Supreme Court of India
CASE NO.:Writ Petition (civil) 141 of 2005
PETITIONER:Sushil Kumar Sharma
RESPONDENT:Union of India and Ors.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19/07/2005
BENCH:Arijit Pasayat & H.K. Sema
Arijit Pasayat, J.
By this petition purported to have been filed under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India, 1950 (in short `the Constitution) prayer is to
declare Section 498A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short `the IPC) to be
unconstitutional and ultra vires in the alternative to formulate guidelines
so that innocent persons are victimized by unscrupulous persons making
Further prayer is made that whenever, any court comes to the conclusion
that the allegations made regarding commission of offence under Section 498
IPC are unfounded, stringent action should be taken against person making
the allegations. This according to the petitioner, would discourage persons
from coming to courts with unclean hands and ulterior motives. Several
instances have been highlighted to show as to how commission of offence
punishable under Section 498A IPC has been made with oblige motive and with
a view to harass the husband, in-laws and relatives.
According to the petitioner there is no prosecution in these cases but
persecution. Reliance was also placed on a decision rendered by a learned
Single Judge of the Delhi High Court wherein concern was shown about the
increase in number of false and frivolous allegations made. It was pointed
out that accusers are more at fault than the accused. Persons try to take
undue advantage of the sympathies exhibited by the courts in matters
relating to alleged dowry torture.
Section 498A appears in Chapter XXA of IPC.
Substantive Sections 498A IPC and presumptive Section 113-B of the Indian
Evidence Act. 1872 (in short `Evidence Act) have been inserted in the
respective statutes by Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983.
Section 498A IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act include in their
amplitude past events of cruelty. Period of operation of Section 113-B of
the Evidence Act is seven years, presumption arises when a woman committed
suicide within a period of seven years from the date of marriage.
Section 498 reads as follows:
498A: Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty-
Whoever being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman,
subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation-For the purpose of this section `cruelty means-
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the
woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or
health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to
coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for
any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any
person related to her to meet such demand.
Section 113-B reads as follows:-
113-B: Presumption as to dowry death-When the question is whether a person
has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before
her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or
harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court
shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.
Explanation-For the purpose of this section `dowry death shall have the
same meaning as in Section have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of the
Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).
Consequences of cruelty which are likely to drive a woman to commit suicide
or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health, whether mental
or physical of the woman is required to be established in order to bring
home the application of Section 498A IPC. Cruelty has been defined in the
explanation for the purpose of Section 498A. It is to be noted that
Sections 304-B and 498A, IPC cannot be held to be mutually inclusive. These
provisions deal with two distinct offences. It is true that cruelty is a
common essential to both the Sections and that has to be proved. The
explanation to Section 498A gives the meaning of `cruelty. In Section 304-
B there is no such explanation about the meaning of `cruelty. But having
regard to common background to these offences it has to be taken that the
meaning of `cruelty or `harassment is the same as prescribed in the
Explanation to Section 498A under which `cruelty by itself amounts to an
The object for which Section 498A IPC was introduced is amply reflected in
the Statement of Objects and Reasons while enacting Criminal Law (Second
Amendment) Act No. 46 of 1983. As clearly stated therein the increase in
number of dowry deaths is a matter of serious concern. The extent of the
evil has been commented upon by the Joint Committee of the Houses to
examines the work of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. In some cases,
cruelty of the husband and the relatives of the husband which culminate in
suicide by or murder of the helpless woman concerned, which constitute only
a small fraction involving such cruelty. Therefore, it was proposed to
amend IPC, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short `the Cr.P.C.)
and the Evidence Act suitably to deal effectively not only with cases of
dowry deaths but also cases of cruelty to married women by the husband, in
laws and relatives. The avowed object is to combat the menance of dowry
death and cruelty.
One other provision which is relevant to be noted is Section 306 IPC. The
basic difference between the two Section i.e. Section 306 and Section 498A
is that of intention. Under the latter. cruelty committed by the husband or
his relations drag the women concerned to commit suicide, while under the
former provision suicide is abetted and intended.
It is well settled that mere possibility of abuse of a provisions of law
does not per se invalidate a legislation. It must be presumed, unless
contrary is proved, that administrative and application of a particular law
would be done not with an evil eye and unequal hand (see A Thangal Kunju
Musaliar v. M. Venkatachalam Potti, Authorised Official and Income-Tax
officer and Anr., AIR (1956) SC 246.
In Budhan Choudhry and Ors. v. State of Bihar, AIR (1955) SC 191 a
contention was raised that a provision of law may not be discriminatory but
it may land itself to abuse bringing about discrimination between the
persons similarly situated. This court repelled the contention holding that
on the possibility of abuse of a provision by the authority, the
legislation may not be held arbitrary or discriminatory and violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution.
