1 Cr.A.Nos.1199 1276 of 2004

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH : AT
JABALPUR

Cr.A. No. 1276/2004

1. Baboolal Yadav, S/O Durga Prasad Yadav,
aged about 26 years.

2. Durga Prasad Yadav, S/O Gunthelal Yadav,
aged about 50 years, both residents of Village-
Rani Pipariya, P.S.- Narsinghpur, District-Narsinghpur
(M.P.)
Appellants

Cr.A. No. 1199/2004

Kanchhedilal, S/o Danelal Yadav
aged about 28 years, resident of Village
-Jhirri Khurd, P.S.-Themi, District-Narsinghpur
(M.P.)

VERSUS

State of Madhya Pradesh
through P.S.-Narsinghpur,
District- Narsinghpur, (M.P.)
Respondent

Present: Hon’ble Shri Hemant Gupta, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Shri Justice C.V. Sirpurkar

…………………………………………………………………………………………………
For appellants : Shri S.C. Datt, Senior counsel with
Shri Siddharth Datt, Advocate.
For respondent : Smt. Manjeet P.S. Chackal, Panel
Lawyer.
………………………………………………………………………………………………
2 Cr.A.Nos.1199 1276 of 2004

JUDGMENT

(Delivered on this 25th day of May, 2017)

Per C.V. Sirpurkar, J.

1. Criminal Appeal Nos. 1276 and 1199 of 2004 arose from the
same judgment dated 07.07.2004 passed by the Court of First
Additional Sessions Judge, Narsinghpur, in Sessions Trial No.
01/2004 (State of M.P. Vs. Baboolal and 4 others), whereby the
appellants Baboolal, Durga Prasad and Kanchhedilal have been
convicted and sentenced as hereunder:

So Name of the Provision Sentence of Fine Default
. Appellant of I.P.C. Imprisonment in Rs. Sentence
N
o.

1. Baboolal S. 302 Imprisonment 2,000/- R.I. for
for life. 1 year
S. 201 R.I. for 3 500/- R.I. for 2
years months
S. 182 R.I. for 6 500/- R.I. for 2
months months
2. Durga Prasad S. 302 Imprisonment 2,000/- R.I. for
for life. 1 year
S. 201 R.I. for 3 500/- R.I. for 2
years months
3. Kanchhedilal S. 302 Imprisonment 2,000/- R.I. for
for life. 1 year
S. 201 R.I. for 3 500/- R.I. for 2
years months
3 Cr.A.Nos.1199 1276 of 2004

S. 182 R.I. for 6 500/- R.I. for 2
months months

All substantive sentences of imprisonment to run concurrently.
Co-accused persons Ramsingh and Ginda @ Gendlal have
been acquitted of the charges under Section 302, 302 read with section
149 and 201 of the I.P.C. Since, both of these appeals under Section
374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure arise from the same
judgment, they have been heard analogously and are being decided by
this common judgment.

2. In a nutshell, the prosecution case may be stated thus:

(a) Appellant Baboolal had married deceased Leela Bai about 6-7
years before the date of the incident. Appellant Durga Prasad is father
of appellant Baboolal and appellant Kanchhedilal is brother-in-law
(sister’s husband) of appellant Baboolal. Deceased Leela Bai had
instituted proceedings against the appellant Baboolal and his mother
under Section 498-A of the I.P.C. and Section 125 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. During the pendency of aforesaid proceedings, an
attempt was made at reconciliation. As a result, on 30.07.2003, learned
Magistrate directed Leela Bai to live with appellant Baboolal on an
experimental basis. Since, deceased Leela Bai expressed willingness
to live with her husband Baboolal, learned Magistrate directed the
parties on 01.09.2003, to live together. On that day, appellants
Baboolal, Durga Prasad and Kanchhedilal had attended the Court.
Deceased Leela Bai and her father Phool Singh (PW/5) had also
appeared before the Court. Appellants Baboolal, Durga Prasad and
Kanchhedilal took deceased Leela Bai along with them from the Court
on 01.09.2003.

