REPORTABLE
INTHESUPREMECOURTOFINDIA
CRIMINALAPPELLATEJURISDICTION
CRIMINALAPPEALNO.594of2019
(arisingoutofSLP(Crl.)No.8103/2018)
RASHMICHOPRA…APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THESTATEOFUTTARPRADESHANR….RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINALAPPEALNO.598of2019
(arisingoutofSLP(Crl.)No.8050/2018)
ANITAGANDHI…APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THESTATEOFUTTARPRADESHANR….RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINALAPPEALNO.599of2019
(arisingoutofSLP(Crl.)No.8052/2018)
NAYANCHOPRATHROUGHPOAHOLDER
RAJESHCHOPRA…APPELLANT(S)
SignatureNotVerifiedVERSUS
Digitallysignedby
SANJAYKUMAR
Date:2019.04.30
16:49:08IST
Reason:
THESTATEOFUTTARPRADESHANR….RESPONDENT(S)
1
WITH
CRIMINALAPPEALNO.597of2019
(arisingoutofSLP(Crl.)No.8042/2018)
AMITCHOPRA…APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THESTATEOFUTTARPRADESHANR….RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINALAPPEALNO.596of2019
(arisingoutofSLP(Crl.)No.8041/2018)
KULDEEPGANDHI…APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THESTATEOFUTTARPRADESHANR….RESPONDENT(S)
AND
CRIMINALAPPEALNO.595of2019
(arisingoutofSLP(Crl.)No.8039/2018)
RAJESHCHOPRA…APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THESTATEOFUTTARPRADESHANR….RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
ASHOKBHUSHAN,J.
Theseappealshavebeenfiledchallengingthe
judgmentofAllahabadHighCourtdated08.08.2018by
2
whichtheapplicationunderSection482Cr.P.C.filed
bytheappellantsprayingforquashingthecomplaint
andproceedingsinComplaintCaseNo.4967of2015have
beendismissed.
2.Alltheappealshavingbeenfiledagainstthesame
judgment,factsofthecasearebeingtakenfrom
CriminalAppealNo.594of2019–RashmiChopraOrs.
Vs.TheStateofUttarPradeshAnr.,inwhichcriminal
appeal,replyaffidavitandrejoinderaffidavithave
beenfiled.Thebackgroundfactsofthecasenecessary
tobenotedfordecidingtheseappealsare:-
2.1NayanChopra,sonofRashmiChopraandRajesh
ChopragotmarriedwithVanshikaBobal,
daughterofrespondentNo.2,IndrajeetSingh
on15.04.2012.Alltheappellantsarefamily
membersofNayanChopra.RashmiChoprais
mother,RajeshChopraisfather,AmitChopra
isBrotherandAnitaGandhiisMother’s
SisterofNayanChopra,whereasKuldeep
GandhiishusbandofAnitaGandhi.Nayan
3
Choprawithhismother,fatherandbrotherareresidentof203,JaintiApartment,Police
Station–Begumpet,Hyderabad(Andhra
Pradesh).AnitaGandhiandKuldeepGandhi
areresidentofGreaterKailash–I,New
Delhi.
2.2AfterthemarriageofNayanChopraand
Vanshika,whichwasperformedatNoida,
DistrictGautamBuddhaNagaron15.04.2012,
Vanshikawentalongwithherhusbandat
Hyderabad,thematrimonialhomeofVanshika.
On28.04.2012,VanshikaandNayanChopraleft
fortheU.S.A.OnoraboutNovember,2013,
VanshikaandNayanChopraseparated.On
23.10.2014,anapplicationwasfiledbyNayan
ChopraintheCircuitCourtfortheCounty
ofKalamazooFamilyDivision,Michigan,USA,
seekingdivorce.
2.3On10.11.2014,acomplaintwassentby
respondentNo.2throughregisteredpostto
theSuperintendentofPolice,GautamBuddha
4
Nagar,Noidamakingallegationsagainst
RajeshChopraandtwootherunknownpersons.
AnapplicationunderSection156(3)wasfiled
byrespondentNo.2.Theapplicationofthe
respondentNo.2wassentbytheMagistrate
toMediationCentrerunningunderthe
DistrictLegalServicesAuthorityfor
counselling.Afterfailureofcounselling
andmediation,anapplicationunderSection
156(3)Cr.P.C.wasfiledbyrespondentNo.2
dated10.05.2015makingallegationsagainst
alltheappellantsunderSection498Aand
Sections3/Section4ofDowryProhibitionAct.
2.4Inthecomplaint,allegationshavebeenmade
onthebasisofincidentdated08.11.2014
againstRajeshChopraandhisassociates.It
wasallegedthatRajeshChopracallthe
respondentNo.2neartheGurudwaraatSector
18,NoidatotalkabouttheproblemofNayan
ChopraandVanshikaandwhenrespondentNo.2
wentfortalks,hemetRajeshChoprawithtwo
unknownpersons.RespondentNo.2further
5
allegesthatonhisrequesttoaccepthis
daughter,RajeshChoprarepeatedhisdemand
ofonecrorerupeesandusedfilthywords
againstVanshika,whichwasobjectedby
respondentNo.2,onwhichRajeshChopraand
hisassociatesbecameannoyedandtheyabused
andbeattherespondentNo.2andsnatchedhis
goldchainfromhisneckandRs.60,000/-from
hispocket.Theallegationswithinthe
meaningofSections323,Section324,Section504,Section506,Section392
ofI.P.C.weremadeonthebasisofthe
aforesaidincident.Intheapplication,it
wasalsostatedthatNayanChoprahasfiled
apetitionfordissolutionofmarriagein
America.
2.5Onthebasisoftheapplicationofdivorce
byNayanChopra,theCircuit9thCourtfor
theCountyofKalamazooFamilyDivision,
Michigangaveajudgmentofdivorceon
24.02.2016.Theorderofjudgmentofdivorce
waspassedafterhearingbothNayanChopra
andVanshikaBobal,whowererepresented
6
throughattorneys.Thejudgmentofdivorce
madeprovisionsforalimony,pension
benefitsandretirementbenefits,life
insurance,propertysettlementandprovision
inlieuofdower,mutualreleaseofclaims
andotherprovisions.
2.6TheapplicationunderSection156(3)Cr.P.C.
filedbyrespondentNo.2wastreatedasa
complaintandregisteredasComplaintNo.
