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Amar Singh vs Smt. Kamla @ Sapna Panthi on 28 March, 2019

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CRR-5630-2018

HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH : GWALIOR
DIVISION BENCH
PRESENT:
HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJAY YADAV

HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK AGARWAL

Criminal Revision No.5630/2018

Amar Singh
Versus
Smt. Kamla alias Sapna Panthi Others
————————————————————————————-

Shri R.K. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel with Shri V.K. Agrawal,

learned counsel appears as amicus curiae.

Shri Amit Lahoti, learned counsel for the applicant.

————————————————————————————-
Whether approved for reporting : Yes/No
ORDER

(28/03/2019)
Per Justice Sanjay Yadav

Single Bench presided over by Hon’ble Shri Justice Sheel Nagu

in Criminal Revision No.5630/2018 having expressed difference of

opinion with the opinion expressed by Hon’ble Shri Justice Gurpal

Singh Ahluwalia in Criminal Revision No. 1257/2018 (Rajesh Dubey

vs. Smt. Rachna Tiwari and Another) decided on 21/03/2018 on the
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CRR-5630-2018

issue of sentencing under Sub-section (3) of Section 125 of Code of

Criminal Procedure 1973(hereinafter referred as to “Cr.PC”), the

matter has been referred to the Division Bench.

2. We place on record our appreciation for able assistance of Shri

R.K. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel with Shri V.K. Agrawal, who

readily agreed to assist the Court as an amicus curie, and of Shri Amit

Lahoti, learned counsel for the Applicant.

3. In the case at hand, the relevant fact is not in dispute that the

husband having failed to abide by the order passed by the Court to pay

an amount of Rs.1,000/- per month to each of three children as

ordered on 15/06/2016 under Sub-section (1) of Section 125 of

Cr.P.C., led the Court direct the husband to suffer civil jail for a

period of 11 months in exercise of its jurisdiction under Sub-section

(3) of Section 125 of Cr.P.C.

4. Similar fact situation has arisen in Rajesh Dubey (supra)

wherein relying on the decision by the Supreme Court in Poongodi

Another vs. Thangavel:[(2013) 10 SCC 618], the order of sentencing

for more than one month has been upheld. Whereas, in the case at

hand, learned Single Judge has expressed his reservation for the said

view on the basis of another decision by the Supreme Court in

Shahada Khatoon and Others vs. Amjad Ali Others:[(1999) 5

SCC(Cri) 1029].

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CRR-5630-2018

5. Chapter IX of the Cr.P.C. which comprises of four Sections, viz,

125, 126, 127 and 128 makes provisions regarding maintenance of

wives, children and parents. Section 125 envisages order for

maintenance of wives, children and parents. Section 126 provides for

the procedure. Section 127 makes provision regarding alteration in

allowance; and Section 128 lays down provision regarding

enforcement of order of maintenance.

6. Pertinent it is to note that the provisions contained in Section

128 of Cr.P.C. only lays down the mode of enforcing recovery of

maintenance allowance, stipulating therein that the order of

maintenance may be enforced by any Magistrate in any place where

the person against whom it is made may be. In case if the order of

maintenance put to enforcement is not complied with, Section 128

Cr.P.C. has no answer as to how the order be actually effected. The

answer lays in Sub-section (3) of Section 125 of Cr.P.C. which

stipulates:

“(3) If any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause
to comply with the order, any such Magistrate may, for
every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the
amount due in the manner provided for levying fines, and
may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of
each month’s allowance for the maintenance or the interim
maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may
be, remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to
imprisonment for a term which may made:

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Provided that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery
of any amount due under this section unless application be
made to the Court to levy such amount within a period of
one year from the date on which it became due.”

7. Sub-section (3) of Section 125 Cr.P.C. thus provides for a

mechanism to effect actual recovery of maintenance amount.

