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Judgments of Supreme Court of India and High Courts

Ashu Dhiman vs Smt. Jyoti Dhiman on 15 November, 2018

Reserved Judgment

IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT
NAINITAL
Crl. Misc. Application (C-482) No. 434 of 2018
Ashu Dhiman …….Applicant
vs.
Smt. Jyoti Dhiman ….Respondent

Mr. Gaurav Singh, Advocate for the applicant.

With
Crl. Misc. Application (C-482) No. 435 of 2018
Brijesh Joshi …….Applicant
vs.
Smt. Beena Joshi ….Respondent

Mr. Dharmendra Bharthwal, Advocate for the applicant.

With
Crl. Misc. Application (C-482) No. 352 of 2018
Sanawwar Sher Khan …….Applicant
vs.
Smt. Shabana Alias Kamar Jahan ….Respondent

Mr. Lalit Sharma, Advocate for the applicant.

With
Crl. Misc. Application (C-482) No. 483 of 2018
Rajeev Sharma …….Applicant
vs.
Smt. Manju Sharma Another ….Respondents

Mr. Ghanshyam Joshi, Advocate for the applicant.
Mr. S.S. Adhikari, A.G.A. with Mr. P.S. Uniyal, Brief Holder for the
State.

With
Crl. Misc. Application (C-482) No. 492 of 2018
Manish Rahul …….Applicant
vs.
Smt. Nitika ….Respondent

Ms. Meenakshi Parihar, Advocate for the applicant.
Ms. Anjali Noliyal, Advocate for the respondent.
2

With
Crl. Misc. Application (C-482) No. 496 of 2018
Smt. Anshu Others …….Applicants
vs.
Jitendra Kumar ….Respondent

Mr. Pankaj Miglani, Advocate for the applicant.
With
Crl. Misc. Application (C-482) No. 510 of 2018
Kuldeep Kumar …….Applicant
vs.
Smt. Kamal Jeet Kaur Another ….Respondents

Mr. Rajendra Singh Azad and Mr. Saurav Adhikari, Advocates for the
applicant.

With
Crl. Misc. Application (C-482) No. 518 of 2018
Nikhil Sangal …….Applicant
vs.
Smt. Saloni Agrawal Another ….Respondents

Mr. Lalit Sharma, Advocate for the applicant.

With
Crl. Misc. Application (C-482) No. 575 of 2018
Rajat Kumar Mahalwala …….Applicant
vs.
State of Uttarakhand Others ….Respondents

Mr. Girish Chandra Lakhchaura, Advocate for the applicant.
Mr. S.S. Adhikari, A.G.A. with Mr. P.S. Uniyal, Brief Holder for the
State.

With
Crl. Misc. Application (C-482) No. 598 of 2018
Sachin Sharma …….Applicant
vs.
Smt. Pankila Another ….Respondents

Mr. Deepak Sharma, Advocate for the applicant.

With
Crl. Misc. Application (C-482) No. 672 of 2018
Sanjeev Gupta …….Applicant
vs.
Smt. Chanchal Gupta ….Respondent

Mr. Vipul Sharma, Advocate for the applicant.
3

With
Crl. Misc. Application (C-482) No. 684 of 2018
Mohd. Naved …….Applicant
vs.
State of Uttarakhand Others ….Respondents

Mr. Bhuwan Bhatt, Advocate for the applicant.
Mr. S.S. Adhikari, A.G.A. with Mr. P.S. Uniyal, Brief Holder for the
State.

With
Crl. Misc. Application (C-482) No. 769 of 2018
Smt. Neeru …….Applicant
vs.
Pankaj Sharma ….Respondent

Mr. Narendra Bali, Advocate for the applicant.

With
Crl. Misc. Application (C-482) No. 794 of 2018
Umar Farukh …….Applicant
vs.
Smt. Taiyaba ….Respondent

Mr. Rajveer Singh, Advocate for the applicant.

With
Crl. Misc. Application (C-482) No. 1516 of 2017
Smt. Sanchi Alias Manisha …….Applicant
vs.
Amit Kumar ….Respondent

Mr. Rajendra Singh Azad, Advocate for the applicant.
Mr. Pankaj Miglani, Advocate for the respondent.

