HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Revision No. 14 / 2015
Smt. Chandrakala W/o Shri Nandlal D/o Sh. Badri Singh, by caste
Kachhawaha, resident of Nathusar, Malion Ka Bas, Bikaner (Raj.)
—-Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan.
2. Nandlal S/o Shri Dalchand, by caste Mali, resident of
Sardarsahar, presently Superintendent of Police, Pali (Raj.)
—-Respondents
__
For Petitioner : Mr. J.S. Choudhary, Sr. Adv. With Mr.
Pradeep Choudhary.
For Respondent-State: Mr. L.R. Upadhyay, PP.
For Respondent No.2 : Mr. Sunil Mehta.
__
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE P.K. LOHRA
Order
15/05/2017
Petitioner-complainant feeling aggrieved by judgment dated
21.11.2014, passed by Addl. Sessions Judge No.2, Bikaner (for
short, ‘learned appellate Court’), whereby learned appellate Court
confirmed the verdict of acquittal dated 04.12.2006, passed by
learned Judicial Magistrate (First Class) No.2, Bikaner (for short,
‘learned trial Court’), has preferred this revision petition under
Section 397/401 Cr.P.C. Initially, the learned trial Court, vide its
judgment dated 04.12.2006, acquitted accused-respondent for
offence under Sections 498A and 406 IPC giving him benefit of
doubt. Subsequently, the learned appellate Court, while
concurring with the findings and conclusions of the learned trial
Court, affirmed the same.
(2 of 6)
[CRLR-14/2015]
In brief, facts of the case are that petitioner-complainant
filed a complaint before Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bikaner
stating therein that she was married with second respondent
Nandlal on 20.11.1989 and at the time of marriage sufficient
dowry was given by her family. It is alleged that after marriage,
accused-respondent was selected in police service as Sub
Inspector and thereafter he started subjecting the petitioner to
physical and mental cruelty. An allegation for demand of dowry is
also made in the complaint. It is also alleged in the complaint that
while the accused was posted at Chhatargarh, he was suspended
and at that time also he raised a demand of Rs.50,000/-. The
accused ultimately turned her out from the house and refused to
return dowry articles.
The learned Magistrate sent the complaint to concerned
police station under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and the police
registering FIR No.294/1994 started investigation. Accused-
respondent was prosecuted for offence under Sections 498-A and
406 IPC by filing charge-sheet. Learned trial Court framed
charge against him for aforesaid offence and on denial, he was put
on trial. In order to prove charge against accused-respondent,
prosecution examined eleven witnesses and got exhibited thirty-
four documents. Subsequently, statement of accused-respondent
was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C and, in defence, he
examined three witnesses and exhibited nineteen documents.
Learned trial Court, then, proceeded to hear final arguments and
by its verdict dated 04.12.2006 acquitted the accused-respondent
extending him benefit of doubt.
(3 of 6)
[CRLR-14/2015]
Feeling dismayed with the verdict of acquittal, State
approached learned appellate Court and the learned appellate
Court vide order dated 11.06.2008 remanded the matter back to
learned trial Court to decide the matter afresh. Being aggrieved
with the order dated 11.06.2008, accused-respondent filed a
revision petition before this Hon’ble Court and the Hon’ble Court
vide order dated 12.05.2011 rejected the same on the ground of
limitation.
Being aggrieved with the order dated 12.05.2011 passed by
this Court, accused-respondent filed a Criminal Appeal before the
Apex Court and the Apex Court vide order dated 07.03.2014
allowed the appeal and quashed and set aside the order dated
11.06.2008 passed by the appellate Court and order dated
12.05.2011 passed by this Court and remitted the matter back to
appellate Court for deciding the appeal filed by the respondent-
State in accordance with law after independently appreciating the
evidence and the findings recorded by the learned trial Court.
On remand, the appellate Court made endeavour to
appreciate the evidence available on record. After scrutinizing
the entire evidence and other materials available on record, the
learned appellate Court fully concurred with the findings and
conclusions of learned trial Court, which entailed dismissal of the
appeal vide judgment dated 21.11.2014. It is, in that
background, petitioner has invoked revisional jurisdiction of this
Court.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the
impugned judgments and thoroughly scanned the entire record.
(4 of 6)
[CRLR-14/2015]
Upon examining the impugned judgment of learned trial
Court, it is abundantly clear that it has made sincere endeavour to
appreciate the evidence while recording its finding favouring the
accused-respondent for extending him benefit of doubt. It is trite
that learned appellate Court also examined the entire evidence
with bird’s eye view for determining alleged culpability of the
accused-respondent for aforesaid offence and concluded in clear
and unequivocal terms that learned trial Court has rightly
exercised its discretion in extending the benefit of doubt.
While exercising revisional jurisdiction, court is only to see
procedural error, irregularity and non-appreciating and non-
application of law. Re-appreciation of evidence is not desirable
under the revisional jurisdiction. It is also trite that this Court in
revision cannot embark on sufficiency of materials before the
court below for recording its satisfaction. As both the Courts
below have examined the matter threadbare in its entirety and
have arrived at a finding concurrently which is based on sound
appreciation of evidence, the same is not liable to be tinkered with
in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. In my considered opinion,
revisional jurisdiction to interfere with the verdict of acquittal is
required to be exercised with utmost caution and circumspection.
Legal position is no more res-integra that against a verdict of
acquittal, revisional jurisdiction is to be exercised only in
exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require
interference for correction of a manifest illegality or prevention of
gross miscarriage of justice. Reliance, in this behalf, can
profitably be made to a decision of Supreme Court in Kaptan
(5 of 6)
[CRLR-14/2015]
Singh V/s. State of Madhya Pradesh [1997 4 Supreme 211].
The Supreme Court, in yet another judgment rendered in K.
Ramachandran V/s. V.N. Rajan Anr. [(2009) 14 SCC 569],
examined the scope of judicial review under Section 401 Cr.P.C.
against the verdict of acquittal, on revision by private
complainant, and held:
“In this very judgment in Akalu Ahri Case though
in para 10, this Court did not generally approve of the
appreciation of evidence by the trial court Judge and
held it to be not perfect or free from flaw and further
observed “the court of appeal may be justified in
disagreeing with the conclusion, but it does not follow
that on revision by a private complainant, the High Court
is not entitled to reappreciate the evidence for itself as if
it is acting as a court of appeal and then order a retrial”.
The situation, as we will show further, is identical in the
present case.
In a later judgment, the Supreme Court has culled out
certain instances for exercising revisional jurisdiction at the
instance of private complainant against a verdict of acquittal. In
case of Sheetala Prasad V/s. Sri Kant Anr. [(2010) 2 SCC 190],
following guidelines are issued by the Supreme Court:
“(1) where the trial court has wrongly shut out
evidence which the prosecution wished to
produce;
(2) where the admissible evidence is wrongly brushed
aside as inadmissible;
(3) where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the
case and has still acquitted the accused;
(4) where the material evidence has been overlooked
either by the trial court or the appellate court or
the order is passed by considering irrelevant
evidence; and
(5) where the acquittal is based on the compounding
of the offence which is invalid under the law.”
(6 of 6)
[CRLR-14/2015]In view of settled law and guidelines enumerated
hereinabove, the case in hand is not covered within the four
corners of any of the guidelines, therefore, it is not worthwhile to
entertain this petition.
Accordingly, I feel dissuaded to exercise revisional
jurisdiction in the matter to interfere with the verdict of acquittal
passed by learned trial Court and affirmed by learned appellate
Court.
Resultantly, the petition fails and same is, hereby, dismissed.
(P.K. LOHRA)J.
a.asopa/-13