;k2
7

ifjoknh ds vf/koDRkk Jh lkguh ds rdksaZ dk leFkZu djrs gq, fuosnu fd;k
gS fd izdj.k esa /kkjk 306 rFkk 120ch Hkk-na-la- dk vijk/k izekf.kr ik;k x;k
gS rFkk v/khuLFk U;k;ky; }kjk mlesa izlaKku Hkh fy;k tk pqdk gSA vr%
vkijkf/kd izdj.k dh dk;Zokgh dks lekIr fd;s tkus dk dksbZ vk/kkj ugha
gSA mUgksaus ;kfpdk vLohdkj fd;s tkus dk fuosnu fd;kA
lquk x;k] mHk; i{k ds rdksaZ ij fopkj fd;k x;kA
ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; us Mahendra Singh and Anr. vs. State of M.P.

¼mijksDr½ ds izdj.k esa vihykFkhZ vfHk;qDr dks fopkj.k U;k;ky; }kjk /kkjk
306 Hkk-na-la- ds vijk/k esa nks”kfl) dj nf.Mr fd;k FkkA ftlds fo:)
vihy esa ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; us vfHkfu/kkZfjr fd;k gS fd e`rd ds
dFkuksa ds vykok vfHk;qDrx.k ds fo:) nq”izsj.k ds laca/k esa vU; dksbZ lk{;
ugha gS ftlls vkRegR;k ds fy, nq”izsfjr djuk lkfcr gksrk gks vkSj e`rd
ds dFkuksa ls Hkh vkRegR;k ds fy, nq”izsj.k ds rRo vkd`”V ugha gksus ds
dkj.k vihy Lohdkj dh tkdj vfHk;qDr dks /kkjk 306 Hkk-na-la- ds vijk/k
ls nks”keqDr fd;k gSA ;g izdj.k nks”kflf) ds ckn dk gS] tcfd gLrxr
izdj.k esa vHkh nks”kfl)h ugha gqbZ gSA nks”kfl)h dh LVst ij lk{; dk lw{e
foospu fd;k tkrk gS tks gLrxr izdj.k esa visf{kr ugha gSA vr% ;g
U;kf;d n`”VkUr ;kphx.k dh dksbZ enn ugha djrk gSA
Swamy Prahaladdas vs. State of M.P. and Anr. ¼mijksDr½ ds izdj.k esa
ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; us vfHkfu/kkZfjr fd;k gS fd
“At the time of framing of charge, the trial court thought
it appropriate to associate the appellant herein as an accused
because of the words he uttered to the deceased. We think that
just on the basis of that utterance the Court of Session was in
error in summoning the appellant to face trial.

In the first place it is difficult, in the facts and
circumstances, to come to even a prima facie view that what was
uttered by the appellant was enough to instigate the deceased to
commit suicide. Those words are casual in nature which are
often employed in the heat of the moment between quarrelling
people. Nothing serious is expected to follow thereafter. The
said act does not reflect the requisite mens rea on the assumption
that these words would be carried out in all events. Besides the
deceased had plenty of time to weigh the pros and cons of the
8

act by which he ultimately ended his life. It cannot be said that
the suicide by the deceased was the direct result of the words
uttered by the appellant.”