From the decided cases in India as well as in United States of America, the
principle appears to be well settled that if a statutory provision is
otherwise intra-vires, constitutional and valid, mere possibility of abuse
of power in a given case would not make it objectionable, ultra-vires or
unconstitutional. In such cases, action and not the section may be
vulnerable. If it is so, the court by upholding the provision of law, may
still set aside the action; order or decision and grant appropriate relief
of the person aggrieved.
In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.,  5
SCC 536, a Bench of 9 Judges observed that mere possibility of abuse of a
provision by those in charge of administering it cannot be a ground for
holding a provision procedurally or substantively unreasonable. In
Collector of Customs v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty,  3 SCR 786 this
The possibility of abuse of a statute otherwise valid does not impart to
it any element of invalidity. It was said in State of Rajasthan v. Union
of India,  3 SCC 592 it must be remembered that merely because power
may sometimes be abused, it is no ground for denying the existence of
power. The wisdom of man has not yet been able to conceive of a Government
with power sufficient to answer all its legitimate needs and at the same
time incapable of mischief. (Also see: Commissioner, H.R.E. v. Sri
Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Meth,  1005.
As observed in Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat,
 6 SCC 672, Unique Butle Tube Industries (P) Ltd. v. U.P. Financial
Corporation and Ors.,  2 SCC 455 and Padma Sundara Rago (dead) and
Ors. v. State,  3 SCC 533. while interpreting a provision, the Court
only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of Law is
misused and subjected to the abuse of the process of law, it is for the
legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary.
The judgment of the Delhi High Court on which reliance was made was
rendered in the case of Savitri Devi v. Ramesh Chand and Ors. In that case
while holding that the allegations regarding commission of offence
punishable under Section 498A IPC were not made out. Certain observations
in general terms were made about the need for legislative changes. The
complaint had moved this Court against the judgment on merits in SLP
(Crl)…..of 2003 entitled Savitri Devi v. Ramesh Chand and Ors. By order
dated 28.11.2003 this Court observed as follows:
Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.
We do not see any merit in the challenge made to the order of the
High Court in Criminal Revision No. 462 of 2002 on the facts of the
case. the special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed.
At the same time, we express our disapproval of some of the
generalized views expressed in paragraphs 23 to 32 of the judgment
of the High Court by the learned Single Judge. The learned Judge
ought to have seen that such observations, though may be
appropriate for seminars or workshops, should have been avoided
being incorporated as part of a court judgment. Some of the views
also touch upon Legislative measures and wisdom of legislative
policy in substance, which according to the learned Judge need to
be taken into account. There was no scope for considering all such
matters in the case which was before the learned Judge. It is
therefore, appropriate that such generalized observations or views
should meticulously avoided by Courts in the judgments.
Above being the position we find no substance in the plea that Section 498A
has no legal or constitutional foundation.
The object of the provision is prevention of the dowry meance. But as has
been rightly contended by the petitioner many instances have come to light
where the complaints are not bonafide and have filed with obligue motive.
In such cases acquittal of the accused does not in all cases wipe out the
ignomy suffered during and prior to trial. Sometimes adverse media coverage
adds to the misery. The question, therefore, is what remedial measures can
be taken to prevent abuse of the well-intentioned provision. Merely because
the provision is constitutional and intra vires, does not give a licence to
unscrupulous persons to wreck personal vendetta or unleash harassment. It
may, therefore, become necessary for the legislature to find out ways how
the makers of frivolous complaints or allegations can be appropriately
dealt with. Till then the Courts have to take care of the situation within
the existing frame work. As noted the object is to strike at the roots of
dowry menace. But by misuse of the provision a new legal terrorism can be
unleashed. The provision is intended to be used a shield and not assassins
weapon. If cry of wolf is made too often as a prank assistance and
protection may not be available when the actual wolf appears. There is no
question of investigating agency and Courts casually dealing with the
allegations. They cannot follow any strait jacket formula in the matters
relating to dowry tortures, deaths and cruelty. It cannot be lost sight of
that ultimate objective of every legal system is to arrive at truth, punish
the guilty and protect the innocent. There is no scope for any pre-
conceived notion or view. It is strenuously argued by the petitioner that
the investigating agencies and the courts start with the presumption that
the accused persons are guilty and that the complainant is speaking the
truth. This is too wide available and generalized statement. Certain
statutory presumption are drawn which again are reputable. It is to be
noted that the role of the investigating agencies and the courts is that of
watch dog and not of a bloodhound. It should be their effort to see that in
innocent person is not made to suffer on account of unfounded, baseless and
malicious allegations. It is equally indisputable that in many cases no
direct evidence is available and the courts have to act on circumstantial
evidence. While dealing with such cases, the law laid down relating to
circumstantial evidence has to be kept in view.
Prayer has been made to direct investigation by the Central Bureau of
Investigation (in short the `CBI) in certain matters where the petitioner
is arrayed as an accused. We do not find any substance in this plea. If the
petitioner wants to prove his innocence, he can do so in the trial, if
The Writ Petition is accordingly disposed of.