SC and HC Judgments Online at MyNation

Judgments of Supreme Court of India and High Courts

Damodara Panicker vs The State Of Kerala on 6 June, 2019

INTHEHIGHCOURTOFKERALAATERNAKULAM

PRESENT

THEHONOURABLEMR.JUSTICER.NARAYANAPISHARADI

THURSDAY,THE06THDAYOFJUNE2019/16THJYAISHTA,1941

Crl.MC.No.2255of2013

CRIMENO.467/2013OFPonkunnamPoliceStation,Kottayam

PETITIONERS:

1DAMODARAPANICKER
AGED84YEARS
KULATHOORVEEDU,ELANGULAMKOORALI.P.O.,
PIN-686522.

2SUMANGALADEVI
AGED54YEARS
W/O.JAYAKRISHNAN,KRISHNPRIYA,NARIYANANI.P.O.,PIN-
686506.KOPRAKALAM,KOTTAYAMDISTRICT.

BYADVS.
SRI.K.GOPALAKRISHNAKURUP(SR.)
SRI.K.SURESH
SRI.S.MANU

RESPONDENTS:

1THESTATEOFKERALA
REPRESENTEDBYTHEPUBLICPROSECUTOR,HIGHCOURTOF
KERALA,ERNAKULAM-31.

2ANILKUMAR.P.A.,
S/O.AYYAPPANNAIR,PUNNAPPADIYILVEEDU,
CHENGALAM.P.O.,ELANGULAM-686583.

BYADVS.
SRI.ALEX.M.SCARIAFORR2
SRI.SAJEEVANKURUKKUTTIYULLATHIL
PUBLICPROSECUTORE.C.BINEESH

THISCRIMINALMISC.CASEHAVINGBEENFINALLYHEARDON23.05.2019,
THECOURTON06.06.2019PASSEDTHEFOLLOWING:
Crl.M.C.No.2255/2013
2

“CR”

R.NARAYANAPISHARADI,J
************************
Crl.M.C.No.2255of2013
———————————————
Datedthisthe6thdayofJune,2019

ORDER

Canimmovablepropertybethesubjectmatterof

commissionofanoffenceofcriminalbreachoftrustwhichis

definedunderSection405oftheIndianPenalCode(forshort

‘SectionIPC’)?Thisquestionincidentallyarisesforconsiderationinthis

petitionfiledunderSection482oftheCodeofCriminal

Procedure,1973(hereinafterreferredtoas’theCode’).

2.Thefirstpetitioneristhefatherofthesecond

petitioner.Theyarethefirstandthesecondaccusedinthe

caseregisteredasCrimeNo.467/2013ofthePonkunnampolice

stationunderSections406,Section466,Section467,Section471andSection120BI.P.C.The

aforesaidcasewasregisteredonthebasisofthecomplaintfiled

bythesecondrespondentintheMagistrate’sCourtconcerned

whichwasforwardedtothepoliceunderSection156(3)ofthe

Codeforinvestigation.ThispetitionunderSection482ofthe

Codeisfiledforquashingthefirstinformationreport
Crl.M.C.No.2255/2013
3

(Annexure-A1)inthecase.

3.Thematerialavermentsinthecomplaint(Annexure-

A2)filedbythesecondrespondent(hereinafterreferredtoas

‘thecomplainant’)areasfollows:Thecomplainantisa

memberofKalathurtharavad.Thefirstpetitionerisalsoa

memberofthatfamily.Partitionofthepropertiesofthe

aforesaidtharavadtookplaceintheyear1101(M.E)asper

thedocumentregisteredas1416oftheSubRegistrar’sOffice,

Kanjirappally.Thepropertyhavinganextentof6.11acres,

whichisshownasitemNo.1inthepartitiondeed,wasset

apartasacommonpropertyinthenatureofatrustfor

conductingcertaindivineandcharitableactsasprescribedin

thatdocument.Thereisstipulationinthepartitiondeedasto

howtheincomefromthispropertyshallbeused.Itisthe

eldestmemberofthefamilywhoisempoweredtomanagethe

aforesaidpropertyasatrustee.Thepropertystoodinthe

nameofKerulaPanickerwhowastheeldestmemberofthe

family.Thefirstpetitionerhadbeenmanagingtheproperty

fromtheyear1970onwardsasatrusteefortheother

membersofthefamily.Inordertograbthisproperty,the

petitionersenteredintoaconspiracywiththethenVillage
Crl.M.C.No.2255/2013
4

OfficerofElamgulamVillageandtheyerasedthename’Kerula’

