INTHEHIGHCOURTATCALCUTTA
CRIMINALREVISIONALJURISDICTION
APPELLATESIDE
Present:
TheHon’bleJusticeShivakantPrasad
CRM10075of2019
ArvindKumarMunka
-Vs.–
TheUnionofIndia
ForthePetitioner:Mr.SekharBasu
Mr.RajdeepMazumder
Mr.MayukhMukherjee
FortheU.O.I.:Mr.K.K.Maiti
HeardOn:16.12.2019
JudgmentOn:24.12.2019
ThisisanapplicationforbailunderSection439oftheCodeofCriminal
Procedure,1973onbehalfofthepetitionerwhohasprayedforhisenlargementon
bailonanyconditions.Thepetitionerhasbeenarraignedasanaccusedalongwith
otheraccusedpersonsinconnectionwiththeCaseNo.C3179of2019arisingout
ofV(12)75/AE/CGST/GR-VII/KOL-NORTH/2019underSections69readwith
Section132(1)oftheCentralGoodsandServicesTaxAct,2017,nowpending
beforethelearnedChiefJudicialMagistrate,Alipore.
ThepetitionercaseisthatheisaCharteredAccountantandhisofficeis
situatedatRoom2H,56MetcalfeStreet,Kolkata-700012andisnowayconnected
withtheinstantcaseandhasbeenfalselyarraignedasanaccusedonthe
allegationthatthepetitionerinconnivancewiththeotheraccusedpersons,
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namely,SanjayKumarPandit,NagendraKumarDubeyaliasSandipDubey,and
Mr.VijayRajpuriyaalongwithotherpersonshadallegedlyissuedGSTinvoices
withoutanysupplyofthegoodstothebuyersoncommissionbasiscausinglossof
morethan98croresapproximately.
Itissubmittedthatthepetitionerwasarrestedandproducedon6.06.2019
beforetheLearnedChiefJudicialMagistrate,Alipore,whovideorderdated
6.06.2019
rejectedhisprayerforbailremandinghimtojudicialcustody,although,
hewasrenderinghiscooperationwiththeinvestigatingagencypriortohisarrest.
ThenthepetitionermovedanapplicationunderSection439Cr.P.C.forhisrelease
onbailbeforelearnedSessionsJudgeAlipore,butbyorderdated20.08.2019the
bailprayerwasrejectedonconsideringthenatureandmagnanimityofunlawful
actdonebytheaccusedpersonsincludingthepetitionerasrevealedfromthefinal
reportoftheinvestigatingagencyandonconsiderationthatthereshallhaveevery
possibilitytoinfluencethewitnesstodestroytheevidenceorevadetheprocessof
furtherinvestigationandtrial.
BeingaggrievedbytheorderofrejectionofapplicationunderSection439
Cr.P.C.,thepetitionerhasprayedforenlarginghimonbailonthegrounds,inter
alia,thatthelearnedCourtsbelowhavecommittedanerrorbynotgrantingbailon
61stdayintermsofSection167oftheCriminalProcedureCode;thelearnedChief
JudicialMagistratehasrecordedorderofdetentionofthepetitionerwithout
adheringtothedirectivesoftheHon’bleSupremeCourtinthecaseofArnesh
Kumar-Vs-StateofBiharAnrs,reportedin2014(8)SCC273aswellasthe
observationinthecaseofRiniJoharAnrs-Vs-StateofMadhyapradesh
Ors,reportedin2016(11)SCC703;thattheoffenceunderSection132ofCGST
Act,2017isbailable;andthatwithoutprevioussanctionbytheCommissionerfor
filingchargesheettheproceedingasawholeisrenderedotiose.
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Mr.SekharBasulearnedSeniorAdvocateappearingforthepetitioner
submittedthatthepurposeofarrest,whenthepetitionerwascooperating,posesa
questionregardingthemaliciousintentoftheprosecutingauthoritybecausewhile
renderinghiscooperation,thepetitionerwascoercedintosigningseveralblank
documentsbytheinvestigatingagency.Itispointedoutthatoffencesunder
Section132(1)(a),(b)and(c)oftheCGSTAct,2017providesforamaximum
punishmentfor5yearsandistriablebythelearnedMagistrateofFirstClass.The
petitionerisincustodysince06.08.2019andnofurtherdetentioniswarranted.He
isnotaresponsiblepersoneitherasaproprietororapersonresponsibleforthe
runningofanyproprietaryconcernandnonoticewasissuedunderSection73of
theCGSTAct,2017andhasbeenfalselyentangledinthiscase.
