REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5040 OF 2008
RAKESH ORS. …APPELLANTS
Vs.
BOARD OF REVENUE U.P. ORS. ETC. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
This appeal has been filed against the judgment of
Allahabad High Court dated 03.03.2006 deciding the two
writ petitions being Writ Petition No. 16105 of 1983
filed by predecessors-in-interest of the appellant and
Writ Petition No. 3020 of 1984 filed by respondent
No.4.
2. Brief facts of the case necessary for deciding this
appeal are:-
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
2.1 One Pursottam was the Sirdar (a category of
SANJAY KUMAR
Date: 2019.03.08
13:17:19 IST
Reason:
tenancy) of agricultural plots Nos. 243, 503
and 1/3rd share in Plot No. 521 situated in
1
Village Pilkhana, District Shahjahanpur. On
25.11.1974, Pursottam deposited 20 times of
the land revenue and made an application for
grant of Bhumidhar rights in accordance with
U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,
1950. On 26.11.1974, Pursottam executed a
sale deed of the aforesaid three plots in
favour of Ajudhi @ Ayodhya. On 23.05.1975,
application of Pursottam for grant of
Bhumidhari Sanad for plot Nos. 243 and 503 was
rejected. A revision application was filed by
Pursottam challenging the order dated
23.05.1975. With regard to Plot No. 521,
Bhumidhari Sanad was granted in the name of
Pursottam by order of Assistant collector on
05.01.1976, before which on 04.12.1975,
Pursottam has died.
2.2 By Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1977 (U.P.
Ordinance No.1 of 1977), promulgated on
28.01.1977, Bhumidhar with transferable rights
2
were granted to every Sirdar referred to in
Sections 130 and 131 of U.P. Zamindari
Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The ordinance
No.1 of 1977 was substituted by U.P.Act No.8
of 1977 enforced with effect from 28.01.1977.
2.3 Ajudhi @ Ayodhya filed two suits – Suit No.
30 of 1978 praying for declaration of
Bhumidhari Rights in Plot Nos. 243 and 503 and
Suit No. 31 of 1978 claiming declaration of
Bhumidhari Rights in Plot No. 521 on the basis
of sale deed dated 26.11.1974 executed by
Pursottam.
2.4 The trial court dismissed both the suits by
judgment dated 23.03.1979. Two appeals were
filed by respondents against the judgment of
trial court. Additional Commissioner allowed
Appeal No. 436/6 of 1979 decreeing the suit
No. 31 of 1978 with regard to Plot No. 521,
with regard to which Sanad was granted, but
the Additional Commissioner dismissed the
appeal No. 435/5 of 1979 arising out of Suit
3
No. 30 of 1978. Both appellant and respondent
filed second appeal before the Board of
Revenue against the judgment of the Additional
Commissioner. Board of Revenue vide its
judgment dated 18.11.1983 dismissed both the
second appeals.
2.5 Parties filed writ petitions against the order
of Board of Revenue. Ram Bilas died during
the pendency of the writ petition, whose heirs
were brought on record. Writ Petition No.
16105 of 1983 was filed by predecessor-in-
interest of the appellant whereas Writ
Petition No. 3020 of 1984 was filed by
respondents. High Court vide its impugned
judgment dated 03.03.2006 allowed the Writ
Petition filed by respondent and dismissed the
writ petition filed by the appellant. By
judgment of the High Court, Suit No.30 of 1978
also stood decreed. Appellant, aggrieved by
the said judgment has come up in this appeal.
4
3. Shri Pramod Swarup, senior Advocate, learned
counsel for the appellant submits that both the suits
filed by respondent deserves to be dismissed in view
of the fact that Pursottam had no right to executed
sale deed of Sirdari rights on 26.11.1974. Although,
he had submitted an application for Bhumidhari Sanad
but he having died on 05.12.1976 before grant of Sanad,
Bhumidhari rights shall accrue to his legal heirs and
the plaintiffs have no right to be declared as
Bhumidhari. He further submits that in any view of the
matter, with regard to Plot Nos. 243 and 503,
application for Bhumidhari Sanad was rejected on
23.05.1975, hence with regard to aforesaid two plots,
Suit No. 30 of 1978 deserves to be dismissed. Learned
counsel for the appellant placed reliance on judgment
of Allahabad High Court in Ram Sabodh and Another Vs.
Deputy Director of Consolidation, U.P., Faizabad and
Others, 1982 All. L.J. 1252.