inthethandaperregisterandsubstitutedthenameofthefirst

petitionerastheowneroftheproperty.Thereafter,thefirst

petitionerexecutedandregisteredasettlementdeedas

documentNo.3269/2006infavourofthesecondpetitioner,his

daughter,giftinghertheaforesaidproperty.Executionofthe

settlementdeedbythefirstpetitionerinfavourofthesecond

petitionerwasinviolationofthestipulationscontainedinthe

partitiondeed.Thepetitionershavecommittedtheoffences

punishableunderSections406,466,467,471and120BI.P.C.

4.HeardSri.K.GopalakrishnaKurup,learnedSenior

AdvocatewhoappearedforthepetitionersandSri.Alex

M.Scaria,learnedcounselforthesecond

respondent/complainantandalsothelearnedPublicProsecutor.

5.LearnedSeniorCounselSri.K.GopalakrishnaKurup

hassubmittedthatitisdoubtfulwhetherimmovableproperty

canbethesubjectmatteroftheoffenceofcriminalbreachof

trust.Hehasalsocontendedthattheavermentsinthe

complaintdonotmakeouttheoffencesallegedagainstthe

petitioners.

6.Ontheotherhand,learnedcounselSri.AlexM.
Crl.M.C.No.2255/2013
5

Scariahascontendedthatthecourthastoaccepteachofthe

allegationsmadeinthecomplaintascorrectonitsfacevalue

forthepurposeofdeterminingwhethertheingredientsofthe

offencesallegedaremadeoutornot.Hehassubmittedthat

thisCourtwouldnotbejustifiedininvokingthepowerunder

Section482oftheCodetoquashthefirstinformationreportso

astostrangulatetheinvestigationattheinception.Relying

uponvariousdecisionsoftheApexCourt,hehascontended

thatitisnotwithinthepoweroftheHighCourt,inapetition

filedunderSection482oftheCode,todelvedeepintodisputed

factsandtoembarkuponappreciationofevidence.

7.Oneoftheoffencesallegedagainstthepetitionersis

criminalbreachoftrustwhichisdefinedunderSection405

I.P.C.Thepunishmentforthatoffenceisprovidedunder

Section406I.P.C.Inthepresentcase,immovablepropertyis

thesubjectmatteroftheaforesaidoffencealleged.The

questionariseswhetherimmovablepropertycanbethesubject

matterofanoffenceofcriminalbreachoftrustwhichisdefined

underSection405I.P.C.

8.Section405oftheIndianPenalCodereadsas

follows:

Crl.M.C.No.2255/2013
6

“Criminalbreachoftrust.-Whoever,being
inanymannerentrustedwithproperty,or
withanydominionoverproperty,dishonestly
misappropriatesorconvertstohisownuse
thatproperty,ordishonestlyusesordisposes
ofthatpropertyinviolationofanydirection
oflawprescribingthemodeinwhichsuch
trustistobedischarged,orofanylegal
contract,expressofimplied,whichhehas
madetouchingthedischargeofsuchtrust,or
wilfullysuffersanyotherpersonsotodo,
commits”criminalbreachoftrust.”

9.Section405I.P.Cspeaksofentrustmentofpropertyor

dominionoverproperty.Theoperationofthisprovisionisnot

restrictedto’movableproperty’.Ifthelegislaturehadintended

torestricttheoperationofSection405I.P.Ctomovable

property,thereisnoreasonwhythegeneralword’property’is

usedinthatprovisionwithoutthequalifyingword’movable’.In

thiscontext,itispertinenttonotethattheoperationofmany

otherprovisionsinSectiontheIndianPenalCode(forexample,

Sections378andSection403)isexpresselyrestrictedto’movable

property’.Therefore,thereisnoreasontofindthatthe

expression”property”usedinSection405I.P.Crefersto

movablepropertyonly.