Mr.Basufurthersubmittedthattheinstantprosecutionhasbeenlodged
withoutthesanctionoftheCommissionercontrarytomandateprovidedunder
Section134ofCGSTAct.TheCommissionerhasonlyauthorizedtheInvestigating
OfficertoarrestunderSection69readwithSection132(1)oftheCGSTActbuthas
notgrantedSanctionunderSection134oftheCGSTActandassuchtheinstant
prosecutionisnotmaintainableandpreciselyraisedthefollowingpointsgermane
totheapplicationforbail:-
1)WhetherthelearnedTrialCourthascommittedanerrorbynotgrantingbail
on61stdayintermsofSection167oftheCriminalProcedureCode?
2)WhetherthedirectionmadeinthecaseofArneshKumar-Vs-Stateof
BiharAnrs,reportedin2014(8)SCC273aswellastheobservationinthecase
ofRiniJoharAnrs-Vs-StateofMadhyapradeshOrs,reportedin2016
(11)SCC703isrequiredtobecompliedwith?
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3)WhethertheoffencesmentionedunderSection132oftheCGSTAct,2017is
bailable?
4)WhethertheCommissionercanissuetheorderforarrestonthebasisof
commitmentofoffencebythepetitioner?
5)WhetheranyprevioussanctionhasbeenissuedbytheCommissionerfor
filingChargeSheethasnotbeendisclosed?
Onthepointno.1,itisarguedthatthelearnedMagistratehasfailedto
comprehendthesignificanceandpurportofSection167(2)SectionoftheCodeofCriminal
Procedure,therebyactinginamannerwhichannulstherudimentaryrequirements
stipulatedinSection167(2)oftheCodeofCriminalProcedurewhichprovidesthat
theMagistratetowhomanaccusedisforwardedunderthissectionmay,whether
hehasorhasnotjurisdictiontotrythecase,fromtimetotime,authorisethe
detentionoftheaccusedinsuchcustodyassuchMagistratethinksfit,foraterm
notexceedingfifteendaysinthewhole;andifhehasnojurisdictiontotrythecase
orcommititfortrial,andconsidersfurtherdetentionunnecessary,hemayorder
theaccusedtobeforwardedtoaMagistratehavingsuchjurisdiction.
Plainreadingoftheprovisionallowsthatapersonmaybeheldincustodyof
thepoliceforaperiodof15daysontheordersofaMagistrateandthelearned
Magistrateisempoweredtoauthorizedetentionoftheaccusedincustodypending
investigationforanaggregateperiodof90daysincaseswheretheinvestigation
relatetooffencepunishablewithdeath,imprisonmentforlifeorimprisonmentfor
notlessthan10yearsormoreandinothercasestheperiodof60dayshasbeen
kept.
Mr.BasureliedonadecisionincaseofHussainaraKhatoonandOrs.
reportedin(1980)1SCC108toarguethatinthelandmarkjudgementSupreme
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CourthascastaboundendutyupontheMagistratetopointouttoanundertrial
abouthisindefeasiblerightbeingaccrued,providedtheinvestigationisnot
concludedwithinthestipulatedperiodandthatanaccusedisentitledofbeing
releasedonbailifheisreadytofurnishthebail.Reliancetoobservationinpara
21ofadecisionincaseofU.O.I.throughSectionC.B.I.vsNiralaYadav@RajaRam
reportedinAIR2014SC3036hasbeenplacedtosubmitthattheaccused
acquiresstatutoryrightofhisreleaseonbailindefaultofsubmissionofcharge
sheetbytheInvestigatingOfficeron60daysofjudicialcustody.Ithasbeen
preciselyheldthatifthecharge-sheetisfiledsubsequenttotheavailingofthe
indefeasiblerightbytheaccused,thenthatrightwouldnotstandfrustratedor
extinguishedand,therefore,ifanaccusedisentitledtobereleasedonbailby
applicationoftheprovisotosub-section(2)ofSection167Cr.P.C.,makesthe
applicationbeforetheMagistrate,buttheMagistrateerroneouslyrefusesthesame
andrejectstheapplicationandthentheaccusedmovesthehigherforumandwhile
thematterremainspendingbeforethehigherforumforconsiderationacharge
sheetisfiled,theso-calledindefeasiblerightoftheaccusedwouldnotstand
extinguishedthereby,andontheotherhand,theaccusedhastobereleasedon
bail.