8. Dwelling on said aspect, it is held in Smt. Kuldip Kaur vs.

Surinder Singh Others:[AIR 1989 SC 232]:

“6. A distinction has to be drawn between a mode of
enforcing recovery on the one hand and effecting actual
recovery of the amount of monthly allowance which has
fallen in arrears on the other. Sentencing a person to jail is
a ‘mode of enforcement’. It is not a ‘mode of satisfaction’
of the liability. The liability can be satisfied only by
making actual payment of the arrears. The whole purpose
of sending to jail is to oblige a person liable to pay the
monthly allowance who refuses to comply with the order
without sufficient cause, to obey the order and to make the
payment. The purpose of sending him to jail is not to wipe
out the liability which he has refused to discharge. Be it
also realised that a person ordered to pay monthly
allowance can be sent to jail only if he fails to pay
monthly allowance ‘without sufficient cause’ to comply
with the order. It would indeed be strange to hold that a
person who ‘without reasonable cause’ refuses to comply
with the order of the Court to maintain his neglected wife
or child would be absolved of his liability merely because
he prefers to go to jail. A sentence of jail is no substitute
for the recovery of the amount of monthly allowance
which has fallen in arrears. Monthly allowance is paid in
order to enable the wife and child to live by providing
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CRR-5630-2018

with the essential economic wherewithal. Neither the
neglected wife nor the neglected child can live without
funds for purchasing food and the essential articles to
enable them to live. Instead of providing them with the
funds, no useful purpose would be served by sending the
husband to jail. Sentencing to jail is the means for
achieving the end of enforcing the order by recovering the
amount of arrears. It is not a mode of discharging liability.

The section does not say so. The Parliament in its wisdom
has not said so. Commonsense does not support such a
construction. From where does the Court draw inspiration
for persuading itself that the liability arising under the
order for maintenance would stand discharged upon an
effort being made to recover it? The order for monthly
allowance can be discharged only upon the monthly
allowance being recovered. The liability cannot be taken
to have been discharged by sending the person liable to
pay the monthly allowance, to jail. At the cost of
repetition it may be stated that it is only a mode or method
of recovery and not a substitute for recovery. No other
view is possible. That is the reason why we set aside the
order under appeal and passed an order in the following
terms:

“Heard both the sides.

The appeal is allowed. The order passed by the
learned Magistrate as confirmed by the High
Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction to
the effect that the amount of monthly allowance
payable under Section 125 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure is wiped out and is not
recoverable any more by reason of the fact that
respondent No.1, Surinder Singh, was sent to jail
in exercise of the powers under Section 125 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure is set aside. In our
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CRR-5630-2018

opinion, respondent No.1, husband of appellant, is
not absolved from his liability to pay the monthly
allowance by reason of his undergoing a sentence
of jail and the amount is still recoverable
notwithstanding the fact that the respondent No.1
husband who is liable to pay the monthly
allowance has undergone a sentence of jail for
failure to pay the same. Our reasons for reaching
this conclusion will follow.

So far as the amount of monthly allowance
awarded in this particular case is concerned, by
consent of parties, we pass the following order in
regard to future payments with effect from 15th
August, 1986.

We direct that Respondent No 1, Surinder Singh
shall pay Rs.275 (Rs.200 for the wife and Rs 75
for the child) as and by way of maintenance to the
appellant Smt. Kuldip Kaur commencing from
August 15, 1986. The amount of Rs.275 shall be
paid by the 15th of every succeeding month. On
failure to pay any monthly allowance for any
month hereafter on the part of respondent No.1,
Surinder Singh, the learned Metropolitan
Magistrate shall issue a warrant for his arrest,
cause him to be arrested and put in jail for his
failure to comply with this Court’s order and he
shall not be released till he makes the payment.
With regard to the arrears which have become due
till August 15, 1986, learned counsel for the
appellant states that having regard to the fact that
respondent No.1, has agreed to the aforesaid
consent order, the appellant will not apply for the
respondent being sent to jail under Section 125 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure but will reserve
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CRR-5630-2018

the liberty to realize the said amount (Rs.5090
plus the difference between the amount that
became due and the amount actually paid under
the interim order) under the law except by seeking
an order for sending respondent No.1 to jail.
The appeal will stand disposed of accordingly.”

