{"id":2427,"date":"2011-05-29T13:39:19","date_gmt":"2011-05-29T08:09:19","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/mynation.net\/docs\/?p=2427"},"modified":"2011-05-29T13:39:19","modified_gmt":"2011-05-29T08:09:19","slug":"1283-2009","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mynation.net\/docs\/1283-2009\/","title":{"rendered":"Powers under Sections 173(8) for Reinvestigation"},"content":{"rendered":"

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA<\/strong><\/p>\n

Criminal Appeal No. 1283 of 2009 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2703 of 2008) Decided On: 21.07.2009<\/p>\n

Appellants<\/strong>: Kishan Lal
\nVs.
\nRespondent<\/strong>: Dharmendra Bafna and Anr.
\nHon’ble Judges: S.B. Sinha and Deepak Verma, JJ.<\/p>\n

Counsels<\/strong>:
\nFor Appellant\/Petitioner\/Plaintiff: K.T.S. Tulsi, Sr. Adv., S.D. Dwarkanath and Kailash Chand, Advs
\nFor Respondents\/Defendant: M.N. Rao, U.U. Lalit and R. Balasubramaniam, Sr. Advs., Promila, S.
\nThananjayan, Amit Bhandari, P. Krishnan and Jayant Kumar Mehta, Advs.<\/p>\n

Subject: Criminal<\/p>\n

Acts\/Rules\/Orders<\/strong>:
\nCriminal Procedure Code (CrPC), 1973 – Sections 156, 156(1), 156(3), 157, 159, 173, 173(2), 173(8), 190,
\n190(1), 202, 202(1), 319 and 482; Indian Penal Code – Sections 120B, 406 and 420; Criminal Procedure Code
\n(CrPC) – Section 561A; Constitution of India – Articles 20(3), 32 and 226<\/p>\n

Cases Referred<\/strong>:
\nNaresh Kavarchand Khatri v. State of Gujarat and Anr. MANU\/SC\/7637\/2008; Dharmeshbhai Vasudevbhai and
\nOrs. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. MANU\/SC\/0749\/2009; S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari and Ors.
\nMANU\/SC\/0182\/1970; Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy and Ors. v. V. Narayana Reddy and Ors.
\nMANU\/SC\/0108\/1976; Sakiri Vasu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. MANU\/SC\/8179\/2007; Mithabhai
\nPashabhai Patel and Ors. v. State of Gujarat MANU\/SC\/0858\/2009; Ramachandran v. R. Udhayakumar MANU\/SC\/7684\/2008<\/p>\n

Prior History<\/strong>:From the Judgment and Order dated 13.03.2008 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Criminal R.C. No.245 of 2008<\/p>\n

Disposition<\/strong>:Appeal dismissed<\/p>\n

Citing Reference<\/strong>:
\nNaresh Kavarchand Khatri v. State of Gujarat and Anr. MANU\/SC\/7637\/2008 Discussed
\nDharmeshbhai Vasudevbhai and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. MANU\/SC\/0749\/2009 Discussed
\nS.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari and Ors. MANU\/SC\/0182\/1970 Mentioned
\nDevarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy and Ors. v. V. Narayana Reddy and Ors. Discussed
\nSakiri Vasu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. MANU\/SC\/8179\/2007 Discussed
\nMithabhai Pashabhai Patel and Ors. v. State of Gujarat MANU\/SC\/0858\/2009 Discussed
\nRamachandran v. R. Udhayakumar MANU\/SC\/7684\/2008 Mentioned<\/p>\n

JUDGMENT<\/strong> :S.B. Sinha, J.<\/p>\n

1. Leave granted.<\/p>\n

2. Jurisdiction of a Magistrate to direct reinvestigation of a case from time to time as laid down under Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “the Code”) is the question involved in this appeal. It arises out of a judgment and order dated 13th March, 2008 passed by a learned single judge of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Crl. R.C. No. 245 of 2008 allowing the criminal revision application filed by the respondent No. 1 from an order dated 13th February, 2008 passed by the learned III Metropolitan Magistrate,George Town, Chennai.<\/p>\n

