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Rahul Yadav vs Idbi Bank on 10 May, 2021

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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Date of decision : 10.05.2021

+ W.P.(C) 5479/2020

RAHUL YADAV ……Petitioner
Through Ms. Saahila Lamba, Advocate

versus

IDBI BANK …..Respondent
Through Mr. Ritin Rai, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Sidhartha Barua and
Mr. Praful Jindal, Advocates

CORAM:
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE JYOTI SINGH

JUDGEMENT

1. Petitioner has filed the present petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India assailing letter dated 22.06.2020, whereby
Respondent has cancelled the candidature of the Petitioner for admission
to one year Post Graduate Diploma in Banking and Finance (PGDBF) at
Manipal School of Banking, Bengaluru for the year 2019-2020, granted
earlier, vide letter dated 04.03.2020.

2. Brief facts germane to the issue under consideration are in a narrow
compass and are as follows: –

(a). Respondent issued Advertisement No.2/2019-2020 dated
21.06.2019 for admission to one year PGDBF, at Manipal School of
Banking, Bengaluru for the year 2019-2020. Upon successful completion

WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 1 of 34
of PGDBF, candidates were to be inducted in the Respondent Bank at the
post of Assistant Manager Grade-‘A’, subject to fulfilling the eligibility
criteria provided in the advertisement.

(b). Advertisement was issued from Mumbai requiring the candidates
to apply online between 23.06.2019 to 03.07.2019 and no other mode of
application was acceptable. The selection process comprised of online
test, followed by personal interview.

(c). Desirous of getting admission in PGDBF, followed by appointment
in IDBI, Petitioner applied in response to the advertisement and appeared
in the online test and personal interview. Vide letter dated 04.03.2020,
Petitioner was informed that he had been selected for admission and was
directed to report on 16.03.2020.

(d). Relevant would it be to mention at this stage that prior to the
submission of the application for admission to PGDBF, Petitioner had
filed a petition, being HMA Petition No.1412/2019, for dissolution of
marriage under Section 13(1) (ia) and (ib) of the
Hindu Marriage Act,
1955, before the Family Court, Dwarka, New Delhi, on account of a
marital discord. Petition was listed for the first time on 10.05.2019 and
was pending on the date of application for PGDBF.

(e). The application form required the candidates to furnish details of
any prosecution / detention / fine / conviction / sentence awarded by any
Court of law for any offence. Petitioner responded by filling ‘No’ against
the relevant column as on the date of the application, none of the above
was applicable. FIR No. 355/2019 under
Sections 498A/ 506 / 323 / 343/
34 IPC was registered against the Petitioner and his family members on
15.12.2019, at the behest of his wife.

WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 2 of 34

(f). On receipt of letter dated 04.03.2020, offering admission,
Petitioner on his own volition wrote to the Respondent and disclosed
registration of FIR against him. When Petitioner reported for training at
Manipal Campus, Bengaluru, he was not allowed to join training and was
informed that on account of the criminal case, decision to grant him
admission was being re-considered and he would be informed of the
outcome.

(g). Vide impugned letter dated 22.06.2020, Petitioner was informed of
cancellation of his admission to PGDBF. Immediately on receipt of the
letter, Petitioner sent an e-mail dated 14.07.2020, requesting the
Respondent to revisit its decision, as the same was premised on mere
allegations, which in any event were false and yet to undergo the test of
judicial scrutiny. Getting no response, Petitioner invoked the jurisdiction
of this Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

3. At the outset, twofold preliminary objections were raised by the
Respondent to the maintainability of the present petition as follows :-

(a) Respondent/Bank is not a ‘State’ or its instrumentality or covered
under the expression ‘other authorities’ under
Article 12 of the
Constitution of India. Respondent is not performing public function or
discharging public duty to be amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court
under
Article 226 of the Constitution.

(b) Lack of territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

4. In support of one limb of the first objection, Mr. Rai, learned
Senior Counsel argued that (a) Respondent/Bank is a Company under the
Companies Act, 2013 engaged in the business of Banking; (b) State
neither supports nor controls its Management; (c) Central Government
WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 3 of 34
does not have any, leave alone deep or pervasive control over its
functioning; (d) Policy decisions related to functioning and routine
administrative matters are taken only by the Board, similar to other
private sector companies and are not required to be referred to or
approved or ratified by the Central Government; (e) Bank is not a
Government Company as defined under
Section 2(45) of the Companies
Act, 2013; (f) Central Government is not a major or sole shareholder and
does not provide exclusive budgetary support for the functioning or day-
to-day activities, save and except, nominal contribution to the share
capital of the Bank; (g) Respondent borrows from financial
institutions/market and meets its expenditure by internal accruals;

(h) Government has the power to nominate only two Directors in the
Board out of 14, and does not exercise any functional control over the
affairs of the Bank; (i) administration is through officers, independently
selected for the purpose, not nominated by Government.

5. Succinctly put, the argument was that Bank is administratively,
financially and functionally controlled by its Board and is not a State or
its instrumentality or ‘other authority’ under
Article 12 of the
Constitution. To substantiate the argument, reliance was placed on the
judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of
Ramana Dayaram Shetty
vs. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489;
Ajay
Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722 and
Pradeep Kumar
Biswas and Ors. vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and Ors.,
(2002) 5 SCC 111.

6. Mr. Rai, relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in GM,
Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. vs. Satrughan Nishad, (2003) 8 SCC 639,
WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 4 of 34
wherein it was held that a Cooperative Society manufacturing sugar was
not amenable to the writ jurisdiction despite the fact that in the said case
the State held 50% shares in the Mill and nominated one-third of the
Directors in the Management Committee. Judgment of the Bombay High
Court in the case of
Vassudev Madkaikar and Ors. vs. State of Goa,
through its Chief Secretary and Ors., (2021) SCC Online Bom 479, was
cited where the Court held that Goa State Cooperative Bank is not a State
as the entire shareholding is not held by the Government and presence of
two nominee Directors does not indicate a deep and pervasive control by
the Government.

