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In The High Court At Calcutta
Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction
14.3.19
CRR 2535 of 2013
Md. Nizam Hussain
v.
State of West Bengal Anr.
Mr. Tarique Quasimuddin
Ms. Zainab Tahur
… for the petitioner.
Mr. Sudip Ghosh
Mr. Bitasak Banerjee
… for the State.
The petitioner has assailed the order dated July 5, 2013 passed by the
learned Additional District Sessions Judge, Court No. 2, Sealdah, South 24-
Parganas whereby the petitioner’s application for discharge under Section 227 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was rejected.
Prosecution case was started on the basis of a written complaint of the
opposite party no. 2 and a specific case being Narkeldanga Police Station Case
No. 05 of 2013 dated January 3, 2013 under Sections 417/420/376 IPC, bearing
G.R. No. 32 of 2013 was registered and after investigation charge-sheet being 10
of 2013 dated February 7, 2013 under Sections 417/420/376 IPC was submitted
against the petitioner/accused to stand trial in open Court. The case was
committed to the Court of Sessions and Sessions Case No. 10(3) of 2013 was
registered before the learned 2nd Additional District Sessions Judge at Sealdah
and a date was fixed for consideration of charge when an application under
Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed with a prayer for
discharge on behalf of the petitioner on the contention that proper scrutiny of the
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FIR being the written complaint it will emerge that there is no ingredient of
Section 376 IPC as the allegation made in the complaint does not fulfil the
ingredient of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code.
The provisions of Section 376 IPC may be quoted herein for useful
consideration: –
” 376. Rape–A man is said to commit “rape” who, except in the case
hereinafter excepted, has sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances
falling under any of the six following descriptions :- First- Against her will.
Secondly- Without her consent. Thirdly- With her consent, when her consent has
been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested in fear of
death or of hurt. Fourthly- With her consent, when the man knows that he is not
her husband, and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another
man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. Fifthly- With her
consent, when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of
mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of
any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature
and consequences of that to which she gives consent. Sixthly- With or without her
consent, when she is under sixteen years of age. Explanation- Penetration is
sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape.
Exception- Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not being
under fifteen years of age, is not rape.”
It is contended that in the charge-sheet the prosecution has relied on the
recorded statement of the defacto complainant under Section 164 CrPC, made
before the learned Judicial Magistrate. On meticulous scrutiny through the
statement it will transpire that the age of the defacto complainant is 36 years old
which can be safely construed that she was quite matured and wise enough to
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enter into any relationship. It will also transpire that prior to divorce of the
defacto complainant the accused used to visit her and they became very friendly
and she used to share her problem with him and subsequently they became very
close. My attention is invited to the statements so recorded by the learned
Magistrate at page 49, which speaks about the fact of involvement of the
prosecutrix with the petitioner.
It is submitted that the opposite party no. 2 had physical relationship with
the petitioner for more than two years, such long duration confirms that both of
them being adult were consenting party and thus the question of rape cannot be
considered. Such fact does not constitute misconception of fact. The Hon’ble
Apex Court in several landmark decisions have observed that a belief that the
promise of marriage was meant to be fulfilled is not a misconception of fact. In
the instant case nowhere from the FIR or statement under Section 164 CrPC it
reveals that the consent of the victim/defacto complainant was hesitant,
reluctant or grudging rather she consciously consented/permitted to enter into
physical relationship.
It is also submitted as regards the charge under Section 417 that it
provides for punishment for cheating defined in Section 415 of IPC. It is argued
that there is neither any ingredient of cheating nor any inducement by the
petitioner thereby causing delivery of any property and not a single iota of
evidence has been collected by the Investigating Officer while submitting charge-
sheet to attract Section 417 and Section 420 IPC.
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It is also submitted that the learned Judge has made it clear in his order
that he has no inherent power to discharge the accused whereas power to
discharge the accused is provided in Section 227 of the CrPC itself and argued
that the order impugned is mechanical and without any basis, accordingly, the
petitioner has prayed for setting aside the order impugned.
I have perused the order impugned. The learned Judge having considered
certain decisions as referred to in his order has come to the conclusion that the
decisions referred to by the parties are distinguishable on facts, circumstances at
that stage of the case and fixed the next date for appearance and framing of
charges which stage is long pending.
The grounds in this revisional application taken by the learned counsel for
the petitioner are no doubt worth consideration which can be considered at the
stage of trial on evidence inasmuch as fact as to whether the petitioner extracted
the consent of the prosecutrix as prima facie emerged from the statement of the
prosecutrix recorded under Section 161 by the I.O. and Statement under Section
164 of CrPC recorded by Judicial Magistrate during investigation are required to
be adjudged.
It may be noted that allegedly the prosecutrix gave her consent for physical
relation with the petitioner on promise and assurance to marry her and due to
such promise she gave kulla talaque to her erstwhile husband to marry the
petitioner so much so that her daughter started recognizing the petitioner as her
father.
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Though a promise to marry without cogent evidence may not give rise to
misconception of fact within the meaning of Section 90 of Indian Penal Code,
such misconception has to be clarified on evidence that such representation was
deliberately made by the petitioner with a view to elicit the consent of the
prosecutrix without having the intention to marry her. If on facts it is proved in
evidence that the petitioner did not really entertained such intention of marrying
her, nevertheless, on facts disclosed at this stage, it appears that admittedly the
prosecutrix is 36 years of age on the date of alleged incident and is a mother of a
daughter whereas the petitioner is aged about 27 years and a student of
Homeopathy college in Kolkata and alleged physical relation developed in her
house when she was a married woman with a daughter.
Therefore, all such factual aspects of the case has to be judged on
evidence.
That apart, bearing in mind the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex
Court, power under Section 482 of the CrPC should not be exercised in the
prosecution cases which involves offences like murder, rape and dacoity etc. as
they have serious impact on the society, I am not inclined to exercise the
inherent power in quashing the proceeding in Sessions Case under reference
pending in the Court of Additional District Sessions Judge, 2nd Court, Sealdah.
Accordingly, the revisional application is dismissed with direction to the
learned trial Court to hold the trial as expeditiously as possible, preferably within
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a period of three months from the date of communication of this order by holding
day to day trial of the case.
Thus, CRR 2535 of 2018 is disposed of.
Let urgent xerox certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the
parties after completion of all legal formalities.
sh
( Shivakant Prasad, J.)