3. Indisputably, on or about 30th December 2005, a complaint was lodged by the appellant against Accused Nos.1 to 9, namely,
\nLakshmichand Bafna (Accused No. 1),
\nDharmendra Bafna (Accused No. 2),
\nMahendar Bafna (Accused No. 3),
\nRakesh Bafna (Accused No. 4),
\nG.R. Surana (Accused No. 5),
\nShantilal Surana (Accused No.6),
\nVijayaraj Surana (Accused No. 7),
\nDinesh Chand Surana (Accused No. 8) and
\nMaran (Accused No. 9) before the Commissioner of Police, Chennai City, Chennai inter alia alleging that they connived together from the beginning and cheated him a sum of Rs. 4.65 crores by denying to return the money which was given to them for purchase of gold. It was alleged that the amount was entrusted on various dates from 06th October 2005 to 17th November 2005. Although they have admitted the liability to the extent of 4.95 crores, but did not return either any gold or money to the complainant.<\/p>\n

4. On or about 12th January 2006, an application for grant of anticipatory bail before the High Court of Madras was filed by all the accused stating that the Accused Nos. 5 to 8 are brothers and are the directors of their family business known as M\/s Surana Corporation Limited. It was admitted that the Accused No. 2 is the sub-agent of Surana Corporation Limited who introduces investors.<\/p>\n

5. A First Information Report (“FIR”) was lodged by the appellant against all the accused on or about 22nd January, 2006 in the Central Crime Branch Station.
\nAllegedly, on or about 27th January 2006, in the aforementioned bail application, the said accused filed statement of accounts of the appellant\/de facto complainant mentioned in the Multi Commodity Exchange of India Limited (“MCX”) which is a Government approved On-Line Trading Exchange of Bullion, Energy, Metal and Oil, admitting that they had undertaken bullion trade with MCX by using the appellant’s money.
\nApart from the said FIR, the parties have filed some Civil Suits also. Indisputably, however, Banwarlal Sharma (Accused No. 10) was subsequently added. It is furthermore not in dispute that the investigation was transferred to CBCID, Chennai by the Director General of Police, Tamil Nadu.
\nOn or about 8th October, 2007, a charge-sheet was filed before the learned III Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Chennai only against Accused Nos. 1 and 2 under Sections 406, 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code (“IPC”). The learned Magistrate took cognizance against the said accused.
\nOn or about 29th October 2007, on the premise that the learned Magistrate had not taken cognizance against the other accused, the appellant filed an application under Section 482 of the Code before the High Court for setting aside the said order. The said application was disposed of by the learned single judge of the High Court in the following terms:<\/p>\n

8. Therefore in the considered view of this order, the above criminal original petition can be disposed of with the following directions:<\/p>\n

The petitioner is at liberty to file an appropriate petition before the III Metropolitan Magistrate,George Town,
\nChennai, incorporating his grievances and the alleged lapses on the part of the investigating agency and seek
\nfurther investigation in the case. On such petition being filed, the learned Magistrate, shall consider the same in
\naccordance with law and if the learned Magistrate is satisfied that a case has been made out by the petitioner for
\nordering further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the learned Magistrate is
\nentitled to invoke the powers under Sections 173(8) of the Criminal Procedure Code and direct the respondent to
\nfurther investigate into the matter.<\/p>\n

Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said observations, appellant filed an application for further investigation before
\nthe learned Magistrate and by an order dated 13th February 2008, a direction for further investigation was issued,
\nobserving:
\nWhile considering the averments made in this petition, this Court holds that several kinds of issues were not
\nundisclosed and beyond from knots of doubts. If those doubts were not cleared through suitable investigation, no
\nopportunity could be given to get it revealed the true picture. While considering the nature of the case, it is
\nimportant to find out how the amount given by the petitioner utilized, when it was utilized and on which state the
\namount has been kept. But, as alleged on behalf of the petitioner, it is the duty of this Court to find out the truth by
\nholding suitable investigation of the matters which were unearthed. In the event of this Court refusing to find out
\nthe true picture by ordering a reinvestigation, either party is likely to get hardships and losses. If the
\nreinvestigation is ordered, a situation for handing out an opportunity for both the parties to bring out the hidden
\ntruths in this case and the facts in this case and this Court holds that it would pave a way for conducting a trial in
\nthe proper direction.<\/p>\n

