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Ganesh Sahu And Anr vs State Of Chhattisgarh 24 … on 22 August, 2019

Page No.1

AFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

Judgment Reserved on : 27.06.2019

Judgment Delivered on : 22/08/2019

CR.A. No. 486 of 2014
1. Ganesh Sahu, S/o. Pardeshi Sahu, Aged About 39 Years,
2. Ganpat Sahu, S/o. Pardeshi Sahu, Aged About 55 Years
Both are R/o. Village -Majgaon, P.S. Kawardha, Distt. Kabirdham
C.G. Civil and Rev. Distt. Kabirdham, Chhattisgarh.
—- Appellants
Versus
State Of Chhattisgarh, Through : P.S.- Kawardha, District Kabirdham,
Chhattisgarh.
—–Respondent

For Appellants : Mr. Ajit Singh, Advocate
For Respondent/State : Mr. Arun Shukla, Govt. Advocate

Hon’ble Shri Justice Rajendra Chandra Singh Samant

C A V JUDGMENT

22/08/2019

1. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment of

conviction and order of sentence, passed by the learned Special

Sessions Judge, Kabirdham (Kawardha) (C.G.) in Special

Sessions Trial No.22/2013 on 30.04.2014, convicting the

appellants for the offence under Section 376 (g) of the Indian

Penal Code and sentencing them to undergo R.I. 10 years and

for the offence under Section 3 (1) (12) of Scheduled Castes
Page No.2

Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and

sentencing them to undergo R.I. for 2 years with default

stipulations.

2. Facts

of the case in brief is this that on 02.05.2013, when the

prosecutrix (P.W.-1) was alone in her house along with her

children, then at about 8 PM in the night, the appellants came to

her door asking for her husband. The prosecutrix replied that her

husband is not at home, thereafter, the appellants and one

another forcefully entered in her house and took her to the

bedroom and then the appellant No.1 had forceful sexual

intercourse without her consent and willingness. During the

incident, the appellant No.2 and one other were holding the

hands of the prosecutrix in assistance to the act done by the

main accused. The prosecutrix immediately informed about this

incident to her husband on mobile phone and also when he came

back to his house. The prosecutrix is a member of scheduled

caste. FIR (Ex.P-3) was lodged in the police station and on that

basis, the case has been investigated and on completion of

investigation, charge-sheet was filed.

3. The trial Court charged the appellants with offence under Section

450 and 376 (g) of the Indian Penal Code, Section 3 (1) (12) and

Section 3 (2) (5) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The appellants denied the charges

and prayed for trial. The prosecution examined as many as 13

witnesses on its behalf. On examining the appellants under
Page No.3

Section 313, they denied all the incriminating evidence against

them and pleaded innocence and false implication. In defence,

the appellant No.2 has examined himself before the Court and

two other witnesses were also examined in support of the

defence. On completion of trial, judgment has been delivered, in

which the appellants stand convicted and sentenced as

mentioned aforesaid.

4. It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

appellants, that the trial Court has passed totally erroneous

judgment of conviction without there being any basis of reliable

and cogent evidence in support of the charge. The prosecution

has failed to prove the case against the appellants beyond all

reasonable doubts. The prosecutrix (P.W.-1) is an unreliable

witness, she had reason to falsely implicate the appellants. The

husband of the prosecutrix -Dharmendra Ratre (P.W.-2) was the

then Sarpanch of respective Gram Panchayat and a No

Confidence motion had been moved against him, regarding

which, voting meeting was scheduled on 04.05.2013. The

husband of the prosecutrix had threatened the appellants to

withdraw No Confidence motion and when they did not agree and

they did not succumbed to his threat, they have been falsely

implicated in this case so that these appellants and one another

may not be able to participate in the voting scheduled on

04.05.2013. Prosecutrix (P.W.-1) and her husband (P.W.-2) are

interested witnesses and in the background of the incident, it can
Page No.4

not be expected that they will make true statement. None of the

other witnesses have supported the prosecution case. The

medical examination report of the prosecutrix very clearly

mentions that no sign of injuries were found on the body and

private parts of the prosecutrix and no definite opinion was given

by the Dr. Usha Suryawanshi (P.W.-8) in her report Ex.P-30.