Crl.M.C.No.2255/2013
7

10.SectionInR.K.Dalmiav.DelhiAdministration:AIR1962

SC1821,theApexCourthasheldasfollows:

“Weareofopinionthatthereisnogood
reasontorestrictthemeaningoftheword
‘property’tomovablepropertyonlywhenitis
usedwithoutanyqualificationinSection405
orinothersectionsSectionoftheIndianPenalCode.
Whethertheoffencedefinedinaparticular
sectionSectionoftheIndianPenalCodecanbe
committedinrespectofanyparticularkindof
propertywilldependnotontheinterpretation
oftheword’property’butonthefactwhether
thatparticularkindofpropertycanbesubject
totheactscoveredbythatsection.Itisin
thissensethatitmaybesaidthattheword
‘property’inaparticularsectioncoversonly
thattypeofpropertywithrespecttowhichthe
offencecontemplatedinthatsectioncanbe
committed”.

11.Asnoticedabove,theoperationofSection405I.P.Cis

notrestrictedtomovableproperty.Entrustmentofimmovable

propertyordominionoversuchpropertycanbemadeupona

person.Conversion,useordisposalofsuchproperty,in

violationofthetermsofsuchentrustment,canbecommitted

bythepersontowhomtheentrustmentismade.Inother

words,immovablepropertycanbethesubjectmatterofthe
Crl.M.C.No.2255/2013
8

actscoveredbySection405I.P.C.Therefore,theoffenceof

criminalbreachoftrust,whichisdefinedunderSection405

I.P.C,iscapableofbeingcommittedinrespectofimmovable

property.

12.Beforeconsideringthequestionwhetherthefacts

statedinthecomplaintwouldattracttheoffencesalleged

againstthepetitioners,itisnecessarytorefertosomeofthe

stipulationscontainedinthepartitiondeed(Annexure-A3)with

regardtothepropertyinvolved.Asperthepartitiondeed,the

propertywassetapartasacommonpropertyforthebenefitof

themembersofthetharavad.Thereisastipulationinthe

partitiondeedthattheincomefromthepropertyshallbeused

forthedivineandcharitableactsprescribedinthatdocument.

Thepartitiondeedcontainsastipulationthattillthedeathof

KerulaPanicker,theaforesaidpropertyshallstandinhisname

andafterhisdeath,thepropertyshallbemanagedbythe

eldestmember(karanavar)ofthefamily.Thereisalsoa

stipulationthatifanysuchpersonresponsibleforthe

managementofthepropertyshowsneglectintheperformance

ofhisduties,thenexteldestmembershallhavetherightto

givenoticetodisengagesuchpersonfromthemanagementof
Crl.M.C.No.2255/2013
9

thepropertyandtotakeoverthemanagementoftheproperty.

Thepartitiondeedfurthercontainsastipulationthatno

memberofthefamilyalonehasgotrighttomakeany

documentinrespectofthepropertyandifanydocumentisto

beexecuted,itshallbedonebyallthemembersofthefamily

whohaveattainedmajorityandifanydocumentisexecutedin

violationofthisstipulation,suchdocumentshallbevoidand

anymemberofthefamilyhasgottherighttoseekappropriate

relief.

13.Now,itshallbeexaminedwhetherthefactsstatedin

thecomplaintattracttheoffenceofcriminalbreachoftrust.

14.AccordingtoSection405I.P.C,theoffenceofcriminal

breachoftrustinvolvesthefollowingingredients:(a)aperson

shouldhavebeenentrustedwithproperty,orentrustedwith

dominionoverproperty;(b)thatpersonshoulddishonestly

misappropriateorconverttohisownusethatproperty,or

dishonestlyuseordisposeofthatpropertyorwilfullysufferany

otherpersontodoso;and(c)thatsuchmisappropriation,

conversion,useordisposalshouldbeinviolationofany

directionoflawprescribingthemodeinwhichsuchtrustisto

bedischarged,orofanylegalcontractwhichthepersonhas
Crl.M.C.No.2255/2013
10

made,touchingthedischargeofsuchtrust(SectionSeeIndianOil

CorporationLimitedv.NEPCIndiaLimited:AIR2006SC

2780).Twodistinctpartsareinvolvedinthecommissionof

theoffenceofcriminalbreachoftrust.Thefirstpartconsistsof

thecreationofanobligationinrelationtothepropertyover

whichdominionorcontrolisacquiredbytheaccused.The

secondpartinvolvesmisappropriationordealingwiththe

propertydishonestlyandcontrarytothetermsoftheobligation

created(SeeOnkarNathMisrav.State:(2008)2SCC

561)

