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Mangal @ Duryodhan Dandpath vs State Of Chhattisgarh 13 … on 27 March, 2018

1

AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
Reserved on 17-3-2018
Pronounced on 27-3-2018
Criminal Appeal No. 607 of 2014
Mangal @ Duryodhan Dandpath S/o Radhanath Dandpathi aged
about 40 Years R/o Malihata, PS Mahanga, Distt. Katak Orissa,
Present Address – Bajirao Maharapara, House of Nirmal, Chowki
Jutmil, PS Kotwali, Raigarh, Civil and Rev. Distt. Raigarh C.G.

—- Appellant
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh through PS City Kotwali, Raigarh Distt.
Raigarh C.G.

—- Respondent

For appellant : Shri Vishwanath Goswami, Adv.
For State : Shri Wasim Miyan, Panel Lawyer.

Hon’ble Shri Manindra Mohan Shrivastava
Hon’ble Shri Sharad Kumar Gupta, JJ

C.A.V. JUDGMENT
Per Sharad Kumar Gupta, Judge

1. Challenge in this appeal is levied to the judgment dated 12-

12-2013 passed by the Special Court Additional Sessions Judge,

FTC, Raigarh (CG) in Special Criminal Case No. 11/2013

whereby and whereunder he has convicted and sentenced the

appellant as under :-

Sr. Conviction Sentence Fine In default of
No. u/S. Sentence payment of
fine
1. 323, IPC 6 months RI Rs. 1,000/- 1 month RI
2. 506-B, IPC 5 years RI Rs. 5,000/- 6 months RI
3. 376, IPC No separate
sentence is
imposed
4. 6, Life imprisonment Rs. 25,000/- 1 year RI
Protection
2

of Children
from
Sexual
Offences
Act, 2012
(in brevity
‘POCSO
Act’)

All the substantive jail sentence have been directed to run

concurrently.

2. This is admitted by the appellant that he took the

prosecutrix along with him in his house at Bajirao Mehra Para,

Raigarh; the prosecutrix lodged an FIR vide Ex. P-1; he was sent

for medical examination at Raigarh; P.W. 7 Dr. Sunil Ratre

medically examined him and his report is Ex. P-10.

3. In brief, the prosecution story is that 3-4 years prior to 28-

2-2013, the prosecutrix along with her parents and her younger

brothers was going to her maternal grand-mother’s house at

village Koyla by train. When in the night the train reached in

Dakaniya Railway Station, her parents and brothers were

sleeping, she got down from the train to drink water. Meanwhile,

train departed from the station and she was left in the railway

station. Thereafter by mistake she reached at Raigarh Railway

Station by changing the trains. In the Raigarh Railway Station,

the appellant met and promised her that he will leave her in her

parental house. Two – three years prior to 28-2-2013, he started

committing sexual intercourse with her. Whenever she opposed,

he gave threats to beat and cause harm to her. Being frightened

she did not tell about the incident to anyone. On 26-2-2013 she

met with a lady advocate P.W. 3 Sharda Mulik on way and
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narrated the incident to her. On 28-2-2013, the prosecutrix went

to Police Chowki Jute Mill along with P.W. 3 Sharda Mulik and

narrated the incident on the basis of which an FIR was lodged in

‘0’ number, thereafter a numbered FIR was registered in PS

Kotwali Raigarh. After completion of the investigation, a charge

sheet was filed against the appellant for offences punishable

under Sections 323, 506, 376, of the Indian Penal Code (in

brevity ‘IPC’) and Sections 6 and 8 of the POCSO Act. The trial

Court framed the charges against the appellant under Sections

323, 506-B, 376 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. To

bring home the charges against the appellant, prosecution

examined as many as 11 witnesses. The appellant abjured the

guilt and faced trial.

4. The appellant has not examined any witness in his

defence. He says in para 28 during accused statement that he

had heard that prosecutrix was talking with some Raju, he

objected thus she lodged the report against him.

5. After hearing the counsel for the parties and considering

the evidence placed on record, the trial Court convicted and

sentenced the appellant as mentioned above.

6. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of conviction

and order of sentence, the appellant has preferred this criminal

appeal.

7. Shri Vishwanath Goswami, counsel for the appellant

submits that age of the prosecutrix is not proved by the

prosecution, allegedly she was consenting party, she is not

reliable witness, there is inordinate delay in lodging the FIR, the
4

appellant has been falsely implicated. Therefore, the impugned

judgment of conviction and order of sentence may be set aside

and the appellant may be acquitted of the charges.

