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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

Judgment Reserved On: 11.04.2022

Judgment Delivered On: 04.08.2022

Court No. – 72

Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. – 18202 of 2019

Applicant :- Amit Sachan @ Amit Kumar Sachan And 4 Others

Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another

Counsel for Applicant :- Ashok Kumar Pandey,Yashwant Singh

Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Akhilesh Kumar Pandey

Hon’ble Mohd. Aslam,J.

1.Heard Sri Ashok Kumar Pandey learned counsel for the applicants, Sri R.P. Mishra, learned A.G.A. for the State as well as Sri Akhilesh Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for opposite party no.2 and perused the record.

2.The instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been moved seeking quashing of the Charge-sheet no. No. 1 of 2018 dated 27.01.2018 as well as the entire proceedings of Criminal Case No.1621 of 2018 (State vs. Amit Sachan Others), arising out of Case Crime No. 0410 of 2017, under Section 452, 498-A, 323, 504, 506 I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station- Bhognipur, District- Kanpur Dehat, pending in the court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Bhognipur, District- Kanpur Dehat.

3.In brief, the prosecution case is that the opposite party no.2 herself lodged the first information report against the accused-applicants on 13.05.2017 at 18:05 hrs. on the basis of written complaint alleging therein that her marriage with accused Amit Sachan was solemnized on 22.02.2016 according to Hindu rites and rituals. In the marriage, a sum of Rs.25 lakhs were spent, but her husband and his other family member were satisfied with the dowry given in her marriage. After marriage, the accused-applicants started taunting her for not bringing sufficient dowry and used to harass her and were also demanding a car and Rs.10 lakh as additional dowry. When the informant returned to her parental house, she narrated the entire incident to her parents. Her father after consoling her sent her to her matrimonial home, but the conduct of her in-laws did not change and they were treating her with cruelty on account of non-fulfillment of additional dowry. It is further alleged that about three months before, her husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law also assaulted her on account of non-fulfillment of additional dowry and ousted her from the house after snatching all jewelleries and clothes. Thereafter, her parents tried to compromise and after a lot of efforts, her in-laws agreed to take her back. On 10.05.2017 at about 08:00 p.m., the accused-applicants came at her parental house and asked for her father and stated that they had come here for panchayat, thereafter, they entered into the house and started abusing and misbehaving with her and her parents. The accused persons also assaulted her with kicks, fists and lathi due to which she sustained injuries on her body and her left leg got fractured.

4.After investigation, charge-sheet was submitted under Section 452, 498-A, 323, 504, 506 I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act against accused persons namely Amit Sachan (husband), Jay Prakash (father-in-law), Smt. Shakuntala Devi (mother-in-law), Kuldeep Sachan and Smt. Arti Sachan on 27.01.2018 on which learned Judicial Magistrate, Bhognipur took cognizance of offence vide order dated 14.11.2018.