With
Crl. Misc. Application (C-482) No. 1711 of 2017
Amit Kumar …….Applicant
vs.
Smt. Sanchi Alias Manisha ….Respondent

Mr. Pankaj Miglani, Advocate for the applicant.

Hon’ble Lok Pal Singh, J.

The aforementioned criminal misc.
applications have been filed under Section 482 of
4

the Cr.P.C. against orders passed by respective
Family Court Judges, on interim maintenance
applications filed in pending proceedings under
Section 125 of the Code. Out of the
aforementioned criminal misc. applications, filed
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., some are filed
against rejection of interim maintenance
applications and some are filed against allowing of
the interim maintenance applications, all passed
under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. Upon hearing the
bunch of aforementioned C-482 petitions, Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court has observed as to
whether the C-482 petitions in this regard are
maintainable or not, and clubbed the petitions.

2. The core issue before this Court is – as
to whether an application under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C. or a criminal revision under Section 397
of Cr.P.C. is maintainable?

3. The Parliament has enacted the Family
Courts Act, 1984 (Act No. 66 of 1984) to provide
for the establishment of Family Courts with a view
to promote conciliation in, and secure speedy
settlement of, disputes relating the marriage and
family affairs and matters connected therewith.

4. Statement of objects and reasons of the
Family Courts Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to
as ‘the Act’) are extracted herein under:

“Statement of Objects and Reasons.-

Several associations of women, other organizations
and individuals have urged, from time to time, that
Family Courts be set up for the settlement of family
disputes, where emphasis should be laid on
conciliation and achieving socially desirable results
5

and adherence to rigid rules of procedure and
evidence should be eliminated. The Law
Commission in its 59 report (1974) had also stress
th

that in dealing with disputes concerning the family
the court ought to adopt an approach radically
different from that adopted in ordinary civil
proceedings and that it should make reasonable
efforts at settlement before the commencement of
the trial. The code of Civil Procedure was amended
in 1976 to provide for a special procedure to be
adopted in suits or proceedings relating to matters
concerning the family. However, not much use has
been made by the courts in adopting this
conciliatory procedure and the courts continue to
deal with family disputes in the same manner as
other civil matters and the same adversary
approach prevails. The need was, therefore, felt, in
the public interest, to establish Family Courts for
speedy settlement of family disputes.

2. The Bill inter alia, seeks to:-

(a) provide for establishment of Family Courts by
the State Government;

(b) make it obligatory on the State Governments
to set up a Family court in every city or town
with a population exceeding on million;

(c) enable the State Government s to set up, such
courts in areas other than those specified in

(b) above;

(d) exclusively provide within the jurisdiction of
the family Courts the matters relating to:-

(i) matrimonial relief, including nullity of
marriage, judicial separation, divorce,
restitution of conjugal rights, or declaration as
to the validity of a marriage or as to the
matrimonial status of any person;

(ii) the property of the spouses or of either of
them;

(iii) declaration as to the legitimacy of any
person;

(iv) guardianship of a person or the custody of
any minor;

(v) maintenance, including proceedings under
Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure;

(e) make it obligatory on the part of the Family
Court to endeavour, in the first instance to
effect a reconciliation or a settlement between
the parties to a family dispute. During this
stage, the proceedings will be informal and
the rigid rules of procedure shall not apply;

(f) provide for the association of social welfare
agencies, counselors, etc., during conciliation
stage and also to secure the services of
medical and welfare experts;

(g) provide that the parties to a dispute before a
Family Court shall not be entitled, as of right,
to be represented by legal practitioner.
However, the Court may, in the interest of
justice, seek assistance of a legal expert as
6

amicus curiae;

(h) simplify the rules of evidence and procedure
so as to enable a Family Court to deal
effectually with a dispute;

(i) provide for only one right of appeal which
shall lie to the High Court.”

5. Section 2 of the Act is definition clause,
which is extracted hereunder:

2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires,-

(a) “Judge” means the Judge or, as the case
may be, the Principal Judge, Additional
Principal Judge or other Judge of a Family
Court;

(b) “notification” means a notification published
in the Official Gazette;

(c) “prescribed” means prescribed by rules
made under this Act;

(d) “Family Court” means a Family Court
established under Section 3;

(e) all other words and expressions used but
not defined in this Act and defined in the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall have
the meanings respectively assigned to them in
that Code.”