5. It is further submitted that the story of the prosecution is highly

improbable, which had been proved by the appellants in defence

evidence. Ganpat Sahu (D.W.-1) has proved the documents that

a notice of No Confidence motion was given to SDO, Kawardha

on 12.04.2013 vide Ex.D-4 and notice was served upon the

husband of the prosecutrix similarly vide Ex.D-5. He has further

stated very clearly that between 29.04.2013 to 03.05.2013, the

appellant No.1 was not present in the place and his presence

was in Damoh (M.P.). Similarly Bharat Lal Ramteke (D.W.-2),

who is a Gram Kotwar of Village – Damoh, District – Balaghat

has made statement in favour of the appellant No.1. Therefore,

on this basis it had been successfully proved by the appellants

that the prosecution case is false.

6. Counsel for the appellants places reliance in the judgment of

Supreme Court in State of Karnataka Vs. F. Natraj, in Cr.A.

No.1439 of 2011 decided on 07.10.2015, in which it is held that

where the testimony of the prosecutrix is full of discrepancies and

does not inspire confidence and further the medical report is not

conclusive, the accused becomes entitled for benefit of doubt. On
Page No.5

similar principle reliance has been placed on the judgment of

Single Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Raj Kumar

Another Vs. State of M.P., (2000) Cri.L.J. 1896. It is prayed that

the appellants were entitled for acquittal. Hence, they may be

acquitted of all the charges. It is prayed in the alternative that in

case, this Court is not inclined to allow this appeal and acquit the

appellants in that case, at least sentence imposed upon the

appellants, which appears to be too harsh, may be reduced

relying on the judgment of Orissa High Court in Ahiraj Saha

Anr. Vs. The State, (2003) Cr.L.J. 3114.

7. Counsel for the State opposes the grounds raised in appeal and

the submissions made in this respect. It is submitted that the

prosecution has proved its case beyond all reasonable doubts. It

is submitted that the trial Court has elaborately considered upon

the grounds of defence raised by the appellants/accused persons

and have rejected it. Therefore, there is no reason to interfere in

the finding of the Court below. It may be so that the appellants

and the husband of the prosecutrix had political rivalry, but there

is evidence present of the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt

against the appellants that they have committed the offence as

alleged. It is also submitted that the grounds of alibi has to be

proved beyond reasonable doubt, which has not been proved in

that manner, therefore, the appellants are neither entitled for

acquittal nor for reduction of sentence. Hence, the appeal be

dismissed.

Page No.6

8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the

record of the Court below.

9. The point in issue in this appeal is whether the prosecution has

proved the charges against the appellants on the basis of the

evidence beyond reasonable doubt?

10. There is no dispute that the prosecutirx is a member of scheduled

caste. The prosecutrix (P.W.-1) has stated that on 02.05.2013 at

about 8 PM, she was in her house alone with her girl child, when

both the appellants and one unknown person came to her door

and asked for her husband, when she replied that her husband is

not at home, she was caught hold by appellant No.2 and one

another and was pinned down on the ground, thereafter, the

appellant No.1 committed rape with her. She has stated that

immediately thereafter, she informed her husband on mobile

phone and when her husband came back, she went to the police

station at Kawardha and lodged the FIR (Ex.P-3). In cross-

examination, she has admitted that she did not suffer any injuries

in the incident. In paragraph 16 of her deposition, she has denied

about knowledge of meeting for No Confidence motion that was

to be held on 04.05.2013. She has further denied that the

appellants and other had given intimation of No Confidence

motion to SDO because of which, she has lodged false FIR. She

has also denied that as her husband had threatened the

appellants to withdraw the no confidence motion to which they

did not agree, therefore, she has lodged false FIR, so that the
Page No.7

appellants and other could not be able to participate in the voting

for No Confidence motion on 04.05.2013. No material

discrepancies has been established in the cross-examination in

comparison to previous statement given by her in Ex.D-1 and D-

2. She has denied all the suggestions that appellant Ganesh was

not present at the time of incident. She has admitted that she had

insisted with the police to arrest the appellants and one another

on the same day. She also admitted that in case all the accused

persons would have been arrested, they would not have been

able to present themselves in the No Confidence motion voting.

The admissions made by her may have some implication which

shall be considered after appreciating all the evidence.

Therefore, it is found that the prosecutrix (P.W.-1) has remained

consistent in her statement given by her in examination-in-chief.

11. Dharmendra Ratre (P.W.-2) has stated that on 02.05.2013 at

about 8.00 PM, he was standing in front of betel shop, when he

received phone call from his wife, he went to his house along with

his friend Kailash and Ashok Vema. When he arrived at home, he

was informed about the incident by his wife prosecutrix (P.W.-1).

