IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Criminal Miscellaneous No.6364 of 2018
Arising Out of PS. Case No.-36 Year-2016 Thana- BHEJA District- Madhubani
Choudhary Janardan Roy Son of Choudhary Sobhit Roy, Resident of Village-
Batho, P.S.-Bahera, District Darbhanga.
… … Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State Of Bihar.
2. Dayakant Jha Son of Late Umakant Jha, Resident of Village-Rahuya
Sangram P.S. Bheja, District-Madhubani.
… … Opposite Party/s
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr.Gagan Deo Yadav, Adv.
For the Opposite Party/s : Mr. Uday Chand Prasad, APP
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ADITYA KUMAR TRIVEDI
ORAL ORDER
4 07-02-2019 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as
learned A.P.P.
On account of death of deceased allegedly by way of
committing suicide at Chennai learned counsel for the petitioner
has raised the maintainability of complaint petition as well as
the order impugned. Though, in detail scrutiny, for the present is
forbidden however, apart from other ingredients for constituting
dowry death, the one happens to be soon before her death
deceased has been tortured by the husband or relative of the
husband for procurement of the dowry and the same is found
duly substantiated which was exulted over the deceased while
she was staying at her Sasural, within the original jurisdiction.
Furthermore, sections 179 of the Cr.P.C. takes care of the
situation.
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.6364 of 2018(4) dt.07-02-2019
2/5
At the present moment, learned counsel for the
petitioner has referred Y. Abraham Ajith Ors vs Inspector
of Police, Chennai Anr. reported in (2004) 8 SCC 100
wherein, while dealing with the jurisdictional avenue, it has
been hold that same was to be within whose jurisdiction torture
was inflicted. However, matter of jurisdiction has thoroughly
been discussed by the Apex Court in Mohan Baitha Ors. vs.
State of Bihar Anr. reported in 2001 (2) PLJR 83 SC
wherein it has been held:
“4. Mr. P.S.Mishra, the learned senior
counsel, appearing for the accused persons
contended that under Section 177 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, an offence
could be inquired and tried by the Court in
whose local jurisdiction, it was committed
and consequently on the basis of allegations
made in the F.I.R. as well as the complaint
filed, the incident constituting the alleged
offence under Section 304B being at
Jahanaganj (Azamgarh) in the state of Uttar
Pradesh, the Magistrate at Bhagalpur in the
State of Bihar will not have territorial
jurisdiction to try the offence. Mr. Mishra
also further contended that on the basis of
allegations made, no offence under Section
406 IPC can be said to have been constituted.
On examining the assertions in the F.I.R. and
the complaint as well as on scrutinizing the
judgment of the learned Single Judge of
Patna High Court, which is the subject
matter of challenge, we do not find any
substance in either of the contentions raised
by Mr. Mishra. So far as the contention
relating to the constitution of offence under
Section 406 is concerned, we are not
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.6364 of 2018(4) dt.07-02-2019
3/5
required to examine the same, since the
accused never assailed the criminal
proceedings itself on the ground that no
offence under Section 406 IPC can be said to
have been committed. The accused merely
assailed the territorial jurisdiction of the
criminal court at Bhagalpur in relation to
offence under Section 304B on the ground
that the said offence stood committed in
Uttar Pradesh. Section 177 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure on which Mr. Mishra
relies, uses the expression “ordinarily”. The
use of the word “ordinarily” indicates that
the provision is a general one and must be
read subject to the special provisions
contained in the criminal procedure code.
That apart, this Court has taken the view that
the exceptions implied by the word
“ordinarily” need not be limited to those
specially provided for by the law and
exceptions may be provided by law on
considerations of convenience or may be
implied from other provisions of law
permitting joint trial of offences by the same
court (See Purshottamdas Dalmia vs. The State of West
Bengal, ) (L.N.Mukherjee vs. The State of Madras , )
and (Banwari Lal Jhunjhunwala and Ors. Vs.
Union of India and Anr. 1963 Supp.(2)
SCR,338).) Even the Law Commission in its
41st Report had observed that the general
rule laid down in Section 177 is neither
exclusive nor peremptory. The learned Single
Judge while dismissing the contention raised
by the accused has relied upon Section 220
of the Code of Criminal Procedure and
considering the narration of events
culminating in the death of Kalpana, which
constitutes offence under Section 304B of
the IPC, the learned Single Judge has come
to a conclusion that there appears to exist a
continuity of action to attract Sub-section(1)
of section 220, and therefore, it cannot be
said that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate at
Bhagalpur is ousted to try the offence under
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.6364 of 2018(4) dt.07-02-2019
4/5
Section 304B. The High Court also has
casually observed that the assertions made
prima facie constitute an offence under
Section 498A and since the accused has
approached the Court even before the
Magistrate has applied his mind to the result
of the investigation on the basis of the
allegations made by the
informant/complainant, it would not be
appropriate to express any definite opinion
on the same. According to Mr. Mishra, from
the tenor of the impugned judgment, it can
be well imagined that the judgment is rather
strained one and has been passed in view of
the earlier directions and by no stretch of
imagination, the incident constituting the
offence under Section 304B can be held to
be one falling under Section 220 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, so as to be tried along
with the offence under Section 406 at
Bhagalpur. It may be noticed that under
Section 220 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, offences more than one
committed by the same persons could be
tried at one trial, if they can be held to be in
one series of acts, so as to form the same
transaction. The expression “same
transaction” from its very nature is incapable
of an exact definition. It is not intended to be
interpreted in any artificial or technical
sense. Common sense and the ordinary use
of language must decide whether on the facts
of a particular case, it can be held to be in
one transaction. It is not possible to
enunciate any comprehensive formula of
universal application for the purpose of
determining whether two or more acts
constitute the same transaction. But the
circumstances of a given case indicating
proximity of time, unity or proximity of
place, continuity of action and community of
purpose or design are the factors for deciding
whether certain acts form parts of the same
transaction or not. Therefore a series of acts
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.6364 of 2018(4) dt.07-02-2019
5/5
whether are so connected together as to form
the same transaction is purely a question of
fact to be decided on the aforesaid criteria.
Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles and
on scrutiny of the narration of events in the
F.I.R. as well as the complaint, we do not
find any infirmity with the conclusion of the
High Court in applying Section 220 of the
Criminal Procedure Code to the case in hand
and in coming to the conclusion that the
jurisdiction of the Magistrate at Bhagalpur
cannot be held to have been ousted for the
offence under Section 304B IPC. In the
aforesaid premises, we see no merits in this
appeal, which accordingly stands dismissed.
The interim order of stay stands vacated and
the Magistrate is directed to proceed with the
matter expeditiously, in accordance with
law.”
The aforesaid judgment has not been considered inY.
Abraham Ajith Ors vs Inspector of Police, Chennai
Anr.
That being so, the instant petition lacks merit and is
accordingly rejected.
(Aditya Kumar Trivedi, J.)
Prakash Narayan
U T