7. Learned Senior Counsel relied on the following judgments, where
High Courts have held that no writ shall lie against IDBI Bank :-

(a). judgment of Kolkata High Court in Kundan Prasad v. UOI
and Ors., W.P. No.8736/2019, decided on 11.06.2019.

(b) judgment of the Bombay High Court in Mrinmayee Rohit
Umrotkar vs. Union of India and Ors., WP (L)
No.6704/2020, decided on 08.12.2020;

(c). judgment of Kerala High Court in Unimoni Financial
Services Ltd. vs. IDBI Bank Ltd., WP (C) No.17635/2020,
decided on 16.12.2020; and

(d). judgment of Kolkata High Court in Debasis Mukherjee vs.
IDBI Bank Ltd. and Ors., W.P.A No.5016/2020, decided on
11.02.2021.

8. The argument of the learned Senior Counsel qua the second limb
of the first objection was that the Respondent is not performing any
public function or discharging a public duty and therefore no writ can lie
against a private Body and that too, for enforcing a contract, which in this
WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 5 of 34
case is a letter of admission to the one-year PGDBF. It was also argued
that it is settled law that even if a Body is performing public duty and
amenable to writ jurisdiction, all its decisions are not necessarily subject
to judicial review and only those decisions which involve public element,
can be judicially reviewed. In support of the proposition, reliance was
placed on the judgments of the Supreme Court in
K.K. Saksena vs.
International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage, (2015) 4 SCC 670
and Ramakrishna Mission’s vs. Kago Kunya and Ors., (2019) 16 SCC
303 and a judgment of this Court in
A.R. Joshi vs. State Bank of India,
(1977) SCC Online Del 17 as well as of the Bombay High Court in
Vassudev Madkaikar and Ors. (supra).

9. It was next contended that the advertisement was issued from
Mumbai and the decision to cancel the admission was also taken in the
office of the Respondent at Mumbai. No cause of action has arisen at
Delhi and thus this Court lacks the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the
petition. Reliance was placed on the judgments of the Supreme Court in
Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar, (1994) 4 SCC 711
and
Kusum Ingots Alloys Ltd. vs. Union of India and Anr. (2004) 6
SCC 254.

10. Elaborating the argument, Mr. Rai submitted that Petitioner
approached this Court premising jurisdiction on receipt of impugned
communication and participation in the online test and personal interview
at Delhi. However, none of these can be determinative factors to decide
the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Writ of certiorari is sought to
quash the letter dated 22.06.2020, which merely communicates a decision
taken in the office of the Respondent at Mumbai. It is the decision, which
WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 6 of 34
gives rise to a cause of action, if any, and not the online test or interview
or receipt of the cancellation letter.

11. Additionally, it was submitted that as the admission process was on
all India basis and the centers for interview were spread across the
country, Respondent had cautiously stipulated in the advertisement that
with respect to disputes arising out of the advertisement or selection, only
Courts at Mumbai shall have jurisdiction, in order to avoid multiplicity of
proceedings before different High Courts as also conflicting decisions.
Relevant exclusive jurisdiction clause is as under :-

“xxv. Any resultant dispute arising out of this advertisement
and the selection process shall be subject to the sole
jurisdiction of the Courts situated in Mumbai only”

12. For enforcing the exclusive jurisdiction clause, judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of
Maharashtra Chess Association vs. Union
of India and Ors., (2020) 13 SCC 285, was referred to by learned senior
counsel.

13. Responding to the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction of
this Court, Ms. Saahila Lamba, learned counsel for the Petitioner,
contended that reliance of the Respondent on Clause 14(xxv) of the
advertisement, the exclusive jurisdiction clause, is misconceived. It was
argued that jurisdiction of a High Court cannot be ousted on the basis of
such a clause, inserted in an advertisement, if otherwise cause of action
arises within the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court. The objection
is contrary to the very scheme and scope of
Article 226(2) of the
Constitution of India and judicial pronouncements in that regard. For the
proposition of law, reliance was placed on judgments of the High Court

WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 7 of 34
of Patna in
Binod Kumar Sharma vs. Union of India Ors. in Civil Writ
Jurisdiction Case No. 22888/2012 decided on 08.04.2013 and
Sunil
Kumar Yadav vs. Union of India Ors. in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case
No. 2998/2013 decided on 17.05.2016.

14. It was urged that a part of the cause of action, if not the entire, has
arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, in as much as
Petitioner had appeared for the online test and personal interview, leading
to his selection, within the territorial boundaries of this Court. This apart,
letter dated 22.06.2020, communicating cancellation of the candidature of
the Petitioner was received at Delhi.

15. To counter the second preliminary objection that writ is not
maintainable as IDBI is not a State or its instrumentality or ‘other
authority’ under
Article 12 of the Constitution, it was asserted that writ
petition is maintainable as (a) 51% of shareholding of IDBI is held by
Life Insurance Corporation of India, a 100% Government owned
Corporation; (b) 47% of shareholding is held by Government of India; (c)
96.78% numbers of shareholders of IDBI are the public and (d)
Board of IDBI comprises of two Non-Executive Directors nominated by
the Government and one Non-Executive Director nominated by the LIC.

16. The argument, as it unfolds is that 98% shares of the IDBI are
owned by the Government or Government controlled Corporation i.e.
LIC and thus the financial control vests with the Government. With two
Government nominated Directors on Board, Government also exercises
administrative control. It was argued that the Supreme Court in Ajay
Hasia (supra) in the context of
Article 12 of the Constitution of India held
that if the entire share capital of a Corporation is held by the Government,
WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 8 of 34
it would go long way in indicating that the Corporation is an
instrumentality or an agency of the Government and the said case
therefore squarely covers the present case. The Supreme Court in the case
of
Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti
Mahotsav Smarak Trust vs. V.R. Rudani (1989) 2 SCC 691 held that
Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Courts to issue writs to any
person or authority for enforcement of fundamental rights and for any
other purpose and the words ‘any person or authority’ in
Article 226 are
not confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the
State, but may cover any other person or body, performing public duty.

