SC and HC Judgments Online at MyNation

Judgments of Supreme Court of India and High Courts

J.Kanagarathinam-vs-State Of Tamilnadu on 17 February, 2010

Madras High Court J.Kanagarathinam-vs-State Of Tamilnadu on 17 February, 2010

DATED: 17.02.2010

C O R A M

THE HONOURABLE Ms.JUSTICE R. MALA

Crl.R.C.No.1165 of 2005

J.Kanagarathinam … Petitioner

Vs

1.State of Tamilnadu

rep. by Deputy Superintendent of Police

Avadi Sub-Division, Avadi, Chennai.

2.Chandrasekar

3.Mannivannan

4.Prabhakaran

5.Latha @ Hemalatha … Respondents

Prayer: Criminal Revision Case filed under Section 397 r/w. 401 of Code of Criminal Procedure against the order of the Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court No.V, Chengalpattu, at Tiruvallur, in S.C.No. 301/04 dated 16.06.2005.

For Petitioner : Mr.S.Vasudevan

For Respondents : Mr.R.Muniappa Raj

Additional Public Prosecutor for R.1

Mr.V.Krishnakumar for R.2 to R.5

O R D E R

This Criminal Revision case has been filed against the judgment of the Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court No.V, Chengalpattu, at Tiruvallur, in S.C.No. 301/04 dated 16.06.2005.

2. The skeleton of the prosecution case is as follows :-

(i) First accused/second respondent is the husband of deceased Jayalatha; second accused/third respondent is his brother; third accused/fourth respondent is the brother-in-law of first accused; and fourth accused/fifth respondent is the sister of first accused. (ii) The marriage between the second respondent/first accused and deceased Jayalatha has taken place on 06.02.1996 at Chennai. It is alleged that during engagement, 35 sovereigns were demanded and the parents of Jayalatha has given 25 sovereigns. After marriage, both were residing at Thiruninravur and they lived together happily for two months. Thereafter, the deceased was subjected to cruelty by respondents 2 to 5/accused Nos. 1 to 4 by demanding 10 sovereigns and Rs.10,000/-. (iii) In the meantime, the deceased gave birth to a female child, by name, Tharani, on 11.11.1997. It is alleged that on 12.09.1998 at about 1.00 p.m. due to the cruelty meted out to Jayalatha by accused 1 to 4, she committed suicide by jumping into the well situated at the backyard of the house. Later, the body was fished out from the well by PW13-Ganesan, one Perumal and another and taken to KMC Hospital. (iv)PW23-Narayanan, Inspector of Police, received a complaint-Ex.P1 from the father of Jayalatha viz., Sundarraj/PW1 on 12.09.1998 at 5.30 pm and registered the case in Cr.No. 394/98 under Sections 174 Cr.P.C. The First Information Report was marked as Ex.P14. PW19-Satheesh, photographer took four photos of the dead body, which are marked as MO1 series. After receipt of FIR, PW22-RDO conducted inquest along with the Poonamallee Tahsildar, and recorded the statement of the witnesses. The Inquest Report is Ex.P7. After inquest, the body was sent for autopsy. PW17-Dr.Govardhan and PW21-Dr.Srinivasan, on receiving requisition letter Ex.P-6 for conducting post-mortem, conducted the post-mortem on 13.09.1998 at 1.15 pm and the post-mortem certificate is marked as Ex.P4. The viscera report is Ex.P5. In the post-mortem certificate-Ex.P4, the following injuries were noted:- "Abrasions: 1) 4 cm x 2 cm over right cheek.

2) 2 cm x 1 cm over lower part of mandible on right side.

3) 1 cm x 1 cm over right side of the nose.

Contusion: a) 8 cm x 4 x = cm contusion over right hip

Hyoid bone: Intact

Trachea: contains blood stain froth.

Nostrils: Blood stains, froth oozing from both nostrils.

Lungs : Marked by congested and oedematious.

Heart: Contains minimal amount of fluid blood in

all chambers.

Brain: Surface vessels were congested.

Stomach: Contained 200 ml of brown colour fluid along with partially digested food particularly without any specific odour."

(v) On the basis of the FIR, PW24-Nandakumar, Deputy Superintendent of Police visited the place of occurrence at 6.30 pm and prepared observation mahazar and rough sketch marked as Ex.P15 and recorded the statements of the witnesses. On 9.10.1998, Dr.Govardhan/PW17 and Dr.Srinivasan/PW21 were enquired and their statements were recorded. The report of RDO sent to Judicial Magistrate II, Thiruvallur, dated 11.06.2004 is Ex.C1. PW25-Ramamurthy, Dy. Superintendent of Police, Chenglepet, further investigated the matter and on 25.3.1999 filed chargesheet under Sections 498-A and 306 IPC against the first accused/second respondent. (vi) PW2/mother of deceased filed Crl.O.P.No.2647 of 1999 under Section 482 Crl.P.C. seeking investigation by CBCID. As per the order of this Court dated 09.08.1999, PW26-Subramanian, Deputy Superintendent of Police, took up the case for re-investigation. He visited the place of occurrence on 26.12.2001 and prepared Observation Mahazar and Rough Sketch. He enquired petitioner/PW1 and other witnesses and recorded their statements. On 28.12.2001 at about 7.15 am, PW26-Deputy Superintendent of Police, arrested accused Nos. 1 to 4 and taken steps for remanding them to judicial custody. After concluding investigation, charge sheet-Ex.P16 was filed against the accused for the offence under sections 498-A, 306 and 304-B IPC. (vii) The trial court framed necessary charges and accused Nos. 1 to 4 pleaded not guilty. When the accused were questioned under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. on the basis of the incriminating materials available against them, they denied their complicity and stated that a false case is foisted against them.