8. On the other hand, Shri Wasim Miyan, Panel Lawyer

appearing for the State supported the impugned judgment and

submitted that the trial Court has rightly convicted and sentenced

the appellant. Hence the appeal may be dismissed.

9. Now we will consider as to what was the age of the

prosecutrix 2 – 3 years prior to 28-2-2013.

10. In the matter of Mahadeo -v- State of Maharashtra and

another [(2013) 14 SCC 637] Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in

para 12 as under :-

“12. We can also in this connection make reference to a
statutory provision contained in the Juvenile Justice (Care
and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, where under Rule
12, the procedure to be followed in determining the age of
a juvenile has been set out. We can usefully refer to the
said provision in this context, inasmuch as under Rule
12(3) of the said Rules, it is stated that:

“12. (3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile
in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry
shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as
the case may be, by the Committee by seeking
evidence by obtaining–

(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if
available; and in the absence whereof;

(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other
than a play school) first attended; and in the absence
whereof;

(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a
municipal authority or a Panchayat;”
5

Under Rule 12(3)(b), it is specifically provided that

only in the absence of alternative methods described

under Rules 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii), the medical opinion

can be sought for. In the light of such a statutory rule

prevailing for ascertainment of the age of a juvenile,

in our considered opinion, the same yardstick can be

rightly followed by the courts for the purpose of

ascertaining the age of a victim as well.”

11. In the case in hand, prosecution had neither proved any

educational certificate of the prosecutrix regarding her age nor

any birth certificate given by a Corporation or a Municipal

Authority or a Panchayat.

12. P.W. 7 Dr. Sunil Ratre says in para 1 of his statement on

oath that on 28-2-2013 he examined X-ray films of right wrist,

right elbow and pelvic bone of the prosecutrix and opined that the

age of the prosecutrix was 15 years subject to 2 years plus-minus

in both sides.

13. There is no such evidence on record on the strength on

which it could be said that the said statement of P.W. 7 Dr. Sunil

Ratre, in this reference the alleged Report Ex. P-9, and alleged

X-ray plates Article A-1 are not believable.

14. In Ex. P-1, the prosecutrix had stated her age about 15

years.

15. At the time of recording the statement of the prosecutrix in

the Court on 6th August, 2013, the age of the prosecutrix was

estimated 14 years.

16. P.W. 3 Sharda Mulik says in paras 1 and 2 of her statement
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on oath on 7-8-2013 that the age of the prosecutrix was about

13-14 years.

17. P.W. 5 Dr. D.K. Toppo says in paras 1 and 2 of his

statement on oath on 3-9-2013 that on 28-2-2013 he examined

the prosecutrix and found that she was an average built girl, 14-

14 teeth were present in upper and lower jaw, age of the

prosecutrix was between 14 to 16 years.

18. There is no such evidence on record on the strength of

which it could be said that the aforesaid allegedly stated age by

the prosecutrix at the time of lodging Ex. P-1, allegedly aforesaid

estimated age of the prosecutrix, aforesaid statement of P.W. 3

Sharda Mulik, aforesaid statement of P.W. 5 Dr. D.K. Toppo, in

that reference his alleged report Ex. P-6, are not natural, not

normal, not simple.

19. Looking to the above-mentioned facts and circumstances

of the case, this Court finds that the aforesaid statement of P.W. 7

Dr. Sunil Ratre, in that reference his alleged report Ex. P-9 and

alleged X-ray films Article A-1, get corroboration from the

aforesaid allegedly stated age by the prosecutrix at the time of

recording FIR Ex.P-1, allegedly aforesaid estimated age of the

prosecutrix, aforesaid statement of P.W. 3 Sharda Mulik,

aforesaid statement of P.W. 5 Dr. D.K. Toppo, and in that

reference his alleged report Ex. P-.6, thus looking to the

observation made in Mahadev’s case (supra), this Court believes

the aforesaid statement of P.W. 7 Dr. Sunil Ratre, in that

reference his report Ex. P-9, X-ray films Article A-1.

20. After appreciation of the evidence discussed hereinabove,
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this Court finds that 2-3 years prior to 28-2-2013, the prosecutrix

was below the age of 16 years.