17. Reliance was placed on the judgement of Division Bench of this
Court in
Sagrika Singh vs. Union of India Ors. in WP(C) 3850/2010,
decided on 29.08.2011, wherein it was held that AGIF performs a public
duty by providing insurance cover to army personnel and their families,
deducting premium from their salaries and is amenable to the writ
jurisdiction of the High Court. Reliance was also placed on the judgment
in
Bernard D’Mello vs. Industrial Finance Corporation Limited Ors. in
W.P.(C) 6571/2003 decided on 05.07.2004, wherein this Court,
considering the fact that MDI receives grant from IFCI, which in turn is
substantially owned by the Government, held that MDI is amenable to
writ jurisdiction.

18. Distinguishing the judgements relied upon by the Respondent,
learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that in the judgement of the
Bombay High Court in Mrinmayee Rohit Umrotkar (supra), the Court
held that IDBI is not an undertaking of the Government of India. This
cannot be cited to support a proposition that IDBI is not amenable to writ
WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 9 of 34
jurisdiction of this Court, as the said decision has not examined the issue
of maintainability in the context of
Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. Judgments of the Kerala High Court in Unimoni Financial Services
Ltd. (supra) and that of the Kolkata High Court in Debasis Mukherjee
(supra) were also distinguished on the same premise.

19. I have heard learned counsel for the Petitioner and learned Senior
Counsel for the Respondent and examined their contentions.

20. The foremost legal nodus required to be addressed is whether this
Court has the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present petition.

21. In order to address this issue it would be pertinent to understand
the legislative history of
Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the
amendments thereto. Under
Article 226, as it originally stood, only the
situs of the Central Government and its agencies was the determining
factor for deciding the territorial jurisdiction and cause of action was not
conceived as a relevant or material factor for entertaining a writ petition.
The unamended Article reads as under:

“226. Power of High Court to issue certain writs:
(1) Notwithstanding anything in
Article 32, every High Court
shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to
which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or
authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government,
within those territories directions, orders or writs, including
writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition,
quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for
any other purpose.

(2) The power conferred on a High Court by clause (1) shall
not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme

WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 10 of 34
Court by Clause (2) of
Article 32.”

22. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Election
Commission vs. Saka Venkata Rao, 1953 SCR 1144, interpreting the said
provision held that writ court would be bound by the territories for its
jurisdiction and the Government or an authority or a person affected by
the issuance of writ, would be amenable to the jurisdiction, either by
location or residence within its territory. The Court observed that ’cause
of action’ gives jurisdiction in suits and this principle finds basis in
statutory enactments but cannot apply to writs as
Article 226 has no
reference to ’cause of action’ or when it arises.

23. Another Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in K.S. Rashid
and Son vs. Income Tax Investigation Commission 1954 SCR 738 took
the similar view and finally in Lt. Col.
Khajoor Singh vs. Union of India
(1961) 2 SCR 828, a larger Bench of the Supreme Court approved the
view in the two Constitution Bench judgements and the authoritative
pronouncement was that a writ court cannot exercise jurisdiction beyond
its territorial boundaries.

24. Subsequently, by the Constitution (Fifteenth) Amendment Act,
1963, Clause (1-A) was inserted in
Article 226, which was later re-
numbered as Clause (2) by the Constitution (Forty-Second) Amendment
Act, 1976. Amended Clause (2) reads as under:

“226. Power of High Court to issue certain writs:
(1) ……

(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions,
orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may
also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in
relation to the territories within which the cause of action,

WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 11 of 34
wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power,
notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority
or the residence of such person is not within those territories.”

25. The underlying intent of the amendment manifests itself from a
plain reading of Clause (2) of
Article 226 that the High Court can issue a
writ to an authority or person or Government, notwithstanding that the
seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is
beyond its territorial jurisdiction, so long as ’cause of action’ arises
within its territory, wholly or in part.

26. Therefore, it is palpably clear that after the amendment to Article
226, ’cause of action’ is a relevant and germane factor to decide the
territorial jurisdiction of a High Court. Through several judicial
pronouncements, it is also settled that even if a small fraction of ’cause of
action’ arises within the jurisdiction of a particular High Court, the said
High Court may in its discretion entertain the writ petition, with a
cautious caveat that the facts arising in the case form an integral part of
the ’cause of action’.

27. A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas
Commission (supra), held as under :

“6. It is well settled that the expression “cause of action”
means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if
traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the
Court. In Chand Kour v. Partab Singh [ILR (1889) 16 Cal
98, 102 : 15 IA 156] Lord Watson said:

“… the cause of action has no relation whatever to
the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor
does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed
for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the ground set

WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 12 of 34
forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other
words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the
Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.”

Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial
jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in
support of the cause of action into consideration albeit
without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or
otherwise of the said facts. In other words the question
whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain
a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the
averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise
whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the question
of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts
pleaded in the petition. Therefore, the question whether in the
instant case the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to
entertain and decide the writ petition in question even on the
facts alleged must depend upon whether the averments made
in paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22, 26 and 43 are sufficient in law to
establish that a part of the cause of action had arisen within
the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.”

28. In Kusum Ingots Alloys Ltd. (supra), a three-Judge Bench of the
Supreme Court reiterated the principles laid down in Oil and Natural Gas
Commission (supra) as well as in the case of
State of Rajasthan v. Swaika
Properties (1985) 3 SCC 217.
In Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of
India (2006) 6 SCC 207 the Supreme Court held as under:-

8. Two clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution on plain
reading give clear indication that the High Court can
exercise power to issue direction, order or writs for the
enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by
Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the
cause of action wholly or in part had arisen within the
territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction
notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority

WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 13 of 34
or the residence of the person against whom the direction,
order or writ is issued is not within the said territories.

12. The expression “cause of action” has acquired a
judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense “cause of
action” means the circumstances forming the infraction of
the right or the immediate occasion for the reaction. In the
wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the
maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction of
the right, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself.
Compendiously, as noted above, the expression means every
fact, which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if
traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the
court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as
distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is
necessary to prove each fact, comprises in “cause of action”.