(viii) The learned Additional District Judge has considered the oral evidence of PWs 1 to 26 and documentary evidence marked as Exs.P1 to P17 and Ex.C1 and came to the conclusion that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against accused Nos. 1 to 4 beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, the trial Court has given benefit of doubt in favour of the accused Nos.1 to 4/respondents 2 to 5 and exonerated them under Sections 498-A, 306 and 304 (B) IPC and acquitted the accused Nos.1 to 4. Against that, the present revision has been filed by PW2.

3. The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner would contend that the marriage between the deceased Jayalatha and first accused/second respondent was performed on 06.02.1996. Due to wedlock, a child was born to them on 11.11.1997. The alleged suicide took place on 12.09.1998 at 1.00 p.m, which is within 17 months of the marriage. The information was received by the father of the deceased at 3.30 pm. The FIR was lodged at 5.30 pm. Initially, a chargesheet has been filed under Sections 498A and 306 IPC against the first accused. Then, PW2/revision petitioner herein has preferred a Crl.O.P.No.2647 of 1999 under Section 482 Crl.P.C. for a direction for investigation by the CBCID and orders was passed on 09.08.1999 directing reinvestigation. After direction in the Criminal Original Petition, the matter has been reinvestigated by the Superintendent of Police and filed the further chargesheet under Sections 498-A, 306 and 304 (B) IPC against the accused 1 to 4/respondents 2 to 5.

4. The learned counsel further submits that PW1, the father of the victim has not given any complaint. The signature has been obtained in a blank paper and contents has been written by the respondents 2 to 5. Hence, the trial Court has committed an error in acquitting the accused 1 to 4/respondents 2 to 5. Since, the accused 1 to 4/respondents 2 to 5 are charged under Section 304-B IPC, the trial court has committed an error in not invoking the presumption under Sec. 113-B. For demand of dowry, sufficient evidence has been placed before the trial court. But the trial court has not considered this aspect in a proper perspective. Hence, he prayed for allowing of this revision case.

5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for respondents 2 to 5 have vehemently opposed the revision and he culled out a portion of the evidence and submits that after a direction has been given by this High Court in Crl.O.P.No.2647 of 1999, the Deputy Superintendent of Police has taken up the matter for further investigation and he examined further witnesses and filed the chargesheet. But, at the time of cross-examination of Investigating Officer, the witnesses have given an improved version, when they were in witness box, at the time of 161 statement, they never whispered that the deceased victim was ill-treated by her husband/second respondent or the respondents 3 to 5 and was subjected to harassment so as to attract the offence under Section 498-A, for demanding dowry or for abetting to commit suicide or as to how the unnatural death has happened. So, the trial court has considered all these aspects in its judgment and has came to the correct conclusion. There is no justifying reason to interfere with the findings of the trial court. Hence, he prayed for the dismissal of this revision case.

6. The learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) submits that even though PW3, who is none other than the brother of victim was with the victim’s family on the date of occurrence till morning then only he has gone to the parents house, he has not whispered that his sister was subjected to harassment by way of demanding dowry. So, the trial court has considered this aspect and has come to the correct conclusion. Hence, he prayed for confirming the order of acquittal passed by the trial court.

7. Since the accused 1 to 4/respondents 2 to 5 were acquitted, the burden is heavily upon PW2/revision petitioner, who is none other than the mother of the victim to prove that the respondents 2 to 5 are guilty of the offences under Sections 498-A, 304(B) and 306 IPC.

8. The marriage between the victim and second respondent was performed on 06.02.1996. The child was born on 11.11.1997. The occurrence has taken place on 12.09.1998. The third respondent, who is none other than her brother-in-law, is a Government servant and he is residing away from the home. Fifth respondent is sister-in-law of the victim and sister of second respondent/first accused. Her husband is arrayed as fourth accused. They got married and they are residing in a separate house.

9. The power of revisional court to reappreciate the evidence:- The learned counsel for the revision petitioner would contend that the revisional court had ample power to consider the evidence and decide the fact and interfere with the findings of the questions of fact. To substantiate the argument, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner relied upon the decision reported in 1990 Crl.L.J. 830, Mithlesh Kumari v. Bindhawasami, wherein the Lucknow Bench observing that the revisional court can enter into evidence of fact and interfere with the finding to do justice, has held as under:- "5. It was firstly argued by the learned counsel for the revisionist that the finding of the learned Magistrate about the second marriage of Bindhawasani opposite party was on an issue of fact and should not have been interfered with in revision by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. I do not find much force in this contention. It is true that in revision the conclusions of fact based on evidence cannot be canvassed and attacked on the footing of an appeal and the Court of revision should not ordinarily look into the evidence to see whether finding is correct or the evidence is sufficient in support of it but the finding is perverse and miscarriage of justice has occurred the Court of revision in order to do justice can enter into evidence of fact and interfere with the finding of fact. In the present case the learned Magistrate did not appreciate the evidence correctly and arrived at a finding about second marriage which was perverse on the face of it…"

Relying on the above citation, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner submits that this Court has right to re-appreciate the evidence and find out, whether the respondents 2 to 5 are guilty of the charges levelled against them.