15.Intheinstantcase,theavermentinthecomplaintis

thatthefirstpetitionerhadbeenmanagingthepropertyin

questionfromtheyear1970onwardsasatrusteeforall

membersofthefamily.But,thereisnoavermentinthe

complaintastohowthefirstpetitionerhadacquired

managementorpossessionoftheproperty.Thereisno

avermentinthecomplaintthattherewasanyentrustmentof

thepropertyordominionoverthepropertytothefirst

petitionerinanymanner.

16.Theexpression’entrustedwithproperty’or’withany

dominionoverproperty’hasbeenusedinawidesensein
Crl.M.C.No.2255/2013
11

Section405I.P.C.Theexpression’entrusted’appearingin

Section405I.P.Cisnotnecessarilyatermoflaw.Ithaswide

anddifferentimplicationsindifferentcontexts.Thepropertyin

respectofwhichcriminalbreachoftrustcanbecommitted

mustnecessarilybethepropertyofsomepersonotherthanthe

accusedorthebeneficialinterestinorownershipofitmustbe

inotherpersonandtheoffendermustholdsuchpropertyin

trustforsuchotherpersonorforhisbenefit(SectionSeeCentral

BureauofInvestigationv.DuncansAgroIndustries

Limited:AIR1996SC2452).

17.True,entrustmentofpropertyasenvisagedin

Section405I.P.Cneednotbeinanyparticularmanner.The

entrustmentmayarisein”anymanner”whatsoever.Thewords

‘inanymanner’inthecontextaresignificant.Thesectiondoes

notprovidethattheentrustmentofthepropertywiththe

accusedshallbemadebysomeperson.Aslongastheaccused

isgivenpossessionofpropertyforaspecificpurposeortodeal

withitinaparticularmanner,theownershipbeinginsome

personotherthantheaccused,hecanbesaidtobeentrusted

withthatpropertytobeappliedinaccordancewiththetermsof

entrustmentandforthebenefitoftheowner(SeeSomNath
Crl.M.C.No.2255/Section2013
12

Puriv.StateofRajasthan:AIR1972SC1490).

18.Intheinstantcase,thereisnotevenanavermentin

thecomplaintthatthefirstpetitionerhadcomeintopossession

ormanagementofthepropertyastheeldestmemberofthe

familyatthattimeorbyvirtueofanyotherstipulation

containedinthepartitiondeed.Thereisnoavermentinthe

complaintsufficienttomakeatleastaninferencethatthefirst

petitionerhadcomeintopossessionormanagementofthe

propertybyvirtueofanystipulationinthepartitiondeed.

19.Inordertoestablish”entrustmentordominion”over

propertytoanaccusedpersonthemereexistenceofthat

person’sdominionoverpropertyisnotenough.Itmustbe

furthershownthathisdominionwastheresultofentrustment

(SectionSeeVeljiRaghavjiPatelv.StateofMaharashtra:AIR

1965SC1433).Theterm”entrusted”inSection405I.P.C

governsnotonlytheword”withtheproperty”immediately

followingitbutalsothewords”orwithanydominionoverthe

property”occurringthereafter(SectionSeeStateofGujaratv.

JaswantlalNathalal:AIR1968SC700).

20.Thecomplaintdoesnotcontainevenanavermentthat

thefirstpetitionerwasentrustedwiththepropertyordominion
Crl.M.C.No.2255/2013
13

overitatleastbyvirtueofthestipulationscontainedinthe

partitiondeed.Intheabsenceofanyavermentinthe

complaintregardingentrustmentofpropertyordominionover

thepropertyinquestionwiththefirstpetitionerinanymanner,

oneofthebasicingredientsoftheoffenceofcriminalbreachof

trustisnotmadeoutagainsthim.Whentheoffencepunishable

underSection406I.P.Cisnotmadeoutagainstthefirst

petitioner,thesecondpetitionercannotbemadeliablefor

committingsuchoffencewiththeaidofSection120BI.P.C.