21. P.W. 5 Dr. D.K. Toppo says in para 4 of his statement on

oath that hymen of the prosecutrix was old torn, she was habitual

of sexual intercourse. He had prepared slides of her vaginal

swab.

22. There is no such evidence on record on the strength of

which it could be said that the aforesaid statement of P.W. 5 Dr.

D.K. Toppo, in that reference his report Ex. P-6 are not

believable. Thus this Court believes the aforesaid statement of

P.W. 5 Dr. D.K. Toppo, in that reference report Ex. P-6.

23. P.W. 7 Dr. Sunil Ratre says in para 2 that the appellant was

able to perform sexual intercourse. There is no such evidence on

record on the basis of which it could be said that the said

statement of P.W. 7 Dr. Sunil Ratre, in that reference report Ex.

P-10 is not believable. Thus, this Court believes the aforesaid

statement of P.W. 7 Dr. Sunil Ratre, and in that reference his

report Ex. P-10.

24. As per the alleged report of RFSL, Raipur Ex. P-19, sperms

were found in the slides Article A-1 and Article A-2 of the

prosecutrix.

25. There is no such evidence on record on the strength of

which it could be said that Ex. P-19 is not believable. Thus, this

Court believes on Ex. P-19.

26. P.W. 2 the prosecutrix says in paras 1, 2 and 3 of her

statement recorded on 6th August 2013 that 3 years ago she

along with her parents, her younger brother was going to her
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maternal aunt’s house at village Koyla by train. She got down in

some railway station for drinking water. The train departed from

the railway station and she was left in that railway station.

Thereafter, she reached at Raigarh railway station by changing

the trains. The appellant met and promised her that he would

leave her to her paternal house. The appellant kept her well for

10-11 days, thereafter he committed sexual intercourse with her.

Whenever she opposed, he beat and threatened to kill her.

Therefore, she did not tell about the incidents to anyone. When

she met with a lady advocate, she narrated her about the

incidents.

27. P.W. 1 Santoshi Bai, mother of the prosecutrix says in para

2 of her statement on oath that her daughter- the prosecutrix had

told her that the appellant used to commit sexual intercourse with

her and used to give threat to beat her.

28. P.W. 3 Sharda Mulik says in para 2 of her statement on

oath that on 28-2-2013, the prosecutrix came to her house and

told that 3 years ago, she reached Raigarh by a train by mistake,

the appellant told her to leave her to her parental home. Few

days after, the appellant started committing sexual intercourse

and whenever she opposed, he used to beat her and give threat

to kill her.

29. P.W. 1 Shantoshi Bai says in para 1 during examination-in-

chief that 3 years ago, the prosecutrix and her (Santoshi Bai’s)

son had gone away from the house without intimation.

30. If the prosecutrix allegedly had gone from the house

without intimation then P.W. 1 Santoshi Bai would not have not
9

made the aforesaid statement of para 2. Moreover P.W. 1

Santoshi Bai is an illiterate lady and this possibility cannot be

ruled out that she has made the aforesaid statement of para 1

because she could not understand the facts properly. If these

circumstances, aforesaid statements of P.W.2 prosecutrix, P.W. 3

Sharda Mulik are considered, then this Court finds that the

aforesaid statement of para 1 of P.W. 1 Santoshi Bai does not

affect the credibility of her statement of para 2, aforesaid

statements of P.W. 2 prosecutrix, aforesaid statement of P.W. 3

Sharda Mulik.

31. In Ex. P-1 it has not been explicitly mentioned that the

appellant used to beat and used to give threat to kill her.

32. But in Ex. P-1 it has been explicitly mentioned that the

appellant was giving threats to beat and cause harm to the

prosecutrix. Thus, the appellant does not get any help from not

mentioning expressly in Ex. P-1 that the appellant used to beat

and give threat to kill the prosecutrix.

33. There is no such evidence on record on the strength of

which it could be said that P.W. 3 Sharda Mulik had stated

aforesaid statement because she had allegedly animosity with

the appellant.

34. There is no such evidence on record on the strength of

which it could be said that the aforesaid statements of P.W. 2 the

prosecutrix, para 2 of P.W. 1 Santoshi Bai, aforesaid statement of

P.W. 3 Sharda Mulik, are not simple, not natural and not normal.

35. In Ex. P-1, it has been clearly mentioned that the appellant

was allegedly committing sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix.
10

36. Ex. P-1 has been lodged after about 2-3 year from the first

incident.