4967of2015,onwhichthelearnedJudicial
Magistrate,GautamBudhNagarissueda
summoningorderon17.01.2017summoningthe
appellantsunderSections498A,Section323,Section504,Section506
ofI.P.C.andSection3/Section4ofDowry
ProhibitionAct.
2.7Theappellantsfiledanapplicationunder
Section482Cr.P.C.intheHighCourtpraying
forquashingthecomplaintandproceedings
andorderdated17.01.2017inComplaintCase
No.4967of2015.Intheapplicationunder
Section482Cr.P.C.,HighCourtpassedan
7
orderreferringthemattertomediation
centreofAllahabadHighCourt.The
mediationhavingfailedbetweentheparties,
applicationunderSection482Cr.P.C.was
heard.Theprayeroftheappellantstoquash
thecomplaintandproceedingshavebeen
refused.Theapplicationwasdisposedof
afterdirectingthattheapplicantsmay
surrenderinthecourtbelowandmakean
applicationforbailwithinaperiodoftwo
months.Aggrievedagainstthejudgmentof
theHighCourt,theseappealshavebeen
filed.
3.Allappealsariseoutofthesameorderpassedin
theirapplicationunderSection482Cr.P.C.
4.WehaveheardShriShikhilSuri,learnedcounsel
fortheappellantsandShriSantoshKrishnan,learned
AORappearingfortherespondentNo.2.Wehavealso
heardlearnedcounselfortheStateofUttarPradesh.
8
5.Learnedcounselfortheappellantssubmitsthat
HighCourtfailedtoexercisejurisdictionunder
Section482Cr.P.C.inquashingtheentirecomplaint
proceedings,whichproceedingsarenothingbutabuse
oftheprocessofthecourt.Itissubmittedthat
NayanChopraandVanshikaBobalhadalreadybeen
granteddivorcebyFamilyCourtofMichigan,whichfact
wasnotbroughtintonoticeoftheMagistrateby
respondentNo.2beforesummoningorderwaspassed.It
issubmittedthatareadingofthecomplaintdoesnot
primafaciedisclosesanyoffenceunderSection498A
andSection3/Section4ofDowryProhibitionActagainstthe
appellants.Theappellants,AnitaGandhiandKuldeep
Gandhiseparatelyresidesandtheyhavenevermet
Vanshika,thegirlaftermarriage.Theallegationsin
thecomplaintarevague,sweepingandgeneral.The
complaintisnotevenfiledbyVanshika,thegirlnor
shegotherstatementrecordedinsupportofthe
complaint.Insofarasincidentallegedon08.11.2014
atSector18,Noidanosuchincidenttookplaceand
allegationsarefalseandconcoctedtosomehowropein
RajeshChopra,thefatheroftheboyNayanChopra.The
9
complainthasnotbeenfiledbycompetentperson,hence
oughtnottohavebeenentertained.
6.ShriSantoshKrishnan,learnedcounselappearing
forrespondentNo.2submitsthatthereisnoerrorin
summoningoftheappellantsbytheMagistratebyorder
dated17.01.2017.ItiswellsettledthatMagistrate
isnotrequiredtorecordelaboratereasonsfor
summoningofanaccused.Thecomplaintdiscloses
severalallegationspertainingtooffenceunderSection
498Aandotheroffencesmentionedtherein.Twocourts
havingtakenoneparticularviewofthematter,this
Courtmaynotexerciseitsjurisdictionininterfering
withtheorders.ItisfurthersubmittedthatSection
498Adoesnotindicatethatcomplaintonbehalfofthe
womenhastobefiledbythewomenherself.The
complainwasfullycompetentandnoerrorhasbeen
committedbyMagistrateintakingcognizanceofthe
complaint.
7.Learnedcounselforthepartieshaveplaced
relianceonvariousjudgmentsofthisCourtinsupport
10
oftheirsubmissions,whichshallbereferredtowhile
consideringthesubmissionsindetail.
8.Wehaveconsideredthesubmissionsofthelearned
counselforthepartiesandhaveperusedtherecords.
9.ThecopyofthecomplaintunderSection156(3)
Cr.P.C.,whichhasbeentreatedasprivatecomplaint
byMagistratehasbeenbroughtontherecordas
AnnexureP-2.Theallegationsinthecomplaintare
thatmarriagewassolemnisedon15.04.2012inwhich
marriage,giftsofRs.50lakhsweregiventoNayan
Chopraandhisfamilymembers.Itisallegedthat
afterthemarriage,allfamilymemberswerenot
satisfiedbythegiftsandtheystartedharassingthe
daughterofrespondentNo.2bydemandingfurtherdowry
ofonecrorerupees.Theyfurtherpressurisedto
solemnisethemarriageofVanshikaasperPunjabirites
andceremonies,onwhichpressure,marriagewas
solemnisedon06.11.2012inGurudwaraatSector37,
NoidaasperPunjabiritesandceremonies.Further
allegationsarethatfamilymembersofNayanChopra
keptonthreateningVanshikatodesertherandon
11
01.12.2013NayanChoprathrewVanshikaoutofhouseand
sincethenVanshikaisresidingwithrespondentNo.2.
Anothersetofallegationsarewithregardtoincident
dated08.11.2014allegedtohavebeentakenplaceat
6.00PMneartheGurudwara,Sector-18,Noida.Itis
allegedthatRajeshChopra,fatherofNayanChopra
calledtherespondentNo.2totalkabouttheirproblem
onwhichdateRajeshChopraagainrepeatedhisdemand
ofonecrorerupeesandusedfilthywordsagainst
VanshikatowhichrespondentNo.2objected,onwhich
RajeshChopraandhisassociatesbecameannoyedand
theyabusedandbeattherespondentNo.2andsnatched
hisgoldchainfromhisneckandRs.60,000/-fromhis
pocket.Theabovetwosetsofallegationshavegiven
risetosummoningorder.Thesummoningorderpassed
bytheMagistrateon17.01.2017isasfollows:-
“ORDER
TheaccusedpersonsNayanChopra,Rajesh
Chopra,RashiChopra,AmitChopra,Kuldeep
GandhiAnitaGandhiaresummonedforthe
offenceunderSections498A,Section323,Section504,Section506
ofIPCandSection3/4ofD.P.Act.The
complainantisdirectedtotakestepsasper
Ruleswithinoneweek.Caseisfixedfor
08.03.2017forappearance.