As this Court holds that certain cause of actions available in this case, and in view of the necessity to find out
\nseveral facts in this case and in accordance of the orders of the High Court of Madras in CRL.O.P. 33354 of 2007,
\nit is to meet the ends of justice, the case could be ordered for reinvestigation and thereby the petition presented
\nby the Petitioner\/complainant under Section 173(8) is allowed.
\nAccused No. 2 filed revisional application thereagainst before the High Court. By reason of the impugned
\njudgment, as noticed hereinbefore, the said revision application has been allowed.<\/p>\n

6. Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would contend:
\n(i) The High Court committed a serious error in opining that no direction for further investigation or reinvestigation
\ncan be directed after cognizance of an offence is taken.
\n(ii) The application for a direction for further investigation having been filed only in terms of the order of the High
\nCourt dated 17th December 2007, another learned judge of the same High Court could not have taken a contrary
\nview.
\n(iii) Direction for further investigation having been made by the learned Magistrate upon taking into consideration
\nall aspects of the matter, the High Court committed a serious error in interfering therewith.
\n(iv) The High Court committed a serious error in passing the impugned judgment insofar as it failed to take into
\nconsideration that Accused No. 6 being father of Accused No. 2 and Accused Nos. 5, 7 and 8 being his brothers;
\nwere running and operating Surana Corporation Limited and having admittedly invested the said amount in MCX,
\nthey must be held to have conspired together for misappropriation of the aforementioned amount of Rs. 4.65
\ncrores entrusted by the appellant to the accused No. 2, and consequent refusal on their part to return the amount
\non the ground that they have suffered a huge loss.<\/p>\n

7. Mr. U.U. Lalit, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the accused other than accused Nos. 2 and
\n6, on the other hand, urged:
\n(i) Despite the fact that the learned Magistrate had the requisite jurisdiction to direct further investigation, such
\norder could not have been passed in the instant case as all aspects of the matter had been taken into
\nconsideration by the Investigating Officers.
\n(ii) Further investigation, the learned Counsel would urge, could be directed only in the event where investigation
\nwas not carried in respect of certain aspects of the matter or where during trial it came to the notice to the court
\nthat some facts which were relevant for arriving at the truth had not been gone into.<\/p>\n

8. Mr. M.N. Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the State would take us through the detailed
\ncounter affidavit filed on behalf of the State to contend that the investigation had been carried out in a fair and
\ndiligent manner touching all aspects of the matter.<\/p>\n

9. It is now a well settled principle of law that when a final form is filed by any Investigating Officer in exercise of
\nhis power under Sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code, the first informant has to be given notice. He may file
\na protest petition which in a given case may be treated to be a complaint petition, on the basis whereof after
\nfulfilling the other statutory requirements cognizance may be taken. The learned Magistrate can also take
\ncognizance on the basis of the materials placed on record by the investigating agency. It is also permissible for a
\nlearned Magistrate to direct further investigation.
\nThe Investigating Officer when an FIR is lodged in respect of a cognizable offence, upon completion of the
\ninvestigation would file a police report. The power of investigation is a statutory one and ordinarily and save and
\nexcept some exceptional situations, no interference therewith by any court is permissible.
\nIn Naresh Kavarchand Khatri v. State of Gujarat and Anr. MANU\/SC\/7637\/2008 : AIR2008SC2180 , this
\nCourt held:<\/p>\n

