HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
RESERVED ON 31-7-2019
DELIVERED ON 1-8-2019
CRMP No. 991 of 2017
Arun Kumar Sao S/o Avdhut Sao Aged About 36 Years Occupation
Government Service, R/o Village Padigaon Tehsil Pussore, District
Raigarh, Presently Residing At Raigarh Tehsil And District Sagar
Madhya Pradesh And Wrongly Mentioned Tehsil And District Raigarh.,
1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, District Raigarh,
Tehsil And District Raigarh Chhattisgarh
2. Smt. Satyavati Sao, W/o Arun Kumar Sao, Aged About 24 Years R/o
Aurada Tehsil Pussoue District Raigarh Chhattisgarh
For petitioner : Mr. Amit Sharma, Adv.
For respondent No. 1 : Mrs. M. Asha, GA.
For respondent No. 2. : Mr. M.K. Jaiswal, Adv.
Hon’ble Shri Sharad Kumar Gupta, Judge
1. Petitioner has preferred this CRMP under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure (in brevity Cr.P.C.) for quashing the FIR No.
71/2017 dated 4-5-2017 registered at Police Station Pusaur, Distt.
Raigarh against him and his family members for the offence punishable
under Sections 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (In short I.P.C.), which
may culminate in filing of charge sheet.
2. In brief the petitioner’s case is that respondent No. 2 Smt.
Satyawati Sao is his wife. She filed an application against him and his
family members on the basis of which an FIR was registered against him
and his family members for the offence punishable under Section 498-
A/34. The police had not gone to the root of the case and without making
preliminary inquiry registered the case. Earlier he had filed a divorce
petition against her, in counter she lodged the FIR. The complaint was
filed on the false ground. The application was filed with ulterior motive to
3. In brief the case of the respondent No. 1/State is that from the
application of respondent No. 2 cognizable offence was made out thus
FIR was lodged. The petition is devoid of merit.
4. In brief the case of the respondent No. 2 is that petitioner and his
family members used to harass her on account of demand of dowry.
Thus, she had given an application to PS Pusaur.
5. Counsel for the petitioner argued that from the face of application
prima facie no case is made out against him. FIR is delayed by 4 years
which indicates the malafide intention of respondent No. 2. As per the
document of Family Welfare Committee, Raigarh dated 19-1-2018 no
case is made out regarding demand of dowry and cruelty.
6. Counsel for the respondents argued that contents of the
application indicate that prima facie cognizable offence punishable under
Section 498-A, IPC is made out.
7. In the case is hand the impugned FIR transpires that allegedly 3
months after the marriage petitioner and his family members had asked
the respondent No. 2 that at the time of returning back from her maternal
house she will bring 4 wheeler, Rs. 50,000/- cash, costly clothes, large
utensils. They ousted her so many times on account of not fulfilling the
demand of dowry. He left her in her maternal house. He and his family
members have threatened her that if she will return back then she will be
8. In the matter of State of Haryana and others -v- Choudhary
Bhajan Lal and others reported in AIR 1992 SC 604, Hon’ble Supreme
Court has observed in para 108 as under:-
“108. ………………… we give the following categories of cases by
way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any
precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted
in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make
out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not
disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance
of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the
Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala
fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a
view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
9. In the matter of R.P. Kapur -v- State of Punjab reported in AIR
1960 SC 866, wherein in para 6, the Full Bench of Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held as under :-
“The inherent power of the High Court under Section 561-A of the
Code cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically
covered by the other provisions of the Code. The inherent
jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash
proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused
person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the
High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said
proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable
or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the
exercise of this inherent jurisdiction.
Some of the categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction to
quash proceedings can and should be exercised are :-
(i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against
the institution or continuance of the said proceeding in respect of
the offence alleged. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for
instance, furnish cases under this category.
(ii) Where the allegations in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted
in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases
no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of
looking at the complaint or the first information report to decide
whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not.