9. In Shahada Khatoon Others vs. Amjad Ali Otherss:

[1999 SCC(Cri.) 1029], a bench of equal strength interpreting Sub-

section 3 of Section 125 ot the Cr.PC. observed:

“The short question that arises for consideration is
whether the learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court
correctly interpreted Sub-section (3) of Section 125 of the
Cr.P.C. by directing that the Magistrate can only sentence
for a period of one month or until payment, if sooner
made. The learned Counsel for the appellants contends
that the liability of the husband arising out of an order
passed under Section 125 to make payment of
maintenance is a continuing one and on account of non-
payment there has been a breach of the order and therefore
the Magistrate would be entitled to impose sentence on
such a person continuing him in custody until payment is
made. We are unable to accept this contention of the
learned counsel for the appellants. The language of Sub-
section (3) of Section 125 is quite clear and it
circumscribes the power of the Magistrate to impose
imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month
or until the payment, if sooner made. This power of the
Magistrate cannot be enlarged and therefore the only
remedy would be after expiry of one month. For breach or
non-compliance with the order of the Magistrate the wife
can approach the Magistrate again for similar relief. By no
stretch of imagination can the the Magistrate be permitted
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CRR-5630-2018

to impose sentence for more than one month. In that view
of the matter the High Court was fully justified in passing
the impugned order and we see no infirmity in the said
order to be interfered with by this Court. The appeal
accordingly fails and is dismissed ”

10. Evidently, the observation in Smt. Kuldip Kaur (supra) was not

taken note.

11. Later, in Shantha alias Ushadevi Another vs. B.G.

Shivananjappa:[2005 SCC (Cri.) 1089], another bench of equal

strength expressed the following view:

“8. We are, therefore, of the view that in the peculiar
circumstances of the case, the bar under Section 125(3)
cannot be applied and the High Court has erred in
reversing the order of Sessions Judge. It must be borne in
mind that Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a measure of social
legislation and it has to be construed liberally for the
welfare and benefit of the wife and daughter. It is
unreasonable to insist on filing successive applications
when the liability to pay the maintenance as per the order
passed under Section 125(1) is a continuing liability.”

12. Evidently, the decision in Smt. Kuldip Kaur (supra) and

Shahada Khatoon Others (supra) was not noticed. These two

decisions were, however, taken note of in Poongodi Another vs.

Thangavel:[(2013) 10 SCC 618] wherein dwelling on the aspect as to

entitlement of wife to claim arrears maintenance, it has been held:

“4. A reading of the order dated 21.4.2004 passed by the
High Court would go to show that the proviso to Section
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CRR-5630-2018

125(3) CrPC has been construed by the High Court to be a
fetter on the entitlement of the claimants to receive arrears
of maintenance beyond a period of one year preceding the
date of filing of the application under Section 125(3)
CrPC. Having considered the said provision of the Code
we do not find that the same creates a bar or in any way
affects the entitlement of a claimant to arrears of
maintenance. What the proviso contemplates is that the
procedure for recovery of maintenance under Section
125(3) CrPC, namely, by construing the same to be a levy
of a fine and the detention of the defaulter in custody
would not be available to a claimant who had slept over
his/her rights and has not approached the court within a
period of one year commencing from the date on which
the entitlement to receive maintenance has accrued.

However, in such a situation the ordinary remedy to
recover the amount of maintenance, namely, a civil action
would still be available.

5. The decision of this Court in Kuldip Kaur v.Surinder
Singh and Anr.[AIR 1989 SC 232] may be usefully
recalled wherein this Court has held the provision of
sentencing under Section 125(3) to be a “mode of
enforcement” as distinguished from the “mode of
satisfaction” of the liability which can only be by means of
actual payment. Para 6 of the Report to the above effect,
namely, that the mode of enforcement i.e. sentencing to
custody does not extinguish the liability may be extracted
below: (SCC p.409, para 6)
“6. A distinction has to be drawn between a mode
of enforcing recovery on the one hand and effecting
actual recovery of the amount of monthly allowance
which has fallen in arrears on the other. Sentencing
a person to jail is a ‘mode of enforcement’. It is not a
‘mode of satisfaction’ of the liability. The liability
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CRR-5630-2018