ijUrq gLrxr izdj.k esa flQZ ‘kCnksa ds vykok ifriRuh dk fookn]
iRuh dk mlds thtk ds lkFk vkifRrtud fLFkfr esa ns[kuk] thtk vkSj
iRuh dh cfgu }kjk e`rd dh iRuh dks nq”izsfjr dj ckj ckj vius ifr dks
tyhy djus] ml ij geyk djus dk vkjksi gSA vr% bl U;kf;d n`”VkUr
ds rF; gLrxr izdj.k ds rF;ksa ls fHkUu gksus ds dkj.k ;kph dh dksbZ enn
ugha djrk gSA
Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chhattishgarh ¼mijksDr½ ds izdj.k esa Hkh
ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; ds le{k ,l,yih esa lk{; dk foLr`r o lw{e
foospu djrs gq, vfHkfu/kkZfjr fd;k gS fd e`rd dh Mk;jh esa tks uksV Fkk
og vkRegR;k ds fy, nq”izsfjr djus ds fy, i;kZIr ugha Fkk] tcfd gLrxr
izdj.k esa vHkh nks”kfl)h ugha gqbZ gSA vr% lk{; dk bruk lw{e foospu
fd;k tkuk visf{kr ugha gSA
Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh
¼mijksDr½ ds
izdj.k esa e`rd dks vihykFkhZ vfHk;qDr us dg fn;k Fkk fd ^^tk ej tk^^
ftl ij ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; us vfHkfu/kkZfjr fd;k fd vkRegR;k ds
fy, nq”izsfjr djus ds fy, Mens-rea vko’;d gS] ftldk vHkko gS vkSj bl
vk/kkj ij /kkjk 107 Hkk-na-la- ds izko/kkuksa ds rgr nq”izsj.k ugha ekuk gSA
ijUrq gLrxr izdj.k ds rF; U;kf;d n`”VkUr ds rF;ksa ls fHkUu gksus ds
dkj.k ;kph dh dksbZ enn ughadjrk gSA D;ksafd gLrxr izdj.k esa [kkyh
‘kCn gh ugha gSa] cfYd d`R; Hkh fd;s x;s gSaA
Devender Singh Vs. State of Haryana ¼mijksDr½ dk izdj.k Hkh
nks”kfl)h ds ckn dk gS rFkk lk{; ds lw{e foospu ls lacaf/kr gS tks
gLrxr izdj.k esa visf{kr ugha gSA vr% ;g U;kf;d n`”VkUr ;kph dh enn
ugha djrk gSA
S.S. Chheena vs. Vijay Kumar Mahajan and Anr
. ¼mijksDr½ ds izdj.k esa
ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; us fopkj djrs gq, vfHkfu/kkZfjr fd;k gS fd
“Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a
person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing.
Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or
aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The
9

intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by
this Court is clear that in order to convict a person under
Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the
offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the
deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must
have been intended to push the deceased into such a position
that he committed suicide.”

ftlesa dksbZ fookn ugha gSA
M. Mohan vs. State, Represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police,
Velmurugan and Anr. vs. State, Represented by the Deputy Superintendent of
Police ¼mijksDr½ ds izdj.k esa ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; us vfHkfu/kkZfjr
fd;k gS fd
“Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a
person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing.
Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or
aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained.

The intention of the Legislature and the ratio of the cases
decided by this court are clear that in order to convict a person
under section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit
the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led
the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act
must have been intended to push the deceased into such a
position that he/she committed suicide.”

ftlesa dksbZ fookn ugha gSA
Gurucharan Singh vs. State of Punjab ¼mijksDr½ rFkk Heera Lal and Ors.

State of Rajasthan ¼mijksDr½ ds izdj.k nks”kfl)h ls lacaf/kr gS] ftuesa lk{;
dk lw{e foospu fd;k x;k gS tks fd gLrxr izdj.k esa visf{kr ugha gSA
Ashok Chaturvedi and Others vs. Shitul H. Chanchani and another

¼mijksDr½ ds izdj.k esa ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; us vfHkfu/kkZfjr fd;k gS
fd
“It has been held in a number of cases that power under
Section 482 has to be exercised sparingly and in the interest of
justice. But allowing the criminal proceeding to continue even
where the allegations in the complaint petition do not make out
any offence would be tantamount to an abuse of the process of
court, and therefore, there cannot be any dispute that in such
case power under Section 482 of the Code can be exercised.