9(a) The learned counsel for respondents 2 to 5 relied upon the following decisions and submits that the jurisdiction of the revisional court is only limited. It is not empowered to reappreciate the evidence. To substantiate his contention, he relied upon the decision reported in 2003 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1205, Thankappan Nadar and others v. Gopala Krishnan and another, wherein the Supreme Court has held as under:- "10. In the present case also, the High Court has not found any procedural illegality or manifest error of law in the order passed by the Sessions Judge. The High Court has merely reappreciated the evidence and arrived at the conclusion that there was no reason not to rely upon the injured witnesses PW 1, PW 2 and PW 4 and that when there is an attack by a large group of people armed with lethal weapons and when they belong to an organised group like RSS, the people of the locality may be terrorised and might be unwilling to testify even if they had actually seen the occurrence. The High Court observed that the victims in the case no doubt belong to the rival party, but that does not render their evidence interested or partisan and thereafter set aside the acquittal order passed in appeal by the Sessions Judge and remitted it for fresh hearing and disposal by observing that the Court would decide the matter unhampered by any of the observations contained in the order. From the findings recorded by the High Court, it is difficult to hold that there was any manifest error of law or procedure. It is nobodys case that the appellate court has shut out or has overlooked the evidence which clinches the issue. The High Court has only reappreciated the entire evidence and has taken contrary view for setting aside the acquittal order. This, in our view, is not permissible while exercising the revisional jurisdiction at the instance of the de facto complainant against the order of acquittal. (underlining added)

In a revision application filed by the de facto complainant against the acquittal order, the Court’s jurisdiction under Section 397 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C., is limited. As per the above citation, the trial court has convicted and sentenced the accused under Sections 143, 147, 148 and 307 read with Section 149 IPC. The appellate court after appreciating the evidence acquitted the accused. In a revision application filed by the de facto complainant, the High Court allowed the appeal and found the accused guilty. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court has held that the High Court exercising revisional jurisdiction is not empowered to re-appreciate the evidence. So, this Court is not empowered to re-appreciate the evidence at the time of exercising the revisional power. 9(b) The scope of the revisional jurisdiction is very limited. This Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction cannot enter into the detail discussion of the merits or demerits of the case. The High Court while sitting in a revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of Criminal Procedure Code, shall not and cannot re-appreciate and re-appraise the evidence and the finding of fact recorded by the two courts below can only be interfered with if such findings are perverse or based on no evidence or suffered from any error of law. The revisional power of the High Court are to be exercised only to correct injustice and not merely to rectify the illegality which not go to the root of the matter. Hence, the finding of the lower Court is not to be disturbed merely because another view is possible. The Court of revision is not bound to entertain an application in revision. It is a discretionary power, whose exercise must depends on the facts and circumstances of the each case. The power to interfere is discretionary and unfattered by limitation. But, it is to be exercised subject to the provisions in Section 465, which prohibits interference on ground of irregularity, unless, there has been infact failure of justice. The revisional court is entitled to reverse the finding only when it reaches to a conclusion that the finding of the trial court is perverse. When a serious misdirection results in acquittal and failure of justice, the High Court will not hesitate to interfere simply because the order has been challenged by private party. The High Court will not in revision ordinarily interfere with the acquittal order at the instance of private party, merely because it is wrong or involve irregularity. The revisional jurisdiction can be exercised only in exceptional cases for limited purpose. 9(c) The Supreme Court has reiterated the above principle and held that the power is not to be lightly exercised when invoked by a private complainant. It could be exercised in exceptional cases where the interest of justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. The jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidence.

9(d) In (1975) 3 Supreme Court Cases 398, Satyendra Nath Dutta and another vs. Ram Narain, the Supreme Court has held as under:-

"The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidence on record.

The High Court wrongly presumed the basis of the Sessions Court so that the illegality of that basis did not affect the Sessions Judge’s decision.

The dominant justification of the order of acquittal recorded by the Sessions Court is the view it took of the evidence of the eyewitnesses. If that evidence was unacceptable, there were no circumstances in the case on which the appellants could be convicted.

Being aware of the limitations of the powers of a revisional court the High Court perhaps did not consider the reasons which influenced the Sessions Court in discarding the evidence of the eyewitnesses. In doing so the High Court was right because it could not merely re-appreciate evidence in the exercise of its revisional powers. But the error which the High Court committed is that in the first place it blamed the accused for not demanding an identification parade, secondly it held by examining a few aspects of the evidence that the accused were previously known to the eyewitnesses and thirdly it assumed wrongly that the conclusion of the Sessions Court that the deceased had made a dying declaration was based on inadmissible evidence. The Sessions Court considered the various circumstances and came to the conclusion that the deceased had made a dying declaration. That conclusion may be wrong but that cannot justify setting aside the order of acquittal and directing a re-trial of the appellants. On a perusal of the appreciation of evidence by the Sessions Court, held that the High Court had transgressed the narrow limits of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 439(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The judgment of the Sessions Court did not suffer from any manifest illegality and the interests of justice did not require the High Court to interfere with the order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Court. Any fair assessment of the evidence of the eyewitnesses would show that the acquittal of the appellants led to no miscarriage of justice." 9(e) In (1975) 4 Supreme Court Cases 477, Pakalapati Narayana Gajapathi Raju and others vs.Bonapalli Peda Appadu and another, the Supreme Court has held as under:-

"The revisional jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely because the lower court has not appreciated the evidence properly.

