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THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
BENCH AT INDORE
*****************
SB:- Hon’ble Shri Justice G. S. Ahluwalia
Cr.A.695/1999
Narayan Makwana Another
Vs.
State of MP
None for the appellants.
Ms. Mamta Shandilya, learned Public Prosecutor for the
respondent/ State.
JUDGMENT
(Delivered on 21/08/2018)
On 16/04/2018 none had appeared for the appellants
and on 02/08/2018 also, none appeared for the appellants.
Since the appellants are on bail from 14/07/2000 and this
appeal is pending since 1999 i.e almost 19 years, therefore,
in the light of the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in
the matter of Surya Baksh Singh vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh, reported in 2014 (14) SCC 222, this Court has no
option, but to decide this appeal on merits after hearing the
counsel for the State and going through the appeal memo as
well as the record of the trial Court. A detailed order has also
been passed in this regard on 2/8/2018.
(2) This Criminal Appeal under Section 374 of CrPC has
been filed against the judgment and sentence dated
10/05/1999, passed by First Additional Sessions Judge,
Ratlam in Sessions Trial No. 86/1998, by which appellant No.1
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Narayan has been convicted under Section 366 of IPC and has
been sentenced to undergo the rigorous imprisonment of four
years and a fine of Rs.500/- and appellant No.2 Ramesh alias
Gudda has been convicted under Sections 366, 376 of IPC
and sentenced to undergo the rigorous imprisonment of four
years and a fine of Rs.500/- and rigorous imprisonment of
seven years and a fine of Rs.500/- respectively, with default
stipulation.
(3) The necessary facts for the disposal of the present
appeal in short are that the father of the prosecutrix lodged a
Guminsaan report on 09/03/1998 to the effect that the
prosecutrix had gone to her school on 09/03/1998 at about
07:30 in the morning and did not come back to the house at
2:00 pm as per daily routine. She was searched by the family
members and since Gudda and Narayan were not in the
house, therefore, a suspicion was expressed against them. In
the Guminsaan report, it was mentioned that the prosecutrix
is aged about 15 years. The FIR Ex.P16 was lodged and
during investigation, it was found that the appellants had
taken away the prosecutrix from the custody of her guardian
to the bus stand and her cycle was parked in the cycle stand.
Thereafter, they went to Mandsaur where appellant Ramesh
alias Gudda took a room on rent in Mahesh Hotel by disclosing
himself as well as the prosecutrix, as husband and wife,
where appellant Ramesh alias Gudda committed rape on the
prosecutrix and also extended a threat that in case if she
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narrates the incident to anybody then she would be killed.
Thereafter, appellant Ramesh alias Gudda took the prosecutrix
to a village near Neemuch, where they went to Piplyamandi in
search of some job and also stayed in a lodge where also, the
prosecutrix was raped. Thereafter, the prosecutrix was taken
to Sukheda and Banjli, where again she was raped by
appellant Ramesh alias Gudda. Later on, appellant Ramesh
alias Gudda took the prosecutrix to the factory of his friend
Dilip and there also, he committed rape on the prosecutrix
and extended a threat. After the recovery, the prosecutrix was
sent for medical examination and in medical examination her
age was clinically assessed in between 14-16 years. The
prosecutrix was found to be habitual for intercourse and was
in menses. For determination of age, the radio-logical test
was also conducted and the age of the prosecutrix was found
in between 15-16 years. The police, during the investigation,
seized mark sheet of the prosecutrix and as per the said
mark sheet, the date of birth of the prosecutrix was
27/04/1983.The undergarment, vaginal slides and pubic hair
of the prosecutrix were sent for FSL examination along with
undergarment of appellant Ramesh alias Gudda and the FSL
report was received, according to which human semen and
sperms were found on the ”Salwar” as well as undergarment
of the prosecutrix and the undergarment of appellant No.2
Ramesh alias Gudda. The register of Mahesh Hotel was
seized. Similarly, a token slip of deposit of cycle of the
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prosecutrix was also seized and after completing the
investigation, the police filed charge sheet against the
appellants for offence under Sections 366 376 of IPC.