6. The power of the court to interfere with an investigation is limited. The police authorities, in terms of Section
\n156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, exercise a statutory power. The Code of Criminal procedure has
\nconferred power on the statutory authorities to direct transfer of an investigation from one Police Station to
\nanother in the event it is found that they do not have any jurisdiction in the matter. The Court should not interfere
\nin the matter at an initial stage in regard thereto. If it is found that the investigation has been conducted by an
\nInvestigating Officer who did not have any territorial jurisdiction in the matter, the same should be transferred by
\nhim to the police station having the requisite jurisdiction.
\nIn Dharmeshbhai Vasudevbhai and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. MANU\/SC\/0749\/2009 : 2009CriLJ2969
\n, this Court held:<\/p>\n

9. Interference in the exercise of the statutory power of investigation by the Police by the Magistrate far less
\ndirection for withdrawal of any investigation which is sought to be carried out is not envisaged under the Code of
\nCriminal Procedure. The Magistrate’s power in this regard is limited. Even otherwise, he does not have any
\ninherent power. Ordinarily, he has no power to recall his order.
\nThis aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari and Ors.
\nMANU\/SC\/0182\/1970 : 1970CriLJ764 , wherein the law has been stated as under:<\/p>\n

6. Without the use of the expression “if he thinks fit”, the second alternative could have been held to be
\nindependent of the first; but the use of this expression, in our opinion, makes it plain that the power conferred by
\nthe second clause of this section is only an alternative to the power given by the first clause and can, therefore, be
\nexercised only in those cases in which the first clause is applicable.<\/p>\n

7. It may also be further noticed that, even in Sub-section (3) of Section 156, the only power given to the
\nMagistrate, who can take cognizance of an offence under Section 190, is to order an investigation; there is no
\nmention of any power to stop an investigation by the police. The scheme of these sections, thus, clearly is that the
\npower of the police to investigate any cognizable offence is uncontrolled by the Magistrate, and it is only in cases
\nwhere the police decide not to investigate the case that the Magistrate can intervene and either direct an
\ninvestigation, or, in the alternative, himself proceed or depute a Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed to
\nenquire into the case. The power of the police to investigate has been made independent of any control by the
\nMagistrate.<\/p>\n

Interpreting the aforementioned provisions vis-a-vis the lack of inherent power in the Magistrate in terms of
\nSection 561A of the Old Criminal procedure Code (equivalent to Section 482 of the new Code of Criminal
\nprocedure), it was held:<\/p>\n

10. This interpretation, to some extent, supports the view that the scheme of the Criminal Procedure Code is that
\nthe power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence is not to be interfered with by the judiciary. Their
\nLordships of the Privy Council were, of course, concerned only with the powers of the High Court under Section
\n561A CrPC, while we have to interpret Section 159 of the Code which defines the powers of a Magistrate which
\nhe can exercise on receiving a report from the police of the cognizable offence under Section 157 of the Code. In
\nour opinion, Section 159 was really intended to give a limited power to the Magistrate to ensure that the police
\ninvestigate all cognizable offences and do not refuse to do so by abusing the right granted for certain limited
\ncases of not proceeding with the investigation of the offence.
\nYet again in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy and Ors. v. V. Narayana Reddy and Ors.
\nMANU\/SC\/0108\/1976 : 1976CriLJ1361 , this Court, upon comparison of the provision of the old Code and the
\nnew Code, held as under:<\/p>\n

7. Section 156(3) occurs in Chapter XII, under the caption : “Information to the Police and their powers to
\ninvestigate”; while Section 202 is in Chapter XV which bears the heading: “Of complaints to Magistrates”. The
\npower to order police investigation under Section 156(3) is different from the power to direct investigation
\nconferred by Section 202(1). The two operate in distinct spheres at different stages. The first is exercisable at the
\npre- cognizance stage, the second at the post-cognizance stage when the Magistrate is in seisin of the case. That
\nis to say in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of a cognizable offence, the power under Section
\n156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a). But
\nif he once takes such cognizance and embarks upon the procedure embodied in Chapter XV, he is not competent
\nto switch back to the pre- cognizance stage and avail of Section 156(3). It may be noted further that an order
\nmade under Sub-section (3) of Section 156, is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police
\nto exercise their plenary powers of investigation under Section 156(1). Such an investigation embraces the entire
\ncontinuous process which begins with the collection of evidence under Section 156 and ends with a report or
\ncharge-sheet under Section 173. On the other hand, Section 202 comes in at a stage when some evidence has
\nbeen collected by the Magistrate in proceedings under Chapter XV, but the same is deemed insufficient to take a
\ndecision as to the next step in the prescribed procedure. In such a situation, the Magistrate is empowered under
\nSection 202 to direct, within the limits circumscribed by that section an investigation “for the purpose of deciding
\nwhether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding”. Thus the object of an investigation under Section 202 is
\nnot to initiate a fresh case on police report but to assist the Magistrate in completing proceedings already
\ninstituted upon a complaint before him.<\/p>\n