10

Bearing in mind the parameters laid down by this Court in
several decisions for exercise of power under Section 482 of the
Code, we have examined the allegations made in the complaint
petition and the statement of the complainant and the two other
witnesses made on oath before the Magistrate. We are clearly of
the opinion that the necessary ingredients of any of the offence
have not been made out so far as the appellants are concerned.
The petition of complaint is a vague one and excepting the bald
allegation that the shares of the complainant have been
transferred on the forged signatures, nothing further has been
started and there is not an iota of material to indicate how all or
any of these appellants are involved in the so-called allegation
of forgery. The statement of the complainant on oath as well as
his witnesses do not improve the position in any manner, and
therefore, in our considered opinion even if the allegations made
in the complaint petition and the statement of complaint and his
witnesses are taken on their face value, the offence under
Sections 406, 420, 467, 468 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code
cannot be said to have been made out. This being the position
the impugned order of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the
offence dated 5.2.1996 so far as it relates the appellants are
concerned cannot be sustained and the High Court also
committed error in not invoking its power under Section 482 of
the Code. In the aforesaid premises, the impugned order of the
High Court as well as the order of the Magistrate dated 5.2.96
taking cognizance of the offence as against the appellants stand
quashed.”

Alka Grewal vs. State of M.P. ¼mijksDr½ ds izdj.k esa e`rd ifr us
vius lqlkbZM uksV esa iRuh ds nq”pfj dk dFku fd;k Fkk] ftl ij
e/;izns’k mPp U;k;ky; dh ,dyihB us ekuk gS fd iRuh ds fo:)
vkRegR;k ds nq”izsj.k ds fy, ;g lqlkbZM uksV i;kZIr ugha gS] ftleas dksbZ
fookn ugha gSA ijUrq gLrxr izdj.k esa tks rF; vk;sa gSa mlds vuqlkj izFke
lwpuk fjiksVZ esa Lo;a e`rd dk fookg ;kph la[;k1 ds lkFk fnukad
22-02-2016 dks gksuk vk;k gS rFkk fookg ds ckn ;kph la[;k1 flQZ ,d
ekg rd vius ifr ds lkFk jgh gS] fQj ihgj pyh x;h rFkk ml ,d ekg
dh vof/k esa gh lkf{k;ksa ds dFkuksa ds vuqlkj og vius ifr ds lkFk jkst
11

xMk djrh] waBs ykaNu yxkrh] ifriRuh dh xksiuh; ckrsa vius thtk
dks crkdj e`rd dks izrkfMr djrh FkhA fnukad 14-04-2016 dks vFkkZr
fookg ds rqjUr i’pkr e`rd tks fd nUr fpfdRld Fkk] mlds Dyhfud]
ksVokMk esa waBs ykaNu yxkrs gq, lftZdy baLVªwesaV ls xys ij xaHkhj pksV
igapkrs gq, tku ls ekjus dh dksf’k’k dha bl ?kVuk dh tkudkjh ;kph
la[;k1 ds ifjokjtu dks nsus ij mlds firk] thtk vkSj cfgu vk;s vkSj
mu yksxksa ds lkeus bZykt gqvk vkSj e`rd o mlds ifjtuksa ij ncko
cukdj LVkEi ij jkthukek djus ds fy, dgk tks fd ikfjokfjd lecw
ls gks x;k rFkk ;g /kedh nsus dk vkjksi yxk;k gS fd gekjs i{k esa c;ku
ugha nksxs rks ge vkidks waBs eqdnes esa Qalk nsaxsA mlds ckn ;kph
la[;k1 ihgj pyh x;hA lkf{k;ksa ds dFkuksa esa ;g rF; Hkh vk;k gS fd
ihgj tkus ds i’pkr jkstkuk e`rd dks Qksu ij ;kphx.k vfHk;qDrx.k e`rd
dks waBs ngst ds dsl esa Qalkus dh /kedh nsdj izrkfMr djuk ‘kq: dj
fn;kA ckn esa ,d waBk dsl Hkh bankSj esa ntZ djok fn;k vkSj ftldh lwpuk
e`rd dks izkIr gksus ij mlus nwljs fnu gh vkRegR;k dj yhA vkRegR;k ls
iwoZ e`rd us tks lqlkbZM uksV NksMk gS] mleas Hkh ;kph la[;k1 Lo;a dh
iRuh] ;kph la[;k2 o 3] ;kph la[;k1 dh cfgu vkSj thtk ds fo:)
Li”V :i ls vkjksi yxk;k gS fd ^^rqe yksxksa dk esUVyh VkWpZj vc lgu
ugh gksrk gS] rqedks ekQ ugha d:axkA ;kph la[;k1 ij Li”V :i ls
vkjksi yxk;k gS fd rqe muds ¼;kph la[;k2 o 3½ ds cgdkos esa vkdj
esjk vkSj vkidh ykbZQ lekIr dj yh^^A
Rashmi Kumar (Smt) vs. Mahesh Kumar Bhada
¼mijksDr½ ds izdj.k esa
ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; dh o`gn ihB us vfHkfu/kkZfjr fd;k gS fd
“The sequences that followed were that she filed another
case for restitution of conjugal rights and an application for
maintenance and thereafter she filed the complaint under
Section 406, IPC. A fair reading of the averments would clearly
indicate that a prima facie case of entrustment of the jewellery
and the household goods had been made out. The learned Judge
was not right in jumping to the conclusion that the averments
made by the respondent in the counter-affidavit disclosed that
no entrustment was made of the jewellery, cash and household
goods and other movables enumerated in Annexures I and II
details of which are not material for our purpose. In the light of
12