(b) Railway Gangman, Roshan Singh (PW/7) had spotted a
headless dead body of a women lying along the railway track near
Khamtara Gate at about 09.00 – 09.15 p.m. on 01.09.2003 between
4 Cr.A.Nos.1199 1276 of 2004

Poll No. 908/1 and 908/0. Intimation of the dead body was given to
P.S.- Narsinghpur at about 07.20 a.m. on 02.09.2003. Appellant
Baboolal accompanied by appellant Kanchhedilal, lodged a report on
02.09.2003 (Ex.P/1) at police out-post Singhpur, P.S.-Narsinghpur to
the effect that while he was returning along with his wife deceased
Leela Bai and his 3 years daughter from the Court on 1.09.2003, just
outside his village Rani Pipariya, Leela Bai told him that she wanted
to answer call of nature. Thereafter, Leela Bai went inside the fields
for aforesaid purpose. When she did not return for 15-20 minutes,
appellant Baboolal searched for her but she could not be located.
Since, there was no claimant of the dead body, it was buried.
However, the father of the deceased, Phool Singh and her other
relatives identified the clothes and other articles on 06.09.2003. On
10.09.2003, pursuant to the disclosure statements made by the
appellant Baboolal under section 27 of the Evidence Act, a skin and
fleshless human skull and hair were discovered from inside the
Soybean crop in Sunil Darda’s field, which is located along side
railway track from where the dead body of the deceased was
recovered. On the same day, on the disclosure statements made by the
appellant Kanchhedilal, the Tawal (a sharp edged implement with a
wooden butt used for digging the earth) with blood like stains, was
recovered from his father-in-law’s house.

(c) During investigation, it was learnt that on 1.9.2003, Subhash
(PW/9) had seen deceased Leela Bai in the company of the present
appellants and co-accused persons Ramsingh and Gendlal. Durga
Prasad had told him that they had entered into a compromise with their
daughter-in-law and they were taking her to Dulha Dev Temple for
Darshan. During investigation, it was also learnt that on the day next
to the date of the incident, appellants Baboolal and Kanchhedilal had
visited Tarachand (PW/10) and had confessed that they had killed
Leela Bai and her dead body was lying on the railway track near
Khamtara Gate.

5 Cr.A.Nos.1199 1276 of 2004

3. After trial, the learned Sessions Judge concluded that the
prosecution has been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that:

(i) the deceased Leela Bai had dragged the family of appellant
Baboolal in the Court; therefore, they had a strong motive to kill her;

(ii) the headless headless body of a female recovered from the
railway track near Khamtara Gate, belonged to deceased Leela Bai;

(iii) her skin, fleshless skull and hair were discovered upon the
disclosure statements made under Section 27 of the Evidence Act by
the appellant Baboolal;

(iv) a blood-stained Tawal was seized upon the disclosure
statements made by the appellant Kanchhedilal;

(v) appellants Baboolal, Durga Prasad and Kanchhedilal were last
seen in the company of the deceased and they had taken her from the
Court;

(vi) appellants Baboolal and Kanchhedilal had tried to mislead the
police by lodging a false “lost person report” regarding deceased Leela
Bai on 02.09.2003.

4. On the basis of aforesaid chain of circumstances, appellants
Baboolal and Kanchhedilal were convicted under Sections 302, 201
and 182 of the I.P.C. and appellant Durga Prasad was convicted under
Sections 302 and 201 of the I.P.C. Since Subhash (PW/9) had turned
hostile and there was no evidence that co-accused persons Ram Singh
and Gendlal were also seen in the company of deceased Leela Bai and
there was no other evidence against them, they were acquitted of all
charges.

5. Learned Senior counsel for the appellants Baboolal, Durga
Prasad and Kanchhedilal has challenged the conviction and sentence
recorded by the trial Court mainly on the grounds that the headless
headless body found lying on the railway track near Khamtara Gate
was not shown to and identified by the parents of the deceased. Thus,
there was no sufficient basis for presumption that it belonged to
deceased Leela Bai. Likewise, there was no sufficient ground to
6 Cr.A.Nos.1199 1276 of 2004

presume that the skull said to have been recovered from the Soybean
field belonged to the deceased. In any case, the panch witnesses did
not support the prosecution case; therefore, it was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the skull was recovered at the instance of the
appellant Baboolal. Likewise, the panch witnesses had also not
supported the fact that on the basis of disclosure statements made by
the appellant Kanchhedilal, a blood stained Tawal was recovered from
his father-in-law’s house. In any case, the prosecution had failed to file
the Serologist’s report to establish that there indeed was blood on the
Tawal so seized. Thus, there was no link to connect the Tawal
allegedly seized at the instance of the appellant Kanchhedilal, to the
crime. It has further been contended that the last seen together is a
very weak piece of evidence and even that circumstance was not
properly established because appellants Baboolal, Durga Prasad and
Kanchhedilal had merely left the Court premises together with the
deceased, it does not mean that they were last seen in the company of
the deceased. As such, the conviction recorded by the trial Court is not
sustainable in the eyes of law and the appellants deserve the benefit of
doubt; therefore, it has been prayed that the appellants be acquitted.