Sd/-illegible
12
17.01.2017
(Vikas)
CivilJudge(Jr.Division)
J.M.GautamBudhNagar.”
10.Oneofthesubmissions,whichhasbeenpressedby
learnedcounselfortherespondentNo.2isthat
Magistratehastobesatisfiedthattherearegrounds
forproceedingandthereisnorequirementofgiving
anyelaboratereasonsforsummoningtheaccused.
11.Learnedcounselfortherespondenthasplaced
relianceonDy.ChiefControllerofImportsExports
Vs.RoshanlalAgarwalOrs.,(2003)4SCC139,this
CourtinparagraphNo.9ofthejudgmentlaiddown
following:-
“9.Indeterminingthequestionwhetherany
processistobeissuedornot,whatthe
Magistratehastobesatisfiediswhether
thereissufficientgroundforproceedingand
notwhetherthereissufficientgroundfor
conviction.Whethertheevidenceisadequate
forsupportingtheconviction,canbe
determinedonlyatthetrialandnotatthe
stageofinquiry.Atthestageofissuingthe
processtotheaccused,theMagistrateisnot
requiredtorecordreasons.Thisquestionwas
consideredrecentlyinSectionU.P.PollutionControl
Boardv.MohanMeakinsLtd.,(2000)3SCC745
andafternoticingthelawlaiddowninSectionKanti
BhadraShahv.StateofW.B.,(200001SCC13
722,itwasheldasfollows:(SCCp.749,
para6)Thelegislaturehasstressedtheneed
torecordreasonsincertain
situationssuchasdismissalofa
complaintwithoutissuingprocess.
Thereisnosuchlegalrequirement
imposedonaMagistrateforpassing
detailedorderwhileissuingsummons.
Theprocessissuedtoaccusedcannot
bequashedmerelyonthegroundthat
theMagistratehadnotpasseda
speakingorder.”
12.SamepropositionwasreiteratedbythisCourtin
NupurTalwarVs.CentralBureauofInvestigation
Anr.,(2012)11SCC465.Therecanbenodisputeto
theabovepropositionaslaiddownbythisCourtthat
whiletakingcognizanceofanoffence,aMagistrateis
notrequiredtopassadetailedorder,however,ina
casewhenMagistrateissuesprocessagainstaperson,
whoisnotevenchargedwiththeoffenceforwhichhe
issummoned,whetherinsuchcasesalsothesummoning
ordercannotbeassailed?
13.Inthepresentcase,therearetwosetsof
allegations,whicharecontainedinthecomplaint,
whichhasalsobeenrepeatedinthestatementsrecorded
14
byrespondentNo.2andhistwowitnesses–PW1–Raj
Kumar,brotherofrespondentNo.2andPW2–Deepa,wife
ofrespondentNo.2.Onesetofallegationsofoffence
underSection498AandSection3/4ofD.P.Actand
secondsetofallegationsareallegationsmadefor
offencesunderSections323,504and506ofI.P.C.
14.Wemayfirsttakeuptheallegationsforoffences
underSections323,Section504andSection506ofI.P.C.The
allegationsunderSections323,Section504andSection506hasbeen
madecitingtheincidentdated08.11.2014.Itis
usefultoextracttheentireallegationspertainingto
incidentdated08.11.2014fromthecomplaint,whichare
tothefollowingeffect:-
“…………………..On08.11.2014atabout6p.m.Nayan
Chopra’sfatherRajeshChopracalledthe
ApplicantneartheGurudwaraatSector18,
Noidatotalkabouttheirproblem.Whenthe
Applicantreachedtherefortalkthenhemet
thereRajeshChopraalongwithtwounknown
persons.WhentheApplicantrequestedRajesh
ChopratoaccepthisdaughtertheRajesh
Chopraagainrepeatedhisdemandofonecore
Rupeesandsaidthatifhehasarrangedfor
onecroreRupeesthenhecansendhis
daughterattheirhome,otherwisekeep
VanshikaathishouseandRajeshChopraused
filthywordsagainstVanshika,thenthe
Applicantobjectedforthesame,onwhich15
RajeshChopraandhisassociatesbecame
annoyedandtheyabusedandbeatthe
Applicantandsnatchedhisgoldchainfrom
hisneckandRs.60,000/-fromhispocket.
ThewifeoftheApplicantandanumberof
otherpeoplegatheredatthespotandsaved
theApplicantfromthem.Whileleavingthese
personsthreatenedtheApplicantthatafter
arrangingforonecroreRupeeshecansend
hisdaughterattheirhouse,otherwisekeep
herathishouseandifhedaretoinformthe
policethentheywillkilltheApplicantand
hisdaughterVanshika…….”
15.Inthestatementmadebythecomplainantinsupport
ofhissubmission,complainantrepeatedthesame
allegationsregardingincidentdated08.11.2014asmade
inthecomplaint,asnotedabove.PW-2,Deepa,wife
ofrespondentNo.2hasalsoabouttheincidentdated
08.11.2014repeatedtheallegationsasnarratedinthe
complaint.Aperusaloftheallegationsinthe
complaintmakesitclearthatthecomplaintwithregard
tooffencesunderSections323,Section504andSection506hasbeen
madeonlyagainstRajeshChopraandtwounknown
persons.Neitherinthecomplaintnorstatementsmade
bycomplainantorhiswitnesses,thereisany
allegationwithregardtoaboveoffencesagainstany
otherappellantsbeforeus.Therebeingnoallegations
16
foroffencesunderSections323,504and506inthe
complaintorstatementbeforetheMagistrate,therewas
noquestionofsummoningtheotherappellantsfor
offencesunderSections323,504and506ofI.P.C.When
thecomplaintdoesnotallegeanyoffenceagainstother
appellants,wefailtoseethathowthecognizanceof
thecomplaintcanbetakenagainstotherappellants
withregardtooffencesunderSections323,504and
506.Inaboveviewofthematter,thecomplaintas
wellassummoningorderareliabletobequashed
againstalltheappellantsexceptRajeshChopradueto
theabovereasonsinaboveregard.