21.Theotheroffencesallegedagainstthepetitioners

areunderSections466,Section467andSection471I.P.C.Section466SectionI.P.C

providesthepunishmentforcommittingforgeryofcourt

records,publicregistersetc.Section467I.P.Cprovidesthe

punishmentforcommittingforgeryofvaluablesecurities,will

etc.Section471I.P.Cprovidesthatwhoeverfraudulentlyor

dishonestlyusesasgenuineanydocumentorelectronicrecord

whichheknowsorhasreasontobelievetobeaforged

documentorelectronicrecord,shallbepunishedinthesame

mannerasifhehadforgedsuchdocumentorelectronicrecord.

22.Oneoftheallegationsinthecomplaintisthatthe

firstpetitionerexecutedandregisteredasettlementdeedin
Crl.M.C.No.2255/2013
14

favourofthesecondpetitioner,giftingherthepropertyin

questionandtherefore,hehascommittedtheoffenceof

forgerypunishableunderSections467and471I.P.C.

23.Section463I.P.CdefinesforgeryandSection464

I.P.Cdealswithmakingafalsedocument.Section463provides

thatwhoevermakesanyfalsedocumentorfalseelectronic

recordorpartofadocumentorelectronicrecordwithintentto

causedamageorinjury,tothepublicortoanyperson,orto

supportanyclaimortitle,ortocauseanypersontopartwith

property,ortoenterintoanyexpressorimpliedcontract,or

withintenttocommitfraudorthatfraudmaybecommitted,

commitsforgery.Inordertoconstituteforgery,thefirst

essentialconditionisthattheaccusedshouldhavemadea

falsedocument.Thefalsedocumentmustbemadewithan

intenttocausedamageorinjurytothepublicortoanyclassof

publicortoanycommunity.Thedefinitionoftheoffenceof

forgerydeclarestheoffencetobecompletedwhenafalse

documentorfalsepartofadocumentismadewithspecified

intention.Inacaseofforgery,thequestionsare:(i)isthe

documentfalse(ii)isitmadebytheaccusedand(iii)isitmade

withanintenttodefraud.Everyforgerypostulatesafalse
Crl.M.C.No.2255/2013
15

documenteitherinwholeorinpart,however,small.

24.AnanalysisofSection464I.P.Cshowsthatitdivides

falsedocumentsintothreecategories:(1)Thefirstiswherea

persondishonestlyorfraudulentlymakesorexecutesa

documentwiththeintentionofcausingittobebelievedthat

suchdocumentwasmadeorexecutedbysomeotherperson,

orbytheauthorityofsomeotherperson,bywhomorby

whoseauthorityheknowsitwasnotmadeorexecuted.(2)The

secondiswhereapersondishonestlyorfraudulently,by

cancellationorotherwise,altersadocumentinanymaterial

part,withoutlawfulauthority,afterithasbeenmadeor

executedbyeitherhimselforanyotherpersonand(3)The

thirdiswhereapersondishonestlyorfraudulentlycausesany

persontosign,executeoralteradocumentknowingthatsuch

personcouldnotbyreasonof(a)unsoundnessofmind;or(b)

intoxication;or(c)deceptionpractiseduponhim,knowthe

contentsofthedocumentorthenatureofthealteration.In

short,apersonissaidtohavemadea’falsedocument’,if(i)

hemadeorexecutedadocumentclaimingtobesomeoneelse

orauthorisedbysomeoneelse;or(ii)healteredortampereda

document;or(iii)heobtainedadocumentbypracticing
Crl.M.C.No.2255/2013
16

deception,orfromapersonnotincontrolofhissenses(SectionSee

MohammedIbrahimv.StateofBihar:(2009)8SCC751).

25.InMohammedIbrahim(supra),theApexCourthas
heldasfollows:

“Thereisafundamentaldifferencebetweena
personexecutingasaledeedclaimingthatthe
propertyconveyedishisproperty,andaperson
executingasaledeedbyimpersonatingtheowner
orfalselyclaimingtobeauthorisedorempowered
bytheowner,toexecutethedeedonowner’s
behalf.Whenapersonexecutesadocument
conveyingapropertydescribingitashis,there
aretwopossibilities.Thefirstisthathebonafide
believesthatthepropertyactuallybelongstohim.