In cross-examination he has denied the suggestions that he had

threatened the Panchas of the Panchayat that he will implicate

them in false case in case they vote against him. He has

admitted that he had notice of no confidence motion. He has

denied about having knowledge that out of 11 panchas, 9 were

against him in that motion. He has denied that it was the
Page No.8

appellant No.2, who had initiated the no confidence motion. He

has further denied the suggestion that he had falsely implicated

the appellants by making use of his wife only to protect himself

from ousting from the post of Sarpanch. Some discrepancy has

been established in the statement before the Court and his

previous statement (Ex.D-3) made before the police, which can

not be said to be material in any sense. He has further denied all

the adverse suggestion given to him and remained consistent on

his statement that he was informed about the incident by his wife.

12. Kailash Pandey (P.W.-9) has stated that on the date of incident,

at about 8.30 in the night, he was present with Dharmendra Ratre

(P.W.-2), in a betel shop. He has stated that at that time,

Dharmendra Ratre (P.W.-2) has received phone call from his wife

and informed that some incident has happened. Then this

witness went along with Dharmendra Ratre (P.W.-2) to see his

wife at Village – Saigona, where Dharmendra Ratre (P.W.-2) after

talking to his wife, informed him that three persons had

committed the house trespass and raped his wife. Thereafter, he

went in company of Dharmenda Ratre (P.W.-2) and prosecutrix

(P.W.-1) for lodging of FIR. In cross-examination, he had

remained firm on his statement, which has not been rebutted.

13. Remaining witnesses examined by the prosecution are regarding

the investigative procedures. Dr. Usha Suryavanshi (P.W.-8)

examined the prosecutrix (P.W.-1) on 03.05.2013 and reported

that she did not find any injury on the body and the private parts
Page No.9

of the prosecutrix or any symptom regarding sexual intercourse,

she could not give any opinion vide her report Ex.P-30.

14. Ganpat Sahu (D.W.-1) has stated that Dharmendra Ratre (P.W.-

2) was Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Majgaon and he himself

and other family members of the family were panchas. He stated

that on 12 April, 2013, a No Confidence motion was initiated and

notice was given to SDO, Kawardha. The Motion had signature of

9 panchas. Thereafter, the meeting was scheduled on

04.05.2013, in which the No Confidence motion was passed. He

has stated that on account of this no confidence motion, which

was to be held on 4th of May, 2013, the prosecutrix and her

husband Dharmendra Ratre (P.W.-2) have collaborated and

conspired to falsely implicate the appellants so that no

confidence motion should fail. He has made statement of alibi

that on 02.05.2013 at about 8.00 PM, he was present in village-

Majgaon, where a bore well was being dug and in cross-

examination, he has denied all the suggestion given by the

prosecutor on the basis of the statement given by the prosecutrix.

There is no denial that No Confidence motion had been initiated

before the date of incident and the meeting was due on

04.05.2013. Whether this circumstances alone can be held as

sufficient reason to hold that the prosecutrix may be making a

false statement needs consideration.

15. Bharat Ramtake (D.W.-2) has stated that he is a Kotwar of village

– Damoh, District – Balaghat (M.P.). He has stated that he was
Page No.10

acquainted with appellant No.1, who had been to village- Damoh

on 29.04.2013 and stayed in the house of Sarju Singh from

29.04.2013 to 03.05.2013, regarding which he had made an entry

in Musafiri Panji, which is produced as Ex.D-12. In cross-

examination, he has admitted that the Musafiri Panji is not

certified and not maintained properly. He has further denied the

suggestion given by the prosecutor that he is making a false

statement.

16. Bharat Lal Ramtake (D.W.-2) firstly has made only statement that

he is working as Kotwar of village- Damoh in District – Balaghat.

No identity papers were produced by him. Neither his identity has

been verified. Secondly the Musafiri Panji register is not certified

as is required under police regulations that Kotwar shall present

register to the police for timely verification. Apart from that a

Kotwar is not a public servant, therefore, any register maintained

by him does not have any presumptive value, hence for this

reason, it can not be said that the statement made by Bharatlal

Ramtake (D.W.-2) is proved beyond reasonable doubt to exempt

the appellant No.1 from his involvement in the commission of

offence as alleged.