4. Shri Abhishek Chaudhary, learned counsel for the
respondent refuting the submissions of the learned
counsel for the appellant contends that both the suits
5
filed by the respondent deserves to be decreed, since
Pursottam (deceased) having deposited the 20 times of
the land revenue and made an application on 25.11.1974
for grant of Bhumidhari rights, bhumidhari rights shall
be treated to have been granted, w.e.f., the date of
making of application, i.e., 25.11.1974, in view of the
provision of Section 137 of the U.P. Zamindari
Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. With regard to
Plot Nos. 243 and 503, with regard to which application
for grant of Sanad was rejected on 23.05.1975 a
revision was filed by Pursottam, which was pending at
the time when U.P. Ordinance No. 1 of 1977 was enforced
granting Bhumidhari rights to Sirdars, by which the
revision stood abated.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties
and have perused the records.
6. The High Court in its impugned judgment has taken
the view that insofar as Suit No. 31 of 1978 filed by
respondent was concerned, Bhumidhari Sanad was granted
in favour of Pursottam (deceased), although, after his
death but the said Sanad will have retrospective effect
6
making Pursottam Bhumidhar w.e.f. 25.11.1974, hence no
error was committed by decreeing Suit No.31 of 1978.
Coming to Suit No. 30 of 1978, filed by the respondent,
High Court took the view that in view of the fact that
Pursottam had challenged the rejection of the
application, which was subjudice when the proceedings
were abated on account of Ordinance No.1 of 1977, the
legal heirs of Pursottam cannot contend contrary to the
interest of Pursottam. The High Court also relied on
Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act in upholding
the claim of the respondent.
7. Before we consider the submissions of the learned
counsel for the parties, it is necessary to refer to
provisions of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms
Act, 1950. Section 134 of the Act provides for
acquisition of Bhumidhari rights by a Sirdar. Section
134(1) (existing at the relevant time) is as follows:-
“134. Acquisition of bhumidhari rights by a
sirdar.– (1) If a sirdar, not being a
sirdar, referred to in clause (b) of Section
131 deposits to the credit of the State
Government an amount equal to twenty times
the land revenue payable or deemed to be
payable on the date of application for the
land of which he is the sirdar, he shall,7
upon an application duly made in that behalf
to an Assistant Collector, be entitled, with
effect from the date on which the amount has
been so deposited, to a declaration that he
has acquired the rights mentioned in Section
137 in respect of such land:
Explanation I. – For the purposes of this
sub-section, the expression ‘land’ includes
share in land.
Explanation II. – For the purpose of this
section the land revenue payable shall—
(a) in respect of land referred to in the
proviso to clause (a) of sub-section
(1) of Section 246, be an amount
arrived at after all the increases
have been given effect to; and
(b) in respect of land to which the
proviso to Section 247 applies, be an
amount determined at hereditary rates
under that section.”
8. Section 137 provides for Grant of certificate.
Section 137 as it existed at the relevant time is quoted
as below:-
“137. Grant of certificate.– (1) If the
application has been duly made and the
Assistant Collector is satisfied that the
applicant is entitled to the declaration
mentioned in Section 134 he shall grant a
certificate to that effect.
(2) Upon the grant of the certificate under
sub-section (1) the sirdar shall from the
8
date on which the amount referred to in sub-
section (1) of Section 134 has been
deposited:
(a) become and the be deemed to be a
bhumidhar of the holing or the share in
respect of which the certificate has been
granted, and
(b) Be liable for payment of such reduced
amount on account of land revenue for the
holding or his share therein, as the case
may be as shall one-half of the amount
of Land revenue payable or deemed to be
payable by him therefor on the date of
application.
Provided further that in the cases
referred to in Explanation II of section 134
sirdar shall, during the period a reduced
amount is payable in accordance with Section
246 or 247, be liable for payment of one-half
of the amount payable from time to time.
Explanation.—For purpose of clause (b)
the land revenue payable by a sirdar on the
date aforesaid shall, where it exceeds an
amount double that computed at the hereditary
rates applicable, be deemed to be equal to
such amount.
(2-A) Where the amount referred to in sub-
section (1) of Section 134 is deposited on a
date other than the first day of the
agricultural year, the land revenue payable
by the bhumidhar under clause (b) of sub-
section (2) for the remainder of the
agricultural year in which the amount is
deposited shall be determined in such manner
as may be prescribed.”