(4) The trial Court by judgment dated 15/07/1998 framed
charge under Section 366 of IPC against appellant No.1
Narayan and framed charge under Sections 366 and 376 of
IPC against appellant No.2 Ramesh alias Gudda.
(5) The appellants abjured their guilt and pleaded not
guilty.
(6) The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined
Yogesh Sharma (PW1), Shekh Mehboob (PW2), Narendra
Singh (PW3), Dinesh Parmar (PW4), Kamlesh Patidar (PW5),
Dr.D.C.Boriwal (PW6), Dr.Manoj Solanki (PW7), Kailash
Chandra Goswami (PW8), Dr. Sudha Rajawat (PW9), Prakash
(PW10), Mangulal (PW11), P. S. Solanki (PW12), prosecutrix
(PW13), Kalkai Singh (PW14), Dharmpal (PW15), Suresh
Vikram (PW16) and Devendra Singh Rathore (PW17). The
appellants examined Dinesh (DW1) in their defence.
(7) The trial Court by judgment dated 10/05/1999 passed in
Sessions Trial No.86/1998 convicted both the appellants for
offence under Section 366 of IPC and also convicted
appellant No.2 for offence under Section 376 of IPC and both
the appellants have been sentenced to undergo the rigorous
imprisonment of four years and a fine of Rs.500/- with default
imprisonment for offence under Section 366 of IPC and
appellant No.2 Ramesh alias Gudda has also been sentenced
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to undergo rigorous imprisonment of seven years and a fine
of Rs.500/- with default stipulation for offence under Section
376 of IPC.
(8) Challenging the judgment and sentence passed by the
Court below, it is mentioned in the memo of this appeal that
the prosecutrix (PW13) was herself a consenting party and
according to the prosecution case itself, she went along with
the appellants and parked her cycle in the cycle stand of the
Railway Station from where she went to Neemuch along with
the appellants and from Neemuch on-wards, the prosecutrix
accompanied appellant No.2 Ramesh alias Gudda to different
places and they had stayed in the lodge also, but she never
made complaint to anybody alleging that she has been
kidnapped by the appellants and thus, it is clear that the
prosecutrix herself was a consenting party.
(9) Per contra, it is submitted by counsel for the State
that whether the prosecutrix was a consenting party or not,
would be material only when if it is found that the prosecutrix
was above the age of 16 years. However, in the present case,
admittedly, the prosecutrix was minor, below the age of 16
years and thus, even if it is presumed that the prosecutrix
was a consenting party, then in view of Section 375 (Sixthly)
of IPC, the consent of minor is immaterial and accordingly,
the trial Court did not commit any mistake in convicting both
the appellants for offence under Section 366 of IPC as well as
convicting appellant no.2 Ramesh alias Gudda for offence
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under Section 376 of IPC.
(10) Heard the learned Public Prosecutor for the State.
(11) Before considering the allegations that whether the
prosecutrix was a consenting party or not, it would be
relevant to consider the provision of Section 375 (Sixthly) of
IPC which reads as under:-
”With or without her consent, when she is under
sixteen years of age.”
(12) The prosecution in order to prove the age of the
prosecutrix has relied upon the school mark sheet of the
prosecutrix as well as the clinical assessment of the age of
prosecutrix and the ossification test report. Dr. D.C. Boriwal
(PW6) has stated that on 02/04/1998, he was posted as
Radiologist in the District Hospital, Ratlam and the prosecutrix
was brought to him by Dr. Rajawat for assessment of her age.
This witness had taken X-rays of elbow joint, knee joint and
wrist joint and on the assessment of X-ray reports, he had
found that the age of the prosecutrix is in between 15-16
years. The ossification test report given by this witness is
Ex.P7, whereas X-ray plates are Ex.P8. In cross-examination,
this witness has admitted that as per Medical Jurisprudence of
Modi, there might be margin of three years and the age of the
prosecutrix might be in between 18-19 years. However, on
the question put by the Court, this witness has further
admitted that the age of the prosecutrix might be less than
16 years also.