can be satisfied only by making actual payment of
the arrears. The whole purpose of sending to jail is
to oblige a person liable to pay the monthly
allowance who refuses to comply with the order
without sufficient cause, to obey the order and to
make the payment. The purpose of sending him to
jail is not to wipe out the liability which he has
refused to discharge. Be it also realised that a
person ordered to pay monthly allowance can be
sent to jail only if he fails to pay monthly allowance
‘without sufficient cause’ to comply with the order.
It would indeed be strange to hold that a person
who ‘without reasonable cause’ refuses to comply
with the order of the Court to maintain his
neglected wife or child would be absolved of his
liability merely because he prefers to go to jail. A
sentence of jail is no substitute for the recovery of
the amount of monthly allowance which has fallen
in arrears. Monthly allowance is paid in order to
enable the wife and child to live by providing with
the essential economic wherewithal. Neither the
neglected wife nor the neglected child can live
without funds for purchasing food and the essential
articles to enable them to live. Instead of providing
them with the funds, no useful purpose would be
served by sending the husband to jail. Sentencing to
jail is the means for achieving the end of enforcing
the order by recovering the amount of arrears. It is
not a mode of discharging liability. The section
does not say so. The Parliament in its wisdom has
not said so. Commonsense does not support such a
construction. From where does the Court draw
inspiration for persuading itself that the liability
arising under the order for maintenance would stand
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CRR-5630-2018

discharged upon an effort being made to recover it?
The order for monthly allowance can be discharged
only upon the monthly allowance being recovered.
The liability cannot be taken to have been
discharged by sending the person liable to pay the
monthly allowance, to jail. At the cost of repetition
it may be stated that it is only a mode or method of
recovery and not a substitute for recovery. No other
view is possible. That is the reason why we set
aside the order under appeal and passed an order in
the following terms……”

6. In another decision of this Court in Shantha alias
Ushadevi and Another v. B.G. Shivananjappa:[2005 SCC
(Cri.) 1089] it has been held that the liability to pay
maintenance under Section 125 CrPC is in the nature of a
continuing liability. The nature of the right to receive
maintenance and the concomitant liability to pay was also
noticed in a decision of this Court in Shahada Khatoon
Ors. v. Amjad Ali Ors:[1999 SC(Cri.) 1029]. Though in
a slightly different context, the remedy to approach the
court by means of successive applications under Section
125(3) CrPC highlighting the subsequent defaults in
payment of maintenance was acknowledged by this Court
in Shahada Khatoon (supra).”

7. The ratio of the decisions in the aforesaid cases squarely
apply to the present case. The application dated 5-2-2002
filed by the appellants under Section 125(3) was in
continuation of the earlier applications and for subsequent
periods of default on the part of the respondent. The first
proviso to Section 125(3), therefore did not extinguish or
limit the entitlement of the appellants to the maintenance
granted by the learned trial court, as has been held by the
High Court.”

13. In Poongodi (supra), Their Lordships were pleased to take note
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CRR-5630-2018

of slightly different context in which Shahada Khatoon (supra) was

decided which may be noticed from the argument advanced by learned

counsel in the said case [i.e. Shahada Khatoon (supra)]. The

contentions advanced in Shahada Khatoon (supra) was the “liability

of husband arising out of an order passed under Section 125 to make

payment of maintenance is a continuing one and on account of non-

payment, there would be entitled to impose sentence on such a person

continuing him in custody until payment is made.” The submissions

thus suggested that, Magistrate can keep or sentence the person until

said person makes up the payment. These submissions glossed over

the language of Sub-section (3) of Section 125 which contemplates a

punishment of imprisonment which may extend to one month or until

payment, if, sooner made. Therefore, the contentions raised were

negatived holding that the “power of the Magistrate cannot be

enlarged and therefore the only remedy would be after expiry of one

month. For breach or non-compliance with the order of the Magistrate

the wife can approach the Magistrate again for similar relief. By no

stretch of imagination can the the Magistrate be permitted to impose

sentence for more than one month.

14. Thus, the issue was not as in the present case where the arrears

of maintenance has been claimed and despite issuance of warrant,

there is non-compliance. Thus, on facts the decision in Shahada
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Khatoon (supra) is distinguishable.

15. In the context which we are dwelling, decision under Section

488 the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882 which is pari materia

Section 125(3) of 1973 Act can be taken note of. Sections 488 of

Cr.PC 1882 stipulates: “The Magistrate may, for every breach of the

order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner

hereinbefore provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person

for the whole or any part of each month’s allowance remaining unpaid

after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which

may extend to one month.”

