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M/S Satyam Caterers Pvt Ltd vs Commissioner (Appeals) 4 … on 17 May, 2019

1

AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

Judgment Reserved on: 15/05/2019

Judgment Delivered on : 17/05/2019

Writ Appeal No. 262 of 2019
{Arising out of order dated 20.03.2019 passed in Writ Petition (T) No. 60
of 2019 by the learned Single Judge}

M/s. Brandavan Food Products (A company incorporated under the
SectionCompanies Act, 1956) Plot No. 327, Ward 18, Near Post Office,
Deepak Nagar, Durg, Chhattisgarh, Through its authorised
signatory Mr. Rajeev Kumar Gupta, S/o Shri B.K Gupta, Aged bout
44 years, R/o Lavahandi, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
—- Appellant
Versus
1. Commissioner (Appeals), Central State Goods and Service Tax
Raipur Commissionerate Central GST Building, Dhamtari Road,
Tikrapara, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
2. Additional Commissioner, Central State Goods Service Tax,
Raipur, Commissionerate Central GST Building, Dhamtari Road,
Tikrapara, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
—- Respondents

AND
Writ Appeal No. 263 of 2019
{Arising out of order dated 20.03.2019 passed in Writ Petition (T) No. 59
of 2019 by the learned Single Judge}

M/s. R.K. Associates and Hoteliers Pvt. Ltd. (A company
incorporated under the SectionCompanies Act, 1956) Room No. 1,
Panchvati, Deepak Nagar, Durg, Chhattisgarh, Through its
authorised signatory Mr. Rajeev Kumar Gupta, S/o Shri B.K Gupta,
Aged bout 44 years, R/o Lavahandi, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

—- Appellant
Versus
2

1. Commissioner (Appeals), Central State Goods and Service Tax
Raipur Commissionerate Central GST Building, Dhamtari Road,
Tikrapara, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

2. Additional Commissioner, Central State Goods Service Tax,
Raipur, Commissionerate Central GST Building, Dhamtari Road,
Tikrapara, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

—- Respondents
AND
Writ Appeal No. 264 of 2019
{Arising out of order dated 20.03.2019 passed in Writ Petition (T) No. 58
of 2019 by the learned Single Judge}

M/s. Satyam Caterers Pvt. Ltd. (A company incorporated under the
SectionCompanies Act, 1956) Room No. 2, Panchvati, Deepak Nagar,
Durg, Chhattisgarh, Through its authorised signatory Mr. Rajeev
Kumar Gupta, S/o Shri B.K Gupta, Aged bout 44 years, R/o
Lavahandi, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

—- Appellant
Versus

1. Commissioner (Appeals), Central State Goods and Service Tax
Raipur Commissionerate Central GST Building, Dhamtari Road,
Tikrapara, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

2. Additional Commissioner, Central State Goods Service Tax,
Raipur, Commissionerate Central GST Building, Dhamtari Road,
Tikrapara, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

—- Respondents
AND
Writ Appeal No. 265 of 2019
{Arising out of order dated 20.03.2019 passed in Writ Petition (T) No. 57
of 2019 by the learned Single Judge}

M/s. R.K. Associates and Hoteliers Pvt. Ltd. (A company
incorporated under the SectionCompanies Act, 1956) Room No. 1,
Panchvati, Deepak Nagar, Durg, Chhattisgarh, Through its
authorised signatory Mr. Rajeev Kumar Gupta, S/o Shri B.K Gupta,
Aged bout 44 years, R/o Lavahandi, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

—- Appellant
3

Versus

1. Commissioner (Appeals), Central State Goods and Service Tax
Raipur Commissionerate Central GST Building, Dhamtari Road,
Tikrapara, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

2. Additional Commissioner, Central State Goods Service Tax,
Raipur, Commissionerate Central GST Building, Dhamtari Road,
Tikrapara, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

—- Respondents

For Appellant : Shri Chetan Sharma, Senior Advocate
alongwith Shri Gagan Gupta, Shri Abhinit Das
and Shri Romir S. Goyal, Advocates.

For Respondent/Revenue : Shri Maneesh Sharma, Advocate.