(iii) Where the allegations made against the accused person do
constitute offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence
adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or
manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of
cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case
where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which
is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and
cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may
or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its
jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Court would not embark
upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable
or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it
would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court’s inherent
jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the
evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be
10. In Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat, [(2017) 9 SCC 641],
again the Hon’ble Supreme Court has had an occasion to consider
whether the High Court can quash the FIR/complaint/criminal
proceedings, in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
CrPC. Considering a catena of decisions on the point, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court Court summarised the following propositions:
“(1) Section 482 CrPC preserves the inherent powers of the High Court
to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of
justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and
preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.
(2) xxx xxx xxx
(3) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint
should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the
High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the
exercise of the inherent power.
(4) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and
plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to
prevent an abuse of the process of any court.
(5) xxx xxx xxx
(6) xxx xxx xxx
(7) xxx xxx xxx
(8) xxx xxx xxx
(9) xxx xxx xxx
(10) xxx xxx xxx
11. In the matter of Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P. [(2013) 10 SCC
591], Their Lordships have held as under in para 20 :-
“20. …… it is not permissible for the High Court to appreciate the
evidence as it can only evaluate material documents on record to
the extent of its prima facie satisfaction about the existence of
sufficient ground for proceedings against the accused and the
Court cannot look into materials, the acceptability of which is
essentially a matter for trial. …..”
12. In the matter of Harshendra Kumar D. v. Rebatilata Koley,
[(2011) 3 SCC 351], Their Lordships have held in para 25 that :-
“25. …….It is fairly settled now that while exercising inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 or revisional jurisdiction under
Section 397 of the Code in a case where complaint is sought to be
quashed, it is not proper for the High Court to consider the defence
of the accused or embark upon an enquiry in respect of merits of
the accusations. ……..”
13. In the matter of Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab [(2014) 6
SCC 466], after considering the decision in Gian Singh v. State of
Punjab, [(2012) 10 SCC 303], in para 29.1, Their Lordships
summed up as under:
“29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be
distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound
the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under
Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to
quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not
compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between
themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and
14. Delay in lodging impugned FIR and saying that allegedly it was
lodged with ulterior motive for wreaking and vengeance as a reaction of
filing an application of Section 13 under the Hindu Marriage Act by the
petitioner, the report of the family welfare committee are the subject
matter of scrutiny of evidence and relates to the defence. Looking to
these facts and aforesaid judicial precedent laid down by Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the matter of Harshendra Kumar D. (Supra), this
Court finds that mere delay in lodging impugned FIR, and saying that it
was lodged to take wreak and vengeance, said report of the Family
Welfare Committee, are not sufficient to discard aforesaid allegations
depict in impugned FIR.
15. If the aforesaid allegations made in the impugned FIR are taken
at their face value and accepted in their entirety prima facie, they
constitute the offence punishable under Section 498-A, IPC which is the
cognizable offence. It cannot be said that allegations are so absurd and
inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can reach
a just conclusion that there is a sufficient ground for proceeding against
the petitioner. In the case in hand, from the impugned FIR this Court is
prima facie satisfied that sufficient grounds are in existence for initiating
proceeding against the petitioner. In the case in hand there is no express
legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the IPC to the
institution and continuance of the proceeding. Looking to these
circumstances and aforesaid judicial precedents laid down by Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the matter of Choudhary Bhajan Lal (supra), R.P
Kapur (supra), Umesh Kumar (supra), Parbatbhai Aahir (supra), this
Court finds that impugned FIR cannot be thrown down.
16. In the case in hand, it does not appear that there is an abuse of
process or intervention is necessary to secure ends of justice. Thus,
looking to the aforesaid judicial precedent laid down by Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the matter of Parbatbhai Aahir (supra) and Narinder Singh
(supra) this court finds that on the ground of abuse of process and to
secure ends of justice, this Court cannot intervene.
17. Looking to the above mentioned facts and circumstances of the
case, this Court finds that it is not a fit case where the extra ordinary
jurisdiction of Section 482, Cr.P.C. be invoked which is invoked sparingly
with care and circumspection. Consequently, the instant CRMP is
dismissed at motion stage without entertaining them for final hearing.
18. In view of above, I.A. no. 1, application for grant of interim relief
(Sharad Kumar Gupta)