We are, however, not oblivious of the fact that recently a Division Bench of this Court in Sakiri Vasu v. State of
\nUttar Pradesh and Ors. MANU\/SC\/8179\/2007 : AIR2008SC907 while dealing with the power of the court to
\ndirect the police officer to record an FIR in exercise of power under Section 156(3) of the Code observed that the
\nMagistrate had also a duty to see that the investigation is carried out in a fair manner (correctness whereof is
\nopen to question).<\/p>\n

10. An order of further investigation can be made at various stages including the stage of the trial, that is, after
\ntaking cognizance of the offence.
\nAlthough some decisions have been referred to us, we need not dilate thereupon as the matter has recently been
\nconsidered by a Division Bench of this Court in Mithabhai Pashabhai Patel and Ors. v. State of Gujarat
\nMANU\/SC\/0858\/2009 : (2009)6SCC332 in the following terms:<\/p>\n

16. This Court while passing the order in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 32 of Constitution of India did not
\ndirect re- investigation. This Court exercised its jurisdiction which was within the realm of the Code. Indisputably
\nthe investigating agency in terms of Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code can pray before the Court and
\nmay be granted permission to investigate into the matter further. There are, however, certain situations, where
\nsuch a formal request may not be insisted upon.<\/p>\n

17. It is, however, beyond any cavil that `further investigation’ and `re-investigation’ stand on different footing. It
\nmay be that in a given situation a superior court in exercise of its constitutional power, namely under Articles 226
\nand 32 of the Constitution of India could direct a `State’ to get an offence investigated and\/or further investigated
\nby a different agency. Direction of a re-investigation, however, being forbidden in law, no superior court would
\nordinarily issue such a direction.
\nPasayat, J. in Ramachandran v. R. Udhayakumar MANU\/SC\/7684\/2008 : 2008CriLJ4309 , opined as under:
\n7. At this juncture it would be necessary to take note of Section 173 of the Code. From a plain reading of the
\nabove section it is evident that even after completion of investigation under Sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the
\nCode, the police has right to further investigate under Sub-section (8), but not fresh investigation or
\nreinvestigation…<\/p>\n

11. We have referred to the aforementioned decision only because Mr. Tulsi contends that in effect and
\nsubstance the prayer of the appellant before the learned Magistrate was for reinvestigation but the learned
\nMagistrate had directed further investigation by the Investigating Officer inadvertently.
\nThe Investigating Officer may exercise his statutory power of further investigation in several situations as, for
\nexample, when new facts come to its notice; when certain aspects of the matter had not been considered by it
\nand it found that further investigation is necessary to be carried out from a different angle(s) keeping in view the
\nfact that new or further materials came to its notice. Apart from the aforementioned grounds, the learned
\nMagistrate or the Superior Courts can direct further investigation, if the investigation is found to be tainted and\/or
\notherwise unfair or is otherwise necessary in the ends of justice.
\n12. The question, however, is as to whether in a case of this nature a direction for further investigation would be
\nnecessary.<\/p>\n