6. Learned panel lawyer for the respondent State on the other
hand has supported the impugned judgment.

7. On perusal of the record and due consideration of the rival
contentions, we are of the view that the prosecution has succeeded in
proving beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of circumstantial
evidence that the appellant Baboolal had committed murder of
deceased Leela Bai, had caused disappearance of evidence of their
crime and had lodged a false lost person report in respect of deceased
Leelabai; therefore, his appeal must fail. However, the prosecution has
failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants Durga
Prasad and Kanchhedilal were also complicit in the murder; therefore,
they deserves to be acquitted extending them the benefit of doubt. The
reasons for our conclusions are as follows:

7 Cr.A.Nos.1199 1276 of 2004

8. First of all, we shall consider whether the trial Court was
justified in concluding that the dead body found on the railway track
and the skull found in the adjacent field belonged to deceased Leela
Bai. The headless body was found on the railway track at about 09.00
p.m.- 09.15 p.m. On 01.09.2003, the date on which deceased Leela Bai
was last seen alive. It is true that the headless body was not shown to
her parents Phool Singh (PW/5) and Sukhwati Bai (PW/8); however,
Phool Singh (PW/5) has stated that when he learnt that a dead body
was recovered near Village Khamtara, he had gone to the police and
reported that his daughter was also missing. He had also told the
police that she was wearing red bangles and red Saree with golden
brocade; whereon, the police had shown him the clothes and broken
pieces of bangles found on the dead body. He had identified the
articles as those belonging to his daughter. Since, Phool Singh (PW/5)
had seen his daughter deceased Leela Bai on 01.09.2003 in the Court,
it would not have been difficult for him to identify the Saree, blouse
and bangles belonging to his daughter and which were found on the
dead body. The identification memo (Ex.P/9) was prepared by the
Investigating Officer in that behalf. It bears the signature of Phool
Singh (PW/5). Sukhwati Bai (PW/8) has also supported the statements
of her husband Phool Singh. In the facts and circumstances of the
case, the statement of Phool Singh sounds natural and there is no
reason to suspect its veracity on this point. Thus, the trial Court was
justified in recording a finding that the headless body belonged to
deceased Leela Bai.

9. So far as the recovery of skull is concerned, reliance may be
placed upon the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the case
of State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, (2000) 1 SCC 471, wherein it was
held that:

“Three possibilities are there in such a situation when the accused has not stated
that the incriminating material was concealed by him. One is that he himself
would have concealed it. Second is that he would have seen somebody else
concealing it, and the third is that he would have been told by another person that
8 Cr.A.Nos.1199 1276 of 2004

it was concealed there. But if the accused declines to tell the criminal court that
his knowledge about the concealment was on account of one of the last two
possibilities the criminal court can presume that it was concealed by the accused
himself. This is because the accused is the only person who can offer the
explanation as to how came to know of such concealment and if he chooses to
refrain from telling the court as to how else he came to know of it, the
presumption is a well-justified course to be adopted by the criminal court that the
concealment was made by him. Such an interpretation is not inconsistent with the
principle embodied in Section 27 of the Evidence Act.”

10. In the present case the skull has been recovered on the basis of
disclosure statements made by the appellant Baboolal in a field
adjacent to the railway track from under the crop. Thus, the skull was
not in a visible condition. Appellant Baboolal had knowledge that the
skull was concealed in such a place. From his knowledge, only three
inferences may possibly be drawn:

(i) appellant Baboolal had himself concealed it;

(ii) he had seen someone else concealing the skull at that place
and;

(iii) someone had told him that a human skull has been concealed
at that place.

11. Having disclosed the presence of a damning article like human
skull in a concealed condition, the burden was upon the appellant
Baboolal to explain that he had not concealed it himself but had either
seen it being concealed by someone else or he was informed about the
presence of the skull at that place by someone else. He has not
discharged that burden; therefore, the conclusion is inescapable that it
was concealed by himself.

12. A theory was advanced before the trial Court that the deceased
did not want to rejoin her husband and when she was directed by the
Court to live with her husband, she ran away and committed suicide
by lying under a running train. In the process, her head was severed
from the body and rolled down in the Soybean crop planted in the
adjacent field. However, this theory has several flaws and needs to be
rejected outright.