6. Chapter V of the Act deals with the
provisions of appeals and revisions. Section 19 is
extracted here-in-below:

19. Appeal.- (1) Save as provided in sub-section
(2) and notwithstanding anything contained in
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or
in the Code or Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1974), or in any other law, an appeal shall lie
from every judgment or order, not being an
interlocutory order, of a Family Court to the
High Court both on facts and on law.
(2) No appeal shall lie from a decree or order
passed by the Family Court with the consent of
the parties [or from an order passed under
Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974):

Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall
apply to any appeal pending before a High
Court or an order passed under Chapter IX of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1974) before the commencement of the Family
Courts (Amendment) Act, 1991].

(3) every appeal under this section shall be
preferred within a period of thirty days from
the date of the judgment or order of a Family
Court.

7

(4) The High Court may, of its own motion or
otherwise, call for an examine the record of any
proceeding in which the Family Court situate
within its jurisdiction passed an order under
Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974) for the purpose of satisfying
itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety
of the order, not being an interlocutory order,
and as to the regularity of such proceeding.]
(5) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision
shall lie to any court from any judgment, order
or decree of a Family Court.

(6) An appeal preferred under sub-section (1)
shall be heard by a Bench consisting of two or
more Judges.

7. Chapter IX the Code of Criminal
Procedure is in regard to the maintenance to
wives, children and parents. The proviso to sub-

section (1) of Section 125 of the Code makes
provision for interim maintenance. For kind
reference the same is extracted hereunder:

“125. Order for maintenance of wives,
children and parents.-(1) If any person
leaving sufficient means neglects or refuses to
maintain-

(a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or

(b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child,
whether married or not, unable to maintain
itself, or

(c) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being
a married daughter) who has attained
majority, where such child is, by reason of any
physical or mental abnormality or injury
unable to maintain itself, or

(d) his father or mother, unable to maintain
himself or herself, a Magistrate of’ the first
class may, upon proof of such neglect or
refusal, order such person to make a monthly
allowance for the maintenance of his wife or
such child, father or mother, at such monthly
rate1[***], as such magistrate thinks fit, and to
pay the same to such person as the Magistrate
may from time to time direct:

Provided that the Magistrate may order
the father of a minor female child referred to in
clause (b) to make such allowance, until she
attains her majority, if the Magistrate is
satisfied that the husband of such minor
female child, if married, is not possessed of’
sufficient means.

[Provided further that the Magistrate
may, during the pendency of the Proceeding
8

regarding monthly allowance for the
maintenance under this sub-section, order such
person to make a monthly allowance for the
interim maintenance of his wife or such child,
father or mother, and the expenses of such
proceeding which the Magistrate considers
reasonable, and to pay the same to such
person as the Magistrate may from time to time
direct:

Provided also that an application for the
monthly allowance for the interim maintenance
and expenses for proceeding under the second
proviso shall, as far as possible, be disposed of
within sixty days from the date of the service of
notice of the application to such person]
Explanation. -For the purposes of this Chapter.

(a) “minor” means a person who, under the
provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1975 (9 of
1875), is deemed not to have attained his
majority;

(b) “Wife” includes a woman who has been
divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from,
her husband and has not remarried.

[(2) Any Such allowance for the maintenance or
interim maintenance and expenses for
proceeding shall be payable from the date of
the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the
application for maintenance or interim
maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as
the case may be.]
(3) If any Person so ordered fails without
sufficient cause to comply with the order, any
such Magistrate may, for every breach of the
order, issue a warrant for levying the amount
due in the manner provided for levying fines,
and may sentence such person, for the whole,
or any part of each month’s [ allowance for the
maintenance or the interim maintenance and
expenses of proceeding, as the case be,]
remaining unpaid after the execution of the
warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may
extend to one month or until payment if sooner
made:

Provided that no warrant shall be issued
for the recovery of any amount due under this
section unless application be made to the court
to levy such amount within a period of one year
from the dare on which it became due:

Provided further that if such person
offers to maintain his wife on condition of her
living with him, and she refuses to live with
him, such Magistrate may consider any
grounds of refusal stated by her, and may
make an order under this section
notwithstanding such offer, if he is satisfied
that there is just ground for so doing.
Explanation.-If a husband has contracted
marriage with another woman or keeps a
9

mistress, it shall be considered to be just
ground for his wife’s refusal to live with him.
(4) No wife shall be entitled to receive
an 4allowance from her husband under this
section she is living in adultery, or if, without
any sufficient reason, if she refuses to live with
her husband, or if they are living separately by
mutual consent.