5.It has been submitted by learned counsel for the accused-applicants that the first information report has been lodged on the basis of false and frivolous allegations. The investigating officer without properly investigating the case has submitted the charge-sheet against the accused-applicants. The applicant nos. 1, 2 3 are husband, father-in law and mother-in-law of the deceased. The applicant no.4 is the sister’s son of applicant no.2 and applicant no.5 is the wife of applicant no.4, who are relatives and have concern with the family affairs of applicant nos. 1 to 3 and they have unnecessarily been dragged in the present litigation by opposite party no.2 with mala fide intention and oblique motive. The general and vague allegations of demand of additional dowry have been levelled against all the applicants. After marriage, the opposite party no.2 had been living with her husband and family members till 28.02.2016. On 29.02.2016, Aryan Miss Priya, brother and sister of the informant and Vivek Sachan, relative of the informant came to the house of the applicants and pressurized for bidai of opposite party no.2. Though, the applicants were not in favour of bidai, but to avoid any confrontation they thought it proper to send opposite party no.2 to her parental house. The opposite party no.2 while going to her parental house took all the ornaments along with her given by the applicant nos. 1 to 3 and other relatives. The applicant nos. 1 to 3 were in constant touch with opposite party no.2 through phone. In the mid of March, 2016, the applicant no.2 requested the father of opposite party no.2 to send her to her matrimonial house, but on some pretext the opposite party no.2 avoided to come to her matrimonial house. The applicant nos. 1 to 3 made their best efforts to bring opposite party no.2, but all went in vain. The opposite party no.2 and her parents started pressurising the applicant no.1 to purchase a separate house for her. The demand of opposite party no.2 to purchase a separate house for her was beyond the capacity of the applicant and was unnecessary, therefore, without any cause or justification the said demand could not be fulfilled, thereupon, the informant and her family members got furiated and opposite party no.2 refused to live with the applicants. After about one year on 28.02.2017, the applicant no.1 filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Lucknow being Suit No. 499 of 2017 (Amit Kumar Sachan vs. Smt. Shakshi Sachan), which is still pending for disposal. The true copy of the petition has been annexed as Annexure No.3 to the affidavit. It is further submitted that opposite party no.2 after getting the knowledge about the aforesaid case, she lodged the instant case on 13.05.2017 as a counter blast on the basis of false and frivolous grounds having no truth. The applicants have never demanded any dowry either from opposite party no.2 or her family members. Moreover, on several occasions the applicant no.1 send money to opposite party no.2 in her saving bank account. On 13.03.2016, a sum of Rs.7000/- was credited by the applicant no.1 from his savings bank a/c no. 315350027042 to savings bank a/c no. 32468935956 of opposite party no.2 and also on 24.03.2016 a sum of Rs. 3000/-. The true copy of pass book entry has been annexed as Annexure No.4 to the affidavit. It is further submitted that opposite party no.2 was doing job in R. Systems International Ltd. at Noida, where she met with an accident with divider and the opposite party no.2 taking advantage of this accident has lodged the first information report. No case is made out against the applicants. The applicant no.2, father of the applicant no.1, send a registered letter to the Superintendent of Police, Kanpur Dehat on 12.09.2017 stating the true and correct facts regarding the alleged incident, copy of which has been annexed as Annexure No.5 to the affidavit. The applicant nos. 4 and 5 are not family members of the husband of opposite party no.2 and they have been dragged in this case in the abuse of process of law. Therefore, the impugned charge-sheet as well as the entire criminal proceedings of the aforesaid case is liable to be quashed.

6.Learned A.G.A. as well as learned counsel for opposite party no.2 have vehemently opposed the contentions of learned counsel for the applicants and submitted that the genuineness of the facts of the case cannot be adjudicated in proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and it can be decided after taking the evidence, which is the domain of the trial court and relied on the law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1960 SC 866. It is further submitted that the charge-sheet and the evidence collected during investigation disclose cognizable offence, therefore, it cannot be interfered in the proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in view of law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 SCC (Cr.) 426. It is further submitted that the applicant no. 4 was mediator of the marriage of opposite party no.2 with the applicant no.1 and the applicant no.5 is his wife. The applicant no.4 is nephew of father-in-law of opposite party no.2. The applicant nos. 4 5 were also taunting the opposite party no.2 for bringing meagre dowry in the marriage and were also demanding a car and Rs.10 lakhs as additional dowry along with applicant nos.1 to 3. It is further submitted that in the affidavit it has been stated that opposite party no.2 had sustained injury due to collision of her two wheeler with divider at Noida, but no such evidence has been produced. In above circumstances, it cannot be adjudicated in the proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C. that the opposite party no.2 sustained injury either by the assault of applicants or due to accident. It is further submitted that the aforesaid admission, prima facie, discloses that applicants came to the parental house of opposite party no.2 and assaulted her by danda. It is also submitted that clear-cut overt act is given in the first information report which is supported by the statement of opposite party no.2 and other witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., therefore, it cannot be said that there is general and bald allegations against the applicant nos. 4 and 5. The instant application has been moved with an intention to harass the opposite party no.2 and the same is liable to be dismissed.

7.I have given thoughtful consideration to the contentions raised by learned counsels of the parties and gone through the file. From the perusal of first information report and the statements recorded during investigation, prima facie, commission of cognizable offence is disclosed. The genuineness of the incident can be adjudicated after evidence that is the domain of the trial court, as it is held by Hon’ble Apex Court in R.P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab (supra). Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Haryana vs. Bhajanlal (supra) has held that the power of quashing of the criminal proceedings should be exercised very sparingly with circumspection that too in rarest of the rare cases and only in such cases where no cognizable offence of any kind is disclosed in the fist information report, the court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash the first information report. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Central Bureau of Investigation vs. A. Ravishankar Prasad Ors., (2009) 6 SCC 351 as held that “inherent powers of the High Court are meant to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. These inherent powers can be exercised in the following category of cases: (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court; and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. Extraordinary power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. The court would be justified in exercising the power when it is imperative to exercise the power in order to prevent injustice and secure the ends of justice. India has largely inherited the provisions of inherent powers from the English jurisprudence, therefore the principles decided by the English courts would be of relevance for us. It is generally agreed that the Crown Court has inherent power to protect its process from abuse. The English courts have also used inherent power to achieve the same objective.