37. In the matter of State of Rajasthan -v- N.K. [(2000) 5 SCC

30, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 15 as under :-

“15…….. a mere delay in lodging the FIR cannot be a
ground by itself for throwing the entire prosecution case
overboard. The court has to seek an explanation for delay
and test the truthfulness and plausibility of the reason
assigned. If the delay is explained to the satisfaction of the
court it cannot be counted against the prosecution……… ”

38. In the matter of State of H.P. v. Gian Chand, (2001) 6

SCC 71, Hon’ble Supreme Court held in para 12 that delay in

lodging the FIR cannot be used as a ritualistic formula for

doubting the prosecution case and discarding the same solely on

the ground of delay in lodging the first information report. Delay

has the effect of putting the court on its guard to search if any

explanation has been offered for the delay, and if offered,

whether it is satisfactory or not. If the prosecution fails to

satisfactorily explain the delay and there is a possibility of

embellishment in the prosecution version on account of such

delay, the delay would be fatal to the prosecution.

39. In the matter of State of H.P. -v- Shree Kant Shekari

[(2004) 8 SCC 153], Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 18

as under :-

“18. The unusual circumstances satisfactorily explained the
delay in lodging of the first information report. In any event,
delay per se is not a mitigating circumstance for the
accused when accusations of rape are involved. Delay in
lodging the first information report cannot be used as a
ritualistic formula for discarding the prosecution case and
11

doubting its authenticity. It only puts the court on guard to
search for and consider if any explanation has been offered
for the delay. Once it is offered, the court is to only see
whether it is satisfactory or not. In case if the prosecution
fails to satisfactorily explain the delay and there is
possibility of embellishment or exaggeration in the
prosecution version on account of such delay, it is a
relevant factor. On the other hand, satisfactory explanation
of the delay is weighty enough to reject the plea of false
implication or vulnerability of the prosecution case. As the
factual scenario shows, the victim was totally unaware of
the catastrophe which had befallen her. That being so, the
mere delay in lodging of the first information report does
not in any way render the prosecution version brittle. These
aspects were highlighted in Tulshidas Kanolkar v. State of
Goa [(2003) 8 SCC 590 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 44] .”

40. The relevant portion of para-13 of the judgment in the

matter of Puran Chand -v- State of H.P. [(2014) 5 SCC 689] of

the Hon’ble Supreme Court is as under :-

“13. ……………The delay in lodging the FIR has been
clearly explained by the prosecution relating the
circumstance and the witnesses supporting the same have
stood the test of scrutiny of the cross-examination as a
result of which the version of the victim girl cannot be
doubted. The delay in lodging the FIR thus stands fully
explained.”

41. This has been earlier found by this Court that 2- 3 years

prior to 28-2-2013, prosecutrix was below 16 years of age,

aforesaid statements of P.W. 2 prosecutrix, P.W. 3 Sharda Mulik,

aforesaid statement of para 2 of P.W. 1 Santoshi Bai are simple,

normal and natural. Moreover, prosecutrix is a tender aged girl.

She had been disassociated from the company of the parents in

some small railway station. She mistakenly reached Raigarh. She
12

was an unknown person at Raigarh. The appellant had taken her

to his house. The appellant was in a position to dominate her

wish and will. It is also mentioned in Ex. P-1 that she was

frightened. These circumstances are just and sufficient for

causing inordinate delay in lodging Ex. P-1. Thus, this Court finds

that the inordinate delay in lodging Ex. P-1 has been sufficiently

explained by the prosecution. Thus, looking to the judicial

precedents in the matters of NK (supra), Gian Chand (supra),

Shree Kant Shekari (supra) and Puran Chand (supra), this

Court finds that the inordinate delay in lodging Ex. P-1 is not fatal

to the prosecution case.

42. Looking to the above-mentioned facts and circumstances,

this Court finds that Ex. P-1 is normal, natural, simple and is not

concocted, not fabricated.