17. It would be appropriate to quote para 61 of the said
judgment, which reads as follows:

61. (1) The correct test in cases falling under Order 2
Rule 2, is „whether the claim in the new suit is in fact
founded upon a cause of action distinct from that
which was the foundation for the former suit‟.
(Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem v. Shumsoonnissa Begum)
(2) The cause of action means every fact which will be
necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed in order
to support his right to the judgment. (Read v. Brown)
(3) If the evidence to support the two claims is
different, then the causes of action are also different.
(Brunsden v. Humphrey)
(4) The causes of action in the two suits may be
considered to be the same if in substance they are
identical. (Brunsden v. Humphrey)
(5) The cause of action has no relation whatever to the
defence that may be set up by the defendant nor does it
depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by
the plaintiff. It refers … to the media upon which the

WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 14 of 34
plaintiff asks the court to arrive at a conclusion in his
favour. (Chand Kour v. Partab Singh) This observation
was made by Lord Watson in a case under
Section 43
of the Act of 1882 (corresponding to Order 2 Rule 2)
where plaintiff made various claims in the same suit.
(IA pp. 139-40)”

29. A year later, in the case of Alchemist Ltd. Anr. vs. State Bank of
Sikkim Ors. (2007) 11 SCC 335, the Supreme Court after tracing the
legislative history of
Article 226 and its amendment, held that accrual of
’cause of action’ is an additional ground for conferring jurisdiction on the
High Court to exercise power under the said Constitutional provision.

Relevant paras of the judgment in are as follows :-

20. It may be stated that the expression “cause of action” has
neither been defined in the Constitution nor in
the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908. It may, however, be described as a
bundle of essential facts necessary for the plaintiff to prove
before he can succeed. Failure to prove such facts would give
the defendant a right to judgment in his favour. Cause of
action thus gives occasion for and forms the foundation of
the suit.

21. The classic definition of the expression “cause of action”
is found in Cooke v. Gill wherein Lord Brett observed:
“„Cause of action‟ means every fact which it would be
necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to
support his right to the judgment of the court.”

25. The learned counsel for the respondents referred to
several decisions of this Court and submitted that whether a
particular fact constitutes a cause of action or not must be
decided on the basis of the facts and circumstances of each
case. In our judgment, the test is whether a particular fact(s)
is (are) of substance and can be said to be material, integral

WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 15 of 34
or essential part of the lis between the parties. If it is, it forms
a part of cause of action. If it is not, it does not form a part of
cause of action. It is also well settled that in determining the
question, the substance of the matter and not the form thereof
has to be considered.

35. Negativing the contention and upholding the order
passed by the High Court, this Court ruled that passing of a
legislation by itself does not confer any such right to file a
writ petition in any court unless a cause of action arises
therefor. The Court stated: (Kusum Ingots case, SCC p. 261,
para 20)
“20. A distinction between a legislation and executive
action should be borne in mind while determining the
said question.”

Referring to ONGC, it was held that all necessary facts must
form an “integral part” of the cause of action. The fact
which is neither material nor essential nor integral part of
the cause of action would not constitute a part of cause of
action within the meaning of Clause (2) of
Article 226 of the
Constitution.

36. In National Textile Corpn. Ltd. v. Haribox Swalram
referring to earlier cases, this Court stated that: (SCC p. 797,
para 12.1)
“12.1 … the mere fact that the writ petitioner carries
on business at Calcutta or that the reply to the
correspondence made by it was received at Calcutta is
not an integral part of the cause of action and,
therefore, the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction
to entertain the writ petition and the view to the
contrary taken by the Division Bench cannot be
sustained.”

37. From the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view the
ratio laid down in a catena of decisions by this Court, it is
clear that for the purpose of deciding whether facts averred

WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 16 of 34
by the appellant-petitioner would or would not constitute a
part of cause of action, one has to consider whether such fact
constitutes a material, essential, or integral part of the cause
of action. It is no doubt true that even if a small fraction of
the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the court,
the court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the
suit/petition. Nevertheless it must be a “part of cause of
action”, nothing less than that.

38. In the present case, the facts which have been pleaded by
the appellant Company, in our judgment, cannot be said to
be essential, integral or material facts so as to constitute a
part of “cause of action” within the meaning of
Article
226(2) of the Constitution. The High Court, in our opinion,
therefore, was not wrong in dismissing the petition.

30. ‘Cause of action’ as understood from judicial pronouncements, can
be described as a bundle of essential facts necessary for the Petitioner to
prove, before he can succeed and is therefore a foundation of any suit or a
writ petition. The expression ’cause of action’ has been defined tersely in
Mulla’s Code of Civil Procedure as follows:

“The “cause of action” means every fact which, if traversed, it
would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to
support his right to a judgment of the court.”

31. In Union of India vs. Adani Exports Ltd. (2002) 1 SCC 567, the
Supreme Court observed that jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a
writ petition would be conferred only when the Petitioner discloses that
the integral facts pleaded to support a ’cause of action’ constitute a cause
empowering the High Court to decide the controversy and if not the
entire, at least some part arises within its jurisdiction. The Court observed

WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 17 of 34
as follows:

“16. It is clear from the above constitutional provision that a
High Court can exercise the jurisdiction in relation to the
territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part,
arises. This provision in the Constitution has come up for
consideration in a number of cases before this Court. In this
regard, it would suffice for us to refer to the observations of
this Court in the case of
Oil and Natural Gas Commission v.
Utpal Kumar Basu [(1994) 4 SCC 711] (SCC at p. 713)
wherein it was held:

“Under Article 226 a High Court can exercise the
power to issue directions, orders or writs for the
enforcement of any of the fundamental rights
conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any
other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part,
had arisen within the territories in relation to which
it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat
of the Government or authority or the residence of
the person against whom the direction, order or writ
is issued is not within the said territories. The
expression „cause of action‟ means that bundle of
facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to
entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the court.
Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of
territorial jurisdiction the court must take all the facts
pleaded in support of the cause of action into
consideration albeit without embarking upon an
enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said
facts. Thus the question of territorial jurisdiction
must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition,
the truth or otherwise of the averments made in the
petition being immaterial.”

