REPORTABLE

INTHESUPREMECOURTOFINDIA
CRIMINALAPPELLATEJURISDICTION

CRIMINALAPPEALNO.594of2019
(arisingoutofSLP(Crl.)No.8103/2018)

RASHMICHOPRA…APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THESTATEOFUTTARPRADESHANR….RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINALAPPEALNO.598of2019
(arisingoutofSLP(Crl.)No.8050/2018)

ANITAGANDHI…APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THESTATEOFUTTARPRADESHANR….RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINALAPPEALNO.599of2019
(arisingoutofSLP(Crl.)No.8052/2018)

NAYANCHOPRATHROUGHPOAHOLDER
RAJESHCHOPRA…APPELLANT(S)

SignatureNotVerifiedVERSUS
Digitallysignedby
SANJAYKUMAR
Date:2019.04.30
16:49:08IST
Reason:
THESTATEOFUTTARPRADESHANR….RESPONDENT(S)

1
WITH

CRIMINALAPPEALNO.597of2019
(arisingoutofSLP(Crl.)No.8042/2018)

AMITCHOPRA…APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THESTATEOFUTTARPRADESHANR….RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINALAPPEALNO.596of2019
(arisingoutofSLP(Crl.)No.8041/2018)

KULDEEPGANDHI…APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THESTATEOFUTTARPRADESHANR….RESPONDENT(S)

AND

CRIMINALAPPEALNO.595of2019
(arisingoutofSLP(Crl.)No.8039/2018)

RAJESHCHOPRA…APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THESTATEOFUTTARPRADESHANR….RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

ASHOKBHUSHAN,J.

Theseappealshavebeenfiledchallengingthe

judgmentofAllahabadHighCourtdated08.08.2018by

2
whichtheapplicationunderSection482Cr.P.C.filed

bytheappellantsprayingforquashingthecomplaint

andproceedingsinComplaintCaseNo.4967of2015have

beendismissed.

2.Alltheappealshavingbeenfiledagainstthesame

judgment,factsofthecasearebeingtakenfrom

CriminalAppealNo.594of2019–RashmiChopraOrs.

Vs.TheStateofUttarPradeshAnr.,inwhichcriminal

appeal,replyaffidavitandrejoinderaffidavithave

beenfiled.Thebackgroundfactsofthecasenecessary

tobenotedfordecidingtheseappealsare:-

2.1NayanChopra,sonofRashmiChopraandRajesh

ChopragotmarriedwithVanshikaBobal,

daughterofrespondentNo.2,IndrajeetSingh

on15.04.2012.Alltheappellantsarefamily

membersofNayanChopra.RashmiChoprais

mother,RajeshChopraisfather,AmitChopra

isBrotherandAnitaGandhiisMother’s

SisterofNayanChopra,whereasKuldeep

GandhiishusbandofAnitaGandhi.Nayan

3
Choprawithhismother,fatherandbrother

areresidentof203,JaintiApartment,Police

Station–Begumpet,Hyderabad(Andhra

Pradesh).AnitaGandhiandKuldeepGandhi

areresidentofGreaterKailash–I,New

Delhi.

2.2AfterthemarriageofNayanChopraand

Vanshika,whichwasperformedatNoida,

DistrictGautamBuddhaNagaron15.04.2012,

Vanshikawentalongwithherhusbandat

Hyderabad,thematrimonialhomeofVanshika.

On28.04.2012,VanshikaandNayanChopraleft

fortheU.S.A.OnoraboutNovember,2013,

VanshikaandNayanChopraseparated.On

23.10.2014,anapplicationwasfiledbyNayan

ChopraintheCircuitCourtfortheCounty

ofKalamazooFamilyDivision,Michigan,USA,

seekingdivorce.

2.3On10.11.2014,acomplaintwassentby

respondentNo.2throughregisteredpostto

theSuperintendentofPolice,GautamBuddha

4
Nagar,Noidamakingallegationsagainst

RajeshChopraandtwootherunknownpersons.

AnapplicationunderSection156(3)wasfiled

byrespondentNo.2.Theapplicationofthe

respondentNo.2wassentbytheMagistrate

toMediationCentrerunningunderthe

DistrictLegalServicesAuthorityfor

counselling.Afterfailureofcounselling

andmediation,anapplicationunderSection

156(3)Cr.P.C.wasfiledbyrespondentNo.2

dated10.05.2015makingallegationsagainst

alltheappellantsunderSection498Aand

Sections3/Section4ofDowryProhibitionAct.

2.4Inthecomplaint,allegationshavebeenmade

onthebasisofincidentdated08.11.2014

againstRajeshChopraandhisassociates.It

wasallegedthatRajeshChopracallthe

respondentNo.2neartheGurudwaraatSector

18,NoidatotalkabouttheproblemofNayan

ChopraandVanshikaandwhenrespondentNo.2

wentfortalks,hemetRajeshChoprawithtwo

unknownpersons.RespondentNo.2further

5
allegesthatonhisrequesttoaccepthis

daughter,RajeshChoprarepeatedhisdemand

ofonecrorerupeesandusedfilthywords

againstVanshika,whichwasobjectedby

respondentNo.2,onwhichRajeshChopraand

hisassociatesbecameannoyedandtheyabused

andbeattherespondentNo.2andsnatchedhis

goldchainfromhisneckandRs.60,000/-from

hispocket.Theallegationswithinthe

meaningofSections323,Section324,Section504,Section506,Section392

ofI.P.C.weremadeonthebasisofthe

aforesaidincident.Intheapplication,it

wasalsostatedthatNayanChoprahasfiled

apetitionfordissolutionofmarriagein

America.

2.5Onthebasisoftheapplicationofdivorce

byNayanChopra,theCircuit9thCourtfor

theCountyofKalamazooFamilyDivision,

Michigangaveajudgmentofdivorceon

24.02.2016.Theorderofjudgmentofdivorce

waspassedafterhearingbothNayanChopra

andVanshikaBobal,whowererepresented

6
throughattorneys.Thejudgmentofdivorce

madeprovisionsforalimony,pension

benefitsandretirementbenefits,life

insurance,propertysettlementandprovision

inlieuofdower,mutualreleaseofclaims

andotherprovisions.

2.6TheapplicationunderSection156(3)Cr.P.C.

filedbyrespondentNo.2wastreatedasa

complaintandregisteredasComplaintNo.