On facts, it was incorrect to say, as the High Court has contended, that the trial Court wholly overlooked the evidence of prosecution witnesses. It was also incorrect to assume that the trial Court has used the F.I.R. as a substantive piece of evidence. Perusal of that judgment shows that the references to the F.I.R. are directed mainly towards pointing out the inconsistencies in the prosecution case. …

3. Section 439(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court may exercise any of the powers conferred on a court of appeal. This provision is made expressly subject to sub-section (4) of Section 439 under which nothing contained in the section shall be deemed to authorise a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. Section 439 has been interpreted in several decisions of this Court which have taken the view that the revisional jurisdiction, when invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, ought not to be exercised lightly and that it can be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. (See Satyendra Nath Dutta v. Ram Narain, (1975) 3 SCC 398; Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, (1973) 2 SCC 583; Chaganti Kotaiah v. Gogineni Venkateshwara Rao, (1973) 2 SCC 249.) It is clear from these decisions that the revisional jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely because the lower court has not appreciated the evidence properly. The High Court has in its judgment referred to the decisions of this Court but in applying those decisions it has transgressed the limits of its revisional powers." 9(f) In 1994-CrLJ-641-Mad, S.Abboy Naidu vs. R.Sundararajan and others, this Court has held as under:-

"8.The fact that the deceased has committed suicide is not in dispute. But the question is whether there are any materials to hold that the accused was responsible for the same, by meting out ill-treatment and cruelty to the deceased. The lower Court has clearly considered the said aspect and came to the conclusion that there is no acceptable evidence to establish the case under Sections 498A and 306, I.P.C. Thus, on a careful consideration of the entire materials, it is clear that the lower Court’s order is perfectly legal and correct and in any event, it cannot be said that the said order is manifestly illegal, unreasonable and perverse so as to warrant this Court to interfere. It is settled proposition of law that the revisional jurisdiction, when invoked on a private complaint against order of acquittal, can be exercised only in exceptional cases where there is manifest illegality or irregularity or gross miscarriage of justice. The revisional jurisdiction cannot be invoked simply by because the lower Court has not appreciated the evidence. In the instant case, as we have discussed, the Court below has correctly appreciated the evidence and rendered a just finding. Hence this Court is of the view that no interference is called for with the order of acquittal passed by the lower Court." (underlining added)

9(g) In (2002) 6 Supreme Court Cases, 650, Bindeshwari Prasad Singh @ B.P.Singh and others vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand and another), the Supreme Court has held as under:-

"…In absence of any manifest illegality, perversity and miscarriage of justice, High Court would not be justified in interfering with the concurrent finding of acquittal of the accused merely because on reappreciation of evidence it found the testimony of the PWs to be reliable whereas trial court had taken an opposite view.. ….

13. The instant case is not one where any such illegality was committed by the trial court. In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the High Court should not reappreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted.

14. We are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction at the instance of the informant. It may be that the High Court on appreciation of the evidence on record may reach a conclusion different from that of the trial court. But that by itself is no justification for exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against a judgment of acquittal. We cannot say that the judgment of the trial court in the instant case was perverse. No defect of procedure has been pointed out. There was also no improper acceptance or rejection of evidence nor was there any defect of procedure or illegality in the conduct of the trial vitiating the trial itself. At best the High Court thought that the prosecution witnesses were reliable while the trial court took the opposite view. This Court has repeatedly observed that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction against an order of acquittal at the instance of a private party, the court exercises only limited jurisdiction and should not constitute itself into an appellate court which has a much wider jurisdiction to go into questions of facts and law, and to convert an order of acquittal into one of conviction. It cannot be lost sight of that when a retrial is ordered, the dice is heavily loaded against the accused, and that itself must caution the court exercising revisional jurisdiction. We, therefore, find no justification for the impugned order of the High Court ordering retrial of the appellants." (underlining added)

9(h) In (2004) 13 Supreme Court Cases 374, Hydru vs. State of Kerala, the Supreme Court has held as under:-

"3. From a bare perusal of the impugned order, it would appear that the High Court upon reappraisal came to a conclusion different from the one recorded by the appellate court. It is well settled that in revision against acquittal by a private party, the powers of the Revisional Court are very limited. It can interfere only if there is any procedural irregularity or material evidence has been overlooked or misread by the subordinate court. If upon reappraisal of evidence, two views are possible, it is not permissible even for the appellate court in appeal against acquittal to interfere with the same, much less in revision where the powers are much narrower. No procedural irregularity has been found by the High Court in the order of the Sessions Court whereby the appellant was acquitted. Therefore, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal in exercise of its revisional powers, as such the same is liable to be interfered with by this Court." (underlining added)

9(i) In (2005) 1 Supreme Court Cases 115, Satyajit Banerjee and others vs. State of W.B. and others, the Supreme Court has held as under:-

"The revisional jurisdiction at the instance of the complainant has to be exercised by the High Court only in very exceptional cases, where the High Court finds defect of procedure or manifest error of law resulting in flagrant miscarriage of justice.

The law laid down in Best Bakery case, (2004) 4 SCC 158 in the extraordinary circumstances obtaining therein, cannot be applied to all cases against the established principles of criminal jurisprudence. Direction for retrial should not be made in all or every case where acquittal of accused is for want of adequate or reliable evidence. In Best Bakery case the first trial was found to be a farce and was described as "mock trial". Therefore, the direction for retrial was in fact, for a real trial. Such an extraordinary situation alone can justify the directions as made by the Supreme Court in Best Bakery case. Moreover, even if a retrial is directed in exercise of revisional powers by the High Court, the evidence already recorded at the initial trial cannot be erased or wiped out from the record of the case. The trial Judge has to decide the case on the basis of the evidence already on record and the additional evidence which would be recorded on retrial."

9(j) In (1963) 3 SCR 412, K.Chinnaswamy Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and another, the Supreme Court has held as under:-

"6. These two cases clearly lay down the limits of the High Courts jurisdiction to interfere with an order of acquittal in revision; in particular, Logendranath Jha case stresses that it is not open to a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction in view of the provisions of Section 439(4) and that the High Court cannot do this even indirectly by ordering retrial. What had happened in that case was that the High Court reversed pure findings of facts based on the trial courts appreciation of evidence but formally complied with sub-section (4) by directing only a retrial of the appellants without convicting them, and warned that the court retrying the case should not be influenced by any expression of opinion contained in the judgment of the High Court. In that connection this Court observed that there could be little doubt that the dice was loaded against the appellants of that case and it might prove difficult for any subordinate judicial officer dealing with the case to put aside altogether the strong views expressed in the judgment as to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the circumstances of the case in general.