9
9. We may first take up the case of the Suit No.31 of
1978 filed by the respondent with regard to which
declaration was sought for Plot No. 521. With regard
to Plot No.521 Bhumidhari Sanad was issued on
05.01.1976 in the name of Pursottam. Additional
Commissioner, Board of Revenue and the High Court taken
the view that Bhumidhari certificate shall relate back
to the date of application by Pursottam and sale deed
executed by him for Plot No.521 was valid. This Court
had occasion to consider Sections 134 and 137 of U.P.
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 as well
as Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act in Ram
Pyare Vs. Ram Narain and Others, (1985) 2 SCC 162. In
the above case, the Sirdar tenant deposited land
revenue and made an application for grant of Bhumidhari
Sanad on 28.10.1961 and on the same day, he sold the
land to appellant. Certificate was issued on
30.10.1961. The suit was filed by the sons of Sirdar
praying for cancellation of sale deed. High Court
decreed the suit against which the appeal was filed.
This Court held that Section 43 of the Transfer of
Property Act was applicable and the tenure holder
10
acquired the Bhumidhari rights and the suit filed by
the sons of Matbar Mal was liable to be dismissed.
After referring to provisions of Section 134 and 137
of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,
1950, this Court laid down following in Paragraph
No.4:-
“4. The decision in Dhani Ram v. Jokhu was
approved by another Division Bench of the
same court consisting of S.D. Khare and R.B.
Misra, JJ., in Ram Swarup v. Deputy Director,
Consolidation, ILR (1971) 1 All. 698. In the
latter case the learned Judges expressed the
further opinion that in a situation like the
one before them, there was no reason why
recourse should not be had to Section 43 of
the Transfer of Property Act to feed the
title as it were, if the necessary conditions
were fulfilled. We agree with the reasoning
of the learned Judges in Ram Swarup v. Deputy
Director, Consolidation. In that case, the
matter was remanded to the Deputy Director
of Consolidation to consider the question of
the applicability of Section 43 of the
Transfer of Property Act and proceed to
dispose of the matter in accordance with law.
In the present case, the facts speak for
themselves and we do not think that it is
necessary to remand the case to the lower
courts for a decision on the question of the
applicability of Section 43 of the Transfer
of Property Act. The amount of deposit under
Section 134 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition
Act was made on October 28, 1961 and it was
on the same day that the sale deed was
executed by Matbar Mal. It is clear that
Matbar Mal erroneously represented to the
vendee that he was authorised to transfer the
property and professed to transfer such
11
property for consideration. The very
execution of the sale deed on the same day
as the deposit of the requisite amount under
Section 134 is significant enough to
establish that the sale deed was the result
of an erroneous representation by Matbar Mal.
It is also clear that the present plaintiffs
who are the sons of the vendor, Matbar Mal
cannot possibly claim to be transferees in
good faith which indeed they do not claim to
be. Section 43 clearly applies to the
situation. The learned counsel for the
respondents however attempted to disclaim the
applicability of Section 43 of the Transfer
of Property Act by referring to Jumma Masjid
v. Kodimaniandra Deviah, AIR 1962 SC 847. He
invited our attention to the following
observations of the learned Judges:
“Now the compelling reason urged by
the appellant for reading a further
exception in Section 43 is that if it
is construed as applicable to
transfers by persons who have only
spes succession is at the date of
transfer, it would have the effect of
nullifying Section 6(a). But Section
6(a) and Section 43 relate to two
different subjects, and there is no
necessary conflict between them;
Section 6(a) deals with certain kinds
of interests in property mentioned
therein, and prohibits a transfer
simpliciter of those interests.
Section 43 deals with representations
as to title made by a transferor who
had no title at the time of transfer,
and provides that the transfer shall
fasten itself on the title which the
transferor subsequently acquires.
Section 6(a) enacts a rule of
substantive law, while Section 43
enacts a rule of estoppel which is one
of evidence. The two provisions
12
operate on different fields, and under
different conditions, and we see no
ground for reading a conflict between
them or for cutting down the ambit of
the one by reference to the other. In
our opinion, both of them can be given
full effect on their own terms, in
their respective spheres. To hold that
transfers by persons who have only a
spes successionis at the date of
transfer are not within the protection
afforded by Section 43 would destroy
its utility to a large extent.”