9 Cr.A.Nos.1199 1276 of 2004

13. First of all, the deceased was sent to live with her husband for
about a month on an experimental basis. Her parents Phool Singh and
Sukhwati Bai have deposed before the Court that she had expressed
her willingness to rejoin her husband permanently. No one had
compelled her rejoin her husband. Due to the willingness expressed by
her, the Court had directed the restoration of conjugal relations on
01.09.2003.; therefore, there are no grounds for presuming that the
deceased was forced into rejoining her husband and had therefore,
committed suicide.

14. It is true that Dr. Rajesh Singhai (PW/11), who had conducted
the post-mortem examination, has admitted the suggestion in his
cross-examination that the injuries sustained by the deceased could
have been caused by running train; however, there is no basis for
aforesaid opinion. It may be noted that there was no other injury, not
even an abrasion, found upon the Headless body. It is highly
improbable that a human being cut by a running train would not suffer
any other injury. Most importantly, in the spot map (Ex.P/7), it has
been clearly shown that the dead body was lying on one side of the
down track. The skull was seized from the field, which was on the
other side of the track for up trains. Thus, there is no possibility that
after being severed by the wheels of a running train, the head would
have rolled over into the adjoining field, from where it was discovered
by the police. In these circumstances, the trial Court has rightly held
that the aforesaid theory put forward by the defence, is not acceptable.

15. On the basis of foregoing discussions, we are of the view that
the dead body without the head found on the railway track near
Khamtara Gate belonged to the deceased Leela Bai and the skull
recovered from the field of Sunil Darda also belonged her.

16. It has been contended by the learned senior counsel for the
appellants that a compromise had been arrived at between appellant
Baboolal and his family members on one hand and deceased Leela Bai
and her family members on the other; therefore, the appellant Baboolal
10 Cr.A.Nos.1199 1276 of 2004

and his family members were looking forward to a congenial marital
life for appellant Baboolal with deceased Leela Bai. As such, the
murder of deceased Leela Bai was farthest from their mind. However,
when we consider the background in which the offence was
committed, we find that it was deceased Leela Bai, who had instituted
cases against the appellant Baboolal and her mother under Section
498-A of the I.P.C. In addition thereto, she had also instituted
proceedings against appellant Baboolal under Section 125 of the
Cr.P.C. for maintenance. Thus, she was instrumental in bringing
appellant Baboolal and his mother on the steps of a police station.
Thus, it cannot be said that the appellant had no motive at all to kill
deceased Leela Bai.

17. Learned senior counsel for the appellant has also contended
that the panch witness Raju @ Ajay Singh (PW/3) has turned hostile
and has not supported the fact that in his presence, appellant Baboolal
had disclosed to the police in custody that he had concealed Leela
Bai’s head in the field of Sunil Darda in the midst of Soyabean plants.
Likewise, Surendra Malviya (PW/2) has also not supported the fact
that the appellant Kanchhedilal had informed the police that he had
concealed the blood stained Tawal at the residence of his father-in-
law’s. Therefore, for want of corroboration, the trial Court erred in
placing reliance upon the statements of Investigating Officer, B.S.
Sengar (PW/12) in this regard. It is true that panch witnesses have not
corroborated the fact that appellants Baboolal and Kanchhedilal had
made disclosure statements regarding the skull and Tawal. However,
we may note that the Investigating Officer has withstood the cross-
examination well. It is not the case of the appellants that he had
inimical relations with the appellants. Thus, there is no reason for the
Investigating Officer to have falsely implicated the appellants
Baboolal and Kanchhedilal. In any case, a human skull is a highly
incriminating piece of evidence. Such skulls are also not readily
available. In these circumstances, there is no reason to doubt the
11 Cr.A.Nos.1199 1276 of 2004

statements of the Investigating Officer that appellants Baboolal and
Kanchhedilal had made such disclosure statements and pursuant to
those statements, the skull and Tawal was recovered at the instance of
the appellants Baboolal and Kanchhedilal, respectively.

18. Now, we shall proceed to consider the important circumstance
that is available at least against the appellant Baboolal. That
circumstance is the so called last seen together. Before adverting to
the facts of the instant case, it would be apposite to take a look at the
prevailing legal position.