7. It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal; but this jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Sub-section (4) of Section 439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that makes it all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial, when it cannot itself directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction. This places limitations on the power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power should be exercised. It is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. We may however indicate some cases of this kind, which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision…."

9(k) So per the decision reported in 2003 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1205, Thankappan Nadar and others v. Gopala Krishnan and another, this Court is not empowered to reappreciate the evidence, since, the trial court has considered the evidence and come to the conclusion that the respondents 2 to 5 are not guilty.

10. The delay is not fatal for valid reason:- In AIR 2009 Supreme Court 2308, Rama Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, the Supreme Court observing that the delay is not fatal for valid reason, witnesses examined in course of further investigation, order of Magistrate summoning witnesses based on supplementary charge-sheet is not illegal, has held as under:- "11. As observed in Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi vs. State of Gujarat and Others, (2004) 5 SCC 347, the prima consideration for further investigation is to arrive at the truth and do real and substantial justice. The hands of the investigating agency for further investigation should not be tied down on the ground of mere delay. In other words the mere fact that there may be further delay in concluding the trial should not stand in the way of further investigation if that would help the court in arriving at the truth and do real and substantial as well as effective justice.

12. If we consider the above legal principles, the order dated 19-2-2008 of the trial court summoning the witnesses named in the supplementary charge-sheet cannot be faulted with. It is true that after the enquiry and investigation, charges were framed on 11-3-2004 and thereafter in the course of the trial about 21 witnesses were examined. In the meantime, the police submitted supplementary charge-sheet with certain new materials and on the basis of supplementary charge-sheet, the prosecution filed an application on 12-1-2008 in the pending Sessions Trial No. 63 of 2004 before the trial court for summoning the persons named in the charge-sheet for their examination as prosecution witnesses. On a careful perusal of the application, the trial court by an order dated 19-2-2008, allowed the same and has summoned those witnesses named in the supplementary charge-sheet." There is no quarrel over the proposition.

11. The evidence of an interested witness can be relied upon, if there is a ring of truth:- The learned counsel for the revision petitioner relied upon the decision reported in (1998) 8 SCC 70, Prem Singh vs. State of Haryana, wherein the Supreme Court has observed that merely because a witness exaggerates or is an interested witness, the evidence cannot be thrown, where it is found that there is a ring of truth to the version of the witness and has held as under:- "5. The prosecution in support of its case on the issue of ill-treatment adduced the evidence of Suraj Bhan (PW 4), Phool Devi (PW 5) and Tek Chand (PW 6). As regards the cause of death, the prosecution relied upon the evidence of Dr R.N. Tehlan (PW 1) and the post-mortem report submitted by him. In addition thereto, reliance was placed on various circumstances to show that the death of Sumitra was homicidal and not suicidal or accidental. ….

11. Coming to the case of the prosecution as regards the complicity of A-1, we find that the evidence of Suraj Bhan (PW 4), Phool Devi (PW 5) and Tek Chand (PW 6) is unblemished as regards the demand of additional dowry/money from Sumitra and her parents and for not acceding to such demands causing ill-treatment and harassment to her. Suraj Bhan (PW 4) in his evidence has given all the necessary details as to how on each occasion whenever Sumitra came to his house, she narrated the incidents of ill-treatment and harassment caused to her on the ground of not bringing sufficient dowry and also not fulfilling the additional demand of money. Phool Devi (PW 5) has corroborated in all material particulars the evidence of Suraj Bhan (PW 4). There is no effective cross-examination of both these witnesses on this issue. There are some minor inter se inconsistencies as regards the time-factor which do not affect the substratum of the prosecution case. Tek Chand (PW 6) is an independent witness from the village who at one time mediated on the issue of additional demand of money and persuaded A-1 to take his wife Sumitra and the matter would be sorted out amicably. In the face of this evidence, we have no manner of doubt that A-1 has caused ill-treatment and harassment to Sumitra including beating on various occasions for not getting additional amounts/dowry. The High Court has very carefully examined the evidence of all these witnesses and in our considered view, the finding recorded by the High Court in this behalf suffers from no infirmity. The High Court has given very good reasons and pointed out as to how the finding recorded by the trial court is unsustainable. We are in agreement with the reasons recorded by the High Court." There is no quarrel over the proposition.

12. Section 304(B) IPC:- Now this Court has to decide, whether the respondents 2 to 5/accused 1 to 4, are guilty under Section 304(B) IPC.

12(a). At this juncture, it is appropriate to incorporate Section 304(B) IPC, which reads as under:-

Section 304B IPC. Dowry death

(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death" and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.

Explanation:-For the purpose of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 ( 28 of 1961).

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.]

12(b) It is true that the marriage between the deceased Jayalatha and second respondent/first accused has taken place on 06.02.1996 and she committed suicide by jumping into the well situated at the backyard of the house on 12.09.1998, so, she died within seven years from the date of marriage. The death is due to drowning in the well, that is proved by way of examining PW17-Dr.Govardhan and Ex.P4-Post-Mortem Certificate. So, the death is unnatural. The main thing to be decided is, whether there is demand of dowry in connection with the marriage soon before death. Absolutely there is no evidence available before the Court. In such circumstances, the trial court has come to the correct conclusion that the respondents 2 to 5/accused 1 to 4, are not guilty under Section 304(B) IPC. 12 (c) The learned counsel for the revision petitioner relied upon the decision reported in 2005 Cri.L.J. 4137, Satbir Singh and others vs. State of Haryana, wherein the Supreme Court has held as under:-

"5.Section 304-B reads as under:-

1.Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Section 304-B as quoted above, clearly shows that in order to bring the offence within the purview of Section 304-B, the following ingredients are to be fulfilled.

a) that the death of woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury occurs other than in normal circumstances,

b) that such death must have occurred during the seven years of her marriage.

c) soon before her death, she must be subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband.

d) such harassment by the husband or relative must be in connection with any demand for dowry.

e) Once the ingredients are fulfilled the death shall be presumed as dowry death. The husband and such relatives shall be deemed to have caused her death.