The exercise of inherent powers would entirely depend on the facts and circumstances of the each case. The object incorporating inherent powers in the Code is to prevent abuse of the process of the court or to secure ends of justice. Both English and the Indian courts have consistently taken the view that the inherent powers can be exercised in those exceptional cases where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if are taken on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.”

8.Hon’ble Apex Court in Dwarka Dass Ors. Vs. State of Haryana, 2003 SCC (Cri) 264, has held that the word “just and proper” used here-in does not however, mean and imply an arbitrary exercise of power-powers of the circumscribed and have to be exercised in accordance with the provisions of law and not de hors the same. Even discretionary powers shall have to be exercised in a manner and in consonance with the known principles of law and not otherwise. Hon’ble Apex Court in R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1960 SC 866 has held that the genuineness of the prosecution case cannot be adjudicated in exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and it can only be adjudicated by trial court after appreciation of the evidence which is the domain of the trial court and the High Court in exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot appreciate the evidence. In this case the genuineness of the prosecution case can be adjudicated after taking evidence by trial court, therefore, I find no ground to quash the impugned charge-sheet, cognizance order as well as the proceedings of the case.

9.Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra Ors, 2020 SCC Online SC 850 has laid down following principles for exercising the inherent power by High Court in paragraph 23 as follows:-

i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence;

ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;

iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on;

iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ”rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty).

v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;

vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;

vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule;

viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere;

ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;

x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;

xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;

xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;

xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;

xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint;

xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR;

xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order.

xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.”

10.In the present case, it is relevant to discuss law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in Geeta Mehrotra and Another vs. State of UP and Another (Criminal Appeal No. 1674 of 2012 decided on 17.10.2012). The relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced herein-under:-

“14. The High Court further overlooked the fact that during the pendency of this case, the complainant-respondent No.2 has obtained an ex-parte decree of divorce against her husband Shyamji Mehrotra and the High Court failed to apply its mind whether any case could be held to have been made out against Kumari Geeta Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra, who are the unmarried sister and elder brother of the complainant’s ex-husband. Facts of the FIR even as it stands indicate that although a prima facie case against the husband Shyamji Mehrotra and some other accused persons may or may not be constituted, it surely appears to be a case where no ingredients making out a case against the unmarried sister of the accused Shyamji Mehrotra and his brother Ramji Mehrotra appear to be existing for even when the complainant came to her in-law’s house after her wedding, she has alleged physical and mental torture by stating in general that she had been ordered to do household activities of cooking meals for the whole family. But there appears to be no specific allegation against the sister and brother of the complainant’s husband as to how they could be implicated into the mutual bickering between the complainant and her husband Shyamji Mehrotra including his parents.

15. Under the facts and circumstance of similar nature in the case of Ramesh vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (2005) SCC (Crl.) 735 at 738 allegations were made in a complaint against the husband, the in-laws, husband’s brother and sister who were all the petitioners before the High Court wherein after registration of the F.I.R. and investigation, the charge sheet was filed by the Inspector of Police in the court of Judicial Magistrate III, Trichy. Thereupon, the learned magistrate took cognizance of the offence and issued warrants against the appellants on 13.2.2002. Four of the accused-appellants were arrested and released on bail by the magistrate at Mumbai. The appellants had filed petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the Madras High Court for quashing the proceedings in complaint case on the file of the Judicial Magistrate III, Trichy. The High Court by the impugned order dismissed the petition observing that the grounds raised by the petitioners were all subject matters to be heard by the trial court for better appreciation after conducting full trial as the High Court was of the view that it was only desirable to dismiss the criminal original petition and the same was also dismissed. However, the High Court had directed the Magistrate to dispense with the personal attendance of the appellants.

16. Aggrieved by the order of the Madras High Court dismissing the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the special leave petition was filed in this Court giving rise to the appeals therein where threefold contentions were raised viz., (i) that the allegations are frivolous and without any basis; (ii) even according to the FIR, no incriminating acts were done within the jurisdiction of Trichy Police Station and the court at Trichy and, therefore, the learned magistrate lacked territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence and (iii) taking cognizance of the alleged offence at that stage was barred under Section 468(1) Cr.P.C. as it was beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 468(2) Cr.P.C. Apart from the subsequent two contentions, it was urged that the allegations under the FIR do not make out any offence of which cognizance could be taken.

17. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in this matter had been pleased to hold that the bald allegations made against the sister in law by the complainant appeared to suggest the anxiety of the informant to rope in as many of the husband’s relatives as possible. It was held that neither the FIR nor the charge sheet furnished the legal basis for the magistrate to take cognizance of the offences alleged against the appellants. The learned Judges were pleased to hold that looking to the allegations in the FIR and the contents of the charge sheet, none of the alleged offences under Section 498 A, 406 and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act were made against the married sister of the complainant’s husband who was undisputedly not living with the family of the complainant’s husband. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court were pleased to hold that the High Court ought not to have relegated the sister in law to the ordeal of trial. Accordingly, the proceedings against the appellants were quashed and the appeal was allowed.

18. In so far as the plea of territorial jurisdiction is concerned, it is no doubt true that the High Court was correct to the extent that the question of territorial jurisdiction could be decided by the trial court itself. But this ground was just one of the grounds to quash the proceedings initiated against the appellants under Section 482 Cr.P.C. wherein it was also alleged that no prima facie case was made out against the appellants for initiating the proceedings under the Dowry Prohibition Act and other provisions of the I.P.C. The High Court has failed to exercise its jurisdiction in so far as the consideration of the case of the appellants are concerned, who are only brother and sister of the complainant’s husband and are not alleged even by the complainant to have demanded dowry from her. The High Court, therefore, ought to have considered that even if the trial court at Allahabad had the jurisdiction to hold the trial, the question still remained as to whether the trial against the brother and sister of the husband was fit to be continued and whether that would amount to abuse of the process of the court.

19. Coming to the facts of this case, when the contents of the FIR is perused, it is apparent that there are no allegations against Kumari Geeta Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra except casual reference of their names who have been included in the FIR but mere casual reference of the names of the family members in a matrimonial dispute without allegation of active involvement in the matter would not justify taking cognizance against them overlooking the fact borne out of experience that there is a tendency to involve the entire family members of the household in the domestic quarrel taking place in a matrimonial dispute specially if it happens soon after the wedding.

20. It would be relevant at this stage to take note of an apt observation of this Court recorded in the matter of G.V. Rao vs. L.H.V. Prasad Ors. reported in (2000) 3 SCC 693 wherein also in a matrimonial dispute, this Court had held that the High Court should have quashed the complaint arising out of a matrimonial dispute wherein all family members had been roped into the matrimonial litigation which was quashed and set aside. Their Lordships observed therein with which we entirely agree that:

“there has been an outburst of matrimonial dispute in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate the disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing their cases in different courts.” The view taken by the judges in this matter was that the courts would not encourage such disputes.

21. In yet another case reported in AIR 2003 SC 1386 in the matter of B.S. Joshi Ors. vs. State of Haryana Anr. it was observed that there is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XXA containing Section 498A in the Indian Penal Code was to prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498A was added with a view to punish the husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. But if the proceedings are initiated by the wife under Sectioin 498A against the husband and his relatives and subsequently she has settled her disputes with her husband and his relatives and the wife and husband agreed for mutual divorce, refusal to exercise inherent powers by the High Court would not be proper as it would prevent woman from settling earlier. Thus for the purpose of securing the ends of justice quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 Cr.P.C. would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It would however be a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not to exercise such a power.

22. In the instant matter, when the complainant and her husband are divorced as the complainant-wife secured an ex-parte decree of divorce, the same could have weighed with the High Court to consider whether proceeding initiated prior to the divorce decree was fit to be pursued in spite of absence of specific allegations at least against the brother and sister of the complainant’s husband and whether continuing with this proceeding could not have amounted to abuse of the process of the court. The High Court, however, seems not to have examined these aspects carefully and have thus side- tracked all these considerations merely on the ground that the territorial jurisdiction could be raised only before the magistrate conducting the trial.