We are unable to see in what manner these
observations can possibly assist the
respondents. In the same decision, it has
been observed later, referring to the
decision of the Madras High Court in Official
Assignee, Madras v. Sampath Naidu, AIR 1933
Mad. 795:
“This reasoning is open to the
criticism that it ignores the
principle underlying Section 43. That
section embodies, as already stated,
a rule of estoppel and enacts that a
person who makes a representation
shall not be heard to allege the
contrary as against a person who acts
on that representation. It is
immaterial whether the transferor acts
bona fide or fraudulently in making
the representation. It is only
material to find out whether in fact
the transferee has been misled. It is
to be noted that when the decision
under consideration was given, the
relevant words of Section 43 were,
‘where a person erroneously
represents’, and now, as amended by
Act 20 of 1929, they are ‘where a
person fraudulently or erroneously
represents’, and that emphasises that
13
for the purpose of the section it
matters not whether the transferor
acted fraudulently or innocently in
making the representation, and that
what is material is that he did make
a representation and the transferee
has acted on it. Where the transferee
knew as a fact that the transferor did
not possess the title which he
represents he has, then he cannot be
said to have acted on it when taking
a transfer. Section 43 would then have
no application and the transfer will
fail under Section 6(a). But where the
transferee does act on the
representation, there is no reason why
he should not have the benefit of the
equitable doctrine embodied in Section
43, however fraudulent the act of the
transferor might have been.”
10. Another judgment, which is relevant for the present
case is Deo Nandan and Another Vs. Ram Saran and Others,
(2000) 3 SCC 440. In the said case, one Bechan was the
Sirdar of agricultural land. He filed an application
on 25.08.1964 for grant of Bhumidhari Sanad and on
25.08.1964, he executed a sale deed of the land to the
plaintiff-appellant. Before any order could be passed
granting the Bhumidhari Sanad in favour of Bechan, he
died on 15.09.1964. The widow of Bechan on 05.01.1965
sold the land. Sanad was issued on 09.02.1965 in favour
of Bechan w.e.f. 25.08.1964, the date on which the
14
application was made. Plaintiff-appellant filed a suit
challenging the sale deed executed by wife of tenure
holder. High Court held that on 25.08.1964, Bechan had
not acquired any right, title or interest, hence he
cannot transfer any right by executing a sale deed in
favour of the plaintiff-appellant. This Court referred
to provisions of Section 134 and 137 and held that the
declaration must necessarily take effect from the date
when the amount is deposited. In paragraph No.7,
following has been laid down:-
“7. Section 134, from its plain language,
indicates and shows that on the application
being made and 10 times the land revenue
being paid, the sirdar becomes entitled “with
effect from the date on which the amount had
been deposited” to a declaration that he has
acquired the rights mentioned in Section 137
of the Act. The section clearly specifies the
date with effect from which the rights would
stand acquired: the date is the one on which
the amount contemplated by Section 134 is
deposited. This clearly obviates the
uncertainty of the point of time when the
title is transferred by fixing the date as
being the one when the amount is deposited.
It would be immaterial as to when the
declaration under Section 137 is made because
that declaration must necessarily take effect
from the date when the amount is deposited.”
11. The submission that before grant of Sanad, the
applicant had died was also considered by this Court
15
in paragraph No.9 and it was held that the certificate
will have a retrospective effect. The view of the High
Court was disapproved and suit was held to be entitled
to be decreed. In paragraph Nos.9 and 10, following
has been laid down:-
“9. It is no doubt true that in the Full Bench
decision in Banshidhar v. Dhirajadhari, AIR
1971 ALL. 526 (FB), in the Single Judge
decision in Mobin Khan v. Chunnu Khan, 1981
All. LJ 402, and in the decision in
Raghunandan Singh v. Vashwant Singh, 1978 RD
183, a different view has been expressed by
the Allahabad High Court. In the Full Bench
decision, the view taken is that it is from
the date when the order is passed under
Section 137 that the sirdar becomes a
bhumidhar. In the latter two cases, it has
been held that if after filing of the
application and making payment of the land
revenue the applicant dies, then certificate
in his name cannot be granted. In our
opinion, the said decisions run counter to
the plain language and meaning of Sections
134 and 137 as they stood at the relevant
point of time. When a certificate is issued
under Section 137, it in fact recognises the
position as on the date when the application
was made and the payment contemplated under
Section 134(1) was deposited. The
certificate, in other words, will have a
retrospective effect and would relate back
to the date of the application. There was
nothing to prevent the Revenue Authorities
from allowing the application filed under
Section 134(1) on the day when it was
presented. The underlying intention of the
legislature, therefore, clearly is that as
and when the said application is accepted and
order is passed under Section 137, it must16
relate back to the date when the application
was filed. Such a situation is not unknown
to law. Mr Prem Prasad Juneja, learned
counsel for the appellants, as an analogy,
has drawn our attention to Order 22 Rule 6
CPC which provides that if any of the parties
to a suit dies after the hearing has been
completed and before the judgment is
pronounced, the suit would not abate. The
doctrine of relation back has been
incorporated in Sections 134 and 137 of the
U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms
Act.