Hon’ble Shri P.R. Ramachandra Menon, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Shri Manindra Mohan Shrivastava, Judge

C.A.V. Judgment

Per P.R. Ramachandra Menon, Chief Justice

1. Whether the interference declined to entertain the merit of the case

by the statutory authorities and also by a learned Judge of this Court

dismissing the appeals/writ petitions for the reason that the appeal was filed

beyond the maximum time limit stipulated under the statute even after the

condonable extent of delay, is correct or not is the question mooted for

consideration in these appeals.

2. The thrust of the argument is that the power of this Court under

SectionArticle 226 of the Constitution is quite wider enough to extend the relief with

regard to the merit involved and that the technical ground of delay cannot be

a bar in this regard.

3. Four different appeals arise from four different proceedings, all of

which were dealt together by the learned Single Judge by passing a common
4

judgment dismissing the writ petitions. Writ Appeal No. 265 of 2019 is treated

as the lead case, as suggested by the learned Senior Counsel for the

Appellants.

4. We have heard Shri Chetan Sharma, the learned Senior Counsel

appearing for the Appellants and Shri Maneesh Sharma, learned Standing

Counsel for the Respondents/Department/Revenue.

5. The crux of the factual matrix reveals that the Appellants are

supplying bed-rolls and newspapers as required by the award of the contract

by M/s. Indian Railways and IRCTC subject to the terms and conditions as

agreed upon. The duty cast upon the Appellants based on the contracts was

being discharged accordingly and while so, they were served with a show

cause notice proposing to tax the supply of newspapers under Section

65(105)(zzt) read with Section 67(76a) and Section 65(24) as ‘outdoor

catering service’, while supply of bed-rolls was proposed to be taxed under

the category of ‘business support service’ under Section 65(105c) read with

Section 65(10)(zzzq) of the Finance Act, 1994 (for short ‘the Act, 1994’).

6. According to the Appellants, the notice was absolutely without any

basis as the delivery of goods sold at the direction of the buyer would not

involve any services and it does not fall within the definition of ‘caterer’ under

Section 65(24) and the ‘outdoor caterer’ under Section 65(76a) of the Act so

as to constitute any ‘outdoor catering service’. It is similarly contended that

supply of bed-rolls and its maintenance also would not qualify to be branded

as ‘business support service’. The explanation submitted by the Appellant in

this regard was considered but it was turned down and the assessment

proceedings were finalised by the competent authority. Met with the situation,

a statutory appeal was preferred before the Commissioner (Appeals) which is

belated by 253 days and hence, it was sought to be condoned by filing a
5

petition to condone the delay. The matter was examined by the

Commissioner (Appeals) who found that as per the relevant provisions of the

statute, the appeal had to be filed within ‘two months’ and thereafter, the

delay, if any could be condoned to a maximum period of ‘one month’, on

offering sufficient cause. By virtue of the undisputed facts, the appeal was

filed belatedly even beyond the condonable extent. The appellate authority

dismissed the application for condonation of delay holding that there was no

power to condone the said extent of delay and as a natural consequence, the

appeal as well.

7. The Appellants moved the Customs, Excise Service Tax

Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (for short ‘the Tribunal’) challenging the course

and proceedings finalised by the appellate authority i.e. the Commissioner

(Appeals) also pointing out that the merit was squarely covered in favour of

the Appellant and that the delay had to be condoned in view of the reasons

specifically stated for the delay. However, the appellate authority also took

the very same stand as taken by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the

appeals came to be dismissed in view of the inordinate delay beyond the

extent as specified in the statute, thus, without entertaining the merits. This

made the Appellants to approach this Court by filing writ petitions referring to

the sequence of events and trying to explain the delay, particularly in

connection with the demise of the mother of the authorised signatory and

also with reference to the unforeseen situations resulted in connection with

the marriage of the daughter of the deponent and also the registration of a

crime in connection with the affairs.