16.Now,wecometotheallegationsinthecomplaint
underSection498AandSection3/4ofD.P.Act.Learned
counselfortherespondentinsupportofhissubmission
thatpoweroftheHighCourtunderSection482Cr.P.C.
hastobeexercisedinexceptionalcircumstances,has
reliedonjudgmentofthisCourtinRakhiMishraVs.
StateofBiharandOthers,(2017)16SCC772.This
Courtintheabovecasehasreliedonanearlier
judgmentofthisCourtinSonuGuptaVs.DeepakGupta,
17
(2015)3SCC424,inwhichjudgment,inparagraphNo.8
followingpropositionwaslaiddown,whichhasbeen
referredtoandreliedon:-
“8.…Atthestageofcognizanceand
summoningtheMagistrateisrequiredtoapply
hisjudicialmindonlywithaviewtotake
cognizanceoftheoffence…tofindout
whetheraprimafaciecasehasbeenmadeout
forsummoningtheaccusedpersons.Atthis
stage,thelearnedMagistrateisnotrequired
toconsiderthedefenceversionormaterials
orargumentsnorisherequiredtoevaluate
themeritsofthematerialsorevidenceof
thecomplainant,becausetheMagistratemust
notundertaketheexercisetofindoutat
thisstagewhetherthematerialswouldlead
toconvictionornot.”
17.ThisCourtinRakhiMishra’scasehasalsolaid
downthatHighCourtinexceptionalcircumstancescan
exercisepowerunderSection482Cr.P.C.whenaprima
faciecaseisnotmadeoutagainsttheaccused.
ParagraphNo.5ofthejudgmentisasfollows:-
“5.Theorderpassedbythetrialcourt
takingcognizanceagainstR-2andR-4toR-9
isinconformitywiththelawlaiddownin
theabovejudgment.Itissettledlawthat
thepowerunderSection482CrPCisexercised
bytheHighCourtonlyinexceptional
circumstancesonlywhenaprimafaciecase
isnotmadeoutagainsttheaccused.Thetest
appliedbythisCourtforinterferenceatthe
initialstageofaprosecutioniswhetherthe18
uncontrovertedallegationsprimafacie
establishacase.”
18.Learnedcounselfortheappellanthasalsorelied
onvariousjudgmentsofthisCourtinsupportofhis
submissions.InK.SubbaRaoandOthersVs.Stateof
Telangana,(2018)14SCC452,thisCourtlaiddown
followinginparagraphNos.5and6:-
“5.Aperusalofthecharge-sheetandthe
supplementarycharge-sheetdisclosesthe
factthattheappellantsarenotthe
immediatefamilymembersofthethird
respondent/husband.Theyarethematernal
unclesofthethirdrespondent.Exceptthe
baldstatementthattheysupportedthethird
respondentwhowasharassingthesecond
respondentfordowryandthattheyconspired
withthethirdrespondentfortakingawayhis
childtotheU.S.A.,nothingelseindicating
theirinvolvementinthecrimewasmentioned.
TheappellantsapproachedtheHighCourtwhen
theinvestigationwaspending.Thecharge-
sheetandthesupplementarycharge-sheetwere
filedafterdisposalofthecasebytheHigh
Court.
6.Criminalproceedingsarenotnormally
interdictedbyusattheinterlocutorystage
unlessthereisanabuseoftheprocessofa
court.ThisCourt,atthesametime,doesnot
hesitatetointerferetosecuretheendsof
justice.SectionSeeStateofHaryanav.BhajanLal,
1992Suppl.(1)SCC335.Thecourtsshould
becarefulinproceedingagainstthedistant
relativesincrimespertainingtomatrimonial
disputesanddowrydeaths.Therelativesof
thehusbandshouldnotberopedinonthe
19
basisofomnibusallegationsunlessspecific
instancesoftheirinvolvementinthecrime
aremadeout.SectionSeeKansRajv.StateofPunjab,
(2000)5SCC207andSectionKailashChandraAgrawal
v.StateofU.P.,(2014)16SCC551”
19.ThisCourtinVineetKumarandOthersVs.Stateof
UttarPradeshandAnother,(2017)13SCC369had
occasiontoexaminetheparametersofexerciseofpower
underSection482Cr.P.C.inrespectofquashingof
criminalproceeding.Oneofus(JusticeAshokBhushan)
speakingfortheBenchafterexaminingthescopeand
ambitofSection482Cr.P.C.laiddownfollowingin
ParagraphNos.22to25:-
“22.Beforeweenterintothefactsofthe
presentcaseitisnecessarytoconsiderthe
ambitandscopeofjurisdictionunderSection
482CrPCvestedintheHighCourt.Section
482CrPCsavestheinherentpoweroftheHigh
Courttomakesuchordersasmaybenecessary
togiveeffecttoanyorderunderthisCode,
ortopreventabuseoftheprocessofany
courtorotherwisetosecuretheendsof
justice.
23.ThisCourttimeandagainhasexamined
thescopeofjurisdictionoftheHighCourt
underSection482CrPCandlaiddownseveral
principleswhichgoverntheexerciseof
jurisdictionoftheHighCourtunderSection
482CrPC.Athree-JudgeBenchofthisCourt
inSectionStateofKarnatakav.L.Muniswamy,(1977)
2SCC699,heldthattheHighCourtis
entitledtoquashaproceedingifitcomes
20
totheconclusionthatallowingthe
proceedingtocontinuewouldbeanabuseof
theprocessofthecourtorthattheendsof
justicerequirethattheproceedingoughtto
bequashed.Inpara7ofthejudgment,the
followinghasbeenstated:(SCCp.703)
“7.…Intheexerciseofthis
wholesomepower,theHighCourtis
entitledtoquashaproceedingifit
comestotheconclusionthatallowing
theproceedingtocontinuewouldbean
abuseoftheprocessofthecourtor
thattheendsofjusticerequirethat
theproceedingoughttobequashed.
ThesavingoftheHighCourt’s
inherentpowers,bothinciviland
criminalmatters,isdesignedto
achieveasalutarypublicpurpose
whichisthatacourtproceedingought
nottobepermittedtodegenerateinto
aweaponofharassmentorpersecution.