17. It is vehemently argued by the counsel for the appellants, that it is

established, that there is strong reason to disbelieve the

statement of the prosecutrix. The case is based only on the basis

of the statement of prosecutrix, which is not a reliable evidence

for the reason that the husband of the prosecutrix Dharmendra
Page No.11

Ratre (P.W.-2) Sarpanch was facing No Confidence motion,

which was scheduled for voting on May, 2013, therefore, the

prosecutrix had interest in the failure of the said no confidence

motion. Secondly, there is no physical evidence present

regarding the commission of offence of forceful rape, therefore,

her statement should be disbelieved. Reliance of the appellant on

the judgment of Supreme Court in case of State of Karnataka Vs.

F. Nataraj (supra) and the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High

Court in case of Raj Kumar anr. Vs. State of M.P.(supra) has no

relevance for the reason that the statement of the prosecutrix has

remained intact in her cross-examination. However, it is a special

case in which there is evidence present against the appellants

regarding commission of offence and also the evidence is

present in favour of defence, which make out strong

circumstances because of which the prosecutrix may make a

false statement to implicate the appellants in this case. The

Supreme Court in the case of Vijayee Singh Ors. Vs. State of

U.P., reported in (1990) 3 SCC 190 in paragraph 15 has held as

under :-

“15………..Just as there is evidence on behalf of the
prosecution so there may be evidence on behalf of
the prisoner which may cause a doubt as to his
guilt. ……”

18. In paragraph 17 of the same judgment the Hon’ble Supreme

Court has observed as under :-

Page No.12

“17……… In Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar Vs.
State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563 it is observed: –

It is fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence
that an accused is presumed to be innocent and
therefore, the burden lies on the prosecution to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecution, therefore, in a case of homicide
shall prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused caused death with the requisite intention
described in Section 299 of the Penal Code. The
general burden never shifts and it always rests on the
prosecution. But, under Section 105 of the Evidence
Act the burden of proving the existence of
circumstances bringing the case within the exception
lies on the accused; and the Court shall presume the
absence of such circumstances. Under Section 105 of
the Evidence Act, read with the definition of “shall
presume” in Section 4 thereof, the Court shall regard
the absence of such circumstances as proved unless,
after considering the matters before it, it believes that
the said circumstances existed Or their existence was
so probable that a prudent man ought, under the
circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the
supposition that they did exist. To put it in other
words, the accused will have to rebut the presumption
that such circumstances did not exist, by placing
material before the Court sufficient to make it consider
the existence of the said circumstances so-probable
that a prudent man would act upon them. The
accused has to satisfy the standard of a “prudent
man”. If the material placed before the Court such as,
oral and documentary evidence, presumptions,
admissions or even the prosecution evidence,
Page No.13

satisfied the test of “prudent man”, the accused will
have discharged his burden. The evidence so placed
may not be sufficient to discharge the burden under
Section 105 of the Evidence Act, but it may raise a
reasonable doubt in the mind of a Judge as regards
one or other of the necessary ingredients of the
offence itself. It may, for instance, raise a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the Judge whether the accused
had the requisite intention laid down in Section 299 of
the Penal Code……….”

“…….The practical result of the three propositions
stated above is that an accused’s plea or an
exception may reach one of three not sharply
demarcated stages, one succeeding the other,
depending upon the effect of the whole evidence in
the case judged by the standard of a prudent man
weighing or balancing probabilities carefully. These
stages are; firstly, a lifting of the initial obligatory
presumption given at the end of Sec. 105 of the Act;
secondly the creation of a reasonable doubt about the
existence of an ingredient of the offence; and thirdly, a
complete proof of the exception by “a preponderance
of probability”, which covers even a slight tilt of the
balance of probability in favour of the accused’s plea.
The accused is not entitled to an acquittal if his plea
does not get beyond the first stage. At the second
stage, he becomes entitled to acquittal by obtaining a
bare benefit of doubt. At the third stage, he is
undoubtedly entitled to an acquittal. This, in my
opinion, is the effect of the majority view in Parbhoo’s
case which directly relates to first two stages only.
The Supreme Court decisions have considered the
last two stages so far, but the first stage has not yet
Page No.14

been dealt with directly or separately there in any
case brought to our notice…….”

19. In the judgment of Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai Vs. State of

Gujarat, reported in AIR 1983 SC 753, at para-7 of the judgment,

the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :-

“7. It is now time to tackle the pivotal issue as
regards the need for insisting on corroboration to the
testimony of the prosecutrix in sex-offences. This
Court, in Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan,(1)
has declared that corroboration is not the sine que-
non for a conviction in a rape case. The utterance of
the Court in Rameshwar may be replayed, across the
time-gap of three decades which have whistled past,
in the inimitable voice of Vivian Bose, J. who spoke
for the Court The rule, which according to the cases
has hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration
is essential before there can be a conviction but that
the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of
prudence, except where the circumstances make it
safe to dispense with it, must be present to the mind
of the judge …….