17. It is seen from the above that in order to confer
jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition or a
special civil application as in this case, the High Court must
be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in support of the
cause of action that those facts do constitute a cause so as to
empower the court to decide a dispute which has, at least in
WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 18 of 34
part, arisen within its jurisdiction. It is clear from the above
judgment that each and every fact pleaded by the
respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead to
the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action
within the court’s territorial jurisdiction unless those facts
pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the
lis that is involved in the case. Facts which have no bearing
with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give
rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction
on the court concerned. If we apply this principle then we see
that none of the facts pleaded in para 16 of the petition, in our
opinion, falls into the category of bundle of facts which would
constitute a cause of action giving rise to a dispute which
could confer territorial jurisdiction on the courts at
Ahmedabad.

18. As we have noticed earlier, the fact that the respondents
are carrying on the business of export and import or that they
are receiving the export and import orders at Ahmedabad or
that their documents and payments for exports and imports are
sent/made at Ahmedabad, has no connection whatsoever with
the dispute that is involved in the applications. Similarly, the
fact that the credit of duty claimed in respect of exports that
were made from Chennai were handled by the respondents
from Ahmedabad have also no connection whatsoever with the
actions of the appellants impugned in the application. The
non-granting and denial of credit in the passbook having an
ultimate effect, if any, on the business of the respondents at
Ahmedabad would not also, in our opinion, give rise to any
such cause of action to a court at Ahmedabad to adjudicate on
the actions complained against the appellants.”
(emphasis added)

32. From the conspectus of the judgements and the affirmation of the
Supreme Court that ’cause of action’ is a significant factor for conferring
territorial jurisdiction on a High Court, it is now crystal clear and no more
obscure that a writ court can exercise jurisdiction where the Respondent

WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 19 of 34
is located in its territories and also where the Government or authority is
located outside its territorial boundaries, but in the latter case, the pre-
requisite to exercise the power shall be the arising of ’cause of action’ in
its territorial boundaries. The said expression as clearly defined and
amplified in various judgments would take in its ambit, partial cause of
action as well. The converse, however is not correct. Where not even a
miniscule part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial
boundaries of the Court, it shall lack the territorial jurisdiction to entertain
a petition and to issue directions to the Respondents who are located
outside its boundaries. The Constitutional Amendment introducing
Article 226 (2) with a non-obstante clause highlights the position
aforesaid and needless to state that this Constitutional mandate would
govern the considerations to decide the territorial jurisdiction of this
Court.

33. The Supreme Court has also unambiguously reiterated that before
entertaining a writ petition, High Court must satisfy itself from the facts
pleaded before it that they have a nexus or relevance with the lis involved
in the case and facts having no bearing with the lis would not give rise to
’cause of action’ to confer territorial jurisdiction. In other words, the
bundle of facts so mentioned must give rise to an actionable wrong within
the territories of the Court. Clause (1) of
Article 226 deals with both the
source of power of Court and its territorial jurisdiction, while clause (2)
amplifies the jurisdiction with respect to the ’cause of action’. Thus, there
is a clear bifurcation in the clauses and from a close reading what unveils,
in the opinion of this Court, is that the power of a Court is certainly not
synonymous to the jurisdiction of a Court. The conclusion that can be
WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 20 of 34
safely drawn is that ’cause of action’ is the keyword to decide the
territorial jurisdiction.

34. Keeping this in the backdrop, it needs to be examined in the case in
hand (a) if any ’cause of action’, wholly or in part, has arisen within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court and (b) the impact and effect of the
exclusive jurisdiction clause mentioned in the advertisement.

35. Taking up the second question first, the answer in the opinion of
this Court lies in a recent judgement of the Supreme Court in Maharashtra
Chess Association (supra). The conundrum before the Supreme Court in
the said case was whether a private agreement between two parties in the
form of their Constitution and Bye-laws, conferring exclusive jurisdiction
on the Courts at Chennai, ousted the writ jurisdiction of the Bombay High
Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution. Appellant therein had filed a
writ petition before the Bombay High Court and the second Respondent
objected to the maintainability on the ground that Clause 21 of the
Constitution and Bye-laws conferred exclusive jurisdiction on Courts at
Chennai, with respect to disputes involving the second Respondent or any
other party to the said Bye-laws, including the Appellant. Bombay High
Court held that Clause 21 ousted the jurisdiction of all other Courts
except the Courts at Chennai.

36. Referring to an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Aligarh
Muslim University Anr. vs. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd.
(1994) 4 SCC 710, the Supreme Court observed as under:

“23. This brings us to the question of whether Clause 21 itself
creates a legal bar on the Bombay High Court exercising its
writ jurisdiction. As discussed above, the writ jurisdiction of

WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 21 of 34
the High Court is fundamentally discretionary. Even the
existence of an alternate adequate remedy is merely an
additional factor to be taken into consideration by the High
Court in deciding whether or not to exercise its writ
jurisdiction. This is in marked contradistinction to the
jurisdiction of a civil court which is governed by statute. In
exercising its discretion to entertain a particular case under
Article 226, a High Court may take into consideration various
factors including the nature of the injustice that is alleged by
the petitioner, whether or not an alternate remedy exists, or
whether the facts raise a question of constitutional
interpretation. These factors are not exhaustive and we do not
propose to enumerate what factors should or should not be
taken into consideration. It is sufficient for the present
purposes to say that the High Court must take a holistic view
of the facts as submitted in the writ petition and make a
determination on the facts and circumstances of each unique
case.