Inacriminalcase,theveiledobject
behindalameprosecution,thevery
natureofthematerialonwhichthe
structureoftheprosecutionrestsand
thelikewouldjustifytheHighCourt
inquashingtheproceedinginthe
interestofjustice.Theendsof
justicearehigherthantheendsof
merelawthoughjusticehasgottobe
administeredaccordingtolawsmadeby
thelegislature.Thecompelling
necessityformakingthese
observationsisthatwithoutaproper
realisationoftheobjectandpurpose
oftheprovisionwhichseekstosave
theinherentpowersoftheHighCourt
todojustice,betweentheStateand
itssubjects,itwouldbeimpossible
toappreciatethewidthandcontours
ofthatsalientjurisdiction.”
21
24.ThejudgmentofthisCourtinSectionStateof
Haryanav.BhajanLal,1992Supp(1)SCC335,
haselaboratelyconsideredthescopeand
ambitofSection482CrPC.Althoughinthe
abovecasethisCourtwasconsideringthe
poweroftheHighCourttoquashtheentire
criminalproceedingincludingtheFIR,the
casearoseoutofanFIRregisteredunder
Sections161,Section165IPCandSection5(2)ofthe
PreventionofCorruptionAct,1947.This
Courtelaboratelyconsideredthescopeof
Section482CrPC/SectionArticle226ofthe
Constitutioninthecontextofquashingthe
proceedingsincriminalinvestigation.After
noticingvariousearlierpronouncementsof
thisCourt,thisCourtenumeratedcertain
categoriesofcasesbywayofillustration
wherepowerunderSection482CrPCcanbe
exercisedtopreventabuseoftheprocessof
theCourtorsecuretheendsofjustice.
25.Para102whichenumerates7categories
ofcaseswherepowercanbeexercisedunder
Section482CrPCisextractedasfollows:
(BhajanLalcase,SCCpp.378-79)
“102.Inthebackdropofthe
interpretationofthevariousrelevant
provisionsSectionoftheCodeunderChapter
XIVandoftheprinciplesoflaw
enunciatedbythisCourtinaseries
ofdecisionsrelatingtotheexercise
oftheextraordinarypowerunder
SectionArticle226ortheinherentpowers
underSection482oftheCodewhichwe
haveextractedandreproducedabove,
wegivethefollowingcategoriesof
casesbywayofillustrationwherein
suchpowercouldbeexercisedeither
topreventabuseoftheprocessofany
courtorotherwisetosecuretheends
ofjustice,thoughitmaynotbe
possibletolaydownanyprecise,
22
clearlydefinedandsufficiently
channelisedandinflexibleguidelines
orrigidformulaeandtogivean
exhaustivelistofmyriadkindsof
caseswhereinsuchpowershouldbe
exercised.
(1)Wheretheallegationsmadein
thefirstinformationreportor
thecomplaint,eveniftheyare
takenattheirfacevalueand
acceptedintheirentiretydonot
primafacieconstituteanyoffence
ormakeoutacaseagainstthe
accused.
(2)Wheretheallegationsinthe
firstinformationreportandother
materials,ifany,accompanying
theFIRdonotdisclosea
cognizableoffence,justifyingan
investigationbypoliceofficers
underSection156(1)oftheCode
exceptunderanorderofa
Magistratewithinthepurviewof
Section155(2)oftheCode.
(3)Wheretheuncontroverted
allegationsmadeintheFIRor
complaintandtheevidence
collectedinsupportofthesame
donotdisclosethecommissionof
anyoffenceandmakeoutacase
againsttheaccused.
(4)Wheretheallegationsinthe
FIRdonotconstituteacognizable
offencebutconstituteonlyanon-
cognizableoffence,no
investigationispermittedbya
policeofficerwithoutanorderof
aMagistrateascontemplatedunder
Section155(2)oftheCode.
23
(5)Wheretheallegationsmadein
theFIRorcomplaintaresoabsurd
andinherentlyimprobableonthe
basisofwhichnoprudentperson
caneverreachajustconclusion
thatthereissufficientground
forproceedingagainstthe
accused.
(6)Wherethereisanexpresslegal
barengraftedinanyofthe
provisionsSectionoftheCodeortheAct
concerned(underwhichacriminal
proceedingisinstituted)tothe
institutionandcontinuanceofthe
proceedingsand/orwherethereis
aspecificprovisioninSectiontheCode
ortheActconcerned,providing
efficaciousredressforthe
grievanceoftheaggrievedparty.
(7)Whereacriminalproceedingis
manifestlyattendedwithmalafide
and/orwheretheproceedingis
maliciouslyinstitutedwithan
ulteriormotiveforwreaking
vengeanceontheaccusedandwith
aviewtospitehimduetoprivate
andpersonalgrudge.”
20.Afterreferringtoseveralothercases,thisCourt
concludedandmadefollowingobservationsinParagraph
No.41:-
“41.InherentpowergiventotheHighCourt
underSection482CrPCiswiththepurpose
andobjectofadvancementofjustice.Incase
solemnprocessofCourtissoughttobe
abusedbyapersonwithsomeobliquemotive,
theCourthastothwarttheattemptatthe24
verythreshold.TheCourtcannotpermita
prosecutiontogoonifthecasefallsinone
ofthecategoriesasillustratively
enumeratedbythisCourtinSectionStateofHaryana
v.BhajanLal.Judicialprocessisasolemn
proceedingwhichcannotbeallowedtobe
convertedintoaninstrumentofoperationor
harassment.Whentherearematerialsto
indicatethatacriminalproceedingis
manifestlyattendedwithmalafideand
proceedingismaliciouslyinstitutedwithan
ulteriormotive,theHighCourtwillnot
hesitateinexerciseofitsjurisdiction
underSection482CrPCtoquashthe
proceedingunderCategory7asenumeratedin
SectionStateofHaryanav.BhajanLal,whichisto
thefollowingeffect:(SCCp.379,para102)“102.(7)Whereacriminalproceeding
ismanifestlyattendedwithmalafide
and/orwheretheproceedingis
maliciouslyinstitutedwithan
ulteriormotiveforwreakingvengeance
ontheaccusedandwithaviewtospite
himduetoprivateandpersonal
grudge.”AboveCategory7isclearlyattractedinthe
factsofthepresentcase.Although,theHigh
CourthasnotedthejudgmentofSectionStateof
Haryanav.BhajanLal,butdidnotadvertto
therelevantfactsofthepresentcase,
materialsonwhichfinalreportwassubmitted
bytheIO.We,thus,arefullysatisfiedthat
thepresentisafitcasewheretheHighCourt
oughttohaveexerciseditsjurisdiction
underSection482CrPCandquashedthe
criminalproceedings.”