19. The apex Court has held in the case of Dharam Deo Yadav v.
State of U. P., 2014 CRI. L. J. 2371 that:

It is trite law that a conviction cannot be recorded against the accused merely on
the ground that the accused was last seen with the deceased. In other words, a
conviction cannot be based on the only circumstance of last seen together. The
conduct of the accused and the fact of last seen together plus other circumstances
have to be looked into. Normally, last seen theory comes into play when the time
gap, between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were seen last
alive and when the deceased is found dead, is so small that possibility of any
person other than the accused being the perpetrator of the crime becomes
impossible. It will be difficult in some cases to positively establish that the
deceased was last seen with the accused when there is a long gap and possibility
of other persons coming in between exists. However, if the prosecution, on the
basis of reliable evidence, establishes that the missing person was seen in the
company of the accused and was never seen thereafter, it is obligatory on the part
of the accused to explain the circumstances in which the missing person and the
accused parted company.

20. Likewise, in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Kashi Ram,
AIR 2007 SC 144, it has been held that:

When any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of
proving that fact is upon him. Thus, if a person is last seen with the deceased, he
must offer an explanation as to when and how he parted company. He must
furnish an explanation which appears to the Court to be probable and
satisfactory. If he does so he must be held to have discharged his burden. If he
fails to discharge the burden in a case based on circumstantial evidence, that
itself provides additional link in the chain of circumstances proved against him.

21. The Supreme Court has observed in the cases of Bodh Raj v.
State of J. and K. AIR 2002 SUPREME COURT 3164, State of U.
P. v. SatishAIR 2005 SUPREME COURT 1000 and Ramreddy
Rajeshkhanna Reddy v. State of Andra Pradesh AIR 2006
SUPREME COURT 1656 that the last seen theory comes into play
12 Cr.A.Nos.1199 1276 of 2004

where the time-gap between the point of time when the accused and
the deceased were seen last alive and when the deceased is found dead
is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being
the author of the crime becomes impossible. It would be difficult in
some cases to positively establish that the deceased was last seen with
the accused when there is a long gap and possibility of other persons
coming in between exists. In the absence of any other positive
evidence to conclude that the accused and the deceased were last seen
together, it would be hazardous to come to a conclusion of guilt in
those cases.

22. In the back-drop of aforesaid legal position, reverting back to
the facts of the case we may find that Phool Singh (PW/5), father of
the deceased has stated on 01.09.2003, that a compromise was to be
recorded in the Court in the criminal case under Section 498-A of the
I.P.C. For aforesaid purpose, appellants Baboolal, Durga Prasad and
Kanchhedilal had come to the Court along with deceased Leela Bai.
After recording of the compromise, the case was disposed of and
Baboolal, Durga Prasad and Kanchhedilal had taken deceased Leela
Bai from the Court. Thus, Phool Singh (PW/5) had last seen the
deceased alive in the company of the three appellants. It appears
natural that the close relatives of the husband would appear in the
Court for compromise in a matrimonial matter to lend assurance to
their commitment that they would keep the woman well. Moreover, in
the examination of accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., all three
appellants have admitted that Baboolal, Durga Prasad and
Kanchhedilal had gone to the Court and after compromise, had taken
the deceased Leela Bai along with them. Thus, this is an undisputed
position that Leela Bai had left the Court premises along with three
appellants.

23. In this regard, learned senior counsel for the appellants has
contended that last seen together is a very weak piece of evidence.
Moreover, the circumstance that the appellants had left the Court
13 Cr.A.Nos.1199 1276 of 2004

premises along with the deceased Leela Bai does not mean that they
were last seen together with the deceased. In the opinion of this Court,
aforesaid argument needs to be separately considered in respect of
Baboolal on one hand and Durga Prasad and Kanchhedilal on the
other.

24. Baboolal was husband of the deceased and Durga Prasad was
her father-in-law. Both of them lived together at Rani Pipariya.
Deceased Leela Bai was also to be taken to her matrimonial home at
Rani Pipariya; therefore, it is natural to assume that at least Baboolal
and Durga Prasad must have accompanied the deceased to Rani
Pipariya. In case, Baboolal or Durga Prasad had parted company with
deceased, the burden was upon them to explain under what
circumstance, they got separated from the deceased. An explanation is
forthcomming from the appellant Baboolal, who had lodged the report
of “Lost Person” (Ex.P/1), wherein he had stated that while he was
returning from the Court, just outside the village, the deceased told
him that she wanted to answer the call of nature and had gone into the
fields, never to return. In that report, the presence of appellant Durga
Prasad has not been shown. In view of recovery of skull belonged to
the deceased at the instance of the appellant Baboolal, the explanation
given by him in the lost person report is not acceptable. However, it
can be used to exonerate appellant Durga Prasad. In any case, there is
no circumstance other than the so called last seen together against him
on record. This circumstance by itself, may not be sufficient to hold
him guilty for murder of the deceased.