10. We are, therefore, of the opinion that
the lower appellate court had rightly
interpreted Sections 134 and 137 and the High
Court was in error in overruling the said
decision.”
12. In view of law as laid down above, the judgment of
Allahabad High Court in Ram Sabodh(Supra) cannot help
the appellant. The judgment of this Court in Deo Nandan
and Another (supra) fully covers the claim of the
plaintiff-respondent with regard to Suit No. 31 of 1978
relating to Plot No.521, with regard to which Sanad was
granted after death of Pursottam. We are of the view
that Additional Commissioner, Board of Revenue and High
Court committed no error in decreeing Suit No.31 of
1978.
13. Now, we come to the claim of the plaintiff-
respondent with regard to Plot Nos. 243 and 503 in Suit
17
No.30 of 1978. The facts reveal that with regard to
aforesaid plots, although application was made on
25.11.1974 by depositing the 20 times amount of the
land revenue, but the application was rejected on
23.05.1975 by the Assistant Collector. A revision was
filed by Pursottam challenging the said order, which
was pending at the time when U.P. Ordinance No.1 of
1977 was issued abating the proceedings. High Court
has noted that the claim of Pursottam to grant of
Bhumidhari Sanad was subjudice in revision, when the
proceedings were abated. It was further observed that
legal heirs, who were brought on the record on the
revision, due to death of Pursottam, were competent to
represent the estate of deceased and cannot setup any
claim adverse to the interest of the deceased. High
Court observed that had Pursottam not died, he would
have acquired the status of Bhumidhar under Ordinance
No.1 of 1977 and since he had already executed the sale
deed after depositing 20 times land revenue, it would
have related back to the date when he made the
application and deposited the amount.
18
14. We may first notice the provisions of U.P.
Ordinance No.1 of 1977, which has been referred to by
the High Court and which are relevant in the facts of
the present case. We have noticed above that under
Section 134 read with Section 137, a Sirdar after
depositing 20 times of land revenue and making an
application could obtain Bhumidhari Sanad. Sections
130 and 131 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950 were substituted by U.P. Ordinance
No.1 of 1977 – U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1977, which was
subsequently enacted as an Act namely, the Uttar
Pradesh Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1977, which are to
the following effect:-
“Section 3: Substitution of sections 130 and
131–For sections 130 and 131 of the
principal Act, the following sections shall
be substituted, namely:–
“130. Bhumidhar with transferable
rights.–Every person belonging to any of
the following classes, not being a person
referred to in section 131, shall be
called a bhumidhar with transferable
rights, and shall have all the rights and
be subject to all the liabilities
conferred or imposed upon such bhumidhars
by or under this Act, namely—19
(a) every person who was a bhumidhar
immediately before the date of
commencement of the Uttar Pradesh
Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1977;
(b) every person who, immediately before
the said date, was a sirdar referred
to in clause (a) or clause (c) of
section 131, as it stood immediately
before the said date;
(c) every person who in any other manner
acquires on or after the said date
the rights of such a bhumidhar under
or in accordance with the provisions
of this Act.
131. Bhumidhar with non-transferable
rights.–Every person belonging to any
of the following classes shall be called
a bhumidhar with non-transferable
rights, and shall have all the rights and
be subject to all the liabilities
conferred or imposed upon such
bhumidhars by or under this Act, namely-
–
(a) every person admitted as a sirdar of
any land under section 195 before
the date of commencement of the
Uttar Pradesh Land Laws (Amendment)
Act, 1977, or as a bhumidhar with
non-transferable rights under the
said section on or after the said
date;
(b) every person who in any other manner
acquires on or after the said date,
the rights of such a bhumidhar under
or in accordance with the provisions
of this Act;
20
(c) every person who is, or has been
allotted any land under the
provisions of the Uttar Pradesh
Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1952.”