4967of2015,onwhichthelearnedJudicial

Magistrate,GautamBudhNagarissueda

summoningorderon17.01.2017summoningthe

appellantsunderSections498A,Section323,Section504,Section506

ofI.P.C.andSection3/Section4ofDowry

ProhibitionAct.

2.7Theappellantsfiledanapplicationunder

Section482Cr.P.C.intheHighCourtpraying

forquashingthecomplaintandproceedings

andorderdated17.01.2017inComplaintCase

No.4967of2015.Intheapplicationunder

Section482Cr.P.C.,HighCourtpassedan

7
orderreferringthemattertomediation

centreofAllahabadHighCourt.The

mediationhavingfailedbetweentheparties,

applicationunderSection482Cr.P.C.was

heard.Theprayeroftheappellantstoquash

thecomplaintandproceedingshavebeen

refused.Theapplicationwasdisposedof

afterdirectingthattheapplicantsmay

surrenderinthecourtbelowandmakean

applicationforbailwithinaperiodoftwo

months.Aggrievedagainstthejudgmentof

theHighCourt,theseappealshavebeen

filed.

3.Allappealsariseoutofthesameorderpassedin

theirapplicationunderSection482Cr.P.C.

4.WehaveheardShriShikhilSuri,learnedcounsel

fortheappellantsandShriSantoshKrishnan,learned

AORappearingfortherespondentNo.2.Wehavealso

heardlearnedcounselfortheStateofUttarPradesh.

8

5.Learnedcounselfortheappellantssubmitsthat

HighCourtfailedtoexercisejurisdictionunder

Section482Cr.P.C.inquashingtheentirecomplaint

proceedings,whichproceedingsarenothingbutabuse

oftheprocessofthecourt.Itissubmittedthat

NayanChopraandVanshikaBobalhadalreadybeen

granteddivorcebyFamilyCourtofMichigan,whichfact

wasnotbroughtintonoticeoftheMagistrateby

respondentNo.2beforesummoningorderwaspassed.It

issubmittedthatareadingofthecomplaintdoesnot

primafaciedisclosesanyoffenceunderSection498A

andSection3/Section4ofDowryProhibitionActagainstthe

appellants.Theappellants,AnitaGandhiandKuldeep

Gandhiseparatelyresidesandtheyhavenevermet

Vanshika,thegirlaftermarriage.Theallegationsin

thecomplaintarevague,sweepingandgeneral.The

complaintisnotevenfiledbyVanshika,thegirlnor

shegotherstatementrecordedinsupportofthe

complaint.Insofarasincidentallegedon08.11.2014

atSector18,Noidanosuchincidenttookplaceand

allegationsarefalseandconcoctedtosomehowropein

RajeshChopra,thefatheroftheboyNayanChopra.The

9
complainthasnotbeenfiledbycompetentperson,hence

oughtnottohavebeenentertained.

6.ShriSantoshKrishnan,learnedcounselappearing

forrespondentNo.2submitsthatthereisnoerrorin

summoningoftheappellantsbytheMagistratebyorder

dated17.01.2017.ItiswellsettledthatMagistrate

isnotrequiredtorecordelaboratereasonsfor

summoningofanaccused.Thecomplaintdiscloses

severalallegationspertainingtooffenceunderSection

498Aandotheroffencesmentionedtherein.Twocourts

havingtakenoneparticularviewofthematter,this

Courtmaynotexerciseitsjurisdictionininterfering

withtheorders.ItisfurthersubmittedthatSection

498Adoesnotindicatethatcomplaintonbehalfofthe

womenhastobefiledbythewomenherself.The

complainwasfullycompetentandnoerrorhasbeen

committedbyMagistrateintakingcognizanceofthe

complaint.

7.Learnedcounselforthepartieshaveplaced

relianceonvariousjudgmentsofthisCourtinsupport

10
oftheirsubmissions,whichshallbereferredtowhile

consideringthesubmissionsindetail.

8.Wehaveconsideredthesubmissionsofthelearned

counselforthepartiesandhaveperusedtherecords.

9.ThecopyofthecomplaintunderSection156(3)

Cr.P.C.,whichhasbeentreatedasprivatecomplaint

byMagistratehasbeenbroughtontherecordas

AnnexureP-2.Theallegationsinthecomplaintare

thatmarriagewassolemnisedon15.04.2012inwhich

marriage,giftsofRs.50lakhsweregiventoNayan

Chopraandhisfamilymembers.Itisallegedthat

afterthemarriage,allfamilymemberswerenot

satisfiedbythegiftsandtheystartedharassingthe

daughterofrespondentNo.2bydemandingfurtherdowry

ofonecrorerupees.Theyfurtherpressurisedto

solemnisethemarriageofVanshikaasperPunjabirites

andceremonies,onwhichpressure,marriagewas

solemnisedon06.11.2012inGurudwaraatSector37,

NoidaasperPunjabiritesandceremonies.Further

allegationsarethatfamilymembersofNayanChopra

keptonthreateningVanshikatodesertherandon

11
01.12.2013NayanChoprathrewVanshikaoutofhouseand

sincethenVanshikaisresidingwithrespondentNo.2.

Anothersetofallegationsarewithregardtoincident

dated08.11.2014allegedtohavebeentakenplaceat

6.00PMneartheGurudwara,Sector-18,Noida.Itis

allegedthatRajeshChopra,fatherofNayanChopra

calledtherespondentNo.2totalkabouttheirproblem

onwhichdateRajeshChopraagainrepeatedhisdemand

ofonecrorerupeesandusedfilthywordsagainst

VanshikatowhichrespondentNo.2objected,onwhich

RajeshChopraandhisassociatesbecameannoyedand

theyabusedandbeattherespondentNo.2andsnatched

hisgoldchainfromhisneckandRs.60,000/-fromhis

pocket.Theabovetwosetsofallegationshavegiven

risetosummoningorder.Thesummoningorderpassed

bytheMagistrateon17.01.2017isasfollows:-

“ORDER

TheaccusedpersonsNayanChopra,Rajesh
Chopra,RashiChopra,AmitChopra,Kuldeep
GandhiAnitaGandhiaresummonedforthe
offenceunderSections498A,Section323,Section504,Section506
ofIPCandSection3/4ofD.P.Act.The
complainantisdirectedtotakestepsasper
Ruleswithinoneweek.Caseisfixedfor
08.03.2017forappearance.

