HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Revision No. 470 / 2016
Suman w/o Gurcharan D/o Harbansh Singh, by caste Ramgarhiya,
r/o Jawahar Nagar, Sriganganagar, presently residing at Court
Road, opposite Circuit House, Hanumangarh Junction, Tehsil and
District Hanumangarh.
—-Petitioner
Versus
Gurcharan Singh s/o Amarjeet Singh, by caste Ramgariya
Mathadu, r/o H.No. 2 G 19, Jawahar Nagar, Sriganganagar
presently Scientist Bhabha Atomic Analysis Division, Bhabha
Atomic Research Centre, Vishakhapattanam (A.P.)
—-Respondent
__
For Petitioner(s) : Mr D.S. Gharsana
For Respondent(s) : Mr C.S. Kotwani
__
HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE VIRENDRA KUMAR MATHUR
Order
Date of pronouncement: (11) /04/2018
This Criminal Revision under sec.397/401 CrPC has been
filed against order dated 30.03.2016 passed by learned Special
Judge, SC/ST (Removal of Atrocities cases), Hanumangarh in Cr.
Appeal No.35/2014, whereby the order dated 30.01.2014 passed
by the Judicial Magistrate, Hanumangarh in Cr. Regular Case
No.179/2011 has been reversed.
Briefly stated, the petitioner filed an application under sec.12
of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
{herein after referred to as ‘the Act’} against the respondent and
contended that the marriage between the parties was solemnized
on 16.02.2009 at Hanumangarh. It was also submitted that after
the marriage, petitioner started living with the husband at
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[CRLR-470/2016]
Sriganganagar. Since marriage the respondent has been working
at Bhabha Atomic Research Center, Vishkhapattanam. It was
averred that the respondent was harassing the petitioner
physically and mentally. The respondent used to demand dowry
from petitioner and always scolded the petitioner for gifts
articles given by her parents in wedding.
The petitioner further alleged in that application that the
respondent did not maintain her properly and sent her back to her
parents’ house. It was also averred that that petitioner’s father
was middle-class man and having obligation to maintain his family
also. The respondent is working as Scientist and earning salary of
Rs.60,000/- per month. Besides, the respondent is having
agriculture lands, residential and commercial properties at various
places and he is in very wealthy position. Therefore, the petitioner
claimed relief under secs.18, 19, 20 22 of the Act for protection,
residential, monetary and compensatory relief.
The application of petitioner was contested by the
respondent by way of filing reply denying the allegations.
After hearing both the parties, the trial court vide order
dated 30.01.2014 allowed application filed by the petitioner in part
and ordered the respondent to pay Rs.4000/- per month to the
petitioner from date of filing of the application i.e. 09.09.2010.
Being aggrieved by the order dated 30.01.2014, the
respondent filed an appeal under sec.29 of the Act and after
hearing both the parties, the learned appellate court allowed
respondent’s appeal vide order dated 30.03.2016 and reversed
order of the trial court dated 30.01.2014. Being aggrieved by the
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[CRLR-470/2016]
order dated 30.03.2016 passed by the appellate court, the
petitioner has filled this Revision Petition.
It was contended that the respondent in his reply to the
application filed by the petitioner categorically stated that
respondent and his entire family is having belief that the petitioner
is responsible for the death of her father-in-law and this very fact
is enough for establishing verbal and emotional abuse against the
petitioner by the respondent. It was also contended that the trial
court in its order specifically held the respondent guilty of
harassing the petitioner but the appellate court without any
reason reversed said well-reasoned order of the trial court.
Learned appellate court has not considered this important aspect
and as such, the impugned order is liable to be quashed.
It was also contended that the learned appellate court has
further erred while allowing the appeal on the ground that the
petitioner has not furnished exact details like dates of alleged
incidents and by this fact the petitioner does not seem bona fide
and the allegations levelled by her are falsified. The observation of
the appellate court is not only logically incorrect but also against
various judicial pronouncements.
Learned counsel appearing for the respondent vehemently
opposed the arguments raised by the petitioner and contended
that the allegation of demand of dowry is false. The trial under
charges of secs.498A and 406 IPC against the respondent has
been concluded and the court passed its judgment on 30.06.2017
whereby the respondents are acquitted of the charges under
secs.498A and 406 IPC. There is no iota of evidence on record
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[CRLR-470/2016]
from which it can be inferred that the respondent has committed
any act of domestic violence against petitioner.
Heard rival contentions of the parties and perused evidence
placed on record.
I have perused original complaint of the petitioner, in which
she has written that after the marriage on 16.02.2009, she
started residing in her matrimonial home at Sriganganagar. Her
husband was posted at Vishakhapattnam in Bhabha Atomic
Research Center. She further made allegation regarding demand
of dowry that at the time of “Vidayi” after the marriage,
respondents demanded a Swift car and rupees Two Lacs. The
allegation of demand of dowry could not be proved during trial of
respondent for charge under secs.498A 406 IPC. The
respondents have placed before this Court judgment dated
30.06.2017 in Cr. Case No.158/2010 passed by the Judicial
Magistrate, Hanumangarh.
From the evidence on record, it is clear that petitioner
Suman left matrimonial home after May 2010. It is further evident
that during period of one half years, petitioner Suman went to
stay with in-laws’ family for one or two times. She never gave
detail as to on what dates she went there and for how many days
she stayed there. She has not mentioned fact that during her stay
at Sriganganagar whether respondent came there to stay with her
and it is also not clear when alleged act of domestic violence said
to be committed.
It would be pertinent to note that the “domestic violence” as
defined under sec.3 of the Act, “any act, omission or commission
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[CRLR-470/2016]
or conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in
case it harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb
or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person
or tends to do so and includes causing physical abuse, sexual
abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse; or
harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with
a view to coerce her or any other person related to her, to meet
any unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or valuable
security; or has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or
any person related to her by any conduct mentioned above or
otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to
the aggrieved person.”
Definition of domestic violence rest upon not only the nature
of the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim but also
upon norms of acceptable behaviour. The core of definition of
domestic violence consists of all the acts that constitute violence.
Any continuous deprivation of aggrieved woman from economic or
financial resources or prohibition of access to shared household
would be a domestic violence. In determining whether any act,
omission, commission or conduct of the respondent constitutes
“domestic violence”, the overall facts and circumstances of the
case shall be a guiding factor.
Learned appellate court, after considering over-all evidence
has right observed as follows:
^^izkFkhZ;k dh dgkuh ls ;g Li’V ugha gksrk gS fd oLrqr% og vius llqjky dc xbZA
izkFkhZ;k dks ;g Hkh fl) djuk pkfg;s Fkk fd ftl le;kof/k esa og nks ckj xaxkuxj
esa jgh og dkSulh vof/k Fkh vkSj D;k ml vof/k esa vihykFkhZ Hkh mlds lkFk vkdj
jgk Fkk tc mlds lkFk ?kjsyw fgalk dkfjr gqbZA ijarq ,slh dksbZ lk{; eSa ikoyh esa
(6 of 6)
[CRLR-470/2016]ugha ns[krk gw¡A izkFkhZ;k ds Øwjrk dsa laca/k esa tks Hkh vk{ksi gS og lkekU; izd`fr ds
lkFk bl ifjizs{; esa izkFkhZ;k lqeu dk ;g vkjksi fd mls ;g rkus nsuk fd og vius
llqj dks [kk xbZ gS vkfn vkfn ;g Hkh vihykFkhZ ds ifjizs{; esa blfy;s mi;qDr
izrhr ugha gksrk gS D;ksafd firk dh e`R;q ds mijkar vihykFkhZ us viuh ekrk dks
xaxkuxj Hkst fn;k Fkk vkSj vihykFkhZ dh dgkuh ds vuqlkj rFkk lqeu rc viuh
lklw ds ikl xaxkuxj jgh FkhA ;gka Hkh vihykFkhZ izkFkhZ;k ls vyx fo’kk[kkiV~ue esa
jgk Fkk vkSj mudh dgkuh ds vuqlkj mlus viuh iRuh dks viuh ekrk ds ikl
NksM+k Fkk tgka ls izkFkhZ;k vihykFkhZ dk ?kj NksM+dj pyh xbZ FkhA eSaus lk{; dk tks
mijksDr foospu fd;k gS mlds vuq:i vihykFkhZ i{k dk “kiFk i esa fn;k x;k ;g
dFku mi;qDr izrhr gksrk gS ftlesa “kiFk i ds in la[;k 5 esa vihykFkhZ ;k izkFkhZ
us ;g dgk gS fd fookg ds i’pkr izkFkhZ;k yxHkx ,d ekl gh mlds llqjky esa
jgh gSA ;fn izkFkhZ;k dk ifr xaxkuxj esa fuokl ugha djrk Fkk rks fQj izkFkhZ;k ds
ifr us izkFkhZ;k ds lkFk Øwjrk dc dh ifr ds vfrfjDr tks Hkh vizkFkhZx.k Fks muds
fo:) izkFkhZ;k ds vk{ksiksa dks v/khuLFk U;k;ky; us udkj fn;k rks fQj vizkFkhZx.k
la[;k 1 ftlds lkFk izkFkhZ;k dHkh Hkh tkdj fo”kk[kkiV~ue ;k vgenkckn ugha jghA
vizkFkhZ us izkFkhZ;k ds lkFk ?kjsyw fgalk dc dkfjr dh ;g esjh le ls ijs gS**Obviously, for granting relief under the Act, it is for the
petitioner to prove that alleged act of violence has been
committed to her. This Court concurs with aforesaid observation
recorded by the learned appellate court.
In view of the above, I find no ground of interference in the
order dated 30.03.2016 passed by the appellate court below. The
Revision petition filed by the petitioner has no merit and the same
is dismissed.
(VIRENDRA KUMAR MATHUR)J.
mma