6. Section 304-B was inserted in the Indian Penal Code by Act 43 of 1986 with effect from 19-10-1986. In consequence thereof, another Section 113-B was inserted in the Evidence Act by Act 43 of 1986 with effect from 1.5.1986. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act deals with the presumption of dowry death which reads as under:- "113-B. Presumption as to dowry death When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death."

7. Undisputedly in this case the death of a woman has occurred during seven years of her marriage. It is also stated that, at the time of marriage the dowry has been paid according to the capacity of the complainant. However, subsequent to the marriage, the deceased Shanti was harassed for not bringing more dowry. Ten days prior to the incident, the deceased had come to the complainant’s place and stated that her in-laws were demanding Rs.7,000/- as they wanted to purchase a buffalo. She had further stated that till she brings the desired money, she would not be allowed to reside in her in-laws place. She died in intervening period of 13/14-6-1989 with bodily injury occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances. In our view, the prosecution has been able to establish the ingredients as enjoined under Section 304-B of Indian Penal Code. Once the prosecution is able to establish the aforesaid ingredients, the presumption against the accused starts as enjoined under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act. Of course, it is rebuttable presumption and the onus lies, on the accused against whom the presumption lies to discharge it. On this aspect the laws are no more res integra. In catena of decisions, this Court has repeatedly held that once that ingredients of Section 304-B IPC have been able to establish by the prosecution, the onus lies on the accused to rebut the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. Avoiding multiplicity, we may refer to the decision rendered by this Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. M.V.Manjunathegowda and another, 2003 (2) SCC 188 at page 189 this Court said that "In order to establish the offence under Section 304-B IPC the prosecution is obliged to prove that the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances and such death occurs within 7 years of her marriage and if it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband. Such harassment and cruelty must be in connection with any demand for dowry. If the prosecution is able to prove these circumstances then the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act will operate. It is a rebuttable presumption and the onus to rebut shifts on the accused. The defence of the accused was a total denial. Therefore, the presumption as to dowry death envisaged under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act remains unrebutted." 12(d) The learned counsel for the revision petitioner relied upon the decision reported in AIR 2005 SC 1411, Yashoda and another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, wherein the Supreme Court has held as under:-

"16. The words "soon before" found in S. 304-B I.P.C. have come up for consideration before this Court in large number of cases. This Court has consistently held that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any straightjacket formula to determine what would constitute "soon before", in the context of S. 304-B I.P.C. It all depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon a decision of this Court rendered by two learned Judges reported in AIR 1997 SC 1873, Sham Lal v. State of Haryana, and submitted that as in that case, so in the present case, there was no evidence to suggest that after the deceased went to her matrimonial home, she had been subjected to cruelty and harassment before her death. The facts of Sham Lal’s case are clearly distinguishable and they have been so distinguished in the case of Kans Raj v. State of Punjab and others (2000) 5 SCC 207, by a Bench of 3 learned Judges of this Court. This Court observed:- "It is further contended on behalf of the respondents that the statements of the deceased referred to the instances could not be termed to be cruelty or harassment by the husband soon before her death. "Soon before" is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances of each case and no straightjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time limit. This expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. The term "soon before" is not synonymous with the term "immediately before" and is opposite of the expression "soon after" as used and understood in S. 114,Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. These words would imply that the interval should not be too long between the time of making the statement and the death. It contemplates the reasonable time which, as earlier noticed,has to be understood and determined under the peculiar circumstances of each case. In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. If the cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be deemed to be "soon before death". If any other intervening circumstance showing the non-existence of such treatment is not brought on record, before such alleged treatment and the date of death. It does not, however, mean that such time can be stretched to any period. Proximate and live-link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the consequential death is required to be proved by the prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon such demand and the date of death should not be too remote in time which,under the circumstances, be treated as having become stale enough".(underlining added) 12(e) The learned counsel for the revision petitioner relied upon the decision reported in (1994) 6 SCC 727, Hem Chand vs. State of Haryana, wherein the Supreme Court has held as under:-

"7. Now coming to the question of sentence, it can be seen that Section 304-B IPC lays down that:

"Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life".