15. Section 134 was omitted by the Uttar Pradesh Land
Laws (Amendment) Act, 1977. The effect of the
provision was that by statute, Bhumidhari right was
conferred on Sirdar, w.e.f., 28.01.1977, the date of
issue of U.P. Ordinance No.1 of 1977, which was
subsequently enacted as an Act, namely, U.P. Land Laws
(Amendment) Act, 1977, which was deemed to have come
into effect on 28.01.1977, the date of issuance of
Ordinance.
16. The most important provision, which needs to be
noticed in the Uttar Pradesh Land Laws (Amendment) Act,
1977 is Section 73, which dealt with transitory
provisions, which is as follows:-
“Section 73: Transitory provisions
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force all
proceedings for acquisition of bhumidhari
rights under sections 134 and 135 of the
Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land21
Reforms Act, 1950, as they stood immediately
before January 28, 1977 and all proceedings
arising therefrom, pending on such date
before any court or authority shall abate.
(2) Where any proceeding has abated under
sub-section (1) the amount deposited for the
acquisition of such rights shall be refunded
to the person depositing the same or to his
legal representatives as the case may be.”
17. Section 73(1) provides that all proceedings for
acquisition of bhumidhari rights under sections 134 and
135 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950, as they stood immediately before
28.01.1977 and all proceedings arising therefrom,
pending on such date before any court or authority
shall abate.
18. The revision against the order dated 23.05.1975
was pending against the rejection of grant of
Bhumidhari Sanad, which stood abated by virtue of
Ordinance No.1 of 1977, as has been noted by the High
Court in its judgment. The most important provision
is Section 73(2), which provides that where any
proceeding has abated under sub-section (1) the amount
deposited for the acquisition of such rights shall be
22
refunded to the person depositing the same or to his
legal representatives as the case may be.
19. Thus, sub-section (2) of Section 73 of U.P.Act No.8
of 1977 contemplated that all proceedings pertaining
to grant of Bhumidhari Sanad shall be abated and amount
deposited shall be refunded to the person applying or
the legal representative. The consequence of the said
provision is that the revision, which was filed by
Pursottam stood abated and the amount so deposited was
to be refunded to his legal representative. The claim
of Pursottam to get Bhumidari rights on the basis of
his application dated 25.11.1974 with regard to Plot
Nos. 243 and 503, thus, stood terminated by virtue of
provisions of Section 73 as extracted above. In view
of provisions of Section 73 as extracted above, the
claim of Pursottam to get Bhumidhari rights on the
basis of his application dated 25.11.1974 stood
negated. Hence, on the basis of the pendency of
revision, no benefit can be taken by Pursottam and High
Court erred in law in holding that by Ordinance No.1
of 1977, Pursottam had also got benefited
retrospectively.
23
20. By statutory provision, i.e. Section 73, all
pending applications and proceedings were abated and
grant of Bhumidhari rights was contemplated under
Sections 130 and 131, which was sought to be inserted
by U.P. Ordinance No.1 of 1977. The benefit of a
statutory provision shall be applicable to those
Sirdars, who were Sirdars on the date when Ordinance
was enforced, which subsequently became an Act. On
28.01.1977, Pursottam was already dead and his legal
heirs were mutated in his place, thus, benefit of
Ordinance No.1 of 1977 and the U.P. Act No. 8 of 1977
cannot be availed by Pursottam, so as to validate his
sale deed dated 26.11.1974 with regard to Plot Nos. 243
and 503. High Court, thus, committed error in allowing
the writ petition filed by the contesting respondent
and decreeing the Suit No. 30 of 1978.
21. The writ petition filed by respondent No.3
questioning the decision of Courts below with regard
to Suit No.30 of 1978 was not liable to be allowed by
the High Court. All the Courts below including the
Board of Revenue had taken correct view with regard to
Suit No.30 of 1978 filed by the respondent.
24
22. In result, the appeal is partly allowed. The
judgment of the High Court insofar as it allows the
Writ Petition No.3020 of 1984 filed by Ajudhi @ Ayodhya
is set aside. The judgment of the High Court insofar
as it dismissed the Writ Petition No. 16105 of 1983 is
affirmed. In consequences, the judgment of the Courts
below decreeing the Suit No. 31 of 1978 of respondent
Ajudhi @ Ayodhya is maintained, whereas judgment of
High Court decreeing the Suit No. 30 of 1978 is set
aside. Suit No.30 of 1978 of Ajudhi @ Ayodhya stands
dismissed. The appeal is decided accordingly. Parties
shall bear their own costs.
………………….J.
( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
………………….J.
( K.M. JOSEPH )
New Delhi,
March 08, 2019.
25