21.Thecriminalprosecutioncanbeallowedtoproceed
onlywhenaprimafacieoffenceisdisclosed.This
25
Courthasobservedthatjudicialprocessisasolemn
proceedingwhichcannotbeallowedtobeconvertedinto
aninstrumentofoppressionorharassment.IfHigh
Courtfindsthatproceedingsdeservetobequashedin
parametersaslaiddownbythisCourtinStateof
HaryanaVs.BhajanLal,1992Supp(1)SCC335,High
courtshallnothesitateinexerciseofjurisdiction
underSection482Cr.P.C.toquashtheproceedings.
22.Now,werevertbacktotheallegationsmadeinthe
complaintunderSection498AandSection3/4ofD.P.
Act.Fewfactshavetobenoticedbeforewelookinto
theallegationsmadeinthecomplaintintheabove
regard.Thecomplainthasbeenfiledbytherespondent
No.2beforetheC.J.M.,GautamBudhNagaron
10.05.2015,beforewhichdate,thepetitionfordivorce
hasalreadybeenfiledbyNayanChopraon23.10.2014
beforetheCircuitCourtfortheCountyofKalamazoo
FamilyDivision,Michigan.Itisontherecordthat
atthetimeoffilingofthecomplaintVanishkaBobal
waslivingatCanadawhereasNayanChoprawasliving
atU.S.A.Bothwereseparatelyliving.Itwaspleaded
26
intheapplicationfordivorcethathusbandandwife
hadseparatedonoraroundNovember,2013.Itison
therecordthatonthedaycriminalcomplaintwasfiled
on10.05.2015intheCourtofC.J.M.GautamBudhNagar
byrespondentNo.2,neitherVanishkawasinIndianor
shewasinIndiaatthetimewhenstatementswere
recordedincomplaintofcomplainantaswellashistwo
witnesses.ThecomplaintisnotbyVanishkabutithas
beenfiledbyfatherofVanishka,respondentNo.2.In
thedivorceapplicationfiledintheStateofMichigan,
VanishkaBobalwasrepresentedbyherattorney.The
divorcewasgrantedwithordersrelatingtoalimony,
pensionbenefitsandretirementbenefits,life
insurance,propertysettlementandprovisioninlieu
ofdower,mutualreleaseofclaimsandotheraspects
on24.02.2016.
23.Thereisnothingontherecordtoindicatethat
ordersofdivorcebetweenthepartieswasbroughtinto
thenoticeoftheMagistratewhenheissuedprocess
againsttheappellants.We,however,areinagreement
withthesubmissionofShriSantoshKrishanthatdecree
27
ofdivorcebetweenNayanChopraandVanshikashallnot
wipeoutanycriminaloffence,whichhasbeencommitted
withinthemeaningofSectionI.P.C.orD.P.Actandthe
criminaloffencecommittedinjurisdictionalcourthas
tobeexamineddespitethedivorcedecreehavingbeen
granted.
24.Comingbacktotheallegationsinthecomplaint
pertainingtoSection498AandSection3/4ofD.P.Act.
Aperusalofthecomplaintindicatesthatthe
allegationsagainsttheappellantsforoffenceunder
Section498AandSection3/4ofD.P.Actaregeneral
andsweeping.Nospecificincidentdatesordetails
ofanyincidenthasbeenmentionedinthecomplaint.
Thecomplainthavingbeenfiledafterproceedingfor
divorcewasinitiatedbyNayanChoprainStateof
Michigan,whereVanshikaparticipatedanddivorcewas
ultimatelygranted.Afewmonthsafterfilingofthe
divorcepetition,thecomplainthasbeenfiledinthe
CourtofC.J.M.,GautamBudhNagarwiththeallegations
asnoticedabove.Thesequenceoftheeventsandfacts
andcircumstancesofthecaseleadsustoconcludethat
thecomplaintunderSection498AandSection3/Section4of
28
D.P.Acthavebeenfiledascounterblasttodivorce
petitionproceedinginStateofMichiganbyNayan
Chopra.
25.Therebeingnospecificallegationregardingany
oneoftheapplicantsexceptcommongeneralallegation
againsteveryonei.e.“theystartedharassingthe
daughteroftheapplicantdemandingadditionaldowry
ofonecrore”andthefactthatallrelativesofthe
husband,namely,father,mother,brother,mother’s
sisterandhusbandofmother’ssisterhavebeenroped
inclearlyindicatethatapplicationunderSection
156(3)Cr.P.C.wasfiledwithaviewtoharassthe
applicants.Further,priortofilingoftheapplication
underSection156(3)Cr.P.C.therewasnocomplaintat
anypointoftimebythegirlorherfathermaking
allegationofdemandofanydowrybyanyoneofthe
applicants.WhenbothNayanChopraandVanshikastarted
livingseparatelysinceNovember,2013,hadtherebeen
anydowrydemandorharassmentthegirlwouldhave
givencomplainttoPoliceoranyotherauthority.
Further,inthedivorceproceedingsatMichigan,
29
U.S.A.,partieshaveagreedfordividingtheir
propertiesincludinggiftsgivenatmarriagebutno
complaintwasmadeinthoseproceedingsregarding
harassmentbyherhusbandorhisfamilymembers.The
judgmentofthedivorcecontainsfollowingclauses
regarding“PropertySettlementandProvisioninLieu
ofDower”:
“PROPERTYSETTLEMENTAND
PROVISIONINLIEUOFDOWER
1.Eachpartyaffirmsthatheorshefully
andaccuratelydisclosedalltheassetsowned
byhimorherinwhichheorshehasany
interest.Byaffixingtheirsignatureson
thisJudgment,PlaintiffandDefendantaffirm
thateachhasdisclosedallassetseachowns
orhasanyinterestin,whetherheldbyhim
orherindividually,bybothofthemjointly
orwithanyotherpersonorentity,orby
anotherpersonorentityforthebenefitof
aparty.Thepropertydivisionsetforthin
thisJudgmentofDivorceisintendedtobea
distributionandallocationofallthe
propertyofthepartiesandalsoisintended
todeclaretheparties’propertyinterests
asofentryofthisJudgmentofDivorce.If
eitherpartyhasfailed,eitherintentionally
orunintentionally,todiscloseanyofhis
orherassets,theissueofpropertydivision
maybereopenedonthemotionofeitherparty
todetermineandresolvethedistributionof
anypreviouslyundisclosedassets.