The point for consideration is whether the extreme punishment of imprisonment for life is warranted in the instant case. A reading of Section 304-B IPC would show that when a question arises whether a person has committed the offence of dowry death of a woman what all that is necessary is it should be shown that soon before her unnatural death, which took place within seven years of the marriage, the deceased had been subjected, by such person, to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with demand for dowry. If that is shown then the court shall presume that such a person has caused the dowry death. It can therefore be seen that irrespective of the fact whether such person is directly responsible for the death of the deceased or not by virtue of the presumption, he is deemed to have committed the dowry death if there were such cruelty or harassment and that if the unnatural death has occurred within seven years from the date of marriage. Likewise there is a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act as to the dowry death. It lays down that the court shall presume that the person who has subjected the deceased wife to cruelty before her death caused the dowry death if it is shown that before her death, such woman had been subjected,by the accused, to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand for dowry. Practically this is the presumption that has been incorporated in Section 304-B IPC also. It can therefore, be seen that irrespective of the fact whether the accused has any direct connection with the death or not, he shall be presumed to have committed the dowry death provided the other requirements mentioned above are satisfied. In the instant case no doubt the prosecution has proved that the deceased died an unnatural death namely due to strangulation, but there is no direct evidence connecting the accused. It is also important to note in this context that there is no charge under Section 302 IPC. The trial court also noted that there were two sets of medical evidence on the file in respect of the death of the deceased. Dr.Usha Rani PW6 and Dr.Indu Lalit PW9 gave one opinion. According to them no injury was found on the dead body and that the same was highly decomposed. On the other hand, Dr.Dalbir Singh PW13 who also examined the dead body and gave his opinion, deposed that he noticed some injuries at the time of re-post-mortem examination. Therefore at the most it can be said that the prosecution proved that it was an unnatural death in which case also Section 304-B IPC would be attracted. But this aspect has certainly to be taken into consideration in balancing the sentence to be awarded to the accused. As a matter of fact, the trial court only found that the death was unnatural and the aspect of cruelty has been established and therefore the offences punishable under Sections 304-B and 201 IPC have been established. The High Court in a very short judgment concluded that it was fully proved that the death of the deceased in her matrimonial home was dowry death otherwise than in normal circumstances as a result of cruelty meted out to her and therefore an offence under Section 304-B IPC was made out. Coming to the sentence the High Court pointed out that the accused-appellant was a police employee and instead of checking the crime, he himself indulged therein and precipitated in it and that bride-killing cases are on the increase and therefore a serious view has to be taken. As mentioned above, Section 304-B IPC only raises presumption and lays down that minimum sentence should be seven years but it may extend to imprisonment for life. Therefore awarding extreme punishment of imprisonment for life should in rare cases and not in every case." On a perusal of oral evidence of PWs 1 to 3, it is seen that there is no evidence to show that soon before death the deceased Jayalatha was subjected to cruelty in connection with the demand of dowry in connection with the marriage.

13. Sections 306 and 107 IPC:- At this juncture, it is appropriate to incorporate Sections 306 and 107 IPC, which reads as under:-

306 IPC. Abetment of suicide :-

If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

Section 107 IPC.Abetment of a thing :-

A person abets the doing of a thing, who-

First: -Instigates any person to do that thing; or

Secondly: -Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or

Thirdly:-Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.

Explanation1:- A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing. Insofar as the offences under Sections 306 and 107 IPC are concerned, there is no iota of evidence before the Court to show that she was induced, incited or provoked by the respondents 2 to 5 to commit suicide. So, the trial court has considered this aspect in a proper perspective and come to the correct conclusion and therefore, I have no hesitation to concur with the findings of the trial court.

14. Section 498A IPC:- Now, it is appropriate to incorporate Section 498A IPC, which reads as under:-

498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty

Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation-For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" means-

(a) Any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

(b) Harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her meet such demand.]

14(a) While considering the evidence that a complaint has been received from the father, but he has stated that he has put his signature alone and the contents have not been written by him.The learned counsel for the revision petitioner would contend that there is no reason assigned by the trial court for discarding the evidence of PWs 1 to 3. It is true that Ex.P1-Complaint has not been written by PW1. PW1 in his evidence, he has stated that Andinadan has obtained the signature in a white paper. While perusing Ex.P1-Complaint, it was stated that on 12.09.1988 at 17.30 hours, he received the complaint and registered a case in F-5, Tiruninravur Police Station in Cr.No. 394 of 1998 for the offence under Section 174 Cr.P.C. Since, she died within seven years from the date of marriage, PW22-Revenue Divisional Officer has conducted the Inquest. In that, no one has deposed that the deceased was ill-treated by her husband and in-laws.

14(b) PW22-Swaminathan, in his evidence, he has stated that during the enquiry, since a case has been registered under Section 174 Cr.P.C. he has examined the parents of the deceased, husband and husband’s brother and other panchayatdars. In his cross-examination, he has fairly conceded that, when he had gone to the place of occurrence both bride and bridegroom family members were there and the first accused/second respondent was also there. In his cross-examination, he has deposed that parents of the deceased Jayalatha has stated to him that the second respondent/first accused/son-in-law has neither demanded any dowry nor ill-treated or harassed the deceased Jayalatha.

14(c) PW24-Nandakumar, Deputy Superintendent of Police, in his cross-examination, at the time of 161 statement, has deposed that PW2-revision petitioner herein has not stated anything about the harassment and dowry demand. Per contra, he has deposed that her daughter Jayalatha was treated very well by his son-in-law. Moreover, she has also stated that her husband redeemed the jewels of her daughter and it was pledged in her name. "….rhl;rp fdfuj;jpdk; bfhLj;j thf;FK:yj;jpy; ehDk; vd; fztUk; vd; kfd;fSk; mof;fo jpUepd;wt{h; brd;W vd; kfis ghh;j;J tUnthk; vd;Wk;. ey;yKiwapy; FLk;gk; elj;jp te;jdh; vd;Wk; vd; kUkfd; re;jpunrfud; v’;fsplk; gznkh eiffisnah nfl;ftpy;iy vd;Wk; vd; kfs; b$ayjh jd; fzth; Jd;g[Wj;jpajhft[k; gzk;. eif. vJt[k; nfl;f brhd;djhfnth g[fhh; vJt[k; brhy;ytpy;iy vd;W Twpa[s;shh; vd;why; rhpjhd;/ Rkhh; 15 ehl;fs; Kd;g[jhd; vd; kfspd; eiffis vd; fzth; kPl;L v’;fs; bgahpy; ng’;fpy; mlF itj;jhh; vd;W Twpa[s;shh; vd;why; rhpjhd;////" 14(d) PW3, the brother of deceased Jayalatha, also in 161 statement, he has stated that both his sister and brother-in-law/first accused/second respondent are leading a happy married life. There is no problem between them. So the evidence of PWs 22 and 24 have proved that both the deceased Jayalatha and the first accused were living happily. So, there is no dispute or misunderstanding between the first accused and the deceased Jayalatha and there is no evidence to show that the first accused/second respondent demanded money from the victim Jayalatha and her family. 14(e) While perusing the evidence of PWs 1 to 3 along with 161 statement, it is seen that during the examination when they are examined before the Court, they have given an improved version. It is only an after thought. At this juncture, this Court has to accept the argument advanced by the learned counsel appearing for respondents 2 to 5 that since the child was with PWs 1 and 2 when the first accused/second respondent asked the child, they gave such an evidence before the Court. PW1 in his evidence, he has stated that he does not know whether in RDO enquiry, he has stated that his son-in-law has not demanded dowry. He has fairly conceded in his cross-examination, what he has deposed before the Court was not mentioned during investigation and RDO enquiry. PW2 the revision petitioner herein fairly conceded that his daughter was not subjected to harassment in view of the dowry demand. She has denied the suggestion that two years after the death of her daughter only, she has given a complaint against the accused. In her cross, she has stated as follows:- "….vd; kfis fhR nfl;L Jd;g[Wj;jpdhh;fs; vd;W ehd; Mh;/o/xtplk; brhy;ytpy;iy///"

