M.Cr.C. No. 19531/2019
(1)

HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH,
BENCH AT GWALIOR
JUSTICE S.A.DHARMADHIKARI
M.Cr.C. No. 19531/2019
Raju Khan others
Vs.
The State of M.P. another
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Shri D.K. Shrivastava, learned counsel for the petitioners.
Shri M.M. Tripathi, learned Public Prosecutor for the
respondents-State.
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ORDER

18 /03/2020

1. Heard on the question of admission as well as IA No.

3448/2019, an application for grant of stay.

2. This petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C has been

filed for quashing the FIR registered at Crime No. 59/2019

at Police Station Rithora District Morena (M.P.) for the

offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC

3. Brief facts leading to filing of this case are that

respondent No.2 Smt. China w/o petitioner No.1 Raju Khan

lodged the report to the effect that she got married with

petitioner No.1 about six years back according to Muslim

rites and customs. Out of the wedlock, three children were

born who are aged about 3,4 and 1 years. In-laws of the

complainant/respondent No.2 after marriage behaved

properly for about two years and thereafter they started

harassing respondent No.2 but after the intervention of her

father and other relatives, petitioners again started behaving
M.Cr.C. No. 19531/2019
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properly. Again on 07/12/2018 all the petitioners started

harassing her and demanded Rs. 50,000/- and also assaulted

her and said that if the demand of dowry is not fulfilled, they

would perform another marriage of her husband. On the

aforesaid basis, report was lodged. The Police Authority after

completion of the investigation has filed the charge sheet.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that

earlier respondent No.2 had lodged a report at Police Station

Rithora District Morena (M.P.) which was registered at

Crime No. 125/2018 under Sections 323, 294 and 506 of the

IPC in which nothing was mentioned about demand of

dowry or cruelty and harassment. On the contrary, it is

mentioned in the report that her husband had performed

another marriage with Lali one year back and therefore

altercation took place and as a result of which she was

injured. The present complaint is the outcome of the previous

enmity between the parties and has nothing to do with

demand of dowry and as such false case has been lodged

against the petitioners just to take revenge and harass the

petitioners. It is further contended that in the case of

Randeep Jaggi Vs the State of M.P. Cr.L.J. 2000 (2) Page

835, it is also held that if the petition for divorce has been

filed and the FIR is lodged subsequently in such

circumstances, the FIR is liable to be quashed . It is required

to be mentioned in the complaint as to the place, time and
M.Cr.C. No. 19531/2019
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date on which the dowry was demanded so that accordingly

the FIR can be lodged at the Police Station having

jurisdiction. In the present case, no such averments have

been made, therefore, the allegation of demand of dowry at

the jurisdiction of Police Station Rithora District Morena

(M.P.) can not be ascertained. Moreover, no specific

allegations have been levelled against each petitioners. Now

a days, it has become routine affair and implicate every

member of the family and misuse the provisions of law. On

these grounds, counsel for the petitioners prays for quashing

the further proceedings.

5. Per contra, it is submitted by counsel for the

respondents that whether the allegations made in the FIR are

correct or not, the same can be decided only after recording

the evidence. Merely, because the FIR in the present case

was lodged after filing of divorce petition can not be a

ground for quashing the FIR and there is every possibility of

demand of dowry, since husband and wife’s relation existed.

Prima-facie allegations have been levelled against the

petitioners including her husband and in laws.

6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

case diary.

7. The Supreme Court in the case of Renu Kumari

Vs. Sanjay Kumar Ors. (supra) has held as

under:

M.Cr.C. No. 19531/2019
(4)

“9. “8. Exercise of power u/s. 482 of
CrPC in a case of this nature is the
exception and not the rule. The section
does not confer any new powers on the
High Court. It only saves the inherent
power which the Court possessed before
the enactment of Cr.P.C. It envisages
three circumstances under which the
inherent jurisdiction may be exercised,
namely, (i) to give effect to an order
under Cr.P.C., (ii) to prevent abuse of the
process of court, and (iii) to otherwise
secure the ends of justice. It is neither
possible nor desirable to lay down any
inflexible rule which would govern the
exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No
legislative enactment dealing with
procedure can provide for all cases that
may possibly arise. The courts, therefore,
have inherent powers apart from express
provisions of law which are necessary for
proper discharge of functions and duties
imposed upon them by law. That is the
doctrine which finds expression in the
section which merely recognises and
preserves inherent powers of the High
Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal
possess, in the absence of any express
provision, as inherent in their constitution,
all such powers as are necessary to do the
right and to undo a wrong in the course of
administration of justice on the principle
of “quando lex aliquid alicui concedit,
concedere videtur id sine quo res ipsa
esse non potest” (when the law gives a
person anything, it gives him that without
which it cannot exist). While exercising
the powers under the section, the court
does not function as a court of appeal or
revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the
section, though wide, has to be exercised
sparingly, carefully and with caution and
only when such exercise is justified by the
tests specifically laid down in the section
itself. It is to be exercised ex debito
justitiae to do real and substantial justice
for the administration of which alone the
courts exist. Authority of the court exists
for advancement of justice and if any
attempt is made to abuse that authority
M.Cr.C. No. 19531/2019
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so as to produce injustice, the court has
the power to prevent abuse. It would be
an abuse of process of the court to allow
any action which would result in injustice
and prevent promotion of justice. In
exercise of the powers the court would be
justified to quash any proceeding if it finds
that initiation/continuance of it amounts
to abuse of the process of court or
quashing of these proceedings would
otherwise serve the ends of justice. When
no offence is disclosed by the report, the
court may examine the question of fact.
When a report is sought to be quashed, it
is permissible to look into the materials to
assess what the report has alleged and
whether any offence is made out even if
the allegations are accepted in toto.