the above, we are of the view that a prima facie case of
entrustment had been made out by the appellant as the stridhana
properties were not returned to her by the husband. Obviously,
therefore, the learned Magistrate, having taken cognizance of
the offence, had issued process for appearance of the
respondent. It is fairly settled legal position that at the time of
taking cognisance of the offence, the Court has to consider only
the averments made in the complaint or in the charge-sheet filed
under Section 173, as the case may be. It was held in State of
Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla
[(1996) 8 SCC 164] that it is not
open for the Court to sift or appreciate the evidence at that stage
with reference to the material and come to the conclusion that
no prima facie case is made out for proceeding further in the
matter. It is equally settled law that it is open to the Court,
before issuing the process, to record the evidence and on
consideration of the averments made in the complaint and the
evidence thus adduced, it is required to find out whether an
offence has been made out. On finding that such an offence has
been made out and after taking cognizance thereof, process
would be issued to the respondent to take further steps in the
matters. If it is a charge-sheet filed under Section 173 of the
Code, the facts stated by the prosecution in the charge-sheet, on
the basis of the evidence collected during investigation, would
disclose the offence for which cognisance would be taken by
the court to proceed further in the matter. Thus it is not the
province of the court at that stage to embark upon and sift the
evidence to come to the conclusion whether offence has been
made out or not. The learned Judge, therefore, was clearly in
error in attempting to sift the evidence with reference to the
averments made by the respondent in the counter-affidavit to
find out whether or not offence punishable under Section 406,
IPC had been made out.”

READ  Krishna Yadav Alias Sikandar Jee vs The State Of Jharkhand on 20 July, 2017

Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander and Another ¼mijksDr½ ds izdj.k esa
ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; us vfHkfu/kkZfjr fd;k gS fd
“Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under
these two provisions, i.e., Section 397 and Section 482 of the
Code and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will
be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to
which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction.

13

However, it is not only difficult but is inherently
impossible to state with precision such principles. At best
and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court,
we are able to cull out some of the principles to be
considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly,
with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or
together, as the case may be :

1) Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court
under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more
due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers.
The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the
charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be
exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too
in the rarest of rare cases.

2) The Court should apply the test as to whether the
uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case
and the documents submitted therewith prima facie
establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently
absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can
ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of
a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may
interfere.

3) The High Court should not unduly interfere. No
meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for
considering whether the case would end in conviction or
not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.

4) Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to
prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some
grave error that might be committed by the subordinate
courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loathe to
interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in
exercise of its inherent powers.

5) Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the
provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very
initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal
proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific
protection to an accused.

6) The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person
14

and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate
and prosecute the offender.

7) The process of the Court cannot be permitted to be used
for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose.

8) Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the
record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give
rise and constitute a ‘civil wrong’ with no ‘element of
criminality’ and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a
criminal offence, the Court may be justified in quashing the
charge. Even in such cases, the Court would not embark
upon the critical analysis of the evidence.

9) Another very significant caution that the courts have to
observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and
materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient
material on the basis of which the case would end in a
conviction, the Court is concerned primarily with the
allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an
offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading
to injustice.

10) It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a
full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by
the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of
acquittal or conviction.

11) Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also
amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is
maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot
be maintained.

12) In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or
under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration
external materials given by an accused for reaching the
conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was
possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record
and documents annexed with by the prosecution.

13) Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of
continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly
satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit
continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that
initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records
with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the
documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.

15

14) Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of
the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court
may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge.

15) Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court
finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or
that interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the
charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to
do real and substantial justice for administration of which
alone, the courts exist.

16) These are the principles which individually and
preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into
consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and
wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code
by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an
offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and
should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the
premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do
not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance to
the requirements of the offence.

This present case is not a case where the allegations were so
predominately of a civil nature that it would have eliminated
criminal intent and liability. On the contrary, it is a fact and,
in fact, is not even disputed that the deceased committed suicide
and left a suicide note. May be, the accused are able to prove
their non-involvement in inducing or creating circumstances
which compelled the deceased to commit suicide but that
again is a matter of trial. The ingredients of Section 306 are
that a person commits suicide and somebody alone abets
commission of such suicide which renders him liable for
punishment. Both these ingredients appear to exist in the
present case in terms of the language of Section 228 of the
Code, subject to trial. The deceased committed suicide and as
per the suicide note left by her and the statement of her son, the
abetment by the accused cannot be ruled out at this stage, but
is obviously subject to the final view that the court may take
upon trial. One very serious averment that was made in the
suicide note was that the deceased was totally frustrated when
the accused persons took possession of the ground floor of her
property, C-224, Tagore Garden, Delhi and refused to vacate
the same. It is possible and if the Court believes the version
16

given by the prosecution and finds that there was actual sale
of property in favour of the accused, as alleged by him, in
that event, the Court may acquit them of not only the offence
under Section 306 IPC but under Section 107 IPC also.
There appears to be some contradiction in the judgment of the
High Court primarily for the reason that if charge under
Section 306 is to be quashed and the accused is not to be put to
trial for this offence, then where would be the question of
trying them for an offence of criminal trespass in terms of
Section 448 IPC based on some facts, which has been permitted
by the High Court.

READ  Sonu @ Sohan Lal vs State on 25 July, 2017

The High Court could not have appreciated or evaluated
the record and documents filed with it. It was not the stage.
The Court ought to have examined if the case falls in any of
the above-stated categories.

The High Court has also noticed that perusal of the
suicide note brings to force the fact that the petitioner-accused
is not only named but his illegal occupation of the house of the
deceased is stated to be one of the primary reasons for Komal
Kapoor in committing the suicide. The statement of the son
of the deceased is also on the same line. Then the High Court
proceeds further to notice that even if it is assumed at this
stage that the suicide note and statement were correct, the
action of the petitioner-accused in forcibly occupying the
portion of the house of the deceased and the deceased taking
the extreme step would not bring his act within the definition
of abetment, as there is no material or evidence placed by
the prosecution on record. This finding could hardly be
recorded without travelling into the merits of the case and
appreciating the evidence. The Court could pronounce whether
the offence falls within the ambit and scope of Section 306
IPC or not. These documents clearly show that the accused
persons had brought in existence the circumstances which, as
claimed by the prosecution, led to the extreme step of suicide
being taken by the deceased. It cannot be equated to inflictment
of cruelty as discussed by the High Court in its judgment.
Once Sections 107 and 306 IPC are read together, then the
Court has to merely examine as to whether apparently the
person could be termed as causing abetment of a thing. An
abetter under Section 108 is a person who abets an offence. It
17

includes both the person who abets either the commission of
an offence or the commission of an act which would be an
offence. In terms of Section 107 IPC, Explanation (1) to
Section 107 has been worded very widely. We may refer to
the judgment of this Court in the case of Goura Venkata Reddy
v. State of A.P
. [(2003) 12 SCC 469], wherein this Court held as
under :