16. In Emperor vs. Beni:[AIR 1938 Allahabad 386], a Full Bench

of Allahabad High Court while deciding on the sentence by the

Magistrate for a period of six months by issuing one warrant for

recovery of the maintenance of the amount of 21 months observed:

“……… We are satisfied after a consideration of the terms
of the section that the intention of the Legislature was to
empower the Magistrate after execution of one warrant
only to sentence a person, who has defaulted in the
payment of maintenance ordered under Section 488,
Criminal P.C., to imprisonment for a period of one month
in respect of each month’s default and that the section does
not enjoin that there should be a separate warrant in
respect of each term of imprisonment for one month. In
other words, where arrears have been allowed to
accumulate, the Court can issue one warrant and impose a
cumulative sentence of imprisonment. We would observe
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CRR-5630-2018

that the decision in Allapichai Ravuthar v. Mohidin Bibi
[(1897) 20 Mad. 3] has been followed in a number of
other cases in Bhiku Khan v. Zahuran:[(1898) 25 Cal.
291], Emperor v. Sardar Muhammad:[(1935) 22 A.I.R.
Lah. 758] and Emperor v. Budhu Ram:[(1919) 6 A.I.R.
Lah. 50]. We would remark further that the warrant of
imprisonment under Section 488, Criminal P.C., the form
of which is to be found in Schedule 5, No. XL,
contemplates a sentence of more than one month’s
rigorous imprisonment in the case of a person who has
defaulted in payment for more than one month. The
warrant runs:

……and whereas it has been further proved that the
said (name) in wilful disregard of the said order has
failed to pay rupees being the amount of the
allowance for the month (or months) of…. And
thereupon an order was made adjudging him to
undergo simple (or rigorous) imprisonment in the
said jail for the period of….”

We therefore hold that in the case of a default in payment
directed by an order under Section 488, Criminal P.C., the
Magistrate seised with the case may issue one warrant and
thereafter pass a sentence of imprisonment of one month
in respect of each month or part of a month for which
there has been default in payment. In the result we reject
the reference and direct that the record be returned.”

17. In Karson Ramji Chawda vs. State of Bombay: AIR 1958

Bom. 99], a full bench of Bombay High Court observed:

“2.This sentence has been challenged on the ground that in
passing the sentence for two months, the Magistrate
exceeded the jurisdiction conferred upon him under
Section 488 (3). The matter came up before Mr. Justice
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Bavde-kar and Mr. Justice Desai and they referred it to a
Full Bench, as they felt that they were bound by an
unveported decision of a Division Bench of this Court
reported in Queen Empress v. Pandu Mahadu, 1885 Rat
Un. Cr. C. 801 (A). The contention urged by Mr. Kotwal
on behalf of the applicant is that in respect of one warrant
issued, the sentence which can be inflicted by the
Magistrate can only be one month and not exceeding one
month. Now turning to the sub-section.