14(f) PW22-Revenue Divisional Officer has visited the place of occurrence after the receipt of FIR and he conducted the enquiry. He sent the report Ex.P13. At that time, he has examined PWs 1 and 2 and first accused-Chandrasekar, second accused-Mannivannan and one Perumal and during the enquiry, PW1 has not stated that his daughter was subjected to harassment by demanding of dowry. But, PW2/revision petitioner herein has stated that her daughter/deceased Jayalatha is a very brave girl and she suspect only homicidal and hence, she prayed for an enquiry. On that basis only PW22 has given a report stating that the death is not due to demand of dowry. She has also further stated that there is no external injuries. While perusing 161 statement, as soon as the occurrence PWs 1 to 3 were examined on 12.09.1998. At that time, PW1 has not stated anything about the dowry harassment. But, after direction from this Court in Crl.O.P.No.2647 of 1999 he was examined on 26.12.2001 nearly after 3 years they have stated that the death is due to dowry harassment. But, they have given further improvement when they were examined before this Court, which has clearly proved their intention. Since, first accused has demanded the custody of his daughter, so they filed Crl.O.P.No. 2647 of 1999 only on 12.02.1999 and further investigation was ordered on 09.08.1999. In the above said circumstances, in such nature of the case, it is unsafe to rely upon the evidence of close relatives viz., parents and brothers.

14(g) It is pertinent to note that as per the latest dictum of Apex Court, till a person is proved guilty, the presumption is, he is innocent. Once, the accused 1 to 4/respondents 2 to 5 were acquitted from the charges levelled against them and they were declared innocent, the burden is heavily upon the revision petitioner to prove that the accused 1 to 4/respondents 2 to 5 are guilty under Sections 498A, 306 and 304(B) IPC.

15. PW3, who is none other than the brother of deceased Jayalatha was in the house of deceased on the date of occurrence till morning, then only he had gone to his parents house, but he has not whispered to anybody and there is also no evidence to show that his sister was subjected to harassment by way of demanding dowry by respondents 2 to 5. Admittedly, except second respondent/first accused, other accused viz., accused 2 to 4 are residing elsewhere, so there is no evidence to show that the deceased committed suicide because of the cruelty meted out by her husband/first accused/second respondent or accused 3 to 4. In such circumstances, the trial court has considered the oral and documentary evidence and come to the correct conclusion. There is no perversity or irregularity committed by the trial court in arriving at the conclusion that the accused 1 to 4/respondents 2 to 5 are not guilty of the charges levelled against them. So, as the revisional court, this Court has no jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence. Hence, I concur with the finding of the trial court and the judgment passed by the trial court is hereby liable to be confirmed and the acquittal is also liable to be confirmed.

16. In fine,

i.this Criminal Revision is dismissed.

ii.The judgment passed by the trial court is confirmed and the acquittal of respondents 2 to 5/accused 1 to 4, is also confirmed.

Paa 17.02.2010

Index: Yes

Internet: Yes

To

1. The Additional District Judge,

Fast Track Court No.V, Chengalpattu,

at Tiruvallur,

2. The Deputy Superintendent of Police

Avadi Sub-Division

Avadi, Chennai.

3. The Public Prosecutor

High Court, Chennai.

R.MALA,J

paa

Crl.R.C.No.1165 of 2005

17.02.2010

Main – Page

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *


Not found ...? HOW TO WIN 498a, DV, DIVORCE; Search in Above link

All Law documents and Judgment copies
Laws and Bare Acts of India
Landmark SC/HC Judgements
Rules and Regulations of India.

STUDY REPORTS

Copyright © 2021 SC and HC Judgments Online at MyNation
×

Free Legal Help, Just WhatsApp Away

MyNation HELP line

We are Not Lawyers, but No Lawyer will give you Advice like We do

Please read Group Rules – CLICK HERE, If You agree then Please Register CLICK HERE and after registration  JOIN WELCOME GROUP HERE

We handle Women Centric biased laws like False Sectioin 498A IPC, Domestic Violence(DV ACT), Divorce, Maintenance, Alimony, Child Custody, HMA 24, 125 CrPc, 307, 312, 313, 323, 354, 376, 377, 406, 420, 497, 506, 509; TEP, RTI and many more…

MyNation FoundationMyNation FoundationMyNation Foundation