2.Itappearstothecourtthatthe
partieshavedividedbetweenthemtotheir
mutualsatisfactionallarticlesofpersonal
property,householdfurnitureand
30
appliances,cash,savingsandchecking
accountsandvehiclesexceptasprovided
below.Thepersonalpropertyassodivided
shallbethesoleandabsolutepropertyof
thepartyinwhosepossessionorunderwhose
controleachofthearticlesofpersonal
propertyarenowfoundandeachshalldefend
andholdtheotherharmlessfromliability
thereon.
a.Thepartiesagreetoreturnalljewelry
totheotherpartythattheycurrently
haveintheirpossession,whichwas
acquiredasaresultoftheirmarriage.
Plaintifftestifiedthatheonlyhad
oneitemofjewelryandprovidedthe
onlyjewelryhehadinhispossession
toDefendant-asinglegoldring.
Plaintifftestifiedshedoesnothave
anyjewelryinherpossession.
b.Thepartiesagreethattheirrespective
parentswillreturntotheother
party’sparents,alljewelrygivenas
giftstotheirparentsandareintheir
parent’spossession,whichwasacquired
bythemasaresultoftheparties’
marriage.Theparentsagreetoexchange
atamutuallyagreeduponlocationand
atamutuallyagreedupontime.
3.Exceptasotherwiseprovidedherein,
eachpartyshallbeliableforthedebts
incurredbyhimorherafterseparation
(11/1/2013)andshalldefendandholdthe
otherharmlessfromallliabilitythereon.
4.Exceptasprovideherein,eachparty
shallbeliableforthedebtsinhisorher
nameandforthedebtsassociatedwith
propertyawardedtohim/herpursuanttothe
JudgmentofDivorceandshalldefendandhold
31
theotherharmlessfromallliability
therein.
5.Exceptasotherwiseprovidedherein,
eachpartyshallretainallmoniesintheir
respectivenames,includingbutnotlimited
tocheckingaccounts,savingsaccounts,
certificatesofdeposit,stocks,bonds,IRAs
or401Ks.
6.Therearenojointdebtsoftheparties
exceptasprovidedherein.
7.Plaintiff,NAYANCHOPRA,shallreceive
the2013HondaCRVfreeandclearfromany
claimoftheDefendant,VANSHIKABOBAL,and
thePlaintiffassumesandagreestopaythe
liabilitythereonandtodefendandholdthe
Defendantharmlessthereon.Defendantshall
transfertitleofsuchvehiclestothe
Plaintiffiftransferringisneeded.
8.Plaintiff,NAYANCHOPRA,shallreceive
the2005ToyotaCamryfreeandclearfromany
claimoftheDefendant,VANSHIKABOBAL,and
thePlaintiffassumesandagreestopaythe
liabilitythereonandtodefendandholdthe
Defendantharmlessthereon.
9.Theprovisionsforeachpartyherein
madeforthepartiesshallbeinlieuofthe
dowerorspousalrightinthelandsofthe
otherandeachshallhereafterholdtheir
remaininglandsfree,clearanddischarged
fromanysuchdower,spousalrightandclaim
andsaidprovisionshallbeinfull
satisfactionofallclaimseithermayhave
inanypropertywhichtheotherowns,ormay
hereafterown,inwhicheitherhasormay
hereafterhaveaninterest.
10.Thepartieswarrantthatneitherhas
incurredanydebtintheotherparty’sname,
oronwhichtheotherpartymaybeliable,
32
whichisnotexpresslydisposedofinthis
Judgment.
11.ThisJudgmentofDivorceshall
constituteaterminationofallrightsofa
survivingspouseincluding,butnotlimited
to,homesteadallowance,election,exempt
property,settlementandfamilyallowanceby
eachpartyinthepropertyoftheother,and
aterminationofallbenefitswhichwould
otherwisepasstoonepartyfromtheother
bytestateandintestate,successionorby
virtueofanyprovisionofanywillexecuted
priortotheentryofthisJudgmentof
Divorce.”
26.Theabovejudgmentindivorceproceedings
indicatesthatNayanChopraandVanshikahavesettled
allissuesbetweenthemincludingdivisionof
propertiesatthetimewhendivorceproceedingswere
inprogressatMichiganandboththepartieswerenot
inIndia,thecomplaintunderSection156(3)Cr.P.C.
hadbeenfiledmakingallegationunderSection498Aof
IPCandtheSectionDowryProhibitionActonlytoharassand
putpressureontheapplicants.
27.Oneobservationalsoneedstobemadewithregard
toorderpassedbytheHighCourt.HighCourtinits
impugnedjudgmenthasnotreferredtoallegationsmade
inthecomplaintexceptnoticingthesummoningorder
33
hasbeenpassedandnoticingtheprinciplesoflaw.
ThisCourthadoccasiontoconsiderasimilarorder
passedbytheHighCourtrejectingtheapplication
underSection482Cr.P.C.inJagdishPrasadandOthers
Vs.StateofUttarPradeshandAnother,(2019)2SCC
184.InthesaidcasealsounderSection482Cr.P.C.
proceedings,thechallengewasmadetosummoningorder
aswellasentireproceedingsofcomplaintcasewhere
allegationsunderSections498AandSection323IPCaswellas
Section3/4ofD.P.Actweremade.InparagraphNo.3,
thefactsgivingrisetofilingtheapplicationunder
Section482Cr.P.C.beforetheHighCourthasbeen
noted.ThisCourtmadefollowingobservationsin
paragraphNos.6to9:-
“6.Havingheardthelearnedcounselforthe
partiesandonperusaloftherecordofthe
caseweareinclinedtosetasidethe
impugnedorderandremandthecasetothe
HighCourtfordecidingtheappellants’
application,outofwhichthisappealarises,
afreshonmeritsinaccordancewithlaw.