“if any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to
comply with the order, any such Magistrate may, for every
breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount
due hereinbefore provided for levying fines, and may
sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each
month’s allowance remaining unpaid after the execution of
the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend
to one month or until payment if sooner made.”
Therefore, this sub-section confers upon the Magistrate
two independent powers; one to issue a warrant which has
to be executed in the manner laid down in the sub-section
and the other to sentence the person also in the manner
laid down in the sub-section. The fallacy underlying Mr.
Kotwal’s argument is that the sentence follows upon the
issue of a warrant. That is not the section. The power of
the Magistrate to sentence the applicant is not dependent
upon the issue of the warrant, or in other words the issue
of the warrant is not a condition precedent to the
jurisdiction of the Magistrate to sentence the applicant.
Therefore, if we read the provision with regard to the
power of the Magistrate to sentence the applicant
independently of the power to issue the warrant, it is clear
that the power to sentence is for the whole or any part of
each month’s allowance remaining unpaid after the
execution of the warrant to imprisonment for a term which
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may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made.
Now these words clearly lay down the power of the
Magistrate. The power of the Magistrate is in respect of
whole or any part of each month’s allowance remaining
unpaid to sentence the applicant for a term not exceeding
one month. Now, the view taken in this unreported
judgment was based, with respect, on the assumption with
which we have just dealt that a separate warrant should
issue for each separate monthly default and when that is
done, the maximum punishment can be one month’s
imprisonment. This view proceeds on the basis that
whenever there is a default, a warrant has to be issued and
the Magistrate must proceed to sentence the applicant alter
the warrant has been issued. With respect, there is no
warrant for this view and this decision was based on a
judgment of the Allahabad High Court reported in Queen-
Empress v. Narain, ILR 9 All 240 (B). The Allahabad
High Court since then in a Full Bench has come to a
contrary conclusion: see Emperor v. Beni, ILR (1938) All
750:(AIR 1938 All 386) (C). Mr. Chandrachud has also
drawn our attention to the judgments in Allapichai
Ravuthar v. Mohidin Bibi, ILR 20 Mad 3 (D), and in King
Emperor v. Budhoo Mandal, which have also taken the
same view and, according to the Allahabad High Court,
presumably the decision in Bhiku Khan v. Zahu-ran, ILR
25 Cal 291 (F), is also to the same effect. It may also be
pointed out that the history of this section also supports
the view that we have taken. In the Code of 1861, the
section ran in the following terms:

“The Magistrate may, for every breach of the order by
warrant, direct the amount due to be levied in the
manner provided for levying fines; or may order such
person to be imprisoned with or without hard labour
for any term not exceeding one month.”

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18. In Gorakshnath Khandu Bagal vs. State of Maharashtra

Others:[2005 Cri.L.J. 3158], a Division Bench of Bombay High

Court had the occasion to dwell upon the issue as presently involved

in the case at hand, held:

“9. …… taking into consideration facts of the present case
and also by making reference to the language of Section
125(3) and the proviso referred thereto and also from form
of warrant provided under Schedule-II in Form No.18, we
record our finding that the Magistrate can impose a
punishment for default of each month or a part of each
month’s default in payment of maintenance, by awarding
imprisonment for a period of one month or till the
payment is made, which ever is sooner. If there are arrears
for more than one month then the imprisonment exceeding
for a period of one month can be imposed. However, what
we find that the proviso contemplates application within
12 months and thereby at the most, in one application 12
defaults can be clubbed together and after every 12
defaults, a separate application will have to be filed.
However, in that eventuality in each application, as there
are maximum 12 defaults, the Magistrate may impose
imprisonment extending upto a period of 12 months, but
that is outer limit. The lesser imprisonment can be
imposed and such imprisonment will be followed until the
payment is made, that means, if the amount is paid during
the period of imprisonment, the person will have to be
released immediately. In short, we find that there is no
substance in this revision petition and the revision petition
is accordingly rejected.”

19. In view whereof, the order making reference i.e. order dated
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13/12/2018 passed in Criminal Revision No.5630/2018 when tested

on the anvil of above analysis cannot be upheld. The view taken by

learned Single Judge in Rajesh Dubey (supra) that the Magistrate can

impose a sentence for default of each month or a part of each months

default in payment of maintenance, by awarding punishment for a

period of one month till payment is made, whichever is sooner. If

there are arrears for more than one month then the imprisonment

exceeding for a period of one month can be imposed is uphold.

20. The reference is answered accordingly.

21. The matter is referred back to learned Single Judge for

consideration of Criminal Revision No.5630/2018 on merit in terms of

above decision.

22. Office is directed to place the order passed today on the record

of Criminal Revision No.1257/2018 and Criminal Revision

No.5630/2018.

(SANJAY YADAV) (VIVEK AGARWAL)
JUDGE JUDGE
pwn*
Digitally signed by PAWAN KUMAR

PAWAN
DN: cIN, oHIGH COURT OF
MADHYA PRADESH BENCH
GWALIOR, postalCode474011,
stMadhya Pradesh,

KUMAR
2.5.4.20baa18e83a2af7a1611e0b
b9811a10869c6907cfbb375a7a236
a25ad39f3a2027, cnPAWAN
KUMAR
Date: 2019.03.28 17:59:45 +05’30’

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