8. The learned Single Judge considered all the connected matters

together and as per the common judgment dated 20.03.2019 held that the

issue involved was no longer res integra as concluded/declared by the Apex

Court in SectionSingh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise,
6

Jamshedpur {(2008) (221) ELT 163 (SC) : (2008) 3 SCC 70}. Reference

was also made to the decision sought to be cited by the Appellants in SectionM/s.

Shri Sai Rolling Mill v. The Commissioner, Customs, Central Excise

Service Tax Others; WA No. 322 of 2017 decided on 15.11.2018 whereby

the appeal against dismissal of the writ petition was disposed off remitting the

matter back to the Central Excise authority for consideration. The learned

Single Judge observed that the facts and situation in M/s. Shri Sai Rolling

Mill (supra) was totally different and with reference to the factual position

involved, it was held that no extraordinary circumstance was substantiated by

the Appellant/Petitioner to warrant interference by invoking the powers of this

Court under SectionArticle 226 of the Constitution of India, in turn leading to

dismissal of the writ petitions. This is to the chagrin of the Appellants who

have filed these appeals seeking indulgence of this Court.

9. Shri Chetan Sharma, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the

Appellants submits that the appeals have been preferred under some firm

grounds as noted below:

• That, the power of this Court under SectionArticle 226 of the

Constitution is wide enough to render justice and that the legal

position as to the exigibility to tax in respect of the two

instances of sale sale/supply having already been answered in

favour of the Assessees with reference to other instances, the

delay in the instance case was never to be reckoned a hurdle

under any circumstances.

• Section 34 of the Arbitration and SectionConciliation Act, 1996

stipulates that the appeal has to be filed within three months

and that no appeal shall be entertained thereafter. Such

terminology, giving a mandate ‘not to entertain the appeal’ is
7

conspicuously absent in the instant case, where the appeal is

preferred under Section 85(3A) of the Act, 1994 and hence, the

delay ought to have been condoned by the statutory authorities

as well as by the learned Single Judge.

• The legal position in this regard has been explained by the Full

Bench of the Gujarat High Court in SectionPanoli Intermediate

(India) v. Union of India Others; {(2015) 326 ELT532 :

(2015) 3 KLT 30} and that the relevant statutory provision dealt

with thereof is virtually identical to Section 85(3A) of the Act,

1994. The said decision stands in favour of the Appellant, and

hence, the verdict passed by the learned Single Judge is liable

to be interdicted.

• Reliance is also sought to be placed on several other verdicts;

viz; SectionCommissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Dass Agrawal;

(2014) 1 SCC 603; Raja Mechanical Company (P) Ltd. v.

Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi-I; (2012) 279 ELT

481; SectionState of Nagaland v. Lipok AO and Others; (2005) 3

SCC 752; SectionCommissioner of Income Tax v. Kasturi Sons;

(1999) 3 SCC 346; Uma Textiles Processors v. Union of

India; (2013) 290 ELT 214; The Food Inspector, Cannanore

Municipality, Cannanore v. M. Gopalan; (1991) AIR (Kerala)

240; M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central

Excise; {(2015) 319 ELT 373 : (2015) 7 SCC 58}; Central

Industrial Security Force v. Commissioner of CGST C.

Ex.; (2018) 14 GSTL 198; Sai Rolling Mill, A partnership

firm registered v. Commissioner, Custom, Central Excise

Service Tax; Writ Appeal No. 322 of 2017, decided on

15.11.2018; SectionITC Ltd. Another v. Union of India (UOI)

Others; SLP(C) No 11508 of 1998, decided on 22.08.1990 and
8

SectionStar Battery Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner, C. Ex; (2011)

264 ELT 363.

• During the course of submission, learned Senior Counsel

submits with specific reference to Uma Textiles (supra), MP

Steel Corporation (supra) and a Division Bench judgment of

this Court in Sai Rolling Mill (supra), besides making

reference to a Division Bench verdict passed by the Allahabad

High Court in Central Industrial Security Force (supra) and

that of a Single Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Star

Battery Ltd. (supra) that the orders/verdict under challenge

have caused miscarriage of justice.