7.Onperusaloftheimpugnedorder,wefind
thattheSingleJudgehasquotedthe
principlesoflawlaiddownbythisCourtin
severaldecisionsrelatingtopowersofthe
HighCourtontheissueofinterferencein
casesfiledunderSection482oftheCode
frompara2totheconcludingparabuthas
34
notreferredtothefactsofthecaseto
appreciatethecontroversyofthecase.We
are,therefore,unabletoknowthefactual
matrixofthecaseafterreadingtheimpugned
judgmentexceptthelegalprincipleslaid
downbythisCourtinseveraldecisions.
8.Inourview,theSingleJudgeoughtto
havefirstsetoutthebrieffactsofthe
casewithaviewtounderstandthefactual
matrixandthenexaminedthechallengemade
totheproceedingsinthelightofthe
principlesoflawlaiddownbythisCourt
withaviewtorecordthefindingsonthe
groundsurgedbytheappellantsastowhether
anyinterferencethereiniscalledforor
not.Wefindthattheaforementionedexercise
wasnotdonebytheHighCourtwhilepassing
theimpugnedorder.
9.We,therefore,findourselvesunableto
concurwithsuchdisposaloftheapplication
bytheHighCourtandfeelinclinedtoset
asidetheimpugnedorderandremandthecase
totheHighCourt(SingleJudge)witha
requesttodecidetheapplicationafreshon
meritsinaccordancewithlawkeepinginview
theaforementionedobservations.Having
formedanopiniontoremandthecaseinthe
lightofourreasoningmentionedabove,we
donotconsideritpropertogointothe
meritsofthecase.”
28.WhatwassaidbythisCourtinparagraphNo.7and
8oftheabovejudgmentissquarelyapplicableinthe
factsofthepresentcaseandtheorderoftheHigh
Courtdeservestobesetasideonthisgroundalone.
35
29.Oneofthesubmissions,whichhasbeenmadebythe
learnedcounselfortheappellantalsoneedstobe
considered.Learnedcounselfortheappellanthad
submittedthatcomplainthasnotbeenfiledbya
competentperson.Itissubmittedthatcomplaintis
notmadebyVanshika,buthasbeenfiledonlybyfather
ofVanshika,henceitisnotmaintainable.Theabove
submissionhasbeenrefutedbyShriSantoshKrishnan.
Hesubmitsthatitisnotnecessarythatacomplaint
underSection498Ashouldbefiledonlybythevictim
ofoffence.Hesubmitsthatcomplaintfiledbyfather
ofthevictim,respondentNo.2wasalsofully
maintainable.Section498Aprovidesasfollows:-
“498A.Husbandorrelativeofhusbandofa
womansubjectinghertocruelty.—Whoever,
beingthehusbandortherelativeofthe
husbandofawoman,subjectssuchwomanto
crueltyshallbepunishedwithimprisonment
foratermwhichmayextendtothreeyears
andshallalsobeliabletofine.
Explanation.—Forthepurposeofthissection,
“cruelty”means—
(a)anywilfulconductwhichisofsuch
anatureasislikelytodrivethe
womantocommitsuicideortocause
graveinjuryordangertolife,
36
limborhealth(whethermentalor
physical)ofthewoman;or
(b)harassmentofthewomanwheresuch
harassmentiswithaviewto
coercingheroranypersonrelated
tohertomeetanyunlawfuldemand
foranypropertyorvaluable
securityorisonaccountof
failurebyheroranyperson
relatedtohertomeetsuch
demand.”
30.Section498Aprovidesforanoffencewhenhusband
ortherelativeofthehusband,subjecthertocruelty.
ThereisnothinginSection498A,whichmayindicate
thatwhenawomanissubjectedtocruelty,acomplaint
hastobefilednecessarilybythewomensosubjected.
AperusalofSection498A,asextractedabove,
indicatesthattheprovisiondoesnotcontemplatethat
complaintforoffenceunderSection498Ashouldbe
filedonlybywomen,whoissubjectedtocrueltyby
husbandorhisrelative.We,thus,areoftheview
thatcomplaintfiledbyrespondentNo.2,thefatherof
Vanshikacannotbesaidtobenotmaintainableonthis
ground.We,thus,rejectthesubmissionofthecounsel
37
fortheappellantthatcomplaintfiledbyrespondent
No.2wasnotmaintainable.
31.Inviewoftheforegoingdiscussions,insofaras
theoffenceunderSection498AandSection3/4ofD.P.
Actisconcerned,weareoftheviewthatpresentisa
case,whichiscoveredbyCategory7asenumeratedby
StateofHaryanaVs.BhajanLal(supra)andtheHigh
CourterredinrefusingtoexerciseunderSection482
Cr.P.C.We,however,observethatinsofaras
allegationsagainstRajeshChoprapertainingto
Sections323,Section504andSection506ofIPCisconcerned,there
werespecificallegations,whichwerealsosupported
bythecomplainantandhistwowitnessesinthe
evidence,atthisstage,thisCourtcannotpronounce
astowhetheranyincidentasallegedbythe
complainanthappenedon08.11.2014orallegedas
offencebyrespondentNo.2oroffenceasallegedwas
committedbyRajeshChopraornot.We,thus,areof
theviewthatinsofarascomplaintpertainingto
offenceunderSections323,Section504andSection506I.P.C.against
RajeshChopraisconcerned,saidcomplaintshallbe
38
proceededwithandtheorderdated17.01.2017isupheld
totheaboveextentonly,i.e.,summoningofRajesh
ChopraunderSections323,Section504andSection506.
32.Inresult,
(i)CriminalAppealNos.594,598,599,597and
596of2019(arisingoutofSLP(Crl.)Nos.
8103,8050,8052,8042and8041of2018)are
allowed.Thecomplaintaswellassummoning
orderdated17.01.2017issetasideinsofar
astheappellantsintheabove-mentioned
criminalappealsareconcerned.
(ii)CriminalAppealNo.595of2019(arisingout
ofSLP(Crl.)No.8039of2018–Rajesh
ChopraVs.TheStateofUttarPradeshAnr.)
ispartlyallowed.Thecomplaintaswellas
summoningorderissetasideinsofaras
offenceunderSection498AandSection3/4
ofD.P.Actisconcerned,however,complaint
shallproceedinsofarasoffenceunder
39
Sections323,Section504andSection506ofI.P.C.and
summoningordertothatextentonlyis
upheld.
………………….J.
(ASHOKBHUSHAN)
………………….J.
(K.M.JOSEPH)
NewDelhi,
April30,2019.
40