(5) On proof that any wife in whose favour an
order has been made under this section is
living in adultery, or that without sufficient
reason she refuses to live with her husband, or
that they are living separately by mutual
consent, the Magistrate shall cancel the order.”

8. Proviso to sub Section (1) of Section
125 of Cr.P.C. stipulates for making a monthly
allowance by a person for the maintenance for his
wife, who is unable to maintain herself; minor
child; disabled children and parents and the
expenses of such proceedings during pending
proceedings, which the Magistrate considers
reasonable. Where the Family Courts have been
established under the Family Courts Act, the
power of the Magistrate under Section 125 of
Cr.P.C. is to the exercised by the Family Court.

9. The proviso to sub Section (4) of
Section 19 of the Family Courts Act is a revisional
jurisdiction against an order not being an
interlocutory order under Chapter IX of Cr.P.C.

10. Learned counsel for the applicant(s)
would submit that being an interlocutory order
while allowing or rejecting an application for
interim maintenance under Proviso to sub Section
(1) of Section 125 of Cr.P.C., an application under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. would be maintainable and
revision does not lie against such an order.

10

11. Per contra, learned counsel for the
respondent(s) would submit that against an order
allowing or rejecting the interim maintenance
application under Proviso to sub section (1) of
Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., criminal misc.
application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is
not maintainable. A Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court has posed a question as to whether the
criminal misc. application under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C. would be maintainable?

12. Upon hearing the learned counsel for
the parties it is necessary for this Court to find
out and interpret the exact meaning of word
‘interlocutory order’. An interlocutory order has
not been defined either in the Code of Criminal
Procedure or in the Code the Civil Procedure.

13. The definition of word ‘interlocutory’ in
view of the definition in Black Law Dictionary is
not explanatory in nature. The word
‘interlocutory order’ has elaborately been defined
in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume 22 of the
third edition at page 742. Para 1606 of the same
reads as under:

“1606. Final or interlocutory. No
definition is given in the Judicature Acts, or
the orders and rules thereunder, of the
terms “final” or “interlocutory”, and a
judgment or order may be final for one
purpose and interlocutory for another, or
final as to part and interlocutory as to part.
The meaning of the two words must
therefore be considered separately in relation
to the particular purpose for which it is
required.”

11

14. The Hon’ble Apex Court has interpreted
and elaborately discussed the definition of
interlocutory order in the case of Mohit alias
Sonu and another vs State of Uttar Pradesh
and another, (2013) 7 SCC 789, wherein it has
been held that an order which substantially
affects rights of an accused or party or decides
certain rights of the parties during pending
proceedings is not an interlocutory order. The
relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are
excerpted hereunder:

“25. In the light of the ratio laid down by this
Court referred to hereinabove, we are of the
considered opinion that the order passed by the trial
court refusing to issue summons on the application
filed by the complainant under Section 319 of Cr.P.C.
cannot be held to be an interlocutory order within the
meaning of sub-section (2) of Section 397 of Cr.P.C.
Admittedly, in the instant case, before the trial court
the complainant’s application under Section 319 of
Cr.P.C. was rejected for the second time holding that
there was no sufficient evidence against the appellants
to proceed against them by issuing summons. The said
order passed by the trial court decides the rights and
liabilities of the appellants in respect of their
involvement in the case. As held by this Court in Amar
Nath’s case, (1977) 4 SCC 137, an order which
substantially affects the rights of the accused or
decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to
be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the
High Court against that order as contemplated under
Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C.

28. So far as the inherent power of the High
Court as contained in Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is
concerned, the law in this regard is set at rest by this
Court in a catena of decisions. However, we would
like to reiterate that when an order, not interlocutory in
nature, can be assailed in the High Court in revisional
jurisdiction, then there should be a bar in invoking the
inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. In other words,
inherent power of the Court can be exercised when
there is no remedy provided in the Code of Criminal
Procedure for redressal of the grievance. It is well
settled that inherent power of the court can ordinarily
12

be exercised when there is no express provision in the
Code under which order impugned can be challenged.