Mr. Dhayalan, Inspector of Police, Crime Branch CID, Metro Wing, Chennai in his counter affidavit inter alia
\nbrought to this Court’s notice that the matter was investigated by (1) Tr. S. Saravana Brabu, Inspector of Police,
\nChennai CCB, (2) Tr. Salathraj, Assistant Commissioner of Police, CCB Chennai (3) Tr. S. Veiladurai, Assistant
\nCommissioner of Police, Job Rocket and Video Piracy, Chennai City, (4) Tr. C. Edward, Inspector of Police, CCB,
\nChennai and (5) Tr. K.G. Rajakumar, Assistant Commissioner of Police, CCB, Egmore, Chennai apart from him.
\nWe have noticed hereinbefore that the investigation was transferred to CBCID by an order dated 29th March 2007
\npassed by the DGP, Tamil Nadu. The matter, thus, has been investigated by two specialized agencies. The
\ndeponent of the counter affidavit categorically stated that he had made a thorough investigation and upon
\nconsideration of the materials gathered during investigation identified that there was no connection between the
\nmoney of the de facto complainant and Accused Nos. 3 to 10 and hence the final form was filed in their favour. It
\nwas pointed out that the complainant had filed the aforementioned application under Section 173(8) of the Code
\nprincipally on the premise that no investigation had been carried out in respect of three documents being (1) The
\nadditional grounds raised in the anticipatory bail application, (2) The plaint filed by Accused No. 2 in the Civil Suit
\nfiled by him and (3) the letter written by Mahaveer Surana, the authorized signatory of Surana Corporation Ltd., to
\nthe Chief Minister’s cell.<\/p>\n

It was furthermore pointed out:
\n(b) The second accused came forward with improbable stories for him to escape from prosecution. The version of
\nthe accused in his anticipatory bail application is without any material to support the same and was not believed.
\nSimilarly, the version of A2 in the suit filed by him was also not believed as it was not borne out by any
\ndocumentary evidence. Similarly, the letter written by Mahaveer Surana to the Chief Minister’s Cell is also a
\ndocument intended to save A-1 and A-2 from the crime and hence not to be believed. The version of the de facto
\ncomplainant, the petitioner herein and also of A-2 to establish the connection between the money paid by the de
\nfacto complainant to A-2 with A-3 to A-10 is not borne out by any documentary evidence. Hence, the case against
\nA-3 to A-10 were dropped. All the three documents are that of the accused. The documents cannot be proved
\nthrough accused. No accused can be compelled to be a witness against himself. The documents could be hit by
\nunder Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.<\/p>\n

The investigating officer was of the opinion that the amount of Rs. 4.65 crores was given to Accused No. 2 for
\nboth trading in gold and silver on the basis of orally agreed terms. Accused No. 2 was introduced by Accused No.
\n1. Accused No. 2 had given the said amount on 18th November 2005 to M\/s Vinayaga Vyapar Limited on various
\ndates on its own risks and on the basis whereof M\/s Vinayaga Vyapar Ltd. entered transactions with M\/s Surana
\nCorporation Ltd. on 17th November 2005 and all payments had been made through cheques only. Upon giving the
\ndetails, the Investigating Officer had come to the following conclusion:
\nThese transactions were for speculative trading only. It is stated in the FIR filed by the petitioner that the
\ntransaction between the petitioner and the A-2 Dharmendra Bafna are independent transaction between
\nthemselves and no third party was involved. The petitioner did not make any agreement or contract with the A-2
\nDharmendra Bafna for doing gold bullion forward trade business and failed to obtain the trade order, trade
\nexecution order and trade confirmation order from the A-2 Dharmendra Bafna and did not deal in cheque
\ntransactions. The petitioner has given Rs. 4.65 crores by cash and entered upon a shady transaction with the A4
\nDharmendra Bafna.<\/p>\n

In regard to the statements made by the accused in their application for anticipatory bail with regard to account
\nwith M\/s MEGHA GG, it has been contended that the same cannot be construed to be an admission on the part of
\nthe Accused Nos. 3 to 10 especially when the petition had not been signed by any of the accused and all the
\ndocumentary evidence and material gathered during the investigation were to the contrary. The said Shri
\nDhayalan had also stated in great details as to why Accused Nos. 3 to 10 were dropped. He had also taken into
\nconsideration the dealings by and between the parties inter se as also the litigations filed by them against each
\nother. It is neither necessary nor desirable to notice the statements made therein by us as we are concerned with
\na question of law.<\/p>\n