25. Thus, the chain of circumstance beginning with the presence
of motive to recovery of skull of the deceased at the instance of the
appellant Baboolal and ending with the circumstance of last seen
together, is complete so far as appellant Baboolal is concerned.
However, it is incomplete with regard to appellant Durgaprasad.

26. So far as the appellant Kanchhedilal is concerned, he is
brother-in-law of the appellant Baboolal. He lived in a different village
14 Cr.A.Nos.1199 1276 of 2004

i.e. Jhirri Khurd, which fell under a different police station namely
Themi. Thus, even if it is assumed that he had left the Court premises
along with other appellants and deceased Leela Bai, he may have
parted their company and left for his own village. Therefore, merely
on the basis of circumstance that he had left the Court premises along
with other co-appellants, it cannot be concluded that he was
responsible for the murder of the deceased. It is also worth mentioning
that the Tawal seized at the instance of the appellant Kanchhedilal was
found to contain blood like stains. It was sent to the Forensic Science
Laboratory for serological examination; however, no report of the
Serologist has either been produced or proved. Thus, it is not proved
that the Tawal was stained with blood. Hence, there is no link to
connect it with the crime. Subhash (PW/9) has turned hostile;
therefore, it is not proved that he saw the five accused persons
including the appellant Kanchhedilal taking deceased Leela Bai to
Dulha Dev Temple for Darshan on the date of the incident. Likewise,
Tarachandra (PW/10) has also turned hostile. Thus, extra-judicial
confession allegedly made by Baboolal and Kanchhedilal to
Tarachandra (PW/10) has also not been proved. As such, there is no
cogent and reliable evidence to convict appellant Kanchhedilal for
murder of deceased; therefore, he deserves the benefit of doubt so far
as the offence under Sections 302 and 201 of the I.P.C. is concerned.

27. Coming to the offence under Section 182 of the I.P.C., it may
be noted that though the appellant Kanchhedilal was present when the
false report of lost person (Ex.P/1) was lodged with the police by
Baboolal; however, he may have been acting on the basis of the
information received by him from the appellant Baboolal. As such, he
cannot be held guilty of furnishing false information to a public
servant either.

28. On the basis of foregoing discussions, we are of the view that
the trial Court was perfectly justified in convicting the appellant
Baboolal under Sections 302, 201 and 182 of the I.P.C.. However, it
15 Cr.A.Nos.1199 1276 of 2004

was not justified in convicting the appellant Durga Prasad under
Sections 302 and 201 of the I.P.C. and appellant Kanchhedilal of the
offence under Sections 302, 201 and 182 of the I.P.C. Thus, the
appellants Durga Prasad and Kanchhedilal deserve the benefit of doubt
in respect of the aforesaid offences and are liable to be acquitted.

29. Consequently, Criminal Appeal No.1276/2004 is partly
allowed and the conviction and sentence of appellant Baboolal under
Sections 302, 201 and 182 of the I.P.C. and the sentence imposed
therefor by the trial Court is affirmed. The conviction of appellant
Durga Prasad under section 302 and 201 of the IPC and sentence
imposed therefore is set aside and he is acquitted of aforesaid offences.

30. The Criminal Appeal No. 1199/2004 is allowed. The
conviction of the appellant Kanchhedilal under Sections 302, 201 and
182 of the I.P.C. and the sentence imposed therefor by the trial Court
is set-aside and he is acquitted of aforesaid offences.

Certified copy as per rules.

{Hemant Gupta} {C.V. Sirpurkar}
Chief Justice Judge

sh
16 Cr.A.Nos.1199 1276 of 2004

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT
JABALPUR

{Division Bench:Hon’ble Shri Hemant Gupta, The Chief Justice
Hon’ble Shri C.V. Sirpurkar, Judge}

Criminal Appeal No. 1276/2004

Baboolal Yadav Anr.

Vs.

State of Madhya Pradesh

Criminal Appeal No. 1199/2004

Kanchhedilal
Vs.

State of Madhya Pradesh

:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

JUDGMENT

For consideration

{C.V. Sirpurkar}
JUDGE
/05/2017

Hon’ble The Chief Justice

{Hemant Gupta}
Chief Justice

Post for: /05/2017

{C.V. Sirpurkar}
JUDGE