9. In R.P. Kapur V/s. State of Punjab,
1960 3 SCR 388 this Court summarised
some categories of cases where inherent
power can and should be exercised to
quash the proceedings:

•(i) Where it manifestly appears that
there is a legal bar against the
institution or continuance e.g. want of
sanction;

•(ii) where the allegations in the first
information report or complaint taken
at their face value and accepted in
their entirety do not constitute the
offence alleged;

•(iii) where the allegations constitute an
offence, but there is no legal evidence
adduced or the evidence adduced
clearly or manifestly fails to prove the
charge.

10. In dealing with the last
category, it is important to bear in
mind the distinction between a case
where there is no legal evidence or
where there is evidence which is clearly
inconsistent with the accusations
made, and a case where there is legal
evidence which, on appreciation, may
or may not support the accusations.
When exercising jurisdiction under
Section 482 CrPC, the High Court
M.Cr.C. No. 19531/2019
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would not ordinarily embark upon an
enquiry whether the evidence in
question is reliable or not or whether
on a reasonable appreciation of it,
accusation would not be sustained.
That is the function of the trial Judge.
Judicial process should not be an
instrument of oppression, or, needless
harassment. The court should be
circumspect and judicious in exercising
discretion and should take all relevant
facts and circumstances into
consideration before issuing process,
lest it would be an instrument in the
hands of a private complainant to
unleash vendetta to harass any person
needlessly. At the same time the
section is not an instrument handed
over to an accused to short-circuit a
prosecution and bring about its sudden
death. The scope of exercise of power
under Section 482 CrPC and the
categories of cases where the High
Court may exercise its power under it
relating to cognizable offences to
prevent abuse of process of any court
or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice were set out in some detail by
this Court in State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335). A
note of caution was, however, added
that the power should be exercised
sparingly and that too in the rarest of
rare cases. The illustrative categories
indicated by this Court are as follows:
(SCC pp.378-79, para 102)
‘(1) Where the allegations made in the
first information report or the complaint,
even if they are taken at their face value
and accepted in their entirety do not
prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other materials, if
any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying
an investigation by police officers under
Section 156(1) of the Code except under
M.Cr.C. No. 19531/2019
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an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations
made in the FIR or complaint and the
evidence collected in support of the same
do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the
accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do
not constitute a cognizable offence but
constitute only a non-cognizable offence,
no investigation is permitted by a police
officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the
FIR or complaint are so absurd and
inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a
just conclusion that there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the
accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the
Code or the Act concerned (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the Act
concerned, providing efficacious redress
for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala fide and/or
where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and
with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge.”

11. As noted above, the powers
possessed by the High Court under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. are very wide and the
very plenitude of the power requires
great caution in its exercise. The court
must be careful to see that its decision, in
exercise of this power, is based on sound
principles. The inherent power should not
be exercised to stifle a legitimate
prosecution. The High Court being the
M.Cr.C. No. 19531/2019
(8)

highest court of a State should normally
refrain from giving a prima facie decision
in a case where the entire facts are
incomplete and hazy, more so when the
evidence has not been collected and
produced before the Court and the issues
involved, whether factual or legal, are of
magnitude and cannot be seen in their
true perspective without sufficient
material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule
can be laid down in regard to cases in
which the High Court will exercise its
extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the
proceeding at any stage. It would not be
proper for the High Court to analyse the
case of the complainant in the light of all
probabilities in order to determine
whether a conviction would be
sustainable and on such premises arrive
at a conclusion that the proceedings are
to be quashed. It would be erroneous to
assess the material before it and conclude
that the complaint cannot be proceeded
with. When an information is lodged at
the police station and an offence is
registered, then the mala fides of the
informant would be of secondary
importance. It is the material collected
during the investigation and evidence led
in the court which decides the fate of the
accused person. The allegations of mala
fides against the informant are of no
consequence and cannot by themselves
be the basis for quashing the
proceedings”.(See Dhanalakshmi v. R.
Prasanna Kumar (1990 Supp SCC 686),
State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma (1992 Supp
(1) SCC 222), Rupan Deol Bajaj v.
Kanwar Pal Singh Gill (1995(6) SCC

194) , State of Kerala v. O.C.

Kuttan (1999(2) SCC 651), State of U.P.

v. O.P. Sharma (1996 (7) SCC

705), Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar
Bhada (1997 (2) SCC 397), Satvinder
Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)
(1999 (8) SCC 728) and Rajesh Bajaj v.
State NCT of Delhi (1999 (3) SCC 259).
The above position was again reiterated in

State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa
M.Cr.C. No. 19531/2019
(9)

(2002) 3 SCC 89, State of M.P. v. Awadh

Kishore Gupta (2004) 1 SCC 691 and State

of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo (2005) 13

SCC 540,

8. Thus, it is clear that if the allegations made against

the petitioners prima-facie make out an offence, then this

Court finds no merit in the case since the proceedings

including the FIR, the involvement of the petitioners would

be decided by the Trial Court after recording the evidence. In

view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of

Renu Kumari (Supra) and the fact that prima-facie

allegations have been levelled against the petitioners, this

Court is of the considered opinion that legitimate prosecution

of the petitioners can not be quashed at this stage.

9. Accordingly, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed.

(S.A.Dharmadhikari)
Judge
Prachi

Digitally signed by PRACHI MISHRA

PRACHI
DN: cIN, oHIGH COURT OF
MADHYA PRADESH BENCH GWALIOR,
ouHIGH COURT OF MADHYA
PRADESH BENCH GWALIOR,
postalCode474011, stMadhya

MISHRA
Pradesh,
2.5.4.20cc727abda3453804cde48b1
afcb367afdaf978aea111b1ff29eae55f
d213bc09, cnPRACHI MISHRA
Date: 2020.03.18 15:44:16 +05’30’