13. It is correct that the revisional court should not interfere with the discretionary jurisdiction exercised by the
\nlearned Magistrate unless a jurisdictional error or an error of law is noticed.
\nWe have noticed hereinbefore the order passed by the learned Magistrate. His order that “several kinds of issues
\nwere not disclosed and beyond from knots of doubts” is vague in nature. It has not been pointed out that in what
\nrespect the investigation has not been carried out. What are hidden truths required to be unearthed had also not
\nbeen pointed out. The learned Magistrate did not consider the fact that the investigation had been carried out by
\ntwo different agencies and by responsible police officers. It has not been found that the Investigating Officer was
\nin any way biased towards the complainant. Furthermore, if the contention of Mr. Tulsi is correct, the question as
\nto whether Accused Nos. 3 to 10 were involved in the matter could be pointed out from the materials which had
\nalready been brought on record. Furthermore, whether the admissions made in the application for anticipatory bail
\nwere binding on them, the same being a matter of inference can also be urged. The other and further remedies as
\npointed out can be resorted to as also invocation of the provisions of Section 319 of the Code at the stage of trial
\nis also permissible in law, if an appropriate case is made out therefor. We furthermore clarify that any
\nobservations made by the High Court or by us should not prejudice the either party and the learned Magistrate
\nshould consider the matter on its own merit and without in any way being influenced by the same, if any occasion
\narises in this behalf in future.
\n14. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in this appeal. The appeal is dismissed accordingly.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Criminal Appeal No. 1283 of 2009 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2703 of 2008) Decided On: 21.07.2009 Appellants:…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1091,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_customify_content_layout":"","_customify_sidebar":"","_customify_page_header_display":"","_customify_disable_header":"","_customify_disable_header_top":"","_customify_disable_header_main":"","_customify_disable_header_bottom":"","_customify_disable_page_title":"","_customify_disable_content_vertical_padding":"","_customify_disable_footer_top":"","_customify_disable_footer_main":"","_customify_disable_footer_bottom":"","_customify_breadcrumb_display":"","_customify_header_transparent_display":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[65],"tags":[15212,15209,15205,15211,2434,15213,547,3051,15196,15214,265,3038,15217,1390,15198,15197,15220,15201,15219,15221,15222,15206,15223,15204,15218,1341,15200,15195,15210,15208,15207,15216,15199,15203,15202,15215],"class_list":["post-2427","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-judgments","tag-15212","tag-406-and-420","tag-amit-bhandari","tag-constitution-of-india-articles-203","tag-criminal-procedure-code","tag-criminal-revision-application","tag-crpc","tag-deepak-verma","tag-dharmendra-bafna","tag-dinesh-chand-surana","tag-fir","tag-first-information-report","tag-g-r-surana","tag-indian-penal-code","tag-k-t-s-tulsi","tag-kishan-la","tag-lakshmichand-bafna","tag-m-n-rao","tag-mahendar-bafna","tag-mcx","tag-multi-commodity-exchange","tag-p-krishnan-and-jayant-kumar-mehta","tag-powers-under-sections-1738","tag-promila","tag-rakesh-bafna","tag-s-b-sinha","tag-s-d-dwarkanath-and-kailash-chand","tag-section-319","tag-section-561a","tag-sections-120b","tag-sections-156","tag-shantilal-surana","tag-sr-adv","tag-sr-advs","tag-u-u-lalit-and-r-balasubramaniam","tag-vijayaraj-surana"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/mynation.net\/docs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2427","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/mynation.net\/docs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/mynation.net\/docs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mynation.net\/docs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1091"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mynation.net\/docs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2427"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/mynation.net\/docs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2427\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/mynation.net\/docs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2427"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mynation.net\/docs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2427"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mynation.net\/docs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2427"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}