Thesecondisthathemaybedishonestlyor
fraudulentlyclaimingittobehiseventhoughhe
knowsthatitisnothisproperty.Buttofallunder
firstcategoryof’falsedocuments’,itisnot
sufficientthatadocumenthasbeenmadeor
executeddishonestlyorfraudulently.Thereisa
furtherrequirementthatitshouldhavebeen
madewiththeintentionofcausingittobe
believedthatsuchdocumentwasmadeor
executedby,orbytheauthorityofaperson,by
whomorbywhoseauthorityheknowsthatitwas
notmadeorexecuted.Whenadocumentis
executedbyapersonclaimingapropertywhichis
nothis,heisnotclaimingthatheissomeoneelse
norisheclaimingthatheisauthorisedby
Crl.M.C.No.2255/2013
17

someoneelse.Therefore,executionofsuch
document(purportingtoconveysomepropertyof
whichheisnottheowner)isnotexecutionofa
falsedocumentasdefinedunderSection464of
theCode.Ifwhatisexecutedisnotafalse
document,thereisnoforgery.Ifthereisno
forgery,thenneitherSection467norSection471
oftheCodeareattrated.”

26.Makingofanyfalsedocumentissinequanonto

attracttheoffenceofforgery.InSheilaSebastianv.

Jawaharaj:AIR2018SC2434,theApexCourthasheld

thatthedefinitionof”falsedocument”isapartofthedefinition

of”forgery”andbothmustbereadtogether.Apersonissaidto

makeafalsedocumentorrecordifhesatisfiesoneofthethree

conditionsasnoticedhereinbeforeandprovidedforunder

Section464I.P.C.

27.Intheinstantcase,thereisnoallegationthatthe

firstpetitionerhadexecutedthesettlementdeedclaimingto

besomeoneelseorauthorisedbysomeoneelse.Thereisno

allegationthathehaddishonestlyorfraudulentlyalteredthe

settlementdeed,withoutlawfulauthority.Thereisalsono

allegationthatheobtainedanydocumentbypracticing

deception,orfromapersonnotincontrolofhissenses.
Crl.M.C.No.2255/2013
18

Therefore,executionofthesettlementdeedbythefirst

petitionerinfavourofhisdaughterdoesnotattracttheoffence

offorgery.

28.Executionofadocumentbyaperson,whohasgotno

titleoveraproperty,sellingortransferringthatpropertyin

favourofanotherperson,doesnotsatisfytheingredientsof

commissionoftheoffenceofforgery(SectionSeeRameshDuttv.

StateofPunjab:(2009)15SCC429).

29.Learnedcounselforthesecondrespondent/

complainantwouldpointoutthatthereisallegationinthe

complaintthatthepetitionersenteredintoaconspiracywith

theVillageOfficerconcernedandtheycorrectedtheentry

regardingtheownershipofthepropertyintherevenueregister

(thandaperregister)andtheaforesaidallegationwouldattract

theoffenceofforgery.

30.Thereisanavermentinthesecondparagraphofthe

complaintthatthepetitionerserasedthename’Kerula’from

thename’KerulaPanicker’inthethandaperregisterand

incorporatedthenameofthefirstpetitionerastheownerof

thepropertyforthepurposeofgrabbingtheproperty.Thereis

alsoavermentsinthethirdandthefourthparagraphsofthe
Crl.M.C.No.2255/2013
19

complaintthatthepetitionershadenteredintoaconspiracy

withtheVillageOfficerandthattheycorrectedtheentryinthe

thandaperregisterkeptinthevillageoffice.

31.Inthiscontext,itistobenotedthattheVillage

Officer,againstwhomtheallegationisraisedbythe

complainant,isnotmadeanaccusedinthecase.Thedateor

monthoryearinwhichcorrectionwasmadeintherevenue

registerwhichwaskeptinthevillageofficeisnotmentionedin

thecomplaint.Itisalsonotstatedinthecomplainthowthe

petitionersgotpossessionoftheregisterkeptinthevillage

officeenablingthemtomakeanycorrectioninit.Itis

inherentlyimprobablethatthepetitionershadcorrectedthe

entryinaregisterwhichwaskeptinthevillageofficeinthe

custodyoftheVillageOfficer.Thevagueandgeneralallegation

thatthepetitionershadenteredintoaconspiracywiththe

VillageOfficerisnotsufficient.Whatistobeconsideredisthe

substanceofthecomplaint.Mereallegationthatthepetitioners

hadenteredintoaconspiracywiththeVillageOfficer,thattoo,

withoutmakingthatVillageOfficerasanaccused,isnot

sufficient.AsheldbytheApexCourtinSheilaSebastian

(supra),achargeofforgerycannotbeimposedonaperson
Crl.M.C.No.2255/2013
20

whoisnotthemakerofthefalsedocument.Makingofa

documentisdifferentthancausingittobemade.Inorderto

attracttheoffenceofforgery,itisimperativethatafalse

documentismadeandtheaccusedpersonisthemakerofthe

same.

