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S vs J on 17 April, 2018

$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Date of Decision: 17th April, 2018

+ CM(M) 750/2017 CM No.25674/2017

S …. Petitioner
Through: Mr. Tanmaya Mehta and Mr.
Anunaya Mehta, Advocates.

versus

J ….. Respondent
Through: In person

CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE J.R. MIDHA
JUDGMENT

1. Following important questions of law have arisen for
consideration in this petition:-

I. What is the nature of proceedings under Section 26 of
the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,
2005 (hereinafter referred to as ‘D.V. Act’) ?
II. What procedure is to be followed by the Court in
adjudicating an application under Section 26 of the D.V.
Act ?

III. Whether the Court is bound to follow Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.P.C.’) to
adjudicate an application under Section 26 of the D.V.
Act ?

2. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 28th March, 2017
whereby the Family Court dismissed the petitioner’s application under

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 1 of 33
Order XIV Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘C.P.C.’) for framing of additional issues.

3. Brief Facts
3.1. On 10th April, 2013, the petitioner instituted a petition for
dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty under Section 13(1)
(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Along with the aforesaid
petition, the petitioner filed an application under Section 26 of
D.V.Act seeking reliefs under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the
D.V. Act.

3.2. On 27th March, 2015, the Family Court framed the following
issues:

“a) Whether the petitioner was treated with cruelty by
the respondent after solemnization of marriage?

(OPP)
b) Relief?”

3.3. On 27th October, 2016, the petitioner filed an application under
Order XIV Rule 5 of the C.P.C. for framing of following additional
issues with respect to the reliefs sought by the petitioner in the
application under Section 26 of the D.V. Act:

“i. Whether the petitioner is entitled to a Protection Order
under Section 18 of the Domestic Violence Act? (OPP)
ii. Whether the petitioner is entitled to a Residence Order
under Section 19 of the Domestic Violence Act? (OPP)
iii. Whether the petitioner is entitled to Monetary Relief
under Section 20 of the Domestic Violence Act? (OPP)
iv. Whether the petitioner is entitled to an Order under
Section 21 of the Domestic Violence Act? (OPP)
v. Whether the petitioner is entitled to an Order under
Section 22 of the Domestic Violence Act? (OPP)”

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 2 of 33

3.4. On 28th March, 2017, the Family Court dismissed the
application on the ground that the proceedings under Section 26 of the
D.V. Act shall be governed by Cr.P.C. which does not provide for
framing of issues and therefore, the additional issues cannot be
framed. The relevant portion of the order dated 28 th March, 2017 is
reproduced hereunder:

“6.1 Nonetheless, the reliefs sought by way of
application cannot be said to be reliefs sought in
the main petition. The issue requiring
adjudication in the main petition u/sec. 13(1)(i-a)
of the HMA is whether the conduct of the
respondent had been cruel towards the petitioner;
so as to entitle her to seek dissolution of marriage.
6.2 Further, a study of provisions of PW D.V. Act
reveal that the proceedings shall be governed by
procedures of Cr.PC. This has been so stipulated
u/sec. 28 of the PW D.V. Act. Needless to say
Code of Criminal Procedure does not provide for
framing of issues, therefore, this Court is of the
opinion that additional issues sought to be framed
cannot be framed in the petition under Section
13(1)(i-a) of the HMA.

7. Petitioner shall, however, be within her rights to
seek the aforesaid reliefs, which she has agitated
in her application u/sec. 26 of the HMA. The
application is, therefore, meritless and is
accordingly dismissed.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

4. Petitioner’s contentions
The reliefs under the D.V.Act can be sought in pending legal
proceedings before the Family Court under Section 26 of the Act and
Section 28 empowers the Court to lay down its own procedure for
disposal of an application under the D.V. Act. In that view of the

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 3 of 33
matter, it is not mandatory for the Family Court to follow Cr.P.C.

Reliance is placed on Shambhu Prasad Singh v. Manjari, 2012 (190)
DLT 647 (DB), Rattan Deep v. Susha, 2016 (2) RCR (Civil) 798
(Delhi), and Rajkumar Rampal Pandey v. Sarita Rajkumar Pandey,
2010 (5) RCR (Civil) 151.

5. Respondent’s contentions
The Family Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the
petitioner’s application under the D.V. Act. The petitioner’s
application under D.V. Act is liable to be dismissed for want of
jurisdiction and no issues can be framed. The Family Court has rightly
dismissed the petitioner’s application. Reliance is placed on Capt.
C.V.S. Ravi v. Ratna Sailaja, 2009(1) MWN (Cr.) 472, M.A.Mony v.
M.P. Leelamma, 2007 Cr LJ 2604, Neetu Singh v. Sunil Singh, AIR
2008 Chh 1, Nandkishor v. Kavita Criminal Application
No.2970/2008 decided by Bombay High Court on 5 th August, 2009,
Dr. Preceline George v. State of Kerala, (2010) 1 KLT 454 and Shalu
Ojha v. Prashant Ojha, (2015) 2 SCC 99.

6. Petitioners’ response to the judgments cited by the respondent

6.1. In Capt. C.V.S. Ravi v. Ratna Sailaja, 2009 (1) MWN (Cr.)
472, relied upon by the respondent, the husband sought transfer of the
wife’s application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act pending before
the Magistrate to the Family Court. The Madras High Court held that
though the reliefs available under Sections 18 to 22 of D.V. Act may
be claimed in any proceedings before the Family Court but the
pending application before the Magistrate under Section 12 cannot be
transferred to the Family Court. This judgement is not relevant as the

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 4 of 33
present case does not relate to transfer of an application from the
Magistrate to the Family Court.

6.2. In M.A.Mony v. M.P. Leelamma, 2007 Cr LJ 2604, the husband
sought transfer of the wife’s application under Section 12 of the D.V.
Act pending before the Magistrate to the Family Court where the
divorce case was pending. The Kerala High Court rejected the prayer
for transfer of the petition. This judgement is not relevant as the
present case does not relate to transfer of an application from the
Magistrate to the Family Court.

6.3. In Neetu Singh v. Sunil Singh, AIR 2008 Chh 1, the wife filed
an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act before the Family
Court which was returned to be filed before the Competent Court.
The Chhattisgarh High Court upheld the order holding that the
application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act can be entertained only
by the Magistrate having jurisdiction whereas the Family Court is
competent to entertain an application under Section 26 in a pending
matter. This judgment does not help the respondent as the petitioner
has filed the application under Section 26 of the D.V. Act before the
Family Court in a pending divorce petition.

6.4. In Nandkishor v. Kavita Criminal Application No.2970/2008
decided by Bombay High Court on 5th August, 2009, the husband
challenged the order passed by the Magistrate under Section 23 of the
D.V. Act without calling for the report from the protection officer.
Bombay High Court dismissed the petition holding that it is not
mandatory to obtain the report from the protection officer. This
judgment has no relevance to the present case.

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 5 of 33

6.5. In Dr. Preceline George v. State of Kerala, (2010) 1 KLT 454,
the husband challenged the ex parte interim order passed by the
Magistrate under Section 23 of the D.V. Act in an application under
Section 12 of the D.V. Act. The Kerala High Court laid down the
guidelines for the Trial Courts which have no relevance to the present
case.

6.6. In Shalu Ojha v. Prashant Ojha, (2015) 2 SCC 99, the
Supreme Court dealt with the power of the Sessions Court to dismiss
the husband’s appeal on the ground of not making the payment in
terms of the conditional interim order. This judgment is not relevant to
the facts of the present case.

7. Relevant portions of the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005
7.1. Statement of Objects and Reasons of the D.V. Act The
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 was enacted
on 13th September, 2005 and came into force on 26th October, 2006.
The Statement Objects and Reasons of the Act record that the civil law
does not address the phenomenon of domestic violence and therefore,
a law be enacted to provide a remedy in civil law for protection of
women from being victims of domestic violence. The relevant portion
of the Statement of Objects and Reasons is reproduced hereunder:-

“INTRODUCTION
The Vienna Accord of 1994 and the Beijing Declaration
and the Platform for Action (1995) have acknowledged
that domestic violence is undoubtedly a human rights
issue. The United Nations Committee on Convention on
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women in its General Recommendations has

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 6 of 33
recommended that State parties should act to protect
women against violence of any kind, especially that
occurring within the family. The phenomenon of domestic
violence in India is widely prevalent but has remained
invisible in the public domain. The civil law does not
address this phenomenon in its entirety. Presently, where
a woman is subjected to cruelty by her husband or his
relatives, it is an offence under section 498A of the Indian
Penal Code. In order to provide a remedy in the civil law
for the protection of women from being victims of domestic
violence and to prevent the occurance of domestic violence
in the society the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Bill was introduced in the Parliament.
STATEMENT OF OBJECT AND REASONS
Domestic violence is undoubtedly a human rights issue
and serious deterrent to development. The Vienna Accord
of 1994 and the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for
Action (1995) have acknowledged this. The United Nations
Committee on Convention on Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (C E D A W) in it’s
General Recommendation No. XII (1989) has
recommended that State Parties should act to protect
women against violence of any kind especially that
occulting within the family.

2. The phenomenon of domestic violence is widely
prevalent but has remained largely invisible in the public
domain. Presently, where a woman is subjected to cruelty
by her husband or his relatives, it is an offence under
Section 498A of IPC. The Civil Law does not however
address this phenomenon in its entirety.

3. It, is therefore, proposed to enact a law keeping in view
of the rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the
Constitution to provide for a remedy under the Civil Law
which is intended to protect the woman from being victims
of domestic violence and to prevent the occurrence of
domestic violence in the society…”

(Emphasis Supplied)

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 7 of 33
7.2. Civil rights under the D.V. Act
Sections 17 to 23 of the D.V. Act enumerate following civil rights:-

– Right to reside in a shared household under Section 17.

– Protection orders under Section 18.

– Residence orders under Section 19.

– Monetary reliefs under Section 20.

– Custody orders under Section 21.

– Compensation orders under Section 22.

– Interim orders under Section 23.

7.3. Procedure for seeking relief under D.V.Act
Section 12 of the D.V. Act empowers an aggrieved person to approach
the Magistrate to seek any of the reliefs mentioned under Sections 17
to 23 of the Act. Section 12 of the D.V. Act is reproduced hereunder:

“Section 12. Application to Magistrate.–
(1) An aggrieved person or a Protection Officer or any
other person on behalf of the aggrieved person may
present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or
more reliefs under this Act: Provided that before passing
any order on such application, the Magistrate shall take
into consideration any domestic incident report received
by him from the Protection Officer or the service provider.
(2) The relief sought for under sub-section (1) may include
a relief for issuance of an order for payment of
compensation or damages without prejudice to the right of
such person to institute a suit for compensation or
damages for the injuries caused by the acts of domestic
violence committed by the respondent: Provided that
where a decree for any amount as compensation or
damages has been passed by any court in favour of the
aggrieved person, the amount, if any, paid or payable in
pursuance of the order made by the Magistrate under this
Act shall be set off against the amount payable under such
decree and the decree shall, notwithstanding anything
contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908), or any other law for the time being in force, be

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 8 of 33
executable for the balance amount, if any, left after such
set off.

(3) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be in
such form and contain such particulars as may be
prescribed or as nearly as possible thereto.
(4) The Magistrate shall fix the first date of hearing, which
shall not ordinarily be beyond three days from the date of
receipt of the application by the court.
(5) The Magistrate shall endeavour to dispose of every
application made under sub-section (1) within a period of
sixty days from the date of its first hearing.”

7.4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Court, Family Court and Criminal
Court to grant relief in pending suits and other legal proceedings
If any suit or legal proceedings are pending before any Civil Court,
Family Court or Criminal Court, affecting aggrieved party, Section 26
empowers the aggrieved person to approach such Court for the relief
under Sections 18 to 22 of the D.V.Act. Section 26 of the D.V. Act is
reproduced hereunder:

“Section 26. Relief in other suits and legal
proceedings.–

(1) Any relief available under sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and
22 may also be sought in any legal proceeding, before a
civil court, family court or a criminal court, affecting the
aggrieved person and the respondent whether such
proceeding was initiated before or after the
commencement of this Act.