IncaseofSectionRajnikantJivanlalPatelAnr.vsIntelligenceOfficer
NarcoticControlBureauNewDelhireportedin(1989)3SCC532ithasbeen
observedthattherighttobailunderSection167(2)proviso(a)isabsolute.Itisa
legislativecommandandnotCourt’sdiscretion.Iftheinvestingagencyfailstofile
chargesheetbeforetheexpiryof90/60days,asthecasemaybe,theaccusedin
custodyshouldbereleasedonbail.Atthatstage,meritsofthecasearenottobe
examined.Infact,theMagistratehasnopowertoremandapersonbeyondthe
stipulatedperiodof90/60days.Hemustpassanorderofbailandcommunicate
thesametotheaccusedtofurnishtherequisitebailbonds.
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AFullBenchdecisionincaseofSectionUdayMohanlalAcharyavsStateOf
Maharashtrareportedin(2001)5SCC453hasbeenreferredandrelianceis
placedonmajorityviewoftheHon’bleApextourgethattheaccusedisentitledto
statutorybailandaslongasthemajorityviewoccupiesthefielditisabinding
precedent.Thatapart,ithasbeenfollowedbyathree-JudgeBenchinSayed
Mohd.AhmadKazmicase[(2012)12SCC(Cri)488]whichisbasedonthree-
JudgeBenchdecisioninUdayMohanlalAcharyacase[(2001)5SCC453:
2001SCC(Cri)760]andcontendedthattheprinciplelaidincaseofPragyna
SinghThakurcase[(2011)10SCC445:(2012)1SCC(Cri)311]doesnotstate
thecorrectprincipleoflaw.
InrebuttalMr.K.K.Maitysubmittedthattherightofanaccusedtobe
releasedonbailafterexpiryofthemaximumperiodofdetentionisprovidedunder
Section167oftheCodeofCriminalProcedure.Section167dealswithpowerofthe
policetoinvestigateincriminaloffencewhichstartswithlodgingofinformationin
cognizablecasesunderSection154ofCr.P.C.andultimatelyculminatein
submissionofreportoncompletionofinvestigationunderSection173ofCr.P.C.
ThelearnedMagistrateisempoweredtotakecognizanceoftheoffenceonthebasis
offinalreport/chargesheetfiledbeforetheMagistratebutwhenfinalreportis
submitted,thecustodyoftheaccusedisnolongerrequiredtobedealtwithunder
Section167oftheCr.P.C.Itisarguedthatthedisputeregardingdefaultbailhas
beendealtwithbytheHon’bleSupremeCourtinthecaseofUdayMohanLal
Acharya-Vs-StateofMaharashtrareportedin(2001)AIR(SCW)1500wherein
thecaseofSanjayDuttreportedin1994AIR(SCW)3857wasconsideredandit
wasobservedthattheindefeasiblerightforgrantofbailontheexpiryoftheinitial
periodof180daysforcompletingtheinvestigationortheextendedperiod
prescribedbySection20(4)(bb)ofTADAasheldinHitendraVishnuThakurisa
rightoftheaccusedwhichisenforceableonlyuptothefilingoftheChallanand
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doesnotsurviveforenforcementontheChallanbeingfiledintheCourtagainst
him.Inthiscontextitissubmittedthatadmittedlythepetitionerwasarrestedon
06.06.2019andonthesamedatethepetitionerwasproducedbeforethelearned
ChiefJudicialMagistratebutafterconsideringthegravityofthecase,remanded
thepetitionertoJudicialCustody.On61stdayfromthedateofarrestabail
applicationwasmovedon06.08.2019andtheverydatetheprosecutionhadfiled
thechargesheet.SothelearnedCJMbyitsorderdated06.08.2019rejectedprayer
forbailholdingthatthedefaultbaildoesnotariseandanapplicationunder
Sectionsection439oftheCodewasalsorejectedbythelearnedSessionJudgebythe
impugnedorder.
Inrespectofpointno2,Mr.BasureliedincaseofSectionUnionOfIndiavsArviva
Industries(I)Ltd.reportedin(2014)3SCC159tocontendthatthepetitioner
shouldnotbedeprivedofhislibertyandbereleasedonbailonanyconditionin
drawingmyattentiontotheobservationthatarrestinvolvesdeprivationoflibertyof
apersonarrestedandthereforeinfringesthebasichumanrightofliberty.Personal
libertyisoneofthecherishedobjectsoftheIndianConstitutionanddeprivationof
thesamecanbeinaccordancewithlawandinconformitywiththeprovisions
thereof,asstipulatedunderSectionArticle21oftheConstitutionandfurthersubmitted
thatintheinstantcase,eventhoughtheoffencestipulatesamaximumtermof
imprisonmentuptofiveyears,yet,noneofdirectionsenshrinedinpara11ofthe
decisionincaseofSectionArneshKumarvsStateofBihar(supra)hasbeenadhered
theretowhichreadsthus:
“Ourendeavourinthisjudgmentistoensurethatpoliceofficersdonot
arrestaccusedunnecessarilyandMagistratedonotauthorisedetention
casuallyandmechanically.Inordertoensurewhatwehaveobserved
above,wegivethefollowingdirection:
AlltheStateGovernmentstoinstructitspoliceofficersnotto
automaticallyarrestwhenacaseunderSection498AoftheIPCis
8registeredbuttosatisfythemselvesaboutthenecessityforarrestunder
theparameterslaiddownaboveflowingfromSection41,Cr.P.C.
Allpoliceofficersbeprovidedwithachecklistcontainingspecifiedsub-
clausesunderSection41(1)(b)(ii).
Thepoliceofficershallforwardthechecklistdutyfiledandfurnishthe
reasonsandmaterialswhichnecessitatedthearrest,while
forwarding/producingtheaccusedbeforetheMagistrateforfurther
detention.
TheMagistratewhileauthorisingdetentionoftheaccusedshallperuse
thereportfurnishedbythepoliceofficerintermsaforesaidandonlyafter
recordingitssatisfaction,theMagistratewillauthorisedetention.
Thedecisionnottoarrestanaccused,beforwardedtotheMagistrate
withintwoweeksfromthedateoftheinstitutionofthecasewithacopy
totheMagistratewhichmaybeextendedbytheSuperintendentofpolice
ofthedistrictforthereasonstoberecordedinwriting.
NoticeofappearanceintermsofSection41AofCr.P.C.beservedonthe
accusedwithintwoweeksfromthedateofinstitutionofthecase,which
maybeextendedbytheSuperintendentofPoliceoftheDistrictforthe
reasonstoberecordedinwriting.
Failuretocomplywiththedirectionsaforesaidshallapartfromrendering
thepoliceofficersconcernedliablefordepartmentalaction,theyshallalso
beliabletobepunishedforcontemptofCourttobeinstitutedbeforeHigh
Courthavingterritorialjurisdiction.
Authorisingdetentionwithoutrecordingreasonsasaforesaidbythe
judicialMagistrateconcernedshallbeliablefordepartmentalactionby
theappropriateHighCourt.”
Thusitiscontendedthatthepetitionerwasneitherservedwithanotice
underSectionsection41AoftheCodenordidthelearnedMagistraterecordhis
satisfactionwithregardtothearrestwhileremandingthepetitionertocustody
whichisevidentfromtheorderdated06.06.2019andfurtherplacedreliancein
caseofRiniJoharAnr.(supra)tosubmitthattheHon’bleApexCourthas
takenasternviewwithregardtonon-compliancetothedirectionsincaseof
ArnishKumar(supra).
Itispointedoutthatonthescrutinyofthecomplaint,itwouldbeapparent
thatthepetitioneronthe29thofMay,2019,hadjoinedtheinvestigation,and
cooperatedwiththeinvestigatingagency,whichiswhyafterhisinterrogation,the
petitionerwasallowedtoleave.However,onceagaintheinvestigatingagency
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summonedthepetitionerandaccordinglythepetitionerwenttotheInvestigating
Officeron06.06.2019onwhichdatehewasarrestedinamechanicalmanner,
withouthavinganyregardtothelawlaiddownbytheHon’bleApexCourt.Itis
furthersubmittedthatinspiteofthepetitionerjoiningtheinvestigation,and
renderinghiscooperationtotheinvestigatingagencyyethewasarrestedandsuch
conductmanifestthemaliciousdeterminationoftheinvestigatingagency.A
referencetoadecisionincaseofSidhharamSatlingappaMhetreVs.StateOf
Maharashtrareportedin(2011)1SCC694hasbeenreliedontoarguethatthe
conductoftheInvestigatingOfficerspeaksavolumesofarasthemalicious
intentionoftheinvestigatingagency.IthasbeenheldthatincaseswheretheCourt
isoftheconsideredviewthattheaccusedhasjoinedinvestigationandheisfully
cooperatingwithinvestigatingagencyandisnotlikelytoabscond,inthatevent,
custodialinterrogationshouldbeavoided.Inthesaidjudgmentthedirectionhas
beenlaiddowntothefollowingeffects-
“Incase,theStateconsiderthefollowingsuggestionsinproperperspective
thenperhapsitmaynotbenecessarytocurtailthepersonallibertyofthe
accusedinaroutinemanner.Thesesuggestionsareonlyillustrativeandnot
exhaustive.
1)Directtheaccusedtojoininvestigatingagency,thenonlytheaccusedbe
arrested.
2)Seizeeitherthepassportorsuchotherrelateddocuments,suchas,thetitle
deedsofpropertiesortheFixedDepositReceipts/ShareCertificatesofthe
accused.
3)Directtheaccusedtoexecutebonds.
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4)Theaccusedmaybedirectedtofurnishsuretiesofnumberofpersonswhich
accordingtotheprosecutionarenecessaryinviewofthefactsoftheparticular
case.
5)Theaccusedbedirectedtofurnishundertakingthathewouldnotvisitthe
placewherethewitnessesresidesothatthepossibilityoftamperingof
evidenceorotherwiseinfluencingthecourseofjusticecanbeavoided.
6)Bankaccountsbefrozenforsmalldurationduringinvestigation.”
Thus,itisarguedthattheHon’bleApexCourthasloathedthearrestofthe
personwhenhehasjoinedtheinvestigation.
Contradictingthesubmissionthesaidcontention,Mr.Maityreferredtoa
decisionoftheHon’bleSupremeCourtinthecaseofP.V.RamanaReddy-Vs-
UnionofIndiareportedin2019(26)GSTLJ(175)SCwhereinithasbeen
categoricallyheldthatthoughSection69(1)ofCGSTAct,2017whichconferspower
upontheCommissionertoorderarrestofapersonforcognizableandnon-bailable
offencedoesnotcontainsafeguardincorporatedinSection41andSection41AoftheCode
ofCriminalProcedure,1973inviewofprovisionofSection70(1)ofthesaidAct
samemustbekeptinmindbeforearrestingaperson.However,Section41A(3)of
theCodeofCriminalProceduredoesnotprovideanabsoluteirrevocableguarantee
againstarrest.
TheHighCourtheldthattheenquirybytheGSTCommissionerunder
CentralGoodsandServicesTaxAct,2017isajudicialproceedingsandnota
criminalproceedings.Itwasheldthatifthereasonstobelievethataperson
committedanyoffenceunderclauses(a),(b),(c)or(d)ofSection132(1)ofCGST
Act,2017warrantinghisarrestthoughtfoundinthefilebutnotdisclosedinthe
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orderauthorisingthearrest,thesameisenoughandisnotrequiredtoberecorded
inorderofauthorization.
AccordinglyMr.MaitycontendedthatSection41andSection41AofCr.P.C.has
beencompliedwithbyobtainingstatementsfromthepetitioneron22.05.2019,
30.05.2019and31.05.2019intermsofsaidprovisionoftheCGSTActwhichis
axiomaticfromtheChargeSheet.TheargumentsofthepetitioneristhatSection
70isnotparimateriawithSection41AofCr.P.C.butparimateriawithSectionsection91
oftheCr.P.C.TheprovisionofSection91ofCr.P.C.providesforsummonsto
producedocumentorotherthingwhereasSection70oftheCGSTActprovides
powertosummonpersonstogiveevidenceandproducedocuments.Therefore,the
saidSection70oftheCGSTAct,2017isnotparimateriawithSection91ofCr.P.C.
InreplyMr.BasuinvitedmyattentiontotermparimateriaasperBlacks
LawDictionary6theditionwhichmeans,ofthesamematter,onthesamesubject;
aslawsparimateriamustbeconstruedwithreferencetoeachotherandarguedthat
onareadingoftheaforesaiddefinitionofparimateriaitbecomesevidentthat
Section41AoftheCodeofCriminalProcedurecanbynostretchofimaginationbe
treatedasparimateriatoSection70oftheCGSTActandfurthersubmittedthaton
abarereadingoftheaforesaidsectionsitwouldbecomeabsolutelyclearthatthe
subjectmatterenvisagedintherespectivesectionsarenotthesameandthe
structuraledificeoftheaforesaidsectionsarecompletelydifferentfromone
another.InsteadSection70oftheCGSTActisparimateriatoSection91ofthe
CodeofCriminalProcedureasthesubjectmatterinSection70oftheCGSTAct
andSection90oftheCodeofCriminalProcedurearethesame.
IamoftheviewthatMr.Basureplyastoparimateriaprovisionhasbeen
answeredincaseofP.V.RamanaReddy(supra).Moreover,thecaseofRiniJhoar
isinpointofviolationofSectionArticle21oftheConstitutionofIndia.Inthepresentcase
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violationofSectionArticle21doesnotandcannotariseasthepetitionerhaslosthis
defaultrightofbailon06.08.2019asonthesamedatetheprosecutionhadfiled
thechargesheetandthelearnedCourtconsideringthemeritsofthecaserejected
thebail.
Mr.MaitylearnedAdvocateappearingforUnionofIndiasubmittedinviting
myattentiontotheFinalReportwhichrevealsthatShriSandipDubey@Nagendra
KumarDubeyinconnivancewiththepetitionerisoperatingseveraltradingunits
andthepetitionerisalsooperatingtwocompaniesunderthenameandstyleM/S
AlvinaSuppliersPvt.Ltd.,andM/SVaidikaImpexPvt.Ltd.inconnivancewith
ShriBijayKumarAgarwalandShriRameshGiri.InthevoluntarystatementShri
NagendraDubeyinformedthathehasprovidedassistanceofvariousbusiness
personsundertheGSTLawsandprovidedtheirregistrationdetailstothe
petitionerandthepetitionerusedtopaythepersonsforthesame.Healsostated
thatthepetitionerwasengagedinissuingbillsorinvoicesinthenameofthe
businessconcernsorpersonsandpaymentagainstinvoicesarebeingtakencareof
bythepetitioner.Thisworkrelatedtomovementofgoodsissupervisedby
petitionerandoneSanjayPanditandasperNagendraDubey’sknowledgethere
wasnomovementofgoodsagainsttheinvoiceissuedandthepetitionerfiledthe
GSTReturnsoftheFirms.Pursuanttohisstatement,thebusinesspremisesofthe
petitionerwassearchedandonsearchvariousincriminatingdocumentswere
recoveredincludingPANCardsofnumerouspeople,BankChequeBooksof
differentBanks,BanksStatements,DigitalSignatureKeys,Stamp,seal,pen
drives,mobilehandset,ATMcardsofvariousBanks,invoices,mobileSIMcards
withthenamesofvariousFirms,Laptops,KacchaBillsetc.Italsorevealedon
investigationthatanotherpersonnamely,SanjayKumarPandithasissuedbillsto
variouspartiesfromM/s.AlvinaSuppliersPvt.Ltd.,andM/s.VaidikaImpexPvt.
Ltd.andfiledtheGSTReturnsonthedirectionofthepetitioner.Healsoadmitted
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thattherewasnosupplyofgoodsorserviceincasesofbillsissuedbyhimandhe
justprintedthebillsandplacedthestampofthepartiesandsignedandissuedthe
billsandalsoadmittedaboutreceiptofhugecashrelatedtofakeinvoice
transactionandtheyusedcashcountingmachinetocountthecash.Thecashis
paidafterdeductingthecommissionbythepetitionertovariousparties.
Thepetitioneron29.05.2019appearedintermsofsummonsunderSection
70ofCGSTAct,andtenderedhisstatement.Headmittedthatauditfile,PANCard,
DigitalSignatureforfilingdocuments,ChequeBooksofparties,GSTInvoicesofthe
partiesarekeptinhisofficeandthathehadissuedbillstovariouspartiesfrom
M/s.AlvinaandM/s.Vaidika.InthistwocompaniesGSTBillsforITC(InputTax
Credit)hasbeengivenfromvariousfirm.Healsoadmittedthathedidnotregister
anypartiesasmentionedintheChargeSheetandinvoiceswereissuedforgoods
andservicebuttherewasnomovement/supplyofgoodsorservicesincasesof
Billsissuedbyhimwithoutmovementofgoodsorservice.Themannerofpayment
againstinvoicesisRTGS.RTGSgivenbypartiesgoestoanotheraccountand
againstRTGStheyreceivedcashwhichwasreturnedtopartiesafterdeductingthe
commission.Theykeptabout1%ofthecommissionbecausetheyhadmade
arrangementsofthepartiestotakebillsfromM/s.AlvinaandM/s.Vaidika.
Therefore,primafacieonthebasisofdocumentaryevidencethepetitioneralong
withotherpersonshavecausedahugelosstotheGovernmentExchequer
amountingtoRs.141,76,46,639/-.Soobviously,theCommissionerhasreasonto
believethatthepetitionerhascommittedoffenceunderSection132oftheCGST
Act,2017andassuchauthorizedtheconcernedofficertoarrestthepetitioner
underSection69oftheCGSTAct.
IhaverespectfullygonethroughtheFullBenchdecisionincaseofUday
MohanAcharya(supra)inrespectofindefeasiblerightforbeingreleasedonbailin
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defaultinfilingchallan/finalreport/chargesheetwithinprescribedtime.Inthe
citeddecision,theaccusedwasremandedtojudicialcustodybyorderofthe
Magistrateon17.6.2000inacaseinstitutedagainsthimunderSections406and
Section420oftheIndianPenalCodereadwithMPIDAct.Sotheperiodof60daysforfiling
ofchargesheetwascompletedon16.8.2000.Onthenextdayon17.8.2000,an
applicationforbeingreleasedonbailwasfiledallegingthatnonfilingofchallan
within60daysentitlestheaccusedtobereleasedonbailunderprovisotoSection
167(2)oftheCodeofCriminalProcedurebuttheMagistratehadrejectedthebail
concludingthatthesaidprovisionwasnotapplicabletocasespertainingtoMPID
Act.Inthecitedcasethecharge-sheetwasfiledon30thAugust,2000.
Inmyhumbleopinion,ratioofdecisionisnotwellnighwithinthefactsand
circumstancesoftheinstantcaseastheaccusedpetitionerwasremandedin
custodyafterhisarreston6.6.2019andbailapplicationwasfiledon6.8.20019,
i.e.,onthesamedayofsubmissionofFinalreport,ergo,indefeasiblerightunder
provisotoSection167(2)oftheCodeofCriminalProcedureforreleaseofthe
petitionerindefaultinfilingchallanwithinprescribedtimedoesariseinviewofthe
ConstitutionBenchdecisionoftheHon’bleSupremeCourttotheeffectthatthe
indefeasiblerightaccruingtotheaccusedinsuchasituationisenforceableonly
priortothefilingofthechallananddoesnotsurviveorremainenforceableonthe
challanbeingfiled,ifalreadynotavailedof.
Asregardspointnos.3,4and5,Mr.Basuadvertedtotheprovisionof
Section132oftheCGSTAct,2017contendingthatoffenceallegedisbailablein
natureforthereasonthatprimafaciethereisallegationofattempttoissuefake
invoiceswithoutthesupplyofgoodsorservicesasthepetitionerisbyprofessiona
CharteredAccountantwhoonlyworksforthecompaniesashisclients.Itispointed
outthatprecedingtheapplicationofSection134oftheCGSTAct,istheprovisionsof
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lawcontainedinSection132(6)oftheAct,whichenjoinsthatapersonshallnotbe
prosecutedforanyoffenceunderthissectionexceptwiththeprevioussanctionof
theCommissioner.
Thelegislativeintentasstemmingfromtheaforesaidsectionisclear,
distinctandleavesnothingtosuppositionexceptthattheauthoritywhois
empoweredtointerferewiththelibertyofapersonbyissuinganorderofarreston
reasonablebeliefaboutnecessityofarrestunderSection69(1)oftheCGSTAct,is
alsostatutoryobligatedtodecide,albeitonlogicalassessmentoffacts,thatthe
personconcernedistobe’prosecuted’.Suchrequirementof’sanction’mustbe
evidentfromtherecordsandastheindispensableprocedureoflawmandates,
mustbebackedbyreasonswhichareprimafacieintelligentlyacceptable.Thus,it
iscontendedthatnodocumentreflectingcompliancewithSection132(6)and
Section134oftheCGSTActhasbeenplacedbeforethisHon’bleCourttoshowthe
Sanctionofthecommissionertoprosecutethepetitioner.SothelearnedMagistrate
Courtisbarredfromtakingcognizanceoftheoffenceinacasewherenovalid
sanctionhasbeenobtainedunderSection132(6)oftheCGSTAct.
Mr.Maity,onthecontrary,submittedthattheoffencecommittedbythe
petitioneriscognizableandnon-bailableandreliedonadecisionoftheHon’ble
PunjabandHaryanaHighCourtinthecaseofVikasGoel-Vs-DeputyDirector,
DirectorateGeneralofGSTIntelligence,Gurugram,reportedin2019(28)
GSTL(590)whereinithasbeenheldthatissuanceofbogusinvoices/billswithout
actualsale/transportationofgoodsandderivingwrongbenefitofmorethan80/-
croresonaccountofsuchpapertransactionbeingeconomicoffenceofhuge
magnitudeandseriousinnature,thepetitioner,whowasthemainaccusedwas
notentitledtoregularbail.
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InthepresentcaselosscausedtoGovernmentExchequeramountstoRs.
141,76,46,639/-.Thereforeinsuchahugeeconomicoffenceheshouldnotbe
enlargedonbail.
Mr.BasureferredtoadecisionincaseofSectionSanjayKumarBhuwalkavs
UnionofIndiareportedin2018(362)ELT568(Cal)andsubmittedthatthis
Hon’bleCourthadenlargedthepetitionersonbailonconditionontheprincipleof
lawthatgrantofbailisaruleandrejectionisanexceptionandinrespectful
considerationoftheprincipleslaiddownintheciteddecisionandfurtherinviewof
latestdecisionoftheHon’bleApexCourtthatthecourtscannotextend
investigationperiodunderSection167oftheCodeofCriminalProcedure.
Accordingly,thisCourtwaspleasedtorelaxtheconditionsofbailimposedbythis
Court’sorderdatedJuly12,2018soastoenabletheirreleaseonbailastheyhave
statutoryrighttobereleasedandfurtherbearinginmindtheprinciplesasto
presumptionofinnocenceandtherightoflibertyguaranteedunderSectionArticle21of
theConstitutionofIndia.
TheciteddecisionwasauthoredbythisCourtholdingthatinregardto
Section134and138ofCGSTAct,theobjectandreasonofthisActisobviouslyto
realizetherevenuetothegovernmentexchequerandbearinginmindtheprovision
ofcompoundingnatureoftheoffenceunderSection138oftheAct,thisCourt
relaxedthebailconditiontodepositRs.39CroretotheGovernmentExchequer
but,inparticular,onthefindingthattheprosecutingagencyhadfailedand
neglectedtosubmitfinalreport/chargesheetagainstthepetitionersandevenno
extensionoftimetocompletetheinvestigationwassoughtforbythem.Therefore,
thebailprivilegewasgrantedinfavourofthepetitionersinthecitedcaseadhering
totheprincipleslaiddownbytheHon’bleApexCourtinrespectofprovisoto
Section167(2)oftheCodeofCriminalProcedure.Thus,Ifindthatthejudgmentin
17
caseofSanjayKumarBhuwalka(supra)isdistinguishablefromthefactsand
circumstancesoftheinstantcase.
Forthereasonsstatedaboveandinconsiderationofthegravityofthe
economicoffenceandbearinginmindtheprinciplelaiddownincaseofP.V.
RamannaReddy(supra),thepetitionerisnotentitledtobeenlargedonbail,
however,thepetitionerisatlibertytoapproachtheauthorityforcompoundingof
theoffenceunderSection138ofCGSTAct.
Accordingly,theCRM10075of2019isherebydismissed.
UrgentcertifiedphotocopyofthisJudgment,ifappliedfor,besuppliedtothe
partiesuponcompliancewithallrequisiteformalities.
(SHIVAKANTPRASAD,J.)