• Despite the specific pleading as to the extraordinary

circumstances under ‘two’ different heads (mother’s case and

the daughter’s marriage, respectively); the learned Single

Judge dealt with only one head (the marriage of the daughter)

and held that it was not an extraordinary circumstance for

condoning the delay. The reason stated is that the Petitioner/

Appellant was still running the business throughout,

notwithstanding the tragedy. It is stated that the omission to

consider the other ground (with reference to the mother’s

death) has caused substantial prejudice to the Appellants and

hence, interference is required, adding that the Appellant was

only acting as a dutiful son, in discharge of his duties towards

his mother in terms of the principle “matru devo bhava”.

• A Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Uma Textiles

(supra) (para 1 and 5) has condoned the delay beyond the

statutory limit, in exercise of the power under SectionArticle 226 of the
9

Constitution of India, holding that the endeavor of the Court

always shall be to promote justice leaning towards the merits

and not to non-suit the parties on technicalities.

10. Shri Maneesh Sharma, the learned Standing Counsel for the

Respondent/Revenue points out that the Appellants had failed to make out

any point to be considered as involving ‘extraordinary case’ for invoking the

power of this Court under SectionArticle 226 of the Constitution of India. The matter

was considered in the said context by the learned Single Judge who

categorically held that the reason/explanation offered could never be taken to

infer that it was an ‘extraordinary case’. That apart, a Division Bench of this

Court has already held as per judgment dated 29.11.2018 in TAXC No. 19 of

2017 that when the particular statute stipulates the time for filing appeal

mentioning the parameters, the provisions of other statutes cannot be looked

into, nor is it possible to make any comparative analysis. Reliance is sought

to be placed on paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the said judgment.

11. The above discussion leads to the core question as to the scope of

Section 85(3A) of the Act, 1994, the extent and power to condone the delay

under the said provision and the scope of interference by this Court in

exercise of the discretionary/extraordinary jurisdiction under SectionArticle 226 of the

Constitution of India. For convenience of reference, Section 85(3A) of the Act,

1994 is extracted below:

“85. (3A). An appeal shall be presented within two
months from the date of receipt of the decision or
order of such adjudicating authority, made on and
after the Finance Bill, 2012 receives the assent of
the President, relating to service tax, interest or
penalty under this Chapter:

Provided that the Commissioner of Central Excise
(Appeals) may, if he is satisfied that the appellant
was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting
the appeal within the aforesaid period of two
10

months, allow it to be presented within a further
period of one month. ”

12. There is no dispute to the fact that the appeal came to be filed

before the appellate authority only after 253 days beyond the stipulated

period of ‘two months’ and hence, it was sought to be condoned by filing an

application. The maximum condonable limit as per the statute is only ‘one

month’, after the prescribed period of two months. This being the position,

whether it could have been condoned by the statutory authority and if not

possible, could it have been dealt with granting relief by this Court in exercise

of the jurisdiction under SectionArticle 226 of the Constitution, is the only question.

13. We have gone through all the verdicts cited from the part of the

Appellants and it is true that a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court had

condoned the delay beyond the statutory extent in exercise of power under

SectionArticle 226 of the Constitution as held in Uma Textiles (supra). The questions

considered by the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Panoli

Intermediate (India) (supra) are as extracted below:

“(1) Whether the period of limitation provided of 60
days, for filing an appeal under Section 35 of the
Central Excise Act, 1944, could be extended only
upto to 30 days as provided by the proviso or the
delay beyond the period of 90 days could also be
condoned in filing an appeal.

(2) Whether a statutory remedy or appeal is provided
under Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and
the delay cannot be condoned under Section 35
beyond the period of 90 days, then whether Writ
Petition under SectionArticle 226 of the Constitution of India
would lie for the purpose of condoning the delay in
filing the appeal?

(3) When if the statutory remedy or appeal under
Section 35 is barred by the law of limitation whether
in a Writ Petition under SectionArticle 226 of the Constitution
of India, the order passed by the original adjudicating
authority could be challenged on merits?