The only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must
be present to the mind of the Judge or the jury as the
case may be and be understood and appreciated by
him or them. There is no rule of practice that there
must, in every case, be corroboration before a
conviction can be allowed to stand.”

20. Similarly in the judgment of Dola Ors. Vs. The State of

Odisha, reported in AIR 2018 SC 4020, the Hon’ble Supreme

Court has held at paragraph 5, 7 8, which reads as under :-

Page No.15

“5. It is well settled law that if the version of the
prosecutrix is believed, basic truth in her evidence is
ascertainable and if it is found to be credible and
consistent, the same would form the basis of
conviction. Corroboration is not a sine qua non for a
conviction in a rape case. The evidence of a victim of
sexual assault stands at par with the evidence of an
injured witness and is entitled to great weight,
absence of corroboration notwithstanding. If the
evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic
infirmity and the “probabilities factor” does not render
it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no
reason to insist on corroboration, except from medical
evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances
of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be
forthcoming. When a grown up and married woman
gives evidence on oath in Court that she was raped, it
is not the proper judicial approach to disbelieve her
outright.

7. In Sadashiv Ramrao Hadbe Vs. State of
Maharashtra, [(2006) 10 SCC 92], this Court

reiterated that the sole testimony of the prosecutrix
could be relied upon if it inspires the confidence of the
Court:

“9. It is true that in a rape case the accused
could be convicted on the sole testimony of
the prosecutrix, if it is capable of inspiring
confidence in the mind of the court. If the
version given by the prosecutrix is
unsupported by any medical evidence or the
whole surrounding circumstances are highly
improbable and belie the case set up by the
prosecutrix, the court shall not act on the
Page No.16

solitary evidence of the prosecutrix. The
courts shall be extremely careful in accepting
the sole testimony of the prosecutrix when the
entire case is improbable and unlikely to
happen.”

8. However, as is also evident from the
observations above, such reliance may be placed
only if the testimony of the prosecutrix appears to be
worthy of credence. In this regard, it is also relevant
to note the following observations of this Court in the
case of Raju v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [(2008) 15
SCC 133], which read thus:

……….11. It cannot be lost sight of that rape
causes the greatest distress and humiliation to
the victim but at the same time a false
allegation of rape can cause equal distress,
humiliation and damage to the accused as
well. The accused must also be protected
against the possibility of false implication,
particularly where a large number of accused
are involved. It must, further, be borne in mind
that the broad principle is that an injured
witness was present at the time when the
incident happened and that ordinarily such a
witness would not tell a lie as to the actual
assailants, but there is no presumption or any
basis for assuming that the statement of such
a witness is always correct or without any
embellishment or exaggeration…….”.

21. Further it was held in paragraph -21 of the same judgment, which

is as under :-

Page No.17

“21. In the matter on hand, on going through the
entire material on record, we are of the clear
opinion that the prosecutrix apparently had motive
to seek revenge against the accused persons…….”

22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Rajoo Ors. Vs. State

of M.P., reported in AIR 2009 SC 858, made similar observation

in paragraph 9, 15 16, which reads as under :-

“9. The aforesaid judgments lay down the basic
principle that ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix
should not be suspected and should be believed, the
more so as her statement has to be evaluated at par
with that of an injured witness and if the evidence is
reliable, no corroboration is necessary. Undoubtedly,
the aforesaid observations must carry the greatest
weight and we respectfully agree with them, but at the
same time they cannot be universally and
mechanically applied to the facts of every case of
sexual assault which comes before the Court. It
cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the greatest
distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same
time a false allegation of rape can cause equal
distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as
well. The accused must also be protected against the
possibility of false implication……..”

15. On an examination of the entire evidence, we
are of the opinion that it would be difficult to
conclusively show the involvement of each of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. To our mind the
truth and falsehood are so inextricably intertwined,
that it is impossible to discern where one ends and
the other begins.