24. At this juncture it is worth discussing the decision of this
Court in
Aligarh Muslim University v. Vinay Engg.
Enterprises (P) Ltd. [Aligarh Muslim University v. Vinay
Engg. Enterprises (P) Ltd., (1994) 4 SCC 710] In that case,
the contract between the parties contained a clause conferring
jurisdiction on the courts at Aligarh. When the High Court of
Calcutta exercised its writ jurisdiction over the matter, this
Court held: (SCC p. 711, para 2)
“2. We are surprised, not a little, that the High Court
of Calcutta should have exercised jurisdiction in a case
where it had absolutely no jurisdiction. The contracts in
question were executed at Aligarh, the construction work
was to be carried out at Aligarh, even the contracts
provided that in the event of dispute the Aligarh Court
alone will have jurisdiction. The arbitrator was from
Aligarh and was to function there. Merely because the
respondent was a Calcutta-based firm, the High Court of
Calcutta seems to have exercised jurisdiction where it
had none by adopting a queer line of reasoning. We are
constrained to say that this is a case of abuse of

WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 22 of 34
jurisdiction and we feel that the respondent deliberately
moved the Calcutta High Court ignoring the fact that no
part of the cause of action had arisen within the
jurisdiction of that Court. It clearly shows that the
litigation filed in the Calcutta High Court was
thoroughly unsustainable.”

25. The Court examined the facts holistically, noting that the
contract was executed and to be performed in Aligarh, and the
arbitrator was to function at Aligarh. It did consider that the
contract conferred jurisdiction on the courts at Aligarh, but
this was one factor amongst several considered by the court in
determining that the High Court of Calcutta did not have
jurisdiction.

26. In the present case, the Bombay High Court has relied
solely on Clause 21 of the constitution and bye-laws to hold
that its own writ jurisdiction is ousted. The Bombay High
Court has failed to examine the case holistically and make a
considered determination as to whether or not it should, in its
discretion, exercise its powers under
Article 226. The scrutiny
to be applied to every writ petition under
Article 226 by the
High Court is a crucial safeguard of the rule of law under the
Constitution in the relevant territorial jurisdiction. It is not
open to a High Court to abdicate this responsibility merely
due to the existence of a privately negotiated document ousting
its jurisdiction.

27. It is certainly open to the High Court to take into
consideration the fact that the appellant and the second
respondent consented to resolve all their legal disputes before
the courts at Chennai. However, this can be a factor within the
broader factual matrix of the case. The High Court may
decline to exercise jurisdiction under
Article 226 invoking the
principle of forum non conveniens in an appropriate case. The
High Court must look at the case of the appellant holistically
and make a determination as to whether it would be proper to
exercise its writ jurisdiction. We do not express an opinion as
to what factors should be considered by the High Court in the
present case, nor the corresponding gravity that should be
accorded to such factors. Such principles are well known to

WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 23 of 34
the High Court and it is not for this Court to interfere in the
discretion of the High Court in determining when to engage its
writ jurisdiction unless exercised arbitrarily or erroneously.
The sole and absolute reliance by the Bombay High Court on
Clause 21 of the constitution and bye-laws to determine that
its jurisdiction under
Article 226 is ousted, is however one
such instance.”

37. The principle reaffirmed in the judgement is that writ jurisdiction
of the High Court is fundamentally discretionary and the Court must take
a holistic view of the facts pleaded to determine if it would be proper to
exercise the discretion. But what is not open to the High Court is to
abdicate this responsibility due to the existence of a privately negotiated
document, ousting its jurisdiction. High Court can take into consideration
that the parties had consented to resolve their legal disputes before a
particular Court, but only as a factor within the broader matrix of the
case. It was also observed by the Supreme Court that High Court may
decline to exercise jurisdiction under
Article 226 invoking the principle
of Forum non-conveniens in an appropriate case, but there cannot be a
sole and absolute reliance on an ouster clause in declining to entertain the
petition.

38. In view of the above, this Court cannot accept the contention of the
Respondent that the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the advertisement is
by itself a sufficient ground to oust the jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 226. Certainly, this would be one amongst the other factors
brought forth by the parties to the lis for consideration of the Court, as
held by the Supreme Court in Maharashtra Chess Association (supra).

WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 24 of 34

39. Coming now to the question, if any part of the ’cause of action’ has
arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. ‘Cause of action’ is
not an abstract concept and will have to be seen in the light of the facts
pleaded and the relief sought in the present petition. The Supreme Court
in
National Textile Corp. Ltd. and Ors. vs. Haribox Swalram and Ors.
(2004) 9 SCC 786, held that each and every fact pleaded in the writ
petition does not ipso facto lead to a conclusion that those facts give rise
to a cause of action within the Court’s territorial jurisdiction and only
those facts which have a nexus or relevance to the lis or the dispute
involved in the case will determine the jurisdiction .

40. Challenge laid in the present petition is to a letter dated 22.06.2020
cancelling the candidature of the Petitioner for admission to PGDBF,
with a consequential relief to direct the Respondent to grant admission to
the Petitioner. As the pleadings go, there are three facets to the claim of
jurisdiction of this Court (a) online test; (b) personal interview and (c)
communication of rejection letter, all at Delhi. Seen and tested in the
backdrop of the lis i.e cancellation of admission, the online test and
personal interview cannot be factors to determine the territorial
jurisdiction of this Court. The grievance of the Petitioner is not qua any
illegality or irregularity in the online examination or the interview. Had
that been the grievance, Petitioner was justified in contending that the
cause of action has, in part, accrued at Delhi. In the present case,
however, neither of the two are under challenge and thus do not give rise
to a ’cause of action’ which connotes a bundle of facts, the Petitioner
must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour.

WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 25 of 34

41. In so far as the third factor is concerned, precedents indicate that
the contention that place of receipt of the rejection/cancellation letters,
gives territorial jurisdiction to the High Court has been invariably rejected
by Courts. In fact, Patna High Court in Sunil Kumar Yadav (supra), the
judgement relied upon by the Petitioner, has rejected this very contention
and held that mere communication of a rejection notice will not give rise
to a cause of action.

