HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6451 / 2016
Harnek Singh Chahal s/o Shri Jeet Singh, b/c Jatsikh, aged 63
years, r/o Chak 14 Z, P.O. 12 Z, Via Mirzewala, Tehsil District Sri
Ganganagar.
—-Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Rajasthan through the Secretary, Department of
Agriculture, Government of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur.
2. The Rajasthan State Seeds Corporation Ltd., Kabir Marg, Bani
Park, Jaipur through its Managing Director.
—-Respondent
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For Petitioner(s) : Mr.Pradeep Choudhary
For Respondent(s) : Mr.B.D.Sharma, Dy.Govt.Counsel
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HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI
Order
05/03/2018
1. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India has been preferred claiming the following reliefs:
“a. by an appropriate writ, order or direction, the
order dated 27.01.1998 (Annex.5) may kindly be
quashed and set aside and the petitioner be
reinstated in service from 12.06.1986 with all the due
consequential benefits such as salary, allowances,
promotion, GPF and gratuity.
b. Any other appropriate writ, order or direction,
which this Hon’ble Court considers just and proper in
the facts and circumstances of the case, may kindly
be passed in favour of the petitioner.
c. Costs of the writ petition may kindly be awarded to
the petitioner.”
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2. The petitioner joined the services on the post of
Assistant Seed Inspector with the Rajasthan State Seed
Corporation Limited in pursuance of the appointment order dated
12.11.1981.
3. On 02.05.1986, an FIR was lodged against the
petitioner for the offences under Sections 498A and 302 IPC at
Police Station, Suratgarh, District Sri Ganganagar.
4. In the meanwhile, the petitioner was suspended by the
respondents on 12.06.1986 while invoking Rule 13 of the
Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control Appeal) Rules,
1958 (for short, ‘the Rules of 1958’), as adopted by the
Corporation.
5. The petitioner was convicted by the competent criminal
court vide order dated 27.01.1990 for the offences under Sections
306 and 498A IPC. Consequent upon such conviction, the
petitioner was dismissed from service vide order dated 27.01.1998
passed by the Managing Director of the Corporation, while
invoking the power conferred by Rule 19(1) of the Rules of 1958.
6. The petitioner preferred S.B.Criminal Appeal
No.50/1990 before this Hon’ble Court, wherein vide order dated
07.11.2013, the conviction of the petitioner, as aforementioned,
was set aside; however, prior thereto, the petitioner had attained
the age of superannuation on 09.08.2013.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has come out with a
case that the petitioner stood dismissed from service, while
invoking the power conferred by Rule 19(1) of the Rules of 1958
by the respondents, only on the ground of his conviction vide
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aforementioned order dated 27.01.1990,.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that once this
Hon’ble Court had acquitted the petitioner from the charge so
levelled, then the baseline of the dismissal order goes away, and
hence, the petitioner ought to have been granted all the
consequential benefits.
9. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the
petitioner relied upon the precedent law laid down by this Hon’ble
Court in Ganesh Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan Ors. reported
in 2013(1) DNJ (Raj.) 3, relevant portion of which reads as
under:-
“6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits
that it is an obligatory duty of the respondents that
after acquittal from the charges against an employee
to grant all retiral benefits including service benefits.
But in this case, petitioner was placed under
suspension in the year 1987 and he remained
suspended till his retirement w.e.f 31.12.1996 and
thereafter, repeatedly, petitioner made request to the
respondents to release his retiral benefits as well as
service benefits but those benefits are not paid to the
petitioner till today.
7. In this writ petition while filing reply by the
State, it is pointed out that although petitioner was
acquitted from the charges levelled against him for the
offence under Section 5(1) (d)(ii) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 but against the said judgment
dated 07.03.98 passed in Case No. 03/97, an appeal
was preferred by the State which is pending in this
Court, therefore, as per Rule 7(4) of the Rajasthan
Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1996, petitioner is not
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entitled for service benefits so also retiral benefits
when the case is pending against the petitioner.
8. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, I
am of the opinion that once an employee is acquitted
from the criminal charges levelled against him after
due trial then, obviously he is required to be treated
acquitted from the charges until and unless he is again
convicted by the appellate court.
9. Only on the basis of pendency of criminal
appeal against the judgment of acquittal the
respondents cannot deny the service benefits as well
as retiral benefits. As per rules, as and when trial
concludes, the respondents are under an obligation to
grant retiral benefits and they cannot retain the retiral
benefits and service benefits absolutely on the ground
that appeal is against the judgment and appeal is
pending.
10. In view of above, the respondents are
directed to release all the retiral benefits and services
benefits because he was placed under suspension in
the year 1997 and remained under suspension till his
retirement and in between that period, petitioner was
getting only subsistence allowance whereas, after
acquittal, he became entitled to get all other services
benefits.
11. In view of above, this writ petition is allowed. The
respondents are directed to complete the process for
fixation and grant of all service benefits and retiral
benefits within a period of six months. It is also made
it clear that petitioner’s case for interest after his
acquittal may also be considered in accordance with
Rule 89 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Pension)
Rules, 1996.”
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9. Learned counsel for the respondents is not in a position
to refute the facts as submitted on behalf of the petitioner.
10. Learned counsel for the respondents however,
submitted that the acquittal of the petitioner was not honourable,
and therefore, the invocation of the power conferred by Rule 19(1)
of the Rules of 1958 by the respondents was justified.
11. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted
that the respondents were justified in invoking the power under
Rule 19(1) of the Rules of 1958, as the petitioner stood convicted
vide order dated 27.01.1990 by the competent court, and thus,
there is no question of granting him any benefit.
12. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties as well
as perusing the record of the case, alongwith the precedent law
cited by learned counsel for the petitioner, this Court finds that the
petitioner was appointed on 12.11.1981. He thereafter, in the year
1986, faced the FIR under Sections 498A and 302 IPC. The
petitioner was suspended on 12.06.1986. The conviction of the
petitioner on 27.01.1990, led to his termination from the services
on 27.01.1998 by the respondents while invoking Rule 19(1) of
the Rules of 1958. The said conviction however, could not be
sustained in S.B.Criminal Appeal No.50/1990, and this Hon’ble
Court, vide order dated 07.11.2013, acquitted the petitioner from
the criminal charges.
13. This Court also finds that the precedent law cited by
learned counsel for the petitioner is also governing the field, and
once such procedure under Rule 19(1) of the Rules of 1958 has
been invoked and penalty was imposed upon the petitioner only
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on the ground of his conduct, which led to his conviction on a
criminal charge, then, in the circumstances, when the charge itself
has been done away with by this Hon’ble Court in the
aforementioned criminal appeal, the impugned order cannot be
sustained.
14. In view of the above, the present writ petition is
allowed and the impugned order dated 27.01.1998 is quashed and
set aside. The petitioner shall be entitled to all benefits notionally
till the date of his superannuation. Thus, the respondents shall
compute all the retiral benefits of the petitioner, treating him to be
in actual service till the date of his actual superannuation.
However, the benefits from termination till the date of
superannuation shall be notional in nature. The petitioner shall be
required to cooperate with such computation, and if any amount is
required to be paid by the petitioner to seek the ultimate retiral
benefits, then the same shall be immediately paid by the
petitioner. Such computation and necessary benefits shall be
rendered to the petitioner within a period of three months from
today. The respondents shall treat the petitioner as all other
similarly situated employees for grant of retiral benefits.
(DR. PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI)J.
Skant/-