Page No.18

16. As already noted above Raju, son of M. Billya
did not file an appeal in this court. In the light of the
fact that we have found the prosecution story to be
doubtful, Raju too must be given the benefit of doubt
in the light of the judgments in Raja Ram Ors. Vs.
State of M.P. (1994) 2 SCC 568, Arokia Thomas vs.
State of T.N. (2006) 10 SCC 542 and Suresh
Chaudhary etc. vs. State of Bihar (2003) 4 SCC 128.
We, accordingly allow the appeals and acquit the
present appellants, as also Raju son of M. Billya.”

23. Further in the case of Rajinder Vs. State of H.P., reported in AIR

2009 SC 3022, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in

paragraph 14, which is as under :-

“14. In Sadashiv Ramrao Hadbe, this Court while
reiterating that in a rape case, the accused could be
convicted on the sole testimony of prosecutrix if it is
capable of inspiring the confidence in the mind of the
Court, put a word of caution that the Court should be
extremely careful while accepting the testimony when
the entire case is improbable and unlikely to have
happened. This is what has been stated:

“9. It is true that in a rape case the
accused could be convicted on the sole
testimony of the prosecutrix, if it is capable of
inspiring confidence in the mind of the court. If
the version given by the prosecutrix is
unsupported by any medical evidence or the
whole surrounding circumstances are highly
improbable and belie the case set up by the
prosecutrix, the court shall not act on the
solitary evidence of the prosecutrix. The
Page No.19

courts shall be extremely careful in accepting
the sole testimony of the prosecutrix when the
entire case is improbable and unlikely to
happen.”

24. Thus it would seem that the principle in believing the unrebutted

statements of the prosecutrix is not a cardinal principle and there

are expectations, when her statements can be disbelieved.

Firstly, there has to be a ground in defence to show that the

prosecutrix has a motive and an interest in the prosecution and

conviction of the person concerned. In presence of such

substance, the rule of prudence would be applicable and if that

theory has some support from the evidence present in the

prosecution case as well as in the defence case, that can be

taken into consideration before drawing conclusion of guilt of the

accused person. Particularly, in this case, there are admissions

in the cross-examination made by the prosecutrix herself that her

husband was the Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat, whereas,

the appellants were Upsarpanch and members of Panchayat.

Although she has denied regarding knowledge of No Confidence

motion against her husband, but she has admitted that her

husband was removed from the post of Sarpanch after the No

Confidence motion. She has further admitted that her husband

needed three votes for his success in No Confidence motion.

She has further admitted the suggestions of the defence that she

had herself requested the police to arrest the three members of

Panchayat immediately on the same day. Although she denied
Page No.20

that she made such a request so that it would lead the No

Confidence motion to a failure. No Confidence motion against

Dharmendra Ratre (P.W.-2), which was to be voted open on

04.05.2013, is admitted by him in his evidence and it is

supported by the evidence of Ganpat Sahu (D.W.-1) and Babulal

Dhruve (D.W.-2), therefore, there are reasons to believe that the

prosecutrix (P.W.-1) was interested to save the position of her

husband as Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat. Some of her

admissions and particularly, the request made by her to the

police officer for arresting the appellants on the same day further

clarifies her interest on the same. The post of Dharmendra Ratre

(P.W.-2) could not be saved, because the voting on No

Confidence motion took place on 04.05.2013 and Dharmendra

Ratre (P.W.-2) was removed from the post of Sarpanch, even

then it can not be said that the matter ended, therefore the

reason that the grievance had continued because the appellants

had casted vote against Dharmendra Ratre (P.W.-2) for his

removal from the post of Sarpanch. Hence, these are the

peculiar circumstances in this case on the basis of which it can

be said that the doubt theory raised by the appellants side has

substance, which can not be ignored in any manner. Therefore,

on one hand, there is statement of the prosecutrix implicating the

appellants in this case and on the other hand it is shown that the

prosecutrix (P.W.-1) had an interest to prosecute and persecute

the appellants in this case, so that the No Confidence motion
Page No.21

against her husband fails. Hence, it is such a case where two

views are possible in that case, the principle is very clear that the

view which is in favour of the accused persons has to be

followed.

25. Hence, after a close scrutiny of the evidence brought from both

the sides and all the material present in the record I am of this

view that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the

appellants beyond all reasonable doubts. Hence, on the basis of

these findings, the appeal is allowed. The appellants are

acquitted of the charges under Section 376 (g) of the Indian

Penal Code and for the offence under Section 3 (1) (12) of

Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)

Act, 1989. The appellants are reported to be in jail. They be set

at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case.

Sd/-

(Rajendra Chandra Singh Samant)
Judge
Balram/
Nirmala

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