Referring to Singh Enterprises (supra), it was held that the Apex

Court was considering the scope and ambit of sufficient cause found in the
11

various statutes and thereby to consider to give effect to the statutory

provision made for limitation. It was further observed that the question as to

whether the provisions of Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 affects

the jurisdiction of the High Court under SectionArticle 226 of the Constitution of India

for exercise of the constitutional power or not was not considered by the Apex

Court. In paragraph 28, the Bench observed as follows:

“28. In the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Singh
Enterprises Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise
Jamshedpur and Others, (2008) 1 CLT 709 : (2008) 124
ECC 1 : (2008) 150 ECR 1 : (2008) 221 ELT 163 : (2007)
14 SCALE 610 : (2008) 3 SCC 70 : (2008) 12 VST 542 :
(2008) AIR SCW 1461 : (2007) 8 Supreme 533, which
has, been relied upon by the learned counsel Mrs. Parikh,
the Apex Court was considering the scope and ambit of
sufficient cause found in the various statutes and thereby
to consider to give the effect of statutory provision made
for limitation. In the said case, the question as to whether
the provisions of Section 35 of the Act affects the
jurisdiction of the High Court under SectionArticle 226 of the
Constitution for exercise of the constitutional power or not
was not considered by the Apex Court. Therefore, the
contention of the learned counsel Mr. Parikh that the
decision of the High Court taking the view that it had no
power to condone the delay after the expiry of the period
of 30 days should mean that the High Court will have no
jurisdiction under SectionArticle 226 in a case where the period of
30 days is over cannot be countenanced for the simple
reason that whether the High Court should exercise the
power to condone the delay after expiry of the period of
30 days while exercising the power under SectionArticle 226 of
the Constitution is one thing, but whether the jurisdiction
of the High Court under SectionArticle 226 of the Constitution is
affected by the statutory provision of Sectionsection 35 of the Act
is another thing. It cannot be disputed if the High Court
declines to exercise the power after the expiry of the
period of 30 days if the case is not falling in the
exceptional circumstance where gross injustice is not
satisfactorily demonstrated before the High Court. Hence,
the said decision is of no help to Mr. Parikh for canvassing
his contention.”

14. In Central Industrial Security Force (supra), a Division Bench of

the Allahabad High Court, as discernible from the discussions in paragraphs

2, 6, 8 and 10, held that by virtue of the statutory mandate, it could not be

stated that there was any illegality in not condoning the delay; but considering
12

the ends of justice, the High Court chose to condone the delay, in exercise of

jurisdiction under SectionArticle 226 of the Constitution of India.

15. It is true that some of the High Courts, including this Court, at

times, have considered the question with reference to the ‘extraordinary

circumstances’, to condone the delay beyond the statutory limit as mentioned

above. The learned Single Judge specifically noted that the reason for the

delay of 253 days in filing the appeal offered by the writ petitioner was that

after passing of the assessment order, the Appellant/Petitioner was engaged

in personal tragedy as his daughter was facing marital dispute and hence, the

appeal could not be filed within the time. In paragraph 9, the learned Single

Judge also observed that the so-called extraordinary situation pressed by the

Petitioner was not of such nature which had paralyzed the Petitioner’s

business or his life and that admittedly, he was carrying on his business

during the relevant period. Hence, according to the learned Judge, there was

no pressing emergency which did not permit the Petitioner to prefer an

appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) on time. The reasoning given by

the learned Single Judge is not liable to be interdicted as unsustainable

under any circumstances.

16. The learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants submits that the

learned Single Judge considered only ‘one’ of the two grounds raised and

with reference to the extraordinary circumstance that there was another

ground in relation to the demise of the mother of the Petitioner as specifically

pleaded in the writ petition. This, however, was omitted to be considered and

hence requires interference.

17. We asked a specific question whether such a ground

pleaded/stated was ever argued before the learned Single Judge, to which

the learned Senior Counsel fairly submitted that he was not aware, as a
13

different counsel was dealing with the situation at that point of time. Be that

as it may, the learned Senior Counsel submits that the Appellant/Petitioner

was only discharging his duty as a dutiful son honouring the values of

motherhood, following the doctrine “matru devo bhava”. This Court is aware

of the unparalleled status of a mother in the society and the vacuum resulted

in the lives of her children. This Court is also aware of the teachings in the

Upanishads, particularly the Taittiriya Upanishad, which says: “maatru

devo bhava, pitru devo bhava, aachaarya devo bhava; atithi devo

bhava”, (be a man to whom mother is god, be a man to whom father is god,

be a man to whom teacher is god, and be a man to whom guest is a god).