32. The intention of the Legislature enacting the
Code of Criminal Procedure and the Code of Civil
Procedure vis-à-vis the law laid down by this Court it
can safely be concluded that when there is a specific
remedy provided by way of appeal or revision the
inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or Section
151 C.P.C. cannot and should not be resorted to.”

15. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Madhu Limaye vs The State of Maharashtra,
(1977) 4 SCC 551, has interpreted the scope of
revision under Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C. and while
interpreting the word ‘interlocutory order’ and the
powers of the High Court under Section 397(2)
and 482 of the Cr.P.C., has held that an order
which adjudicates / determines the rights of the
parties to some extent cannot be said to be an
interlocutory order and having considered the
definition of ‘interlocutory order’ gathered from
the Halsbury’s Laws of England has further held
that in such contingency a revision is
maintainable and remitted the matter to the High
Court to decide the revision on merits. The
relevant paragraphs of the judgment (supra) are
extracted hereunder:

“13. In S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King, AIR
1949 FC 1, Kania C. J., delivering the judgment of the
Court has referred to some English decisions at pages
185 and 186. Lord Esher M. R. said in Salaman v.
Warner, (1891) 1 QB 734:

“If their decision, whichever way it is
given, will, if it stands, finally dispose of the
matter in dispute, I think that for the purposes of
these rules it is final. On the other hand, if their
decision, if given in one way, will finally
dispose of the matter in dispute, but, if given in
the other, will allow the action to go on, then I
think it is not final, but interlocutory.”

13

To the same effect are the observations quoted
from the judgments of Fry L. J. and Lopes L. J.

Applying the said test, almost on facts similar to the
ones in the instant case, it was held that the order in
revision passed by the High Court (at that time, there
was no bar like section 397 (2) was not a “final order”
within the meaning of section 205 (1) of the
Government of India Act, 1935. It is to be noticed that
the test laid down therein was that if the objection of
the accused succeeded, the proceeding could have
ended but not vice versa. The order can be said to be a
final order only if, in either event, the action will be
determined. In our opinion if this strict test were to be
applied in interpreting the words ‘interlocutory order”
occurring in section 397(2), then the order taking
cognizance of an offence by a Court, whether it is so
done illegally or without jurisdiction, will not be a
final order and hence will be an interlocutory one.
Even so, as we have said above, the inherent power of
the High Court can be invoked for quashing such a
criminal proceeding. But in our judgment such an
interpretation and the universal application of the
principle that what is not a final order must be an
interlocutory order is neither warranted nor justified If
it were so it will render almost nugatory the revisional
power of the Sessions Court or the High Court
conferred on it by section 397(1). On such a strict
interpretation, only those orders would be revisable
which are orders passed on the final determination of
the action but are not appealable under Chapter XXIX
of the Code. This does not seem to be the intention of
the Legislature when it retained the revisional power
of the High Court in terms identical to the one in the,
1898 Code. In what cases then the High Court will
examine the legality or the propriety of an order or the
legality of any proceeding of an inferior Criminal
court? Is it circumscribed to examine only such
proceeding which is brought for its examination after
the final determination and wherein no appeal lies?
Such cases will be very few and far between. It has
been pointed out repeatedly, vide, for example, The
River Wear Commissioners v. William Adamson,
(1876-77) 2 AC 743 and R. M. D. Chamarbaugwalla
v. The Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628 that although
the word occurring in a particular statute are plain and
unambiguous, they have to be interpreted in a manner
which would fit in the context of the other provisions
of the statute and bring about the real intention of the
legislature. On the one hand, the legislature kept intact
the revisional power of the High Court and, on the
other, it put a bar on the exercise of that power in
14