42. In Oil and Natural Gas Commission (supra), NICCO, one of the
tenderers, whose bid was rejected on account of lack of eligibility criteria
stipulated in the tender, filed a writ petition before the Calcutta High
Court on the plea that part of the cause of action had arisen within its
territorial jurisdiction. According to NICCO, it had read the
advertisement concerning the tender in a newspaper, Times of India, at
Calcutta and this gave rise to part of the cause of action. The writ petition
was entertained by the Calcutta High Court. Being aggrieved, ONGC
approached the Supreme Court. Allowing the appeal and setting aside the
order of the High Court, the Supreme Court held that merely reading of
an advertisement at Calcutta and submitting an offer in Calcutta and/or
making representation therefrom would not constitute facts forming an
integral part of the cause of action. The advertisement itself mentioned
that tenders were to be submitted at Delhi and thereafter scrutiny and a
final decision was also to take place at Delhi and thus, even if the
averments in the writ petition are taken as true, no cause of action arose
within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. Applying the
judgement to the present case, receipt of the admission and impugned
cancellation letter at Delhi will not give rise to a cause of action within
WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 26 of 34
the jurisdiction of this Court.

43. The actionable claim in the present case is the impugned letter
dated 22.06.2020 whereby the Respondent has cancelled the admission of
the Petitioner to the one-year PGDBF. The letter undoubtedly emanates
from the office of the Respondent at Mumbai and significantly is
preceded by and is a consequence of a decision taken by the Respondent
to cancel the admission, which has its genesis and origin in the office of
the Respondent at Mumbai. Therefore, even assuming for the sake of
argument that the online examination and interview give rise to a
miniscule or a small fraction of a cause of action, this Court is not
persuaded to entertain the present petition, applying the doctrine of forum
non-conveniens, as larger part of the cause of action i.e. advertisement,
decision to cancel the appointment and the cancellation letter, have all
emanated from Mumbai. Relevant records wherein the decision was taken
as well as the officers instrumental in taking the decision are also in
Mumbai.

44. In this context I may refer to a judgement of the Co-ordinate Bench
of this Court in somewhat similar circumstances in
Neetu vs. Department
of Financial Services, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3549, wherein Petitioner
had challenged a letter cancelling her appointment to the post of
Probationary Officer with the Respondent Bank. Maintainability of the
petition was questioned by the Respondent on the ground inter alia that
the impugned order was issued from the Corporate Office of the
Respondents at Mumbai. The Court observed that an actionable cause of
action had arisen in favour of the Petitioner based on the impugned letter
of cancellation. Placing reliance on the principles enunciated by the Full
WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 27 of 34
Bench of this Court in
Sterling Agro Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India,
AIR 2011 Delhi 174 it was held that merely because a fraction of the
cause of action has arisen before a particular Court, should not be the
only guiding factor to entertain a petition and the Court, invoking the
doctrine of forum conveniens, can decline to entertain a petition on the
ground that a larger part of the actionable cause has arisen elsewhere.
Relevant paras of the judgment in Neetu (supra) are as follows :-

“4. It is settled law that merely because a fraction of the cause
of action has arisen before a particular Court, should not be
the only guiding factor to entertain a petition and the Court,
by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens can decline to
entertain a petition on the ground that a large part of the
actionable cause has arisen elsewhere. A Full Bench of five
Judges of this Court in the case of
Sterling Agro Industries
Ltd. v. Union of India reported as AIR 2011 Delhi 174 had the
occasion to examine the doctrine of „forum conveniens‟ and
the concept of cause of action in view of the conflicting
judgments on the issue that were referred to them. After
examining a number of decisions of the Supreme Court on this
issue including those in the cases of Sri Nasiruddinv, State
Transport Appellate Tribunal, (1975) 2 SCC 671, Kishore
Rungtav. Punjab National Bank, 2003 (151) ELT 502 (Bom),
Alchemist Limited (supra), National Textile Corporation Ltd.
v. HariboxSwalram, (2004) 9 SCC 786, the Full Bench had
observed as below:

“31. The concept of forum conveniens fundamentally
means that it is obligatory on the part of the court to
see the convenience of all the parties before it. The
convenience in its ambit and sweep would include the
existence of more appropriate forum, expenses
involved, the law relating to the lis, verification of
certain facts which are necessitous for just
adjudication of the controversy and such other

WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 28 of 34
ancillary aspects. The balance of convenience is also
to be taken note of. Be it noted, the Apex Court has
clearly stated in the cases of Kusum Ingots (supra),
Mosaraf Hossain Khan (supra) and Ambica Industries
(supra) about the applicability of the doctrine of forum
conveniens while opining that arising of a part of
cause of action would entitle the High Court to
entertain the writ petition as maintainable.

32. The principle of forum conveniens in its ambit and
sweep encapsulates the concept that a cause of action
arising within the jurisdiction of the Court would not
itself constitute to be the determining factor compelling
the Court to entertain the matter. While exercising
jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India, the Court cannot be totally
oblivious of the concept of forum conveniens. The Full
Bench in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (supra) has not
kept in view the concept of forum conveniens and has
expressed the view that if the appellate authority who
has passed the order is situated in Delhi, then the
Delhi High Court should be treated as the forum
conveniens. We are unable to subscribe to the said
view.”

5. The Full Bench of this Court had finally summarized their
discussion in the following words:-

“33. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we are inclined to modify
the findings and conclusions of the Full Bench in New India
Assurance Company Limited (supra) and proceed to state our
conclusions in seriatim as follows:

(a) The finding recorded by the Full Bench that the
sole cause of action emerges at the place or location
where the tribunal/appellate authority/revisional
authority is situate and the said High Court (i.e., Delhi
High Court) cannot decline to entertain the writ

WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 29 of 34
petition as that would amount to failure of the duty of
the Court cannot be accepted inasmuch as such a
finding is totally based on the situs of the
tribunal/appellate authority/revisional authority totally
ignoring the concept of forum conveniens.

(b) Even if a miniscule part of cause of action arises
within the jurisdiction of this Court, a writ petition
would be maintainable before this Court, however, the
cause of action has to be understood as per the ratio
laid down in the case of Alchemist Ltd. (supra).

(c) An order of the appellate authority constitutes a
part of cause of action to make the writ petition
maintainable in the High Court within whose
jurisdiction the appellate authority is situated. Yet, the
same may not be the singular factor to compel the High
Court to decide the matter on merits. The High Court
may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by
invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens.

(d) The conclusion that where the appellate or
revisional authority is located constitutes the place of
forum conveniens as stated in absolute terms by the
Full Bench is not correct as it will vary from case to
case and depend upon the lis in question.

(e) The finding that the court may refuse to exercise
jurisdiction under
Article 226 if only the jurisdiction is
invoked in a malafide manner is too
restricted/constricted as the exercise of power under
Article 226 being discretionary cannot be limited or
restricted to the ground of malafide alone.

(f) While entertaining a writ petition, the doctrine of
forum conveniens and the nature of cause of action are
required to be scrutinized by the High Court depending
upon the factual matrix of each case in view of what

WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 30 of 34
has been stated in Ambica Industries (supra) and
Adani Exports Ltd. (supra).

(g) The conclusion of the earlier decision of the Full
Bench in New India Assurance Company Limited
(supra) “that since the original order merges into the
appellate order, the place where the appellate
authority is located is also forum conveniens” is not
correct.

(h) Any decision of this Court contrary to the
conclusions enumerated hereinabove stands
overruled.”

6. In the case in hand, not even a fraction of the cause of
action can be stated to have arisen in Delhi for filing the
petition in this court. Even if that was the case, then too this
court is still vested with the discretion not to entertain a
petition on the ground that a large part of the cause of action
has not arisen within its territorial jurisdiction, but elsewhere.

7. Given the facts of the case, this Court is of the opinion that
the present petition is not maintainable in Delhi for want of
territorial jurisdiction. Accordingly, the petition is disposed of,
while granting liberty to the petitioner to approach the
competent court vested with territorial jurisdiction in that
regard.”

45. In Maharashtra Chess Association (supra), the Supreme Court,
while held that in the context of
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, a
High Court cannot abdicate its responsibility of entertaining a writ
petition purely on the basis of an exclusive jurisdiction clause but also
observed that this could be a factor to be taken into consideration. In light
of the lis between the parties in the present case, the exclusive jurisdiction

WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 31 of 34
clause in the advertisement does become relevant and additionally
persuades this Court not to entertain the present petition albeit there
cannot be a doubt on the proposition of law that parties cannot oust the
writ jurisdiction by incorporating a privately negotiated ouster clause.

46. Cancellation letter indicates that Respondent has relied on clause
14 (xix) of the advertisement which prescribed background check as one
of the conditions for appointment. On merits, the case of the Petitioner is
that criminal cases arising out of marital discords should not be a reason
enough to deny an appointment. In this context, the exclusive jurisdiction
clause becomes relevant, stipulating that any dispute arising out of the
advertisement, shall be subject to jurisdiction of Courts at Mumbai. The
advertisement prescribed an online objective test with as many as 95
centres from where the candidates could attempt the examination. The
centres, as is evident from a perusal of Annexure-I to the advertisement,
were spread across the length and breadth of the country. Learned Senior
counsel for the Respondent had sought to explain that given the large
number of the centres, an exclusive jurisdiction clause was incorporated
in the advertisement, to avoid litigation in different High Courts as well
as obviate chances of conflicting decisions. Thus, examined holistically,
this Court is of the view that the present petition cannot be entertained.

47. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has strenuously relied on the
judgements of Patna High Court in Binod Kumar Sharma (supra) and
Sunil Kumar Yadav (supra) in support of the contention that this Court
has territorial jurisdiction. Having perused the said judgements, in my
view, the same do not help the Petitioner.

WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 32 of 34

48. In Binod Kumar Sharma (supra) challenge was to a selection
process initiated by the Staff Selection Commission for recruitment of
Constables (GD) in the various Para-Military Forces. Be it noted that in
the said batch of petitions, after expressing its view, the Court had finally
placed the matter before Hon’ble the Chief Justice for referring to a
Division Bench or for constituting a Larger Bench, in view of earlier
decisions of the Court, taking a view contrary to the view the Court
dealing with the petitions, was inclined to take.

49. In Sunil Kumar Yadav (supra), the issue before the Court was a
challenge to an order whereby the Petitioner therein had been informed
that his name had been withdrawn from the select list due to non-
submission of the OBC certificate in the required format. Petitioner was
an aspiring candidate to the post of Sub-Inspector (Fire) pursuant to an
advertisement issued by the Staff Selection Commission. In the said case,
Staff Selection Commission, Bangalore had issued the advertisement and
the notifications were published in the State of Bihar. The preliminary
test was conducted at Allahabad and the final written test at Lucknow.
Due to non-production of a proper caste certificate, Petitioner’s
candidature was rejected. Patna High Court on an objection by the
Respondent to its territorial jurisdiction, held that mere communication of
a rejection notice will not give rise to a ’cause of action’ before the said
Court and in that context, observed that either cause of action would arise
where the notification was published or where the test was held.

50. In the aforesaid case, petition was filed before the Patna High
Court based on communication of the rejection notice and disagreeing
with the Petitioner on this issue the writ petition was dismissed. This in
WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 33 of 34
fact goes against the Petitioner herein. Place of examination was not a
point for adjudication before the Court and suffice would it be to state
that in view of the binding dicta of the Supreme Court in the judgements
referred above as well as the principles laid down by the Full Bench of
this Court, the observations of the Court in Sunil Kumar Yadav (supra)
cannot help the Petitioner.

51. For all the aforesaid reasons, the present petition is not
maintainable before this Court and thus Court is not delving into the
second preliminary objection raised by the Respondent questioning the
maintainability under
Article 12 of the Constitution of India and/or on the
touchstone of public function or public duty. The question is left open to
be decided by the Court having territorial jurisdiction to decide the
matter.

52. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed granting liberty to the
Petitioner to approach the competent Court vested with territorial
jurisdiction.

53. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on
the merits of the case.

54. No orders as to costs.

JYOTI SINGH, J
MAY 10, 2021
yg/rd

WP(C) 5479/2020 Page 34 of 34

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