When the Appellant contends that he was otherwise engaged in connection

with the demise of his mother, even if it is acceptable, it cannot cover the

inordinate delay of 253 days during which period, the Appellant did not find it

necessary to compromise with the business activities and other commercial

transactions. It has to be reasonably presumed that this plea under this head

was never argued before the learned Single Judge; which otherwise would

have found a place in the judgment, dealing with the same in appropriate

manner. If the Appellant has got a case that it was argued, but omitted to be

considered, the redressal of the grievance could only be by way of filing a

review petition and nothing else. But since we are holding that the inordinate

delay of 253 days cannot be covered by the said incidence/incident, during

which period the Appellant was admittedly carrying on the commercial

activities/business, it does not constitute any ‘extraordinary circumstance’ to

have interfered by this Court, invoking the discretionary power under SectionArticle

226 of the Constitution of India.

18. During the course of hearing, this Court put across the latest

judgment rendered by the Apex Court on the point, as decided in Oil and

Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Gujarat Energy Transmission
14

Corporation Limited Others; (2017) 5 SCC 42. It was with regard to the

belated appeal filed in terms of Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003

against the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal. The said provision reads

as follows:

“125. Appeal to Supreme Court. – Any person
aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate
Tribunal, may, file an appeal to the Supreme Court
within sixty days from the date of communication of
the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal, to him,
on any one or more of the grounds specified in
section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(5 of 1908):

Provided that the Supreme Court may, if it is
satisfied that the appellant was prevented by
sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said
period, allow it to be filed within a further period not
exceeding sixty days.”

19. The above provision stipulates that the statutory remedy against

the verdict of the Appellate Tribunal was to be by way of an appeal to be

preferred before the Supreme Court within 60 days from the date of

communication of the order; with a proviso to have the delay, if at all any , to

be condoned within a further period not exceeding 60 days. The scope of the

said provision was considered with reference to the various rulings rendered

by the Apex Court on the point, particularly, in Chhattisgarh SEB v. Central

Electricity Regulatory Commission; (2010) 5 SCC 23, the verdict passed

by the Apex Court in Singh Enterprises (supra) sought to be relied on by

both the Appellants and also by the Respondent (extracted and relied on by

the learned Single Judge as well), SectionSuryachakra Power Corporation v.

Electricity Department; (2016) 16 SCC 152; M.P. Steel Corporation

(supra) and such other verdicts.

20. After a threadbare analysis of the provisions of law and the

precedents, it was declared in categorical terms by the ‘three member Bench’

that, once the period of limitation is specifically prescribed in a statute and
15

stipulates the maximum period/extent of delay which can be condoned, it

cannot be condoned by the Apex Court even in exercise of the power under

SectionArticle 142 of the Constitution of India. Having said so, the Appellants cannot

be heard to say that the High Court is still having power to condone the delay

beyond the prescribed extent under the statute, by invoking the power under

SectionArticle 226 of the Constitution, which in fact will be amounting to re-writing the

law and contrary to the verdict passed by the Apex Court, which is having a

binding effect all over India in view of SectionArticle 141 of the Constitution of India.

There is no answer from the part of the Appellants to the law declared by the

‘three member Bench’ of the Apex Court in Oil and Natural Gas

Corporation Ltd. (supra) but for stating that the said judgment is not

applicable, despite the fact that it has been rendered with reference to the

judgments sought to be relied on by the Appellant, as discussed above.

21. In the above facts and circumstances, we are of the firm view that

the verdict passed by the learned Single Judge is perfectly within the four

walls of law and is not assailable under any circumstances. Interference is

declined and all the appeals stand dismissed accordingly. The parties shall

bear their costs.

Sd/- Sd/-
(P. R.Ramachandra Menon) (Manindra Mohan Shrivastava)
CHIEF JUSTICE JUDGE

Amit

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