43. In the matter of Shree Kant Shekari (supra), the Hon’ble

Supreme Court has dealt with the false implication, the relevant

portion of para 22 reads as under :-

“22. “…………………. In any event no girl of a tender age
and her parents would like to jeopardise her entire future by
falsely implicating a person alleging forcible sexual
intercourse”

44. In the matter of Puran Chand (supra), Hon’ble supreme

Court has dealt with the false implication, the relevant portion of

para 14 is as under :-

“14. ……In fact, we are prone to infer with reason that if
the prosecution had an intention of really planting a false
story of rape, it is highly improbable that they would have
created a story having a huge time gap between the date of
incident and the date of lodgment of the FIR leaving the
13

scope for weakening the prosecution case. If it were a well
thought out concocted story so as to lodge a false case,
obviously the prosecution would not have taken the risk of
giving a time gap of more than 20 days between the
incident and the lodgement of the FIR. This clinching
circumstantial evidence demolishes the defence version
and inspires much confidence in what has been stated by
the victim girl.”

45. In the case in hand, the prosecutrix is a tender aged girl.

Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no

possibility that prosecutrix and her mother would stake the future

of the prosecutrix to falsely implicate the appellant. Thus, looking

to the judicial precedents in Shree Kant Shekari (supra) and

Puran Chand (supra), this Court finds that there is no possibility

of false implication of the appellant in the case in hand. Thus, this

Court disbelieves the defence of the appellant that prosecutrix

had filed FIR against him only on the alleged ground that he had

objected the prosecutrix to talk with Raju on telephone.

46. Looking to the above-mentioned facts and circumstances

of the case, this Court finds that the aforesaid statements of the

prosecutrix get corroboration from the statement of para 2 of P.W.

1 Santoshi Bai, aforesaid statement of P.W. 3 Sharda Mulik, FIR

Ex. P-1, aforesaid statement of para 4 of P.W. 5 Dr. D.K. Toppo,

in that reference from Ex. P-6, aforesaid statement of para 2 of

P.W. 7 Dr. Sunil Ratre, in that reference from Ex. P-10, from

report of RFSL Ex. P-19, from the concerned admitted facts of

the appellant, thus, looking to the judicial precedents laid down

by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Mahadev (supra)

and Puran Chand (supra), this Court believes the aforesaid
14

statements of prosecutrix.

47. As per the provisions of Section 375 of the IPC, Sixthly [as

per the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 came into force on

3rd day of February,2013] a man is the guilty of the offence of

rape who commits sexual intercourse with or without consent of

the prosecutrix who is under 18 years of age.

48. As per the definition of Section 2 (1) (d) of the POCSO Act,

child means any person below the age of 18 years.

49. In the matter of Harpal singh -v- State of Himanchal

Pradesh [(1981) 1 SCC 560], which was a matter of sexual

intercourse with a girl below 16 years of age, Hon’ble Supreme

Court held that consent of girl below 16 years of age for sexual

intercourse is of no consequence. The fact that no injury was

detected on the private part of the girl and that she was found to

have been used to sexual intercourse is immaterial.

50. In the matter of Bishnu Dayal -v- State of Bihar [(1980)

Suppl. SCC 358] Hon’ble Supreme Court held that consent of

minor girl for sexual intercourse is immaterial and accused is

liable for punishment under Section 376, IPC.

51. In Shree Kant Shekari (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court

dealt with the matter of sexual intercourse with minor girl, the

relevant portion of para 14 is extracted herebelow :-

“14. …….Therefore, on the date of occurrence and even
when the FIR was lodged on 20-11-1993 she was about 14
years of age. Therefore, the question of consent was really
of no consequence”

52. This has been earlier decided that 2-3 years prior to 28-2-
15

2013, the prosecutrix was below 16 years old thus looking to the

above-mentioned judicial precedents laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Harpal Singh (supra), Vishnu Dayal (supra)

and Shree Kant Shekari (supra), this Court finds that the

question of consent of the prosecutrix does not arise in the case

in hand.

53. In the matter of Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai -v- State

of Gujarat [(1983) 3 SCC 217], Hon’ble Supreme Court has held

that in the matter of offence of rape, Section 376, IPC, if the

evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity,

and the ‘probabilities factor’ does not render it unworthy of

credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on

corroboration except from the medical evidence, where having

regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can

be expected to be forthcoming, subject to the following

qualification- Corroboration may be insisted upon when a woman

having attained majority is found in a compromising position and

there is likelihood of her having leveled such an accusation on

account of the instinct of self preservation- Or when the

‘probabilities factor’ is found to be out of tune.

54. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sheikh Zakir -v-

State of Bihar [(1983) 4 SCC 10], has held that evidence of the

victim in a rape case is treated almost like the evidence of

accomplice requiring corroboration. There must be an indication

in the course of judgment that the judge had this rule in his mind

when he prepared the judgment and if in a given case the judge

finds that there is no need for such corroboration he should give
16

reasons for dispensing with such corroboration. But if the

conviction is based on the evidence of a prosecutrix without any

corroboration it will not be illegal on that sole ground. Whenever

corroboration is necessary it should be from an independent

source but it is not necessary that every part of the evidence of

the victim should be confirmed in every detail by independent

evidence. Such corroboration can be sought from either direct

evidence or circumstances or both.

55. In Shree Kant Shekari (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court in

para 21 has held that :-

“21. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of
having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an
accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her
testimony cannot be acted without corroboration in material
particulars. She stands on a higher pedestal than an
injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the
physical form, while in the former it is physical as well as
psychological and emotional. However, if the court on facts
finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on
its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or
circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her
testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration, as
understood in the context of an accomplice, would suffice.”

56. If, for the sake of the argument, it is deemed that the

aforesaid statements of the prosecutrix does not get

corroboration from other evidence, though this Court does not

find so, then this has been earlier decided that aforesaid

statements of the prosecutrix is simple, natural and normal, thus

looking to the judicial precedents laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai (supra),
17

Sheikh Zakir (supra) and Shree Kant Shekari (supra), this

Court finds that the Court can act upon on the statements of the

prosecutrix against the appellant.

57. In the matter of Mahadev (supra), which was a case of

allurement and inducement of about 15 years old prosecutrix by

the appellant for making money by recording her bhajans on

cassettes to go along with the appellant with gold ornaments from

home to a different State and town, the appellant himself brought

back the prosecutrix after 50 days upon start of investigation, the

doctor found old ruptured hymen and prosecutrix used to sexual

intercourse, the prosecutrix in her deposition gave every minute

detail including keeping her in a place far from home and physical

abuse for a month and twenty days which was not contradicted in

cross-examination by the appellant, in these circumstances, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the trial Court rightly found the

appellant guilty of offences charged and the High Court further

upheld conviction.

58. In the matter of Puran Chand (supra), Hon’ble Apex Court

has observed in para 17 as under :-

“17. In the instant matter, in view of the evidence led by the
witnesses, supported by the circumstantial evidence, the
prosecution version is fit to be relied upon brushing aside
the theory of improbability of the offence and holding the
prosecution case proved beyond reasonable doubt, leading
to the conclusion that the incident in fact did happen in the
manner in which it has been described by the victim girl
who was only of 17 years and hence a minor at the time of
the incident supported by the medical evidence which
although might be somewhat weak, gains strength from
other attending circumstantial evidence wherein there is no
18

missing link in the chain of events.”

59. After the appreciation of the evidence discussed

hereinabove, looking to the judicial precedents laid down by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahadev (Supra) and Puran Chand

(Supra) this Court finds that the prosecution has succeeded to

prove the charges punishable under Sections 323, 506-B, 376 of

the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act against the appellant.

The trial Court has not committed any illegality in convicting the

appellant under Sections 323, 506-B and 376, IPC and Section 6

of the POCSO Act. Thus, this Court affirms the judgment of

conviction passed by the trial Court.

60. As regards sentence awarded to the appellant for offence

punishable under Sections 323 and 506-B of the IPC, considering

the facts and circumstances of the case, they appear to be just

and proper, and do not call for any interference. Hence, this Court

also affirms the sentences regarding Section 323, 506-B, IPC.

61. So far as sentence awarded for offence under Section 6 of

the POCSO Act is concerned, the trial Court has sentenced the

appellant to undergo imprisonment for life. Looking to the facts

and circumstances of the case, it does not appear that the

appellant may be sentenced for the maximum period which is

prescribed for Section 6 of the POCSO Act. It appears to be

excessive and is on higher side. In the opinion of this Court,

cause of justice would be best subserved if the imprisonment for

life is altered to rigorous imprisonment of 12 years. Therefore, the

imprisonment for life is reduced to rigorous imprisonment of 12

years. The fine sentences and in default of payment of fine the
19

sentence awarded by the trial Court under all the sections are

also affirmed.

62. The appeal is accordingly partly allowed.

Sd/- Sd/-
(Manindra Mohan Shrivastava) (Sharad Kumar Gupta)
Judge Judge

pathak

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