“8. Section 107 IPC defines abetment of a thing. The
offence of abetment is a separate and distinct offence provided
in the Act as an offence. A person abets the doing of a thing
when (1) he instigates any person to do that thing; or (2)
engages with one or more other persons in any conspiracy for
the doing of that thing; or (3) intentionally aids, by act or
illegal omission, the doing of that thing. These things are
essential to complete abetment as a crime. The word
“instigate” literally means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring
about by persuasion to do any thing. The abetment may be
by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid, as provided in the
three clauses of Section 107. Section 109 provides that if the
act abetted is committed in consequence of abetment and there
is no provision for the punishment of such abetment then the
offender is to be punished with the punishment provided for
the original offence. “Act abetted” in Section 109 means the
specific offence abetted. Therefore, the offence for the
abetment of which a person is charged with the abetment is
normally linked with the proved offence. In the instant case,
the abetted persons have been convicted for commission of
offence punishable under Section 304. So in the case of A-1 it
is Section 304 read with Section 109 IPC, that is attracted.”

A wilful misrepresentation or wilful concealment of
material fact and such person voluntarily causing or procuring
or attempting to cause or procure a thing to be done is said to
instigate the doing of that thing. According to the record, the
accused had made a wrong statement that he had paid a sum of
Rs.24,00,000/- for purchase of the property C-224, Tagore
Garden, Delhi and the property belonged to him. Whether
it was a misrepresentation of the accused and was an attempt to
harass the deceased and her family which ultimately led to her
suicide is a question to be examined by the Court. The
allegations as made in the afore-stated documents clearly
18

reflects that blank documents were got signed, but the
purpose, the consideration and complete facts relating to the
transaction were not disclosed to the deceased or the family.
This would, at least at this stage, not be a case for examining
the correctness or otherwise of these statements as these
allegations cannot be said to be ex facie perverse, untenable
or malicious. It would have been more appropriate exercise
of jurisdiction by the High Court, if it would have left the
matter to be determined by the Court upon complete trial.
May be the accused would be entitled to get some benefits, but
this is not the stage. These are matters, though of some civil
nature, but are so intricately connected with criminal nature
and have elements of criminality that they cannot fall in the
kind of cases which have been stated by us above. There,
the case has to be entirely of a civil nature involving no
element of criminality.

Tejender Pal Singh Sahni Alias Rimpy vs. State of Rajasthan Anr. ds
izdj.k esa bl U;k;ky; us oSdfYid mipkj gksus ds vk/kkj ij /kkjk 482
n.M izfdz;k lafgrk ds izko/kkuksa ds rgr vkjksi i is’k gksus ds ckn izFke
lwpuk fjiksVZ dks fujLr fd;s tkus dh izkFkZuk ij fopkj djuk U;k;ksfpr
ugha ekuk gSA
gLrxr izdj.k esa tSlk fd Åij foospu fd;k x;k gS] nq”izsj.k ds
laca/k esa ;kph la[;k1 tks e`rd dh iRuh gS] ds fo:) e`rd dk vius
lqlkbZM uksV eas ckjckj VkWpZj djus dk vkjksi yxk;k gSA v;kph la[;k2
ifjoknh ,oa vU; lkf{k;ksa us ‘kknh ds nl fnu ckn e`rd ds Dyhfud esa
tkdj ml ij izk.k?kkrd geyk dj pksV igaqpkus dk vkjksi yxk;k gS] ckj
ckj mls tyhy djus rFkk ngst dk eqdnek ntZ djkus dh /kedh nsus dk
vkjksi yxk;k gSA ;kph la[;k1 dk fookg e`rd ds lkFk fnukad 22Qjojh]
2016 dks gqvk gSA mlds ckn fnukad 14-04-2016 dks ;kph la[;k1 us
mlds Dyhfud esa tkdj geyk djus dk vkjksi gS vkSj t;iqj esa tc rd
mlds lkFk jgh gS] miyC/k lkexzh ds vuqlkj ckj ckj VkWpZj fd;k gS]
ftlesa ;kph la[;k2 o 3 us lkFk fn;k gSA rRi’pkr ;kph la[;k1 }kjk
geyk djus ds ckotwn e`rd ij mlds ekrkfirk ij ncko cukdj ngst
dk eqdnek ntZ djkus dh /kedh nsdj ncko cukdj fy[kkih djkus dk
19