Sd/-illegible

12
17.01.2017
(Vikas)
CivilJudge(Jr.Division)
J.M.GautamBudhNagar.”

10.Oneofthesubmissions,whichhasbeenpressedby

learnedcounselfortherespondentNo.2isthat

Magistratehastobesatisfiedthattherearegrounds

forproceedingandthereisnorequirementofgiving

anyelaboratereasonsforsummoningtheaccused.

11.Learnedcounselfortherespondenthasplaced

relianceonDy.ChiefControllerofImportsExports

Vs.RoshanlalAgarwalOrs.,(2003)4SCC139,this

CourtinparagraphNo.9ofthejudgmentlaiddown

following:-

“9.Indeterminingthequestionwhetherany
processistobeissuedornot,whatthe
Magistratehastobesatisfiediswhether
thereissufficientgroundforproceedingand
notwhetherthereissufficientgroundfor
conviction.Whethertheevidenceisadequate
forsupportingtheconviction,canbe
determinedonlyatthetrialandnotatthe
stageofinquiry.Atthestageofissuingthe
processtotheaccused,theMagistrateisnot
requiredtorecordreasons.Thisquestionwas
consideredrecentlyinSectionU.P.PollutionControl
Boardv.MohanMeakinsLtd.,(2000)3SCC745
andafternoticingthelawlaiddowninSectionKanti
BhadraShahv.StateofW.B.,(200001SCC

13
722,itwasheldasfollows:(SCCp.749,
para6)

Thelegislaturehasstressedtheneed
torecordreasonsincertain
situationssuchasdismissalofa
complaintwithoutissuingprocess.
Thereisnosuchlegalrequirement
imposedonaMagistrateforpassing
detailedorderwhileissuingsummons.
Theprocessissuedtoaccusedcannot
bequashedmerelyonthegroundthat
theMagistratehadnotpasseda
speakingorder.”

12.SamepropositionwasreiteratedbythisCourtin

NupurTalwarVs.CentralBureauofInvestigation

Anr.,(2012)11SCC465.Therecanbenodisputeto

theabovepropositionaslaiddownbythisCourtthat

whiletakingcognizanceofanoffence,aMagistrateis

notrequiredtopassadetailedorder,however,ina

casewhenMagistrateissuesprocessagainstaperson,

whoisnotevenchargedwiththeoffenceforwhichhe

issummoned,whetherinsuchcasesalsothesummoning

ordercannotbeassailed?

13.Inthepresentcase,therearetwosetsof

allegations,whicharecontainedinthecomplaint,

whichhasalsobeenrepeatedinthestatementsrecorded

14
byrespondentNo.2andhistwowitnesses–PW1–Raj

Kumar,brotherofrespondentNo.2andPW2–Deepa,wife

ofrespondentNo.2.Onesetofallegationsofoffence

underSection498AandSection3/4ofD.P.Actand

secondsetofallegationsareallegationsmadefor

offencesunderSections323,504and506ofI.P.C.

14.Wemayfirsttakeuptheallegationsforoffences

underSections323,Section504andSection506ofI.P.C.The

allegationsunderSections323,Section504andSection506hasbeen

madecitingtheincidentdated08.11.2014.Itis

usefultoextracttheentireallegationspertainingto

incidentdated08.11.2014fromthecomplaint,whichare

tothefollowingeffect:-

“…………………..On08.11.2014atabout6p.m.Nayan
Chopra’sfatherRajeshChopracalledthe
ApplicantneartheGurudwaraatSector18,
Noidatotalkabouttheirproblem.Whenthe
Applicantreachedtherefortalkthenhemet
thereRajeshChopraalongwithtwounknown
persons.WhentheApplicantrequestedRajesh
ChopratoaccepthisdaughtertheRajesh
Chopraagainrepeatedhisdemandofonecore
Rupeesandsaidthatifhehasarrangedfor
onecroreRupeesthenhecansendhis
daughterattheirhome,otherwisekeep
VanshikaathishouseandRajeshChopraused
filthywordsagainstVanshika,thenthe
Applicantobjectedforthesame,onwhich

15
RajeshChopraandhisassociatesbecame
annoyedandtheyabusedandbeatthe
Applicantandsnatchedhisgoldchainfrom
hisneckandRs.60,000/-fromhispocket.
ThewifeoftheApplicantandanumberof
otherpeoplegatheredatthespotandsaved
theApplicantfromthem.Whileleavingthese
personsthreatenedtheApplicantthatafter
arrangingforonecroreRupeeshecansend
hisdaughterattheirhouse,otherwisekeep
herathishouseandifhedaretoinformthe
policethentheywillkilltheApplicantand
hisdaughterVanshika…….”

15.Inthestatementmadebythecomplainantinsupport

ofhissubmission,complainantrepeatedthesame

allegationsregardingincidentdated08.11.2014asmade

inthecomplaint,asnotedabove.PW-2,Deepa,wife

ofrespondentNo.2hasalsoabouttheincidentdated

08.11.2014repeatedtheallegationsasnarratedinthe

complaint.Aperusaloftheallegationsinthe

complaintmakesitclearthatthecomplaintwithregard

tooffencesunderSections323,Section504andSection506hasbeen

madeonlyagainstRajeshChopraandtwounknown

persons.Neitherinthecomplaintnorstatementsmade

bycomplainantorhiswitnesses,thereisany

allegationwithregardtoaboveoffencesagainstany

otherappellantsbeforeus.Therebeingnoallegations

16
foroffencesunderSections323,504and506inthe

complaintorstatementbeforetheMagistrate,therewas

noquestionofsummoningtheotherappellantsfor

offencesunderSections323,504and506ofI.P.C.When

thecomplaintdoesnotallegeanyoffenceagainstother

appellants,wefailtoseethathowthecognizanceof

thecomplaintcanbetakenagainstotherappellants

withregardtooffencesunderSections323,504and

506.Inaboveviewofthematter,thecomplaintas

wellassummoningorderareliabletobequashed

againstalltheappellantsexceptRajeshChopradueto

theabovereasonsinaboveregard.

16.Now,wecometotheallegationsinthecomplaint

underSection498AandSection3/4ofD.P.Act.Learned

counselfortherespondentinsupportofhissubmission

thatpoweroftheHighCourtunderSection482Cr.P.C.

hastobeexercisedinexceptionalcircumstances,has

reliedonjudgmentofthisCourtinRakhiMishraVs.

StateofBiharandOthers,(2017)16SCC772.This

Courtintheabovecasehasreliedonanearlier

judgmentofthisCourtinSonuGuptaVs.DeepakGupta,

17
(2015)3SCC424,inwhichjudgment,inparagraphNo.8

followingpropositionwaslaiddown,whichhasbeen

referredtoandreliedon:-

“8.…Atthestageofcognizanceand
summoningtheMagistrateisrequiredtoapply
hisjudicialmindonlywithaviewtotake
cognizanceoftheoffence…tofindout
whetheraprimafaciecasehasbeenmadeout
forsummoningtheaccusedpersons.Atthis
stage,thelearnedMagistrateisnotrequired
toconsiderthedefenceversionormaterials
orargumentsnorisherequiredtoevaluate
themeritsofthematerialsorevidenceof
thecomplainant,becausetheMagistratemust
notundertaketheexercisetofindoutat
thisstagewhetherthematerialswouldlead
toconvictionornot.”

17.ThisCourtinRakhiMishra’scasehasalsolaid

downthatHighCourtinexceptionalcircumstancescan

exercisepowerunderSection482Cr.P.C.whenaprima

faciecaseisnotmadeoutagainsttheaccused.

ParagraphNo.5ofthejudgmentisasfollows:-

“5.Theorderpassedbythetrialcourt
takingcognizanceagainstR-2andR-4toR-9
isinconformitywiththelawlaiddownin
theabovejudgment.Itissettledlawthat
thepowerunderSection482CrPCisexercised
bytheHighCourtonlyinexceptional
circumstancesonlywhenaprimafaciecase
isnotmadeoutagainsttheaccused.Thetest
appliedbythisCourtforinterferenceatthe
initialstageofaprosecutioniswhetherthe

18
uncontrovertedallegationsprimafacie
establishacase.”

18.Learnedcounselfortheappellanthasalsorelied

onvariousjudgmentsofthisCourtinsupportofhis

submissions.InK.SubbaRaoandOthersVs.Stateof

Telangana,(2018)14SCC452,thisCourtlaiddown

followinginparagraphNos.5and6:-

“5.Aperusalofthecharge-sheetandthe
supplementarycharge-sheetdisclosesthe
factthattheappellantsarenotthe
immediatefamilymembersofthethird
respondent/husband.Theyarethematernal
unclesofthethirdrespondent.Exceptthe
baldstatementthattheysupportedthethird
respondentwhowasharassingthesecond
respondentfordowryandthattheyconspired
withthethirdrespondentfortakingawayhis
childtotheU.S.A.,nothingelseindicating
theirinvolvementinthecrimewasmentioned.
TheappellantsapproachedtheHighCourtwhen
theinvestigationwaspending.Thecharge-
sheetandthesupplementarycharge-sheetwere
filedafterdisposalofthecasebytheHigh
Court.

6.Criminalproceedingsarenotnormally
interdictedbyusattheinterlocutorystage
unlessthereisanabuseoftheprocessofa
court.ThisCourt,atthesametime,doesnot
hesitatetointerferetosecuretheendsof
justice.SectionSeeStateofHaryanav.BhajanLal,
1992Suppl.(1)SCC335.Thecourtsshould
becarefulinproceedingagainstthedistant
relativesincrimespertainingtomatrimonial
disputesanddowrydeaths.Therelativesof
thehusbandshouldnotberopedinonthe

19
basisofomnibusallegationsunlessspecific
instancesoftheirinvolvementinthecrime
aremadeout.SectionSeeKansRajv.StateofPunjab,
(2000)5SCC207andSectionKailashChandraAgrawal
v.StateofU.P.,(2014)16SCC551”

19.ThisCourtinVineetKumarandOthersVs.Stateof

UttarPradeshandAnother,(2017)13SCC369had

occasiontoexaminetheparametersofexerciseofpower

underSection482Cr.P.C.inrespectofquashingof

criminalproceeding.Oneofus(JusticeAshokBhushan)

speakingfortheBenchafterexaminingthescopeand

ambitofSection482Cr.P.C.laiddownfollowingin

ParagraphNos.22to25:-

“22.Beforeweenterintothefactsofthe
presentcaseitisnecessarytoconsiderthe
ambitandscopeofjurisdictionunderSection
482CrPCvestedintheHighCourt.Section
482CrPCsavestheinherentpoweroftheHigh
Courttomakesuchordersasmaybenecessary
togiveeffecttoanyorderunderthisCode,
ortopreventabuseoftheprocessofany
courtorotherwisetosecuretheendsof
justice.

23.ThisCourttimeandagainhasexamined
thescopeofjurisdictionoftheHighCourt
underSection482CrPCandlaiddownseveral
principleswhichgoverntheexerciseof
jurisdictionoftheHighCourtunderSection
482CrPC.Athree-JudgeBenchofthisCourt
inSectionStateofKarnatakav.L.Muniswamy,(1977)
2SCC699,heldthattheHighCourtis
entitledtoquashaproceedingifitcomes

20
totheconclusionthatallowingthe
proceedingtocontinuewouldbeanabuseof
theprocessofthecourtorthattheendsof
justicerequirethattheproceedingoughtto
bequashed.Inpara7ofthejudgment,the
followinghasbeenstated:(SCCp.703)

“7.…Intheexerciseofthis
wholesomepower,theHighCourtis
entitledtoquashaproceedingifit
comestotheconclusionthatallowing
theproceedingtocontinuewouldbean
abuseoftheprocessofthecourtor
thattheendsofjusticerequirethat
theproceedingoughttobequashed.
ThesavingoftheHighCourt’s
inherentpowers,bothinciviland
criminalmatters,isdesignedto
achieveasalutarypublicpurpose
whichisthatacourtproceedingought
nottobepermittedtodegenerateinto
aweaponofharassmentorpersecution.
Inacriminalcase,theveiledobject
behindalameprosecution,thevery
natureofthematerialonwhichthe
structureoftheprosecutionrestsand
thelikewouldjustifytheHighCourt
inquashingtheproceedinginthe
interestofjustice.Theendsof
justicearehigherthantheendsof
merelawthoughjusticehasgottobe
administeredaccordingtolawsmadeby
thelegislature.Thecompelling
necessityformakingthese
observationsisthatwithoutaproper
realisationoftheobjectandpurpose
oftheprovisionwhichseekstosave
theinherentpowersoftheHighCourt
todojustice,betweentheStateand
itssubjects,itwouldbeimpossible
toappreciatethewidthandcontours
ofthatsalientjurisdiction.”

21

24.ThejudgmentofthisCourtinSectionStateof
Haryanav.BhajanLal,1992Supp(1)SCC335,
haselaboratelyconsideredthescopeand
ambitofSection482CrPC.Althoughinthe
abovecasethisCourtwasconsideringthe
poweroftheHighCourttoquashtheentire
criminalproceedingincludingtheFIR,the
casearoseoutofanFIRregisteredunder
Sections161,Section165IPCandSection5(2)ofthe
PreventionofCorruptionAct,1947.This
Courtelaboratelyconsideredthescopeof
Section482CrPC/SectionArticle226ofthe
Constitutioninthecontextofquashingthe
proceedingsincriminalinvestigation.After
noticingvariousearlierpronouncementsof
thisCourt,thisCourtenumeratedcertain
categoriesofcasesbywayofillustration
wherepowerunderSection482CrPCcanbe
exercisedtopreventabuseoftheprocessof
theCourtorsecuretheendsofjustice.

25.Para102whichenumerates7categories
ofcaseswherepowercanbeexercisedunder
Section482CrPCisextractedasfollows:
(BhajanLalcase,SCCpp.378-79)

“102.Inthebackdropofthe
interpretationofthevariousrelevant
provisionsSectionoftheCodeunderChapter
XIVandoftheprinciplesoflaw
enunciatedbythisCourtinaseries
ofdecisionsrelatingtotheexercise
oftheextraordinarypowerunder
SectionArticle226ortheinherentpowers
underSection482oftheCodewhichwe
haveextractedandreproducedabove,
wegivethefollowingcategoriesof
casesbywayofillustrationwherein
suchpowercouldbeexercisedeither
topreventabuseoftheprocessofany
courtorotherwisetosecuretheends
ofjustice,thoughitmaynotbe
possibletolaydownanyprecise,

22
clearlydefinedandsufficiently
channelisedandinflexibleguidelines
orrigidformulaeandtogivean
exhaustivelistofmyriadkindsof
caseswhereinsuchpowershouldbe
exercised.

(1)Wheretheallegationsmadein
thefirstinformationreportor
thecomplaint,eveniftheyare
takenattheirfacevalueand
acceptedintheirentiretydonot
primafacieconstituteanyoffence
ormakeoutacaseagainstthe
accused.

(2)Wheretheallegationsinthe
firstinformationreportandother
materials,ifany,accompanying
theFIRdonotdisclosea
cognizableoffence,justifyingan
investigationbypoliceofficers
underSection156(1)oftheCode
exceptunderanorderofa
Magistratewithinthepurviewof
Section155(2)oftheCode.

(3)Wheretheuncontroverted
allegationsmadeintheFIRor
complaintandtheevidence
collectedinsupportofthesame
donotdisclosethecommissionof
anyoffenceandmakeoutacase
againsttheaccused.

(4)Wheretheallegationsinthe
FIRdonotconstituteacognizable
offencebutconstituteonlyanon-

cognizableoffence,no
investigationispermittedbya
policeofficerwithoutanorderof
aMagistrateascontemplatedunder
Section155(2)oftheCode.

23
(5)Wheretheallegationsmadein
theFIRorcomplaintaresoabsurd
andinherentlyimprobableonthe
basisofwhichnoprudentperson
caneverreachajustconclusion
thatthereissufficientground
forproceedingagainstthe
accused.

(6)Wherethereisanexpresslegal
barengraftedinanyofthe
provisionsSectionoftheCodeortheAct
concerned(underwhichacriminal
proceedingisinstituted)tothe
institutionandcontinuanceofthe
proceedingsand/orwherethereis
aspecificprovisioninSectiontheCode
ortheActconcerned,providing
efficaciousredressforthe
grievanceoftheaggrievedparty.

(7)Whereacriminalproceedingis
manifestlyattendedwithmalafide
and/orwheretheproceedingis
maliciouslyinstitutedwithan
ulteriormotiveforwreaking
vengeanceontheaccusedandwith
aviewtospitehimduetoprivate
andpersonalgrudge.”

20.Afterreferringtoseveralothercases,thisCourt

concludedandmadefollowingobservationsinParagraph

No.41:-

“41.InherentpowergiventotheHighCourt
underSection482CrPCiswiththepurpose
andobjectofadvancementofjustice.Incase
solemnprocessofCourtissoughttobe
abusedbyapersonwithsomeobliquemotive,
theCourthastothwarttheattemptatthe

24
verythreshold.TheCourtcannotpermita
prosecutiontogoonifthecasefallsinone
ofthecategoriesasillustratively
enumeratedbythisCourtinSectionStateofHaryana
v.BhajanLal.Judicialprocessisasolemn
proceedingwhichcannotbeallowedtobe
convertedintoaninstrumentofoperationor
harassment.Whentherearematerialsto
indicatethatacriminalproceedingis
manifestlyattendedwithmalafideand
proceedingismaliciouslyinstitutedwithan
ulteriormotive,theHighCourtwillnot
hesitateinexerciseofitsjurisdiction
underSection482CrPCtoquashthe
proceedingunderCategory7asenumeratedin
SectionStateofHaryanav.BhajanLal,whichisto
thefollowingeffect:(SCCp.379,para102)

“102.(7)Whereacriminalproceeding
ismanifestlyattendedwithmalafide
and/orwheretheproceedingis
maliciouslyinstitutedwithan
ulteriormotiveforwreakingvengeance
ontheaccusedandwithaviewtospite
himduetoprivateandpersonal
grudge.”

AboveCategory7isclearlyattractedinthe
factsofthepresentcase.Although,theHigh
CourthasnotedthejudgmentofSectionStateof
Haryanav.BhajanLal,butdidnotadvertto
therelevantfactsofthepresentcase,
materialsonwhichfinalreportwassubmitted
bytheIO.We,thus,arefullysatisfiedthat
thepresentisafitcasewheretheHighCourt
oughttohaveexerciseditsjurisdiction
underSection482CrPCandquashedthe
criminalproceedings.”

21.Thecriminalprosecutioncanbeallowedtoproceed

onlywhenaprimafacieoffenceisdisclosed.This

25
Courthasobservedthatjudicialprocessisasolemn

proceedingwhichcannotbeallowedtobeconvertedinto

aninstrumentofoppressionorharassment.IfHigh

Courtfindsthatproceedingsdeservetobequashedin

parametersaslaiddownbythisCourtinStateof

HaryanaVs.BhajanLal,1992Supp(1)SCC335,High

courtshallnothesitateinexerciseofjurisdiction

underSection482Cr.P.C.toquashtheproceedings.

22.Now,werevertbacktotheallegationsmadeinthe

complaintunderSection498AandSection3/4ofD.P.

Act.Fewfactshavetobenoticedbeforewelookinto

theallegationsmadeinthecomplaintintheabove

regard.Thecomplainthasbeenfiledbytherespondent

No.2beforetheC.J.M.,GautamBudhNagaron

10.05.2015,beforewhichdate,thepetitionfordivorce

hasalreadybeenfiledbyNayanChopraon23.10.2014

beforetheCircuitCourtfortheCountyofKalamazoo

FamilyDivision,Michigan.Itisontherecordthat

atthetimeoffilingofthecomplaintVanishkaBobal

waslivingatCanadawhereasNayanChoprawasliving

atU.S.A.Bothwereseparatelyliving.Itwaspleaded

26
intheapplicationfordivorcethathusbandandwife

hadseparatedonoraroundNovember,2013.Itison

therecordthatonthedaycriminalcomplaintwasfiled

on10.05.2015intheCourtofC.J.M.GautamBudhNagar

byrespondentNo.2,neitherVanishkawasinIndianor

shewasinIndiaatthetimewhenstatementswere

recordedincomplaintofcomplainantaswellashistwo

witnesses.ThecomplaintisnotbyVanishkabutithas

beenfiledbyfatherofVanishka,respondentNo.2.In

thedivorceapplicationfiledintheStateofMichigan,

VanishkaBobalwasrepresentedbyherattorney.The

divorcewasgrantedwithordersrelatingtoalimony,

pensionbenefitsandretirementbenefits,life

insurance,propertysettlementandprovisioninlieu

ofdower,mutualreleaseofclaimsandotheraspects

on24.02.2016.

23.Thereisnothingontherecordtoindicatethat

ordersofdivorcebetweenthepartieswasbroughtinto

thenoticeoftheMagistratewhenheissuedprocess

againsttheappellants.We,however,areinagreement

withthesubmissionofShriSantoshKrishanthatdecree

27
ofdivorcebetweenNayanChopraandVanshikashallnot

wipeoutanycriminaloffence,whichhasbeencommitted

withinthemeaningofSectionI.P.C.orD.P.Actandthe

criminaloffencecommittedinjurisdictionalcourthas

tobeexamineddespitethedivorcedecreehavingbeen

granted.

24.Comingbacktotheallegationsinthecomplaint

pertainingtoSection498AandSection3/4ofD.P.Act.

Aperusalofthecomplaintindicatesthatthe

allegationsagainsttheappellantsforoffenceunder

Section498AandSection3/4ofD.P.Actaregeneral

andsweeping.Nospecificincidentdatesordetails

ofanyincidenthasbeenmentionedinthecomplaint.

Thecomplainthavingbeenfiledafterproceedingfor

divorcewasinitiatedbyNayanChoprainStateof

Michigan,whereVanshikaparticipatedanddivorcewas

ultimatelygranted.Afewmonthsafterfilingofthe

divorcepetition,thecomplainthasbeenfiledinthe

CourtofC.J.M.,GautamBudhNagarwiththeallegations

asnoticedabove.Thesequenceoftheeventsandfacts

andcircumstancesofthecaseleadsustoconcludethat

thecomplaintunderSection498AandSection3/Section4of

28
D.P.Acthavebeenfiledascounterblasttodivorce

petitionproceedinginStateofMichiganbyNayan

Chopra.

25.Therebeingnospecificallegationregardingany

oneoftheapplicantsexceptcommongeneralallegation

againsteveryonei.e.“theystartedharassingthe

daughteroftheapplicantdemandingadditionaldowry

ofonecrore”andthefactthatallrelativesofthe

husband,namely,father,mother,brother,mother’s

sisterandhusbandofmother’ssisterhavebeenroped

inclearlyindicatethatapplicationunderSection

156(3)Cr.P.C.wasfiledwithaviewtoharassthe

applicants.Further,priortofilingoftheapplication

underSection156(3)Cr.P.C.therewasnocomplaintat

anypointoftimebythegirlorherfathermaking

allegationofdemandofanydowrybyanyoneofthe

applicants.WhenbothNayanChopraandVanshikastarted

livingseparatelysinceNovember,2013,hadtherebeen

anydowrydemandorharassmentthegirlwouldhave

givencomplainttoPoliceoranyotherauthority.

Further,inthedivorceproceedingsatMichigan,

29
U.S.A.,partieshaveagreedfordividingtheir

propertiesincludinggiftsgivenatmarriagebutno

complaintwasmadeinthoseproceedingsregarding

harassmentbyherhusbandorhisfamilymembers.The

judgmentofthedivorcecontainsfollowingclauses

regarding“PropertySettlementandProvisioninLieu

ofDower”:

“PROPERTYSETTLEMENTAND
PROVISIONINLIEUOFDOWER

1.Eachpartyaffirmsthatheorshefully
andaccuratelydisclosedalltheassetsowned
byhimorherinwhichheorshehasany
interest.Byaffixingtheirsignatureson
thisJudgment,PlaintiffandDefendantaffirm
thateachhasdisclosedallassetseachowns
orhasanyinterestin,whetherheldbyhim
orherindividually,bybothofthemjointly
orwithanyotherpersonorentity,orby
anotherpersonorentityforthebenefitof
aparty.Thepropertydivisionsetforthin
thisJudgmentofDivorceisintendedtobea
distributionandallocationofallthe
propertyofthepartiesandalsoisintended
todeclaretheparties’propertyinterests
asofentryofthisJudgmentofDivorce.If
eitherpartyhasfailed,eitherintentionally
orunintentionally,todiscloseanyofhis
orherassets,theissueofpropertydivision
maybereopenedonthemotionofeitherparty
todetermineandresolvethedistributionof
anypreviouslyundisclosedassets.

2.Itappearstothecourtthatthe
partieshavedividedbetweenthemtotheir
mutualsatisfactionallarticlesofpersonal
property,householdfurnitureand

30
appliances,cash,savingsandchecking
accountsandvehiclesexceptasprovided
below.Thepersonalpropertyassodivided
shallbethesoleandabsolutepropertyof
thepartyinwhosepossessionorunderwhose
controleachofthearticlesofpersonal
propertyarenowfoundandeachshalldefend
andholdtheotherharmlessfromliability
thereon.

a.Thepartiesagreetoreturnalljewelry
totheotherpartythattheycurrently
haveintheirpossession,whichwas
acquiredasaresultoftheirmarriage.
Plaintifftestifiedthatheonlyhad
oneitemofjewelryandprovidedthe
onlyjewelryhehadinhispossession
toDefendant-asinglegoldring.

Plaintifftestifiedshedoesnothave
anyjewelryinherpossession.

b.Thepartiesagreethattheirrespective
parentswillreturntotheother
party’sparents,alljewelrygivenas
giftstotheirparentsandareintheir
parent’spossession,whichwasacquired
bythemasaresultoftheparties’
marriage.Theparentsagreetoexchange
atamutuallyagreeduponlocationand
atamutuallyagreedupontime.

3.Exceptasotherwiseprovidedherein,
eachpartyshallbeliableforthedebts
incurredbyhimorherafterseparation
(11/1/2013)andshalldefendandholdthe
otherharmlessfromallliabilitythereon.

4.Exceptasprovideherein,eachparty
shallbeliableforthedebtsinhisorher
nameandforthedebtsassociatedwith
propertyawardedtohim/herpursuanttothe
JudgmentofDivorceandshalldefendandhold

31
theotherharmlessfromallliability
therein.

5.Exceptasotherwiseprovidedherein,
eachpartyshallretainallmoniesintheir
respectivenames,includingbutnotlimited
tocheckingaccounts,savingsaccounts,
certificatesofdeposit,stocks,bonds,IRAs
or401Ks.

6.Therearenojointdebtsoftheparties
exceptasprovidedherein.

7.Plaintiff,NAYANCHOPRA,shallreceive
the2013HondaCRVfreeandclearfromany
claimoftheDefendant,VANSHIKABOBAL,and
thePlaintiffassumesandagreestopaythe
liabilitythereonandtodefendandholdthe
Defendantharmlessthereon.Defendantshall
transfertitleofsuchvehiclestothe
Plaintiffiftransferringisneeded.

8.Plaintiff,NAYANCHOPRA,shallreceive
the2005ToyotaCamryfreeandclearfromany
claimoftheDefendant,VANSHIKABOBAL,and
thePlaintiffassumesandagreestopaythe
liabilitythereonandtodefendandholdthe
Defendantharmlessthereon.

9.Theprovisionsforeachpartyherein
madeforthepartiesshallbeinlieuofthe
dowerorspousalrightinthelandsofthe
otherandeachshallhereafterholdtheir
remaininglandsfree,clearanddischarged
fromanysuchdower,spousalrightandclaim
andsaidprovisionshallbeinfull
satisfactionofallclaimseithermayhave
inanypropertywhichtheotherowns,ormay
hereafterown,inwhicheitherhasormay
hereafterhaveaninterest.

10.Thepartieswarrantthatneitherhas
incurredanydebtintheotherparty’sname,
oronwhichtheotherpartymaybeliable,

32
whichisnotexpresslydisposedofinthis
Judgment.

11.ThisJudgmentofDivorceshall
constituteaterminationofallrightsofa
survivingspouseincluding,butnotlimited
to,homesteadallowance,election,exempt
property,settlementandfamilyallowanceby
eachpartyinthepropertyoftheother,and
aterminationofallbenefitswhichwould
otherwisepasstoonepartyfromtheother
bytestateandintestate,successionorby
virtueofanyprovisionofanywillexecuted
priortotheentryofthisJudgmentof
Divorce.”

26.Theabovejudgmentindivorceproceedings

indicatesthatNayanChopraandVanshikahavesettled

allissuesbetweenthemincludingdivisionof

propertiesatthetimewhendivorceproceedingswere

inprogressatMichiganandboththepartieswerenot

inIndia,thecomplaintunderSection156(3)Cr.P.C.

hadbeenfiledmakingallegationunderSection498Aof

IPCandtheSectionDowryProhibitionActonlytoharassand

putpressureontheapplicants.

27.Oneobservationalsoneedstobemadewithregard

toorderpassedbytheHighCourt.HighCourtinits

impugnedjudgmenthasnotreferredtoallegationsmade

inthecomplaintexceptnoticingthesummoningorder

33
hasbeenpassedandnoticingtheprinciplesoflaw.

ThisCourthadoccasiontoconsiderasimilarorder

passedbytheHighCourtrejectingtheapplication

underSection482Cr.P.C.inJagdishPrasadandOthers

Vs.StateofUttarPradeshandAnother,(2019)2SCC

184.InthesaidcasealsounderSection482Cr.P.C.

proceedings,thechallengewasmadetosummoningorder

aswellasentireproceedingsofcomplaintcasewhere

allegationsunderSections498AandSection323IPCaswellas

Section3/4ofD.P.Actweremade.InparagraphNo.3,

thefactsgivingrisetofilingtheapplicationunder

Section482Cr.P.C.beforetheHighCourthasbeen

noted.ThisCourtmadefollowingobservationsin

paragraphNos.6to9:-

“6.Havingheardthelearnedcounselforthe
partiesandonperusaloftherecordofthe
caseweareinclinedtosetasidethe
impugnedorderandremandthecasetothe
HighCourtfordecidingtheappellants’
application,outofwhichthisappealarises,
afreshonmeritsinaccordancewithlaw.

7.Onperusaloftheimpugnedorder,wefind
thattheSingleJudgehasquotedthe
principlesoflawlaiddownbythisCourtin
severaldecisionsrelatingtopowersofthe
HighCourtontheissueofinterferencein
casesfiledunderSection482oftheCode
frompara2totheconcludingparabuthas

34
notreferredtothefactsofthecaseto
appreciatethecontroversyofthecase.We
are,therefore,unabletoknowthefactual
matrixofthecaseafterreadingtheimpugned
judgmentexceptthelegalprincipleslaid
downbythisCourtinseveraldecisions.

8.Inourview,theSingleJudgeoughtto
havefirstsetoutthebrieffactsofthe
casewithaviewtounderstandthefactual
matrixandthenexaminedthechallengemade
totheproceedingsinthelightofthe
principlesoflawlaiddownbythisCourt
withaviewtorecordthefindingsonthe
groundsurgedbytheappellantsastowhether
anyinterferencethereiniscalledforor
not.Wefindthattheaforementionedexercise
wasnotdonebytheHighCourtwhilepassing
theimpugnedorder.

9.We,therefore,findourselvesunableto
concurwithsuchdisposaloftheapplication
bytheHighCourtandfeelinclinedtoset
asidetheimpugnedorderandremandthecase
totheHighCourt(SingleJudge)witha
requesttodecidetheapplicationafreshon
meritsinaccordancewithlawkeepinginview
theaforementionedobservations.Having
formedanopiniontoremandthecaseinthe
lightofourreasoningmentionedabove,we
donotconsideritpropertogointothe
meritsofthecase.”

28.WhatwassaidbythisCourtinparagraphNo.7and

8oftheabovejudgmentissquarelyapplicableinthe

factsofthepresentcaseandtheorderoftheHigh

Courtdeservestobesetasideonthisgroundalone.

35

29.Oneofthesubmissions,whichhasbeenmadebythe

learnedcounselfortheappellantalsoneedstobe

considered.Learnedcounselfortheappellanthad

submittedthatcomplainthasnotbeenfiledbya

competentperson.Itissubmittedthatcomplaintis

notmadebyVanshika,buthasbeenfiledonlybyfather

ofVanshika,henceitisnotmaintainable.Theabove

submissionhasbeenrefutedbyShriSantoshKrishnan.

Hesubmitsthatitisnotnecessarythatacomplaint

underSection498Ashouldbefiledonlybythevictim

ofoffence.Hesubmitsthatcomplaintfiledbyfather

ofthevictim,respondentNo.2wasalsofully

maintainable.Section498Aprovidesasfollows:-

“498A.Husbandorrelativeofhusbandofa
womansubjectinghertocruelty.—Whoever,
beingthehusbandortherelativeofthe
husbandofawoman,subjectssuchwomanto
crueltyshallbepunishedwithimprisonment
foratermwhichmayextendtothreeyears
andshallalsobeliabletofine.

Explanation.—Forthepurposeofthissection,
“cruelty”means—

(a)anywilfulconductwhichisofsuch
anatureasislikelytodrivethe
womantocommitsuicideortocause
graveinjuryordangertolife,

36
limborhealth(whethermentalor
physical)ofthewoman;or

(b)harassmentofthewomanwheresuch
harassmentiswithaviewto
coercingheroranypersonrelated
tohertomeetanyunlawfuldemand
foranypropertyorvaluable
securityorisonaccountof
failurebyheroranyperson
relatedtohertomeetsuch
demand.”

30.Section498Aprovidesforanoffencewhenhusband

ortherelativeofthehusband,subjecthertocruelty.

ThereisnothinginSection498A,whichmayindicate

thatwhenawomanissubjectedtocruelty,acomplaint

hastobefilednecessarilybythewomensosubjected.

AperusalofSection498A,asextractedabove,

indicatesthattheprovisiondoesnotcontemplatethat

complaintforoffenceunderSection498Ashouldbe

filedonlybywomen,whoissubjectedtocrueltyby

husbandorhisrelative.We,thus,areoftheview

thatcomplaintfiledbyrespondentNo.2,thefatherof

Vanshikacannotbesaidtobenotmaintainableonthis

ground.We,thus,rejectthesubmissionofthecounsel

37
fortheappellantthatcomplaintfiledbyrespondent

No.2wasnotmaintainable.

31.Inviewoftheforegoingdiscussions,insofaras

theoffenceunderSection498AandSection3/4ofD.P.

Actisconcerned,weareoftheviewthatpresentisa

case,whichiscoveredbyCategory7asenumeratedby

StateofHaryanaVs.BhajanLal(supra)andtheHigh

CourterredinrefusingtoexerciseunderSection482

Cr.P.C.We,however,observethatinsofaras

allegationsagainstRajeshChoprapertainingto

Sections323,Section504andSection506ofIPCisconcerned,there

werespecificallegations,whichwerealsosupported

bythecomplainantandhistwowitnessesinthe

evidence,atthisstage,thisCourtcannotpronounce

astowhetheranyincidentasallegedbythe

complainanthappenedon08.11.2014orallegedas

offencebyrespondentNo.2oroffenceasallegedwas

committedbyRajeshChopraornot.We,thus,areof

theviewthatinsofarascomplaintpertainingto

offenceunderSections323,Section504andSection506I.P.C.against

RajeshChopraisconcerned,saidcomplaintshallbe

38
proceededwithandtheorderdated17.01.2017isupheld

totheaboveextentonly,i.e.,summoningofRajesh

ChopraunderSections323,Section504andSection506.

32.Inresult,

(i)CriminalAppealNos.594,598,599,597and

596of2019(arisingoutofSLP(Crl.)Nos.

8103,8050,8052,8042and8041of2018)are

allowed.Thecomplaintaswellassummoning

orderdated17.01.2017issetasideinsofar

astheappellantsintheabove-mentioned

criminalappealsareconcerned.

(ii)CriminalAppealNo.595of2019(arisingout

ofSLP(Crl.)No.8039of2018–Rajesh

ChopraVs.TheStateofUttarPradeshAnr.)

ispartlyallowed.Thecomplaintaswellas

summoningorderissetasideinsofaras

offenceunderSection498AandSection3/4

ofD.P.Actisconcerned,however,complaint

shallproceedinsofarasoffenceunder

39
Sections323,Section504andSection506ofI.P.C.and

summoningordertothatextentonlyis

upheld.

………………….J.

(ASHOKBHUSHAN)

………………….J.

(K.M.JOSEPH)
NewDelhi,
April30,2019.

40