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(13) Dr. Sudha Rajawat (PW9) had medically examined the
prosecutrix, who had stated that she had found five abrasions
on the scalp of the prosecutrix and clinically she had assessed
the age of the prosecutrix in between 14-16 years and for
ascertaining the age of the prosecutrix, she had referred the
prosecutrix to the Radiologist. The MLC report given by this
witness is Ex.P7. In cross-examination, she admitted that she
had disclosed the reasons for assessing the age of prosecutrix
in between 14-16 years. She further admitted that she agrees
with the Medical Jurisprudence of Modi, according to which
the menses starts from the age of 14 years, however, she
further clarified that there might be certain exceptions also.
(14) Kailash Chandra Goswami (PW8) has proved the seizure
of mark sheet of the prosecutrix. The mark sheet is Ex.P10
and the same was seized vide seizure memo Ex.P11. In the
mark sheet, the date of birth of the prosecutrix is mentioned
as 27/04/1983.
(15) It is mentioned in the grounds raised in the memo of
appeal that the trial Court has committed a material illegality
by holding the prosecutrix as minor.
(16) Per contra, it is submitted by the Public Prosecutor for
the State that there is no discrepancy in the date of birth
mentioned in the mark sheet of the prosecutrix as well as in
the ossification test report of the prosecutrix and clinical
assessment of the age of the prosecutrix. Dr. Sudha Rajawat
(PW9) had clinically assessed the age of the prosecutrix in
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between 14-16 year. Dr.D.C. Bariwal (PW6) had assessed the
age of the prosecutrix in between 15-16 years and as per
mark sheet of the prosecutrix, her date of birth was
27/04/1983. According to the prosecution case, the
prosecutrix was kidnapped by the appellants on 09/03/1998.
Thus, if the date of birth of the prosecutrix as mentioned in
the mark sheet is considered in the light of clinical
assessment of the age of the prosecutrix as well as
ossification test report of the prosecutrix, then it would be
clear that on the date of kidnapping, the prosecutrix was aged
about 15 years and was below the age of 16 years. Thus, it is
held that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing
beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecutrix was minor on
the date of incident and was below the age of 16 years. Under
these circumstances, it is clear that the consent of the
prosecutrix is immaterial in view of provision of Section
375(Sixthly) of IPC. Although the prosecutrix (PW13) had
stated that the appellants had taken her to the railway station
where appellant No.1 Narayan had parked her cycle in the
cycle stand of the Railway Station and handed over the key
of the said cycle to appellant No.2 Ramesh alias Gudda, from
where both of the appellants took the prosecutrix to Neemuch
by train and at Neemuch, appellant No.1 Narayan came back
after leaving the prosecutrix along with appellant No.2
Ramesh alias Gudda and thereafter, appellant No.2 Ramesh
alias Gudda had taken her to different places, where she was
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committed rape by appellant No.2 Ramesh alias Gudda, but
as already held by this Court that the prosecutrix was minor
on the date of kidnapping, therefore, whether she was a
consenting party or not, is not required to be considered
because the consent of the minor is immaterial. Accordingly, it
is held that appellant No.2 Ramesh alias Gudda is guilty of
committing for offence under Sections 366 and 376 of IPC.
(17) So far as the case of appellants for offence under
Section 366 of IPC is concerned, this Court has already come
to the conclusion that the prosecutrix was minor on the date
of incident and was aged about 15 years. In order to make
out an offence under Section 366 of IPC, the prosecution is
required to prove that the prosecutrix was kidnapped.
(18) ”Kidnapping” is defined in Section 361 of IPC, which
reads as under:-
”361. Kidnapping from lawful guardianship.–
Whoever takes or entices any minor under 1[sixteen]
years of age if a male, or under 2[eighteen] years of
age if a female, or any person of unsound mind, out
of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor
or person of unsound mind, without the consent of
such guardian, is said to kidnap such minor or person
from lawful guardianship.”