relation to any interlocutory order. In such a situation
it appears to us that the real intention of the legislature
was not to equate the expression “interlocutory order”
as invariably being converse of the words “final
order”. There may be an order passed during the
course of a proceeding which may not be final in the
sense noticed in Kuppuswami’s case (supra), but, yet it
may not be an interlocutory order-pure or simple.
Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. By a
rule of harmonious construction, we, think that the bar
in sub-section (2) of section 397 is not meant to be
attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They
may not be final orders for the purposes of Article 134
of the Constitution, yet it would not be correct to
characterise them as merely interlocutory orders within
the meaning of section 397(2). It is neither advisable,
nor possible, to make a catalogue of orders to
demonstrate which kinds of orders would be merely,
purely or simply interlocutory and which kinds of
orders would be final, and then to prepare an
exhaustive list of those types of orders which will fall
in between the two. The first two kinds are well-
known and can be culled out from many decided cases.
We may, however, indicate that the type of order with
which we are concerned in this case, even though it
may not be final in one sense, is surely not
interlocutory so as to attract the bar of sub-section (2)
of section 397. In our opinion it must be taken to be an
order of the type falling in the middle course.

14. In passing, for the sake of explaining
ourselves, we may refer to what has been said by
Kania C.J. in Kuppuswami’s case (supra) at page 187
by quoting a few words from Sir George Lowndes in
the case of V.M. Abdul Rahman Vs. D. K. Cassim and
Sons, AIR 1933 PC 58. The learned Law Lord said
with reference to the order under consideration in that
case :

“The effect of the order from which it is
here sought to appeal was not to dispose finally
of the rights of the parties. It no doubt decided
an important, and even a vital, issue in the case,
but it left the suit alive, and provided for its trial
in the ordinary way.”

Many a time a question arose in India as to what
is the exact meaning of the phrase “case decided”
occurring in section 115 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Some High Courts had taken the view that
it meant the final order passed on final determination
of the action. Many others had however, opined that
15

even interlocutory orders were covered by the said
term. This Court struck a mean and it did not approve
of either of the two extreme lines. In Baldevdas v.
Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd., (1969) 2 SCC
201, it has been pointed out :

“A case may be said to be decided, if the
Court adjudicates for the purposes of the suit some
right or obligation of the parties in controversy :”

We may give a clear example of an order in a
civil case which may not be a final order within the
meaning of Article 133(1) of the Constitution, yet it
will not be purely or simply of an interlocutory
character. Suppose for example, a defendant raises the
plea of jurisdiction of a particular Court to try the suit
or the bar of limitation and succeeds, then the action is
determined finally in that Court. But if the point is
decided against him the suit proceeds. Of course, in a
given case the point raised may be such that it is
interwoven and interconnected with the other issues in
the case, and that it may not be possible to decide it
under Order 14 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure
as a preliminary point of law. But, if it is a pure point
of law and is decided one way or the other, then the
order deciding such a point may not be interlocutory,
albeit-may not be final either. Surely, it will be a case
decided, as pointed out by this Court in some
decisions, within the meaning of section 115 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. We think it would be just and
proper to apply the same kind to test for finding out
the real meaning of the expression ‘interlocutory order’
occurring in section 397(2).”

16. In view of the dictionary meaning of
interlocutory order as defined in Halsbury’s Law
of England, Volume 22 of the third edition at page
742, interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
judgment supra, an order which adjudicates the
rights of the parties on rejecting or allowing the
interim maintenance application during
proceedings cannot be said to be an interlocutory
order.

17. In view of the definition of the
interlocutory order and the ratio of the judgment
16

supra, this Court is of the view that an order
passed under Proviso to sub section (1) of Section
125 of Cr.P.C. rejecting or allowing an application
for maintenance, pending proceedings, is not an
interlocutory order which adjudicates the rights of
the parties to some extent. The revision under
Section 397 of Cr.P.C. is maintainable. It has
been held that such an order is amenable to
revisional jurisdiction of this Court. The powers
of High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. are
inherent in nature and could be exercised where
statutory remedy of appeal and revision under the
Cr.P.C. is not available. Thus, in view of the
findings recorded above that revision against such
an order is maintainable, an application under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. would not be maintainable.
The core issue framed by this Court to deal with
the controversy is answered accordingly. Since
the criminal misc. applications filed by the
applicant(s) under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. are not
maintainable, the applicant(s) would be at liberty
to avail the remedy of filing revision, if so advised.

18. In view of the above, the
aforementioned criminal misc. applications under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. stands disposed of.

19. Let a copy each of this judgment be
kept in the files of connected C-482 petitions.

(Lok Pal Singh, J.)
15.11.2018
balwant

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