23. In the instant case, the question of territorial jurisdiction was just one of the grounds for quashing the proceedings along with the other grounds and, therefore, the High Court should have examined whether the prosecution case was fit to be quashed on other grounds or not. At this stage, the question also crops up whether the matter is fit to be remanded to the High Court to consider all these aspects. But in matters arising out of a criminal case, fresh consideration by remanding the same would further result into a protracted and vexatious proceeding which is unwarranted as was held by this Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of Tamil Nadu (supra) that such a course of remand would be unnecessary and inexpedient as there was no need to prolong the controversy. The facts in this matter on this aspect was although somewhat different since the complainant had lodged the complaint after seven years of delay, yet in the instant matter the factual position remains that the complaint as it stands lacks ingredients constituting the offence under Section 498A and Section ¾ Dowry Prohibition Act against the appellants who are sister and brother of the complainant’s husband and their involvement in the whole incident appears only by way of a casual inclusion of their names. Hence, it cannot be overlooked that it would be total abuse of the process of law if we were to remand the matter to the High Court to consider whether there were still any material to hold that the trial should proceed against them in spite of absence of prima facie material constituting the offence alleged against them.

24. However, we deem it appropriate to add by way of caution that we may not be misunderstood so as to infer that even if there are allegation of overt act indicating the complicity of the members of the family named in the FIR in a given case, cognizance would be unjustified but what we wish to emphasize by highlighting is that, if the FIR as it stands does not disclose specific allegation against accused more so against the co-accused specially in a matter arising out of matrimonial bickering, it would be clear abuse of the legal and judicial process to mechanically send the named accused in the FIR to undergo the trial unless of course the FIR discloses specific allegations which would persuade the court to take cognisance of the offence alleged against the relatives of the main accused who are prima facie not found to have indulged in physical and mental torture of the complainant-wife. It is the well settled principle laid down in cases too numerous to mention, that if the FIR did not disclose the commission of an offence, the court would be justified in quashing the proceedings preventing the abuse of the process of law. Simultaneously, the courts are expected to adopt a cautious approach in matters of quashing specially in cases of matrimonial dispute whether the FIR in fact discloses commission of an offence by the relatives of the principal accused or the FIR prima facie discloses a case of over-implication by involving the entire family of the accused at the instance of the complainant, who is out to settle her scores arising out of the teething problem or skirmish of domestic bickering while settling down in her new matrimonial surrounding.

25. In the case at hand, when the brother and unmarried sister of the principal accused Shyamji Mehrotra approached the High Court for quashing the proceedings against them, inter-alia, on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction as also on the ground that no case was made out against them under Sections 498A/323/504/506 I.P.C. including Section ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act, it was the legal duty of the High Court to examine whether there were prima facie material against the appellants so that they could be directed to undergo the trial, besides the question of territorial jurisdiction. The High Court seems to have overlooked all the pleas that were raised and rejected the petition on the solitary ground of territorial jurisdiction giving liberty to the appellants to approach the trial court.

26. The High Court in our considered opinion appear to have missed that assuming the trial court had territorial jurisdiction, it was still left to be decided whether it was a fit case to send the appellants for trial when the FIR failed to make out a prima facie case against them regarding the allegation of inflicting physical and mental torture to the complainant demanding dowry from the complainant. Since the High Court has failed to consider all these aspects, this Court as already stated hereinbefore, could have remitted the matter to the High Court to consider whether a case was made out against the appellants to proceed against them. But as the contents of the FIR does not disclose specific allegation against the brother and sister of the complainant’s husband except casual reference of their names, it would not be just to direct them to go through protracted procedure by remanding for consideration of the matter all over again by the High Court and make the unmarried sister of the main accused and his elder brother to suffer the ordeal of a criminal case pending against them specially when the FIR does not disclose ingredients of offence under Sections 489A/323/504/506 I.P.C. and Sections ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

27. We, therefore, deem it just and legally appropriate to quash the proceedings initiated against the appellants Geeta Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra as the FIR does not disclose any material which could be held to be constituting any offence against these two appellants. Merely by making a general allegation that they were also involved in physical and mental torture of the complainant-respondent No.2 without mentioning even a single incident against them as also the fact as to how they could be motivated to demand dowry when they are only related as brother and sister of the complainant’s husband, we are pleased to quash and set aside the criminal proceedings in so far as these appellants are concerned and consequently the order passed by the High Court shall stand overruled. The appeal accordingly is allowed.”

11.The above case law is not applicable in this case because in the first information report the reason for implicating the applicant nos. 4 5 is given in detail and specific role has been assigned to them. In above circumstances, it cannot be said that the first information report does not disclose specific allegation against applicant nos. 4 5, except casual reference of their names in the first information report. Moreover, Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that first information report was lodged against unmarried sister of main accused and his elder brother to suffer the ordeal of a criminal case pending against them.

12.In above circumstances, the present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. lacks merit and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.

Order Date :- 04.08.2022

Vikas

[Mohd. Aslam, J.]