(19) Thus, it is clear that where a person is a female below
eighteen years of age and if she is taken out of the lawful
guardian of such minor, without the consent of such guardian,
then the said act of the accused would be a ”kidnapping” of
such minor or a person from lawful guardianship. In the
present case, as this Court has already held that the
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prosecutrix was less than 16 years on the date of kidnapping,
therefore, it is clear that she was below 18 years of age for
the purpose of offence under Section 366 of IPC. The
prosecutrix (PW13) in her evidence has specifically stated that
appellant No.1 and appellant No.2 had taken her to a Railway
Station where appellant No.1 Narayan had parked her cycle in
the cycle stand of the Railway Station and from where, both
of the appellants took her to Neemuch by train and at
Neemuch, appellant No.1 Narayan came back after leaving
the prosecutrix along with appellant No.2 Ramesh alias
Gudda. Thus, it is clear that the prosecutrix was kidnapped by
appellant No.1 Narayan also from Ratlam and brought her to
Neemuch. From there, the appellant No.2 Ramesh alias
Gudda took her to different places and committed rape on
her. Considering the allegations made against the appellants,
it is clear that the prosecution has established beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellant No.1 along with the
appellant No.2 had kidnapped the prosecutrix. Accordingly,
appellants are also held guilty for offence under Section 366
of IPC.
(20) So far as the question of sentence is concerned, the
appellant No.2 has been awarded the jail sentence of rigorous
imprisonment of seven years for offence under Section 376 of
IPC, which is the minimum sentence provided under the law.
Therefore, the sentence awarded to the appellant No.2 by the
trial Court for offence under Sections 366 and 376 of IPC does
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not call for any interference and accordingly, the sentence
awarded to the appellant No.2 for offence under Sections 366
and 376 of IPC is affirmed.
(21) So far as the sentence awarded to the appellants for
offence under Section 366 of IPC is concerned, it is clear that
no minimum jail sentence is provided. The allegation against
appellant No.1 Narayan is that he had facilitated the appellant
No.2 Ramesh alias Gudda to kidnap the prosecutrix and the
appellants took the prosecutrix to the Railway Station, Ratlam
where her cycle was parked in the cycle stand of the Railway
Station and from there, they went to Neemuch by train and at
Neemuch, appellant No.1 Narayan left appellant No.2 Ramesh
alias Gudda and the prosecutrix and came back. There is no
allegation against the appellant No.1 to the effect that he, in
any manner, had molested or sexually violated the
prosecutrix. From the record of the trial Court, it appears
that during trial the appellant No.1 had remained in jail from
25/03/1998 to 13/05/1998 and he was granted bail by this
Court by order dated 14/07/2000 after his conviction by
judgment dated 10/05/1999. Thus, it is clear that the
appellant No.1 has remained in jail from 10/05/1999 to
14/07/2000 after his conviction. Under the facts and
circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the jail sentence already undergone by the
appellant No.1 Narayan for offence under Section 366 of IPC
would serve the ends of justice. Therefore, the sentence
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awarded to the appellant No.1 Narayan for offence under
Section 366 of IPC is modified to the period already
undergone by him. Accordingly, the judgment and sentence
dated 10/05/1999 passed by First Additional Sessions Judge,
Ratlam in ST No.86/1998 is hereby affirmed with the above-
mentioned modification.
(22) So far as appellant No.1 Narayan is concerned, as he
has been sentenced to the period already undergone by him,
therefore, his bail bonds and surety bonds are discharged. He
is no more required in the present case.
(23) So far as appellant No.2 Ramesh alias Gudda is
concerned, as he is on bail, therefore, his bail bonds and
surety bonds are hereby cancelled. He is directed to
immediately surrender before the trial Court for undergoing
the remaining jail sentence.
(24) Accordingly, the appeal succeeds in part and is
Allowed accordingly.
(G.S.Ahluwalia)
Judge
MKB Digitally signed by MAHENDRA KUMAR BARIK
Date: 2018.08.21 18:09:24 +05’30’
Digitally signed by MAHENDRA
KUMAR BARIK
Date: 2018.08.21 18:09:42 +05’30’