32.Intheaforesaidcircumstances,theallegations/

avermentsinthecomplaintdonotspellouttheingredientsof

theoffenceofforgerypunishableunderSections466,Section467and

Section471I.P.Cagainstthepetitioners.

33.Inthiscontextitisalsopertinenttonotethatsome

oftheothermembersofthefamilyofthecomplainanthave

institutedasuitasO.S.No.148/2013intheMunsiff’sCourt,Pala

againstthepetitionersandtwootherpersonsseekingcertain

reliefsinrespectofthepropertyinvolvedinthepresentcase.

Inthatsuit,adecreeofdeclarationissoughtthattheproperty

isatrustpropertyandadecreeofrecoveryofpossessionofthe

propertyisalsosought.Thereisalsoareliefsoughtinthat

suitforsettlementofaschemeforadministrationofthe

property.

34.Thedisputeinvolvedintheinstantcaseisbasically

oressentiallyofacivilnature.True,acivilremedydoesnot
Crl.M.C.No.2255/2013
21

foreclosetherightoftheaggrievedpartytoapproachthe

criminalcourtwithacomplaintsettingoutallegationsdisclosing

commissionofcriminaloffences.But,iftheallegations

containedinthecomplainttakenontheirfacevaluedonot

constituteanyoftheoffencesalleged,theHighCourtshallnot

hesitatetoquashthecriminalproceedings.Whenthedispute

relatestoimmovablepropertyisbasicallyoressentiallyofa

civilnatureandwhenitisgiventhecolourofcriminaloffences,

theaccusedcannotbemadetoundergotheordealofatrialin

acriminalcourt.Criminalproceedingsarenotashortcutof

otherremediesavailableinlaw.

35.Inthepresentcase,someothermembersofthe

familyhaveinstitutedasuitforappropriatereliefsinrespectof

thepropertyinvolved.Thesecondrespondentfiledthe

complaintagainstthepetitionersnearlysixyearsafterthe

executionofthesettlementdeedinrespectofthepropertyby

thefirstpetitionerinfavourofthesecondpetitioner.The

avermentsinthecomplaint,readonitsface,donotdisclose

theingredientsnecessarytoconstitutetheoffencesalleged

againstthepetitioners.Anattempthasbeenmadebythe

secondrespondenttocloakthedispute,whichisessentiallyof
Crl.M.C.No.2255/2013
22

acivilnature,withacriminalnature.Inthesecircumstances,

thefirstinformationreport,whichisbasedonthecomplaint,is

liabletobequashed.

36.Consequently,thepetitionisallowed.Annexure-A1

firstinformationreportinCrimeNo.467/2013ofPonkunnam

policestationandallfurtherproceedingspursuanttoitare

herebyquashed.

(sd/-)

R.NARAYANAPISHARADI,JUDGE
jsr/27/05/2019
Crl.M.C.No.2255/2013
23

APPENDIX
PETITIONERS’EXHIBITS:

EXHIBITP1ANX.A1TRUECOPYOFTHEFIRINCRIME
NO.467/13OFTHEPONKUNNMPOLICE
STATION.

EXHIBITP2ANX.A2TRUECOPYOFTHECOMPLAINTIN
C.M.P.NO.1457/2013FILEDBYTHE2ND
RESPONDENT.

EXHIBITP3ANX.A3TRUECOPYOFTHEDOCUMENTNO.

1816OF1101(ME)OFTHEKANJIRAPPALLY
SUBREGISTRY.

EXHIBITP4ANX.A4TRUECOPYOFTHEDOCUMENTNO.

3269/2006.

RESPONDENTS’EXHIBITS:

NIL

TRUECOPY

PSTOJUDGE

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