vkjksi gSA rRi’pkr bankSj tkus ds ckn VsyhQksu ls ckj ckj VkWpZj djus]
ngst dk eqdnek ntZ djkus dk vkjksi gS vkSj ckn esa ngst dh fjiksVZ Hkh
djk;h] ftldh tkudkjh e`rd dks feyus ij mlus vkRegR;k dh gSA
ftlds vk/kkj ij vuqla/kku esa ;kphx.k ds fo:) /kkjk 306] 120ch Hkk-an-la-
dk vijk/k iqfyl us cuuk ekurs gq, vkjksi i is’k fd;k gS] ftl ij
fo}ku eftLVªsV us izlaKku vkns’k ikfjr fd;k gSA vr% izFken`”V;k ;g ugha
dgk tk ldrk fd /kkjk 107 Hkk-na-la- ds rgr vkRegR;k ds fy, nq”izsj.k dh
dksbZ lk{; ;kphx.k ds fo:) u gksA
ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; }kjk State of Haryana Ors. Vs. Ch.
Bhajan Lal Ors. [1992 Suppl (1) SCC 335]. ds izdj.k esa izFke lwpuk
fjiksVZ dks fujLr fd;s tkus ds laca/k esa fuEu lkr vk/kkj crk;s gSa] tks fuEu
izdkj gSa%

“105. In the backdrop of the interpretation of
the various relevant provisions of the Code
under Chapter XIV and of the principles of
law enunciated by this Court in a series of
decisions relating to the exercise of the extra-
ordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers Under Section 482 of the
Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we give the following
categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either
to prevent abuse of the process of any Court
or otherwise to secure the ends of justice,
though it may not be possible to lay down any
precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid
formulae and to give an exhaustive list of
myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
should be exercised.

1. Where the allegations made in the
First Information Report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety
do not prima-facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused.

20

2. Where the allegations in the First
Information Report and other materials,
if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying
an investigation by police officers Under
Section 156(1) of the Code except under
an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

3. Where the uncontroverted allegations
made in the FIR or complaint and the
evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of
any offence and make out a case against
the accused.

4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do
not constitute a cognizable offence but
constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by
a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated Under
Section 155(2) of the Code.

5. Where the allegations made in the
FIR or complaint are so absurd and
inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach
a just conclusion that there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the
accused.

6. Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the
Code
or the concerned Act (under which
a criminal proceeding is instituted) to
the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.

21

7. Where a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala fide
and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him
due to private and personal grudge.”

gLrxr izdj.k esa mijksDr lkrksa vk/kkjksa esa ls dksbZ Hkh vk/kkj izFke
lwpuk fjiksVZ vFkok mldh vkuq”kkafxd dk;Zokgh dks fujLr fd;s tkus dk
ugha ik;k tkrk gS rFkk uk gh Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander and Another

¼mijksDr½ ds vuqlkj izdj.k esa /kkjk 482 n.M izfdz;k lafgrk ds izko/kkuksa ds
rgr vkijkf/kd izdj.k dh dk;Zokgh dks lekIr fd;s tkus ds rRo fo|eku
ik;s tkrs gSaA
rnuqlkj bl ;kfpdk esa dksbZ lkj ugha ik;k tkrk gS vkSj ;g
;kfpdk vLohdkj dh tkrh gSA

¼cuokjh yky ‘kekZ½
U;k;kf/kifr
feRry@129

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *