SC and HC Judgments Online at MyNation

Judgments of Supreme Court of India and High Courts

Darshna vs Govt Of Nct Of Delhi & Ors on 3 October, 2018

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Judgment reserved on: September 18, 2018
Judgment delivered on: October 03, 2018

+ LPA 537/2018

DARSHNA ….. Appellant
Through: Mr. Rahul Sagar Sahay and
Mr. Siddharth Bangar, Advs.

versus

GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI ORS ….. Respondents
Through: Mr. Naushad Ahmad Khan, ASC
(Civil), GNCTD with Mr. Zahid
Hanief, Adv.

CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE V. KAMESWAR RAO

JUDGMENT

V. KAMESWAR RAO, J

1. This Appeal has been filed by the appellant challenging

the order dated 18th July, 2018 passed by the learned Single Judge

in W.P.(C) 6592/2018, whereby the learned Single Judge has

dismissed the writ petition challenging the order dated 8 th June,

2018 passed by the District Magistrate whereby the appellant has

been directed to evict the first floor of house No. 2777/21,

Beadonpura, Karol Bagh, New Delhi – 110005 occupied by her

and to hand over the physical possession of the property to

LPA 537/2018 Page 1 of 20
respondent no.2, namely Dhani Ram.

2. The facts as noted from the record are, the appellant is the

daughter-in-law of Dhani Ram and is residing in the premises

along with Dhani Ram and his wife. It is her case that she

occupies only one room of the said property. It is noted that there

are matrimonial disputes between Darshna and her husband.

Further there are also disputes between Darshna and her in-laws,

i.e. Dhani Ram and his wife. Darshna has instituted proceedings

under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,

2005 against her in laws. Darshna and her husband had also

instituted divorce proceeding before the Principal Judge, Family

Court on the ground of cruelty. It is also a conceded position that

Darshna and her husband are now separated and are not living

along with Dhani Ram and his wife in the aforesaid property for

the last several months. Darshna has filed an application for

maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C., which is stated to be

pending. The proceedings by Darshna alleging offences under

Section 498A/406 34 IPC are pending against her husband and

parents in law. It is also noted that Dhani Ram has also filed a

Civil Suit against the appellant Darshna for permanent and

mandatory injunction, which is pending before Tis Hazari Court,
LPA 537/2018 Page 2 of 20
Delhi. Dhani Ram has also filed an application before the

District Magistrate seeking eviction of his son and appellant from

the premises. The said proceedings were decided by the District

Magistrate whereby a direction has been given, which has already

been reflected above.

3. The case of the appellant before the learned Single Judge

as canvassed by her counsel was that petition filed by Dhani Ram

for eviction was not maintainable as Dhani Ram had not sought

for any relief of maintenance under Section 4 of the Maintenance

and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (hereinafter

referred to as Act of 2007) and that getting rent from the shops

on ground floor of the property, he did not require any

maintenance and as such the claim for eviction without

maintenance was not maintainable.

4. One of the submissions made on behalf of the appellant

before the learned Single Judge was also that the provisions of

Delhi Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens

Rules as amended in the year 2016 only enable senior citizen to

evict his son, daughter or legal heir from his self-acquired

property on account of his non-maintenance and ill-treatment. It

was the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that
LPA 537/2018 Page 3 of 20
the daughter-in-law did not fall within the scope of the said

Rules. Therefore, the application for evicting the appellant / his

daughter-in-law is not maintainable. Further it was stated that the

property in question was an ancestral property of Dhani Ram and

therefore, he could not maintain the application for eviction under

the Act or the Rules.

5. It is noted from the impugned order that serious

allegations have been made against the appellant on her

misbehavior and physically assaulting Dhani Ram and his wife..

The learned Single Judge has also noted the fact that the District

Magistrate had called for a report from the SDM, Karol Bagh and

who on enquiries confirmed that Darshna used to fight with her

in-laws; she used to spit on them and also used filthy language.

Learned Single Judge accepted the allegations made by Dhani

Ram and the fact that Dhani Ram and Darshna cannot live

together in the same premises. In fact, Dhani Ram placed reliance

on the CCTV footage, which footage, according to the learned

Single cannot be faulted.

6. On the issue, that the application filed by Dhani Ram for

eviction was not maintainable as he had not made a request for

maintenance as is contemplated under Section 4 of the Act is
LPA 537/2018 Page 4 of 20
concerned, the same was rejected by the learned Single Judge by

relying upon the Delhi Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and

Senior Citizens (Amendment) Rules, 2016, holding that the said

rules entitle a senior citizen to seek eviction of his son, daughter

or his legal heir (s) on account of ill-treatment and were framed

in aid of protecting the life and property of the senior citizens and

not in furtherance of Section 4 of the Act. The said conclusion of

the learned Single Judge is justified. In fact, this court in LPA

205/2017 titled as Sunny Paul v. State of NCT of Delhi and Ors.

rejected a similar contention by holding as under:

“On a perusal of the provisions of the Act of 2007, it is
seen that the same has been enacted to provide for
effective provisions for the maintenance and welfare of
parents and senior citizens guaranteed and recognized
under the Constitution and for matters connected
therewith or incidental thereto. The necessity of
framing the Act is because of the erosion of joint family
system resulting in the elderly parents and senior
citizens getting neglected by the children including lack
of physical and financial support from them. Section 3
of the Act of 2007 gives the overriding effect over any
other enactment / instrument. Chapter II of the Act deals
with the maintenance of parents and senior citizens.
Section 4 of the Act enables a senior citizen including
parent who is unable to maintain himself from his own
earnings or out of the property owned by him to make
an application under Section 5 for his / her maintenance
so that he / she can lead a normal life. Chapter V of the
Act of 2007 deals with protection of life and property of

LPA 537/2018 Page 5 of 20
senior citizens. Section 23(1) under Chapter V confers a
power on the Tribunal to declare transfer of property in
certain circumstances as void. Section 23(2) inter-alia
stipulates that a senior citizen has a right to receive
maintenance out of an estate and if such estate or part
thereof is transferred, the right to receive maintenance
may be enforced against the transferee if the transferee
has notice of the right, or if the transfer is gratuitous;
but not against the transferee for consideration and
without notice of right. There is nothing in Section 23,
which pre-supposes an application for maintenance as a
prerequisite for seeking a relief under it. The scope of
Section 23 is to declare the transfer of property by a
senior citizen with an intent that the transferee shall
provide the basic amenities and physical needs to the
transferor and if such transferee refuses or fails to
provide such amenities and physical needs, in such an
eventuality, the transfer of property can be declared
void by the Tribunal. A senior citizen may be contended
if the transfer of property effected is treated as void so
as to enable him to maintain himself from the estate, for
which a senior citizen may not seek maintenance. So
the plea of the learned counsel for the appellant that in
the absence of a claim for maintenance by the
respondent Nos.2 and 3, a petition under Section 23
shall not be maintainable, is without any merit. Further,
the Delhi Government had initially framed Delhi
Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior
Citizens Rules, 2009, which have been amended in the
year 2016, whereby Sub Rule 3(1)(i) has been
incorporated to Rule 22 of the Rules. The same reads as
under:-

“(i) A senior citizen may make an application
before the Dy. Commissioner/District
Magistrate(DM) of his district for eviction of
his son and daughter or legal heir from his self
acquired property on account of his non-
maintenance and ill-treatment.

XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX”

LPA 537/2018 Page 6 of 20

12. The said Sub Rule has undergone an amendment in
the year 2017 to the following extent:-

“(i) A senior citizen/parents may make an
application before the Deputy
Commissioner/District Magistrate of his district
for eviction of his son and daughter or legal heir
from his property of any kind whether movable or
immovable, ancestral or self-acquired, tangible or
intangible and include rights or interests in such
property on account of his non-maintenance and
ill-treatment.”

13. The said Sub Rule 3 has been incorporated in Rule
22 of the Rules to give effect to Section 23 of the Act and
not to Section 4 of the Act. So, it follows that it is not
necessary that to invoke Section 23, one has to seek
maintenance under Section 4.”

7. In so far as the plea on behalf of the appellant that the

property in question is not Dhani Ram’s self-acquired property

but an ancestral property is concerned, learned Single Judge

rejected the plea by noting that the property was allotted to the

mother of Dhani Ram, Smt. Bahuti Devi on 4th May, 1967 and

the same devolved on him by way of a Registered Will dated 28th

January, 1968. The learned Single Judge rejected the said plea by

relying upon Rule 22(3)(1)(i) of Delhi Maintenance and Welfare

of Parents and Senior Citizens (Amendment) Rules 2017, which

stipulated that a senior citizen or a parent can make an application

to the concerned Deputy Commissioner / District Magistrate for

LPA 537/2018 Page 7 of 20
eviction of his son, daughter or legal heir from his property of

any kind whether moveable or immoveable, ancestral or self-

acquired, tangible or intangible and includes rights or interests in

such properties on account of his non-maintenance and ill-

treatment.

8. On perusal of Rule 22(3)(1)(i) as incorporated in the

Delhi Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens

Rules 2017 and noting the fact that the property in question had

devolved on him by way of a registered Will executed by his

mother, surely it follows that Dhani Ram’s son or for that matter

his daughter-in-law can claim no right in the same. In any case,

under the Rules, a senior citizen / parent can seek eviction of son,

daughter or legal heir from an ancestral or self-acquired property,

the vires of which Rule has not been challenged by the appellant

in these proceedings nor before the learned Single Judge. As

long as the said Rules exist, the order of the Tribunal giving

impugned directions cannot be faulted.

9. In so far as the plea of the appellant before the learned

Single Judge that Rule 22(3)(1)(i) applies to son, daughter and

legal heir and not to the daughter-in-law is concerned, the same

was also rejected by the learned Single Judge by holding that the
LPA 537/2018 Page 8 of 20
said Rule cannot be interpreted in a restrictive manner; he relied

upon the Judgment of the Division Bench in the case of the

Shadab Khairi and Anr. V. The State and Ors, LPA 783/2017

decided on 22nd February, 2018 wherein it was held that the Act,

being a welfare legislation was required to be interpreted

liberally. We concur with the said conclusion. This court while

considering the Judgment of the learned Single Judge in Sunny

Paul and Anr. (Supra) has upheld the Judgment of the learned

Single Judge in Sunny Paul’s case by holding as under:

“15. Insofar as the submission of the learned counsel
for the appellant that the Tribunal did not have the
jurisdiction to direct the appellant to vacate the property is
concerned, suffice to state, that as stated above, the
Government of NCT of Delhi has framed Rules called Delhi
Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens
Rules, 2009. The same were amended in December, 2016,
whereby Sub Rule 3 was incorporated to Rule 22, which
stipulates as under:-

“(3)(1) Procedure for eviction from property/residential
building of Senior Citizen/Parents –

(i) A senior citizen may make an application before the
Dy. Commissioner/District Magistrate(DM) of his
district for eviction of his son and daughter or legal heir
from his self acquired property on account of his non-
maintenance and ill-treatment.

(ii) The Deputy Commissioner/DM shall immediately
forward such application to the concerned Sub
Divisional Magistrates for verification of the title of the
property and facts of the case within 15 days from the
date of receipt of such application.

LPA 537/2018 Page 9 of 20

(iii) The Sub Divisional Magistrate shall immediately
submit its report to the Deputy Commissioner/DM for
LPA 783/2017 Page 7 final orders within 21 days from
the date of receipt of the complaint/application.

(iv) The Deputy Commissioner/DM during summary
proceedings for the protection of senior citizen parents
shall consider all the relevant provisions of the said Act
2007. If the Deputy Commissioner/DM is of opinion that
any son or daughter or legal heir of a senior
citizen/parents is not maintaining the senior citizen and
ill treating him and yet is occupying the self acquired
property of the senior citizen, and that they should be
evicted, the Deputy Commissioner/DM shall issue in the
manner hereinafter provided a notice in writing calling
upon all persons concerned to show cause as to why an
order of eviction should not be issued against
them/him/her.

(v) The notice shall-

(a) specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is
proposed to be made; and

(b) require all persons concerned, that is to say, all
persons who are, or may be, in occupation of, or claim
interest in, the property/premises, to show cause, if any,
against the proposed order on or before such date as is
specified in the notice, being a date not earlier than ten
days from the date of issued thereof.

(2) Eviction Order from property/residential building of
Senior Citizens/Parent. –

(i) If, after considering the cause, if any, shown by any
person in pursuance to the notice and any evidence
he/she may produce in support of the same and after
giving him/her a reasonable opportunity of being heard,
the Deputy Commissioner/DM is satisfied that the
eviction order needs to be made, the Deputy
Commissioner/DM may make an order of eviction, for
LPA 783/2017 Page 8 reasons to be recorded therein,
LPA 537/2018 Page 10 of 20
directing that the property/residential building shall be
vacated;

(3) Enforcement of Orders,

(i) If any person refuses or fails to comply with the order
of eviction within thirty days from the date of its issue,
the Deputy Commissioner/DM or any other officer duly
authorized by the Deputy Commissioner/DM in this
behalf may evict that person from the premises in
question and take possession;

(ii) The Deputy Commissioner/DM shall have powers to
enforce the eviction orders through Police and the Dy.
Commissioner of Police concerned shall be bound to
carry out execution of the eviction order.

(iii) The Deputy Commissioner/DM will further
handover the property/premises in question to the
concerned Senior Citizen.

(iv) The Deputy Commissioner/DM shall forward
monthly report of such cases to the Social Welfare
Department by 7th of the following month.”

16. A further amendment has been carried out to Sub Rule 3
to Rule 22 of the Delhi Maintenance and Welfare of Parents
and Senior Citizens Rules, 2009 in the year 2017, which
amendment has already been reproduced above. The
aforesaid Rules also deal with enforcement of orders passed
by the Tribunal.

17. A reading of the Rules framed by the Government of
NCT clearly reflect that a senior citizen can file an
application seeking eviction of his son and daughter or
legal heir from his self acquired or ancestral property on
the ground of ill-treatment or non maintenance. The vires
of these Rules has not been challenged by the appellant.
The limited challenge is to the jurisdiction of the
Maintenance Tribunal to order an eviction under the Act of
2007. So noting the limited challenge to the order passed
by the Tribunal and keeping in view the fact that the
enactment being a social legislation and the same requires
LPA 537/2018 Page 11 of 20
to be given liberal interpretation to achieve the mandate of
the Act of 2007 i.e for the welfare of the parents and senior
citizens and for the protection of their life and property,
there is no doubt that the Tribunal does have the
jurisdiction to direct vacation by the children of any
property in which the senior citizen has a right of residence
/ possession. In this regard, we may refer to the judgment of
the Supreme Court in Board of Muslim Wakfs, Rajasthan
v. Radha Krishna and Ors (1979) 2 SCC 468 wherein it
was held that the construction which tends to make any part
of the Statute meaningless or ineffective must always be
avoided and the construction which advances the remedy
intended by the Statute should be accepted.

18. In Hindustan Lever Ltd vs Ashok Vishnu Kate Ors
1995 SCC (6) 326, it was held that words occurring in
statutes of liberal import such as social welfare legislation
and human rights legislation are not to be put in
Procrustean beds or shrunk to Liliputian dimensions. In
construing these legislations the imposture of literal
construction must be avoided and the prodigality of its
misapplication must be recognized and reduced.

19. On a similar proposition, the Supreme Court in State of
Bihar Ors. V. Anil Kumar and Ors AIR 2017 SC 2716
has by relying upon National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Laxmi
Narain Dhut (2007) 4 SCALE 36 held as under: –

“68. A statute is an edict of the Legislature and in
construing a statute, it is necessary to seek the
intention of its maker. A statute has to be construed
according to the intent of those who make it and the
duty of the court is to act upon the true intention of
the Legislature. If a statutory provision is open to
more than one interpretation the Court has to
choose that interpretation which represents the true
intention of the Legislature. This task very often
raises difficulties because of various reasons,
inasmuch as the words used may not be scientific
symbols having any precise or definite meaning and
the language may be an imperfect medium to convey
one’s thought or that the assembly of Legislatures
LPA 537/2018 Page 12 of 20
consisting of persons of various shades of opinion
purport to convey a meaning which may be obscure.
It is impossible even for the most imaginative
Legislature to foresee all situations exhaustively and
circumstances that may emerge after enacting a
statute where its application may be called for.
Nonetheless, the function of the Courts is only to
expound and not to legislate. Legislation in a
modern State is actuated with some policy to curb
some public evil or to effectuate some public benefit.
The legislation is primarily directed to the problems
before the Legislature based on information derived
from past and present experience. It may also be
designed by use of general words to cover similar
problems arising in future. But, from the very
nature of things, it is impossible to anticipate fully
the varied situations arising in future in which the
application of the legislation in hand may be called
for, and, words chosen to communicate such
indefinite referents are bound to be in many cases
lacking in clarity and precision and thus giving rise
to controversial questions of construction. The
process of construction combines both literal and
purposive approaches. In other words the legislative
intention i.e., the true or legal meaning of an
enactment is derived by considering the meaning of
the words used in the enactment in the light of any
discernible purpose or object which comprehends
the mischief and its remedy to which the enactment
is directed. (See District Mining Officer and Ors. v.
Tata Iron Steel Co. Anr. JT 2001 (6) SC 183). It
is also well settled that to arrive at the intention of
the legislation depending on the objects for which
the enactment is made, the Court can resort to
historical, contextual and purposive interpretation
leaving textual interpretation aside.

(emphasis supplied)

69. It was also opined:

More often than not, literal interpretation of a statute
or a provision of a statute results in absurdity.

Therefore, while interpreting statutory provisions,
LPA 537/2018 Page 13 of 20
the Courts should keep in mind the objectives or
purpose for which statute has been enacted. Justice
Frankfurter of U.S. Supreme Court in an article titled
as Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes (47
Columbia Law Reports 527), observed that,
“legislation has an aim, it seeks to obviate some
mischief, to supply an adequacy, to effect a change of
policy, to formulate a plan of Government. That aim,
that policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it
is evidenced in the language of the statutes, as read in
the light of other external manifestations of purpose”.

20. The learned Single Judge has also relied upon the
judgments of the Punjab Haryana High Court and
Gujarat High Court in the case of Justice Shanti Sarup
Dewan, Chief Justice (Retired) and another (supra) and
Jayantram Vallabhdas Meswania (supra).

21. In para of Justice Shanti Sarup Dewan, Chief Justice
(Retired) and another (supra), the Punjab Haryana High
Court has held as under:-

“37. It cannot be said that in such a situation, where
respondent No. 7 was at best living with the
permission of his parents, which permission stands
long withdrawn, the appellants and more
specifically appellant No.1 should be compelled to
knock the door of the civil court and fight a legal
battle to obtain exclusive possession of the property.
This would defeat the very purpose of the said Act
which has an over- riding effect qua any other
enactment in view of Section 3 of the said Act.
Infact, the Civil Court has been precluded from
entertaining any matter qua which jurisdiction is
vested under the said Act and specifically bars
granting any injunction. Respondent No. 7 is thus
LPA No. 1007 of 2013 (OM) required to move out
of the premises to permit the appellants to live in
peace and civil proceedings can be only qua a claim
thereafter if respondent No. 7 so chooses to make in
respect of the property at Chandigarh but without
LPA 537/2018 Page 14 of 20
any interim injunction. It is not the other way round
that respondent No. 7 with his family keeps staying
in the house and asking the appellants to go to the
Civil Court to establish their rights knowing fully
well that the time consuming civil proceedings may
not be finished during the life time of appellant No.1.
Infact, that is the very objective of respondent No.

7.”

22. Further, in Jayantram Vallabhdas Meswania (supra),
in paras 14 15, the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court
has held as under:-

“14. It, however, appears that respondent’s children
are not taking sufficient care and are not providing
proper and sufficient maintenance for the
respondent and that therefore so as to maintain
himself the respondent needs sufficient
earning/income whereby he can maintain himself
and provide for his own food, clothing, medical
attendance and treatment, etc. Therefore, the
respondent asked the petitioner to handover the
possession of the part of the premises (property)
wherein the petitioner is staying with his wife.
However, the petitioner declined to handover the
possession of the part of the premises which is in his
possession. In view of such conduct and action of the
petitioner the respondent was compelled to file the
application wherein the authority passed the
impugned order. It appears that in his application
the respondent requested the authority to take
appropriate measures as per Section 23 so as to get
the possession of the part of the premises. The
petitioner opposed the application and has now
challenged the impugned orders on the ground that
the same are beyond the scope and purview of
Section 23. Emphasis is placed on the expression
“transfer of property” in the said provision. It is
claimed that the respondent has not transferred the
property in his favour and therefore the provision
would not be applicable and could not have been
LPA 537/2018 Page 15 of 20
invoked.

14.1.However, the petitioner conveniently overlooks
the provision under Section 4 of the Act. Sub Section
(1) of Section 23 provides, inter alia, that where a
senior citizen has transferred by way of gift or
otherwise, his property, subject to the condition that
the transferee shall provide basic amenities and
physical needs to the transferor then the transfer
may be declared void if the transferee refuses or
fails to provide such amenities. Sub Section (2) of
Section 23 provides, inter alia, that where a senior
citizen has right to receive maintenance out of an
estate which is transferred, the right to receive
maintenance may be enforced against the transferee
provided that the transfer is not made for
“consideration”.

14.2. As mentioned above, it is not in dispute that
the petitioner is in possession and occupation of part
of the property/premises.

14.3.It is also not in dispute that the petitioner is “in
possession of property” without consideration.

14.4.It also does not appear to be in dispute that as
an elder son of the respondent the petitioner also
would inherit right/interest in the property.

15. The question which, therefore, arises is whether
the term “transfer” in Section 23 of the Act should
be construed so as to mean only actual transfer of
ownership and title or the said expression should be
construed, having regard to the object of the Act and
the provisions under Section 2(b), 2(d), 2(f), 2(h)
and Section 4, so as to also include possession of the
property as well.

15.1. It is noticed earlier that Sub Section (4) of
Section 4 provides, inter alia, that any person who
would inherit the property (which includes right or
LPA 537/2018 Page 16 of 20
interest in such property) and is “in possession of
property” shall maintain such senior citizen which
includes the needs of such senior citizen to lead
normal life.

15.2. Having regard to the object of the Act and the
intention of the legislature, there is no reason or
justification or indication to restrict the meaning
and scope of the term “transfer” so as to mean only
“actual transfer of title and ownership” and to
exclude “possession of property” from the purview
of Section 23 and/or from the term “transfer”
employed in Section 23 of the Act.

15.3. There is no provision in the Act to suggest or
to indicate that the said term carries very narrow,
and literal meaning so as to mean only actual
transfer of title and ownership and the concept of
possession, which is recognized by the Act –
particularly under Section 4 of the Act, has to be
kept out.

15.4.On overall consideration and having regard to
the provision under Sections 2(b), 2(d), 2(f), 4 and
the object of the Act, the said term should receive
wider meaning so as to include
possession/occupation of property, as well. The said
concept is already recognised, accepted and
internalised by the Act vide Section 4 of the Act.

15.5. It is not in dispute that the property is in name
of the respondent and he has the right to receive
maintenance i.e. income/earning from the said
property.

15.6. In view of the said provisions, the term
“transfer of property” should receive wide and
liberal construction so as to include an act of
allowing possession and/or occupation of premises
or part of the premises provided, of course, the
possession is not allowed for consideration
LPA 537/2018 Page 17 of 20
(including rent).

15.7. Sub Section (2) of Section 23 contemplates a
situation where the transferor has right to receive
maintenance from such property then such
transferor can enforce the right to receive
maintenance from the transferee.

15.8. For the purpose of the said provision the
transferee would mean person who is allowed
possession and/or occupation of the
premises/property or part of the premises/property
from which the transferor i.e. the owner of the
premises/property can, otherwise, receive
income/earning i.e. maintenance.

15.9. The provisions under Section 23 of the Act
cannot be, and need not be, read in isolation or by
divorcing the said provision from other provisions,
particularly Section 4 of the Act read with Section
2(b), 2(f), 2(g) 2(h) of the Act.”

23. We agree with the conclusion arrived at by the High
Courts in the aforesaid judgments. At the cost of repetition,
we may state here that having regard to the object of the Act

(i) the term “transfer” shall include actual transfer of title
or ownership; the act of allowing possession of property /
allowing stay in the property or in part of property from
which the Senior Citizen / Parents can earn income to
maintain themselves and (ii) similarly the term “transferee”
shall mean the children / legal heir in whose favour the
property, is transferred or is in possession of or are staying
in the property or part of the property (but without
consideration).”

10. In fact, in Sunny Paul and Anr. (supra) this court relied

upon the paragraphs of the judgment of the Division Bench in

LPA 537/2018 Page 18 of 20
Shadab Khairi and Anr. (supra). That apart, in Para 26, the

learned Single Judge has stated as under:

“26. In the present case, excluding daughter-in-law
from the scope of Rule 22(3)(1)(i) of the Delhi
Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior
Citizens Rules, 2009 as amended would debilitate the
provisions of the Rules and render it incapable to
serve the object of Section 22 of the Act. It is difficult
to accept that although a senior citizen is entitled to
evict his/her son who is maltreating him, he/she has
no option but to suffer the ill-treatment at the hands
of his/her daughter-in-law. A daughter-in-laws right
to reside in the premises of her in-laws cannot be
greater than her husbands‟. The expression “son and
daughter or legal heirs” as used in the aforesaid
Rules must also take within its sweep the families of
the daughter/son, of a senior citizen. The term “legal
heirs” must be understood in the broadest sense.
Indisputably, a daughter-in-law is also a heir in
certain circumstances (widow of a pre-deceased
son).”

11. We agree with the aforesaid conclusion of the learned

Single Judge. We also note that in Para 28, the learned Single

Judge has held as under:

28. It is also relevant to note that Darshna has no
right, title and interest in the premises and, therefore,
cannot insist on residing with Dhani Ram and his wife
especially when the relationships between the said
parties have deteriorated to the extent as indicated
above.”

12. Surely, the aforesaid conclusion also weighed with the

learned Single Judge in upholding the order of the Tribunal.

LPA 537/2018 Page 19 of 20

13. Keeping in view the objective of the Act and it is high-

time that senior citizens / parents are allowed to live in peace and

tranquility, the orders passed by the Maintenance Tribunal and

the learned Single Judge cannot be faulted. The Appeal is

dismissed.

CM. No. 37529/2018 (for Stay)
Dismissed as infructuous.

V. KAMESWAR RAO, J

CHIEF JUSTICE

OCTOBER 03, 2018/jg

LPA 537/2018 Page 20 of 20

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Copyright © 2018 SC and HC Judgments Online at MyNation
×

Free Legal Help, Just WhatsApp Away

MyNation HELP line

We are Not Lawyers, but No Lawyer will give you Advice like We do

Please read Group Rules – CLICK HERE, If You agree then Please Register CLICK HERE and after registration  JOIN WELCOME GROUP HERE

We handle Women Centric biased laws like False Sectioin 498A IPC, Domestic Violence(DV ACT), Divorce, Maintenance, Alimony, Child Custody, HMA 24, 125 CrPc, 307, 312, 313, 323, 354, 376, 377, 406, 420, 497, 506, 509; TEP, RTI and many more…

Web Design BangladeshWeb Design BangladeshMymensingh