AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
Reserved on 16.04.2018
Pronounced on 19.04.2018
First Appeal (M) No. 58 of 2012
• Ashok Kumar Sambhakar S/o Late Abhayram Sambhakar, R/o
Shihava Road, Dhamtari, At Present Medical Officer, Community
Health Centre, Koyalibeda, Dist. Kanker, C.G.
—- Appellant
Versus
• Smt. Sheeta Singh W/o Ashok Kumar, Occupation – Service,
Working at Central Co-opeative Bank, Main Branch, G.E. Road,
Rajnandgaon C.G.
—- Respondent
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For Appellant : Smt. Indira Tripathi, Advocate
For Respondent : None
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Hon’ble Mr. Sharad Kumar Gupta, Judge
C.A.V. JUDGMENT
1) Challenge in this appeal is levied to the judgment and decree
dated 12.01.2012 of the District Judge, Kabirdham (Kawardha)
passed in Civil Suit No.3-A/2010, whereby and whereunder she
dismissed the petition of appellant filed under Section 13 of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 1955’).
2) This is admitted by respondent that name, address, other
particulars of both the parties shown in the title of the petition are
true, the marriage of both the parties was solemnized in 1996 in
accordance to customary rights and rituals in Dhamtari, at the time
of marriage, appellant was studying M.S. at Raipur and she was
employed in Central Cooperative Bank, Rajnandgaon, after the
marriage, they resided in Rajnandgaon as husband and wife, in
1999, appellant was appointed as Assistant Surgeon in C.H.C.
2Bodla, they also resided in Bodla, she used to travel up and down
from Rajnandgaon to Bodla, in 2006 appellant was transferred from
Bodla to village Koyalibeda, district-Kanker.
3) In brief, appellant’s case is that he had told to respondent that
either she resign the service or get her transfer to any branch near
Bodla. From January, 2005 she stopped to come to his house at
Bodla. Thereafter, in March, 2006 he had also told her to live with
him at Koyalibeda, but she was not ready.
4) In nutshell, respondent’s case is that she used to come to the
place of her husband till March, 2010. In March 2010, she had gone
to her husband in village Koyalibeda and found that one woman,
namely, Suko Netam is living with him as wife. He was also coming
to her house at Durg.
5) After completion of trial, the trial Court passed the aforesaid
judgment and decree. Being aggrieved, appellant preferred this
appeal.
6) Smt Indira Tripathi, learned counsel for appellant vehemently
argued that the trial Court has not appreciated the evidence properly
which was available on record. It is not necessary that before filing
of the divorce petition, an application for restitution of the conjugal
rights be filed. The respondent has deserted appellant, thus, there
is no remedy available to appellant except for applying divorce.
7) None appears for respondent, though served.
8) Points for determination :-
There are following points for determination in this case :-
3(1) Whether respondent has subjected appellant with cruelty ?
(2) Whether respondent has deserted appellant for a continuous
period of not less than two years immediately preceding the
presentation of the petition without reasonable and without the
consent or against the wish of him ?
(3) Whether appellant is entitled to get the decree of divorce on
the ground of cruelty and desertion ?
(4) Relief and costs.
Points for determination No.1 2 – Findings with reasons :-
9) The trial Court has not given the finding with reason on issue
of cruelty saying that this ground has not been raised by appellant
but this approach is not correct because appellant has pleaded in
para 14 of the plaint that respondent refused to lead a conjugal life
which amounts cruelty. Therefore, the trial Court ought to have given
finding with reason on issue of cruelty.
10) Looking to the convenience, points for determination Nos. 1
2 are decided simultaneously.
11) AW1 Ashok Kumar Sambhakar says in para 8 and 9 of his
statement given on oath that from January, 2005 respondent
stopped visiting him, he went so many times to respondent at
Rajnandgaon but respondent refused to live with him. She deprived
him from his conjugal rights. After the transfer in Koyalibeda, in
March, 2006 he had told her to live with him in Koyalibeda but
respondent did not agree.
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12) AW2 Chaitram says in para 3 of his statement given on oath
that from 2005, respondent stopped to come in appellant’s house at
Bodla.
13) NAW1 Smt. Sheeta Singh says in para 4 and 5 of her
statement given on oath that she had continuously visited appellant
at village Bodla and also in village Koyalibeda. Appellant does not
want to keep her without any reason. Appellant used to come at
Durg and stay in her house.
14) NAW2 Harishankar Singh who is the younger brother of
respondent says in para 3 and 4 of his statement given on oath
during posting at Bodla appellant used to come in respondent’s
house. Respondent had gone to appellant’s house at village
Koyalibeda. Appellant had refused to keep her.
15) Smt. Indira Tripathi, counsel for the appellant placed reliance
on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Adhyatma Bhattar
Alwar v Adhyatma Bhattar Sri Devi {2002 (1) SCC 308}, relevant
portion of para 13 is as under:-
“13. Coming to the case at hand, it is revealed from the
evidence on record, as discussed in the judgments of the
Trial Court and the High Court that the respondent had gone
to her parents house for birth of the child, which apparently
cannot be construed as an expression of her desire to
forsake her husband permanently; but after the birth of her
child when attempts were made by the appellant, his parents
and relations, she laid down a condition that the appellant
should live in a separate house from his parents taking the
plea that her father-in-law had attempted to molest her,
which explanation she signally failed to establish. In the
meantime, father of the appellant expired some time in
1988, putting an end to the so-called reason of misbehavior
5of her father-in-law. There is nothing on record that
thereafter she expressed her desire to join her husband at
the matrimonial home. It is relevant to state here that the
appellant is the only son of his parents and as expected, he
was not willing to establish a separate residence leaving his
parents to live alone in their old age. The cumulative effect
of the circumstances and the conduct of the respondent is
that she had given expression of animus deserendi. Thus,
the two ingredients of the matrimonial offence of desertion
i.e. separation in fact and animus deserendi have been
established by the appellant……”
16) She further relied on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Geeta Jagdish Mangtani v. Jagdish Mangtani {2005 (8) SCC
177} , relevant portion of para 5 is as under:-
“5. ……….there has been no attempt on the part of the wife
to stay with the husband. She is a school teacher and it is
common knowledge that in schools there are long vacations
during summer months, more so, in Government schools
where the wife teaches. At least during those holidays she
could have visited the husband at Ulhasnagar along with her
son and stayed with him. There is nothing on record to show
that any such attempt was ever made by her to visit the
husband during this entire period. She has stated in her
evidence that the husband used to come and stay with her
during her vacations. This has been denied by the husband.
Therefore, the conclusion in inevitable, that there was never
any attempt on the part of the wife to go to husband’s house
i.e., matrimonial home of the parties after she left on 22-6-
1993. From this fact alone animus deserendi on the part of
the wife is clearly established. She has chosen to adopt a
course of conduct which proves desertion on her part. In the
facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that
this desertion on the part of the wife was with a reasonable
cause. Such a course of conduct over a long period
indicates total abandonment of marriage and cannot be
justified on ground of monetary consideration alone as a
6reasonable cause to desert. It also amounts to wilful neglect
of the husband by the wife.”
17) In the case in hand significant feature is that respondent is
also an employee of the Central Cooperative Bank and posted at
Rajnandgaon. It is not expected from a woman employee to resign
her service and join the company of husband.
18) AW1 Ashok Kumar Sambhakar says in para 15 during his
cross examination that on the complaint of respondent a case has
been registered against him under Section 498-A IPC at Durg.
Moreover, AW2 Chaitram says in para 6 during his cross
examination that he does not know whether that appellant and
respondent have the relationship as husband and wife. He does not
know whether that respondent has resided in village Koyalibeda
with appellant.
19) Appellant has not examined any neighbour of village
Koyalibeda, who could say that respondent allegedly never resided
with appellant in village Koyalibeda. Appellant has not proved any
letter wherein it has been mentioned that from 2005 respondent had
refused to lead a conjugal life with him at village Bodla, he had tried
so many times to bring her from Rajnandgaon but she refused to
live with him, he had also told her to live with him at village
Koyalibeda but she was not ready. Appellant has not proved any
report lodged by him in any police station wherein said facts have
been mentioned. Appellant failed to prove any document of their
community wherein said facts have been mentioned. Appellant has
failed to prove any notice given by him to respondent wherein said
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facts have been mentioned. For not doing so there is no explanation
from him.
20) This is not the appellant’s case that he had allegedly made
attempts to go and stay at respondent’s house during holidays but
she had refused and not permitted him to join her company.
21) Appellant has filed the divorce petition near about 4 years
after March, 2006. He failed to explain such inordinate delay in filing
divorce petition.
22) Looking to the aforesaid circumstances this Court finds that
appellant does not get any help from the judicial precedents laid
down by Hon’ble Supreme Court Adhyatma Bhattar Alwar
(Supra) and Geeta Jagdish Mangtani (Supra).
23) In Gurinder Singh v Bhupinder Caur {Mrr.L.J. 2008 (1) }
Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court has laid down the following
judicial precedent: –
“Desertion means the separation of one spouse from
other with an intention of bringing cohabitation permanently to
an end without reasonable cause an consent of the other
spouse and with an intention not return or resume
cohabitation. Mere severance of relation or separation without
desertion is not sufficient. Desertion is not walking out of a
house but is withdrawn from a home. Desertion consists in
withdrawn not from a place but from the state of thing.”
24) Hon’ble Supreme Court in Adhyatma Bhattar Alwar (Supra)
has laid down the following judicial precedent:-
“For the offence of desertion two essential conditions must be
there; (1) the factum of separation and (2) the intention to
8bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi).
Two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is
concerned; (1) the absence of consent and (2) absence of
conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the
matrimonial house to form the necessary intention.”
25) Looking to the above mentioned facts and circumstances this
Court finds that the aforesaid judicial precedents laid down in
Gurinder Singh Supra) and Adhyatma Bhattar Alwar (Supra)
are applicable against appellant regarding point for determination
No.2.
26) Looking to the facts and circumstances mentioned
herebefore, this Court disbelieves the aforesaid statements of para
8 and 9 of AW1 Ashok Kumar Sambhakar, para 3 of AW2 Chaitram
and believes the aforesaid statements of para 4 and 5 of NAW1
Smt. Sheeta Singh, para 3 and 4 of NAW2 Harishankar Singh.
27) After appreciation of the evidence discussed herebefore this
Court finds that there is no such evidence on record which shows
that respondent has an intention to bring cohabitation permanently
to an end (animus deserandi) without reasonable cause and
consent of appellant, respondent has an intention not to return or
resume cohabitation with appellant.
28) After the appreciation of the evidence discussed herebefore
this Court finds that appellant failed to prove that respondent has
subjected appellant with cruelty and she has deserted him for a
continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding
the presentation of the petition without reasonable cause and
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without the consent or against the wish of him. Thus, this Court
decides points for determination No. 1 and 2 accordingly.
Point for determination No.3- Findings with reasons :-
29) This has been earlier decided that respondent has not
subjected appellant with cruelty and she has not deserted him.
Thus, this Court finds that appellant is not entitled to get the decree
of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion.
Point for determination No.4 – Findings with reasons :-
30) After complete appreciation of the evidence discussed
hereinbefore, this Court finds that there is no substance in this
appeal. Thus, the impugned judgment and decree of the trial Court
are hereby affirmed as to aforesaid extent. The appeal deserves to
be and is hereby dismissed.
31) Appellant shall bear his own costs as well as costs of
Respondent.
32) Decree be drawn up accordingly.
Sd/-
(Sharad Kumar Gupta)
JUDGE
kishore/padma