(2) Any relief referred to in sub-section (1) may be
sought for in addition to and along with any other relief
that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal
proceeding before a civil or criminal court.
(3) In case any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved
person in any proceedings other than a proceeding under
this Act, she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of
the grant of such relief.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 9 of 33
7.5. Procedure to be followed by the Court
Section 28(2) of the D.V. Act provides that the Court can formulate its
own procedure for disposal of an application under Section 12 of the
D.V. Act and it is not bound to follow the Cr.P.C. Section 28 of the
D.V. Act is reproduced hereunder:-

“Section 28. Procedure.- (1) Save as otherwise
provided in this Act, all proceedings under sections 12,
18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and offences under section 31
shall be governed by the provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).

(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall prevent the court
from laying down its own procedure for disposal of an
application under section 12 or under sub-section (2) of
section 23.”

(Emphasis Supplied)
7.6. D.V. Act not in derogation of any other law
Section 36 of the D.V. Act provides that the provisions of the Act are
in addition to and not in derogation of any other law which means that
in addition to D.V. Act, various other provisions under the general
laws as well as specific statutes can be invoked by the aggrieved
person. Section 36 of the D.V. Act is reproduced hereunder:-

“Section 36. Act not in derogation of any other law.–
The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not
in derogation of the provisions of any other law, for the
time being in force.”

8. Relevant judgments
8.1. In Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma 2013 (14) SCALE 448, the
Supreme Court examined the scope of D.V. Act and held that D.V.

Act was enacted to provide a remedy in civil law for protection of
women from being victims of domestic violence. The Supreme Court

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 10 of 33
observed that the reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 can be sought in any
legal proceedings pendings before a Civil Court, a Family Court or a
Criminal Court. Relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced
hereunder:

“14. The D.V. Act has been enacted to provide a remedy
in Civil Law for protection of women from being victims
of domestic violence and to prevent occurrence of
domestic violence in the society. The D.V. Act has been
enacted also to provide an effective protection of the
rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution, who
are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the
family.

xxx xxx xxx

17. Section 26 of the D.V. Act provides that any relief
available under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may also
be sought in any legal proceeding, before a Civil Court,
family court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved
person and the respondent whether such proceeding was
initiated before or after the commencement of this Act.
Further, any relief referred to above may be sought for in
addition to and along with any other reliefs that the
aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal
proceeding before a civil or criminal court. Further, if
any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved person in
any proceedings other than a proceeding under this Act,
she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of the grant
of such relief.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

8.2. In Kunapareddy v. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari (2016) 11
SCC 774, the Supreme Court considered the nature of proceedings
under the D.V. Act and held that Section 28(2) of the D.V. Act
empowers the Court to lay down its own procedure and the Magistrate

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 11 of 33
dealing with the D.V. Act is empowered to allow the amendment of
the application. Relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced
hereunder:-

“Whereas proceedings under certain sections of the
D.V. Act as specified in sub-Section (1) of Section 28
are to be governed by the Code, the Legislature at the
same time incorporated the provisions like sub – Section
(2) as well which empowers the Court to lay down its
own procedure for disposal of the application under
Section 12 or Section 23(2) of the D.V. Act. This
provision has been incorporated by the Legislature
keeping a definite purpose in mind.”

(Emphasis Supplied)
8.3. In Shambhu Prasad Singh v. Manjari 2012 (190) DLT 647,
relied upon by the petitioner, the Division Bench of this Court held
that the Magistrate is not obliged to call for and consider DIR before
issuing notice to the respondent in proceedings under Section 12 of the
D.V. Act. In para-9 of the judgment, the Division Bench observed that
the woman exposed to domestic violence is entitled to move to the
Court in pending proceedings such as divorce and maintenance etc.
Relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder:-

“9. The basic objective in enacting the Act is to secure
various rights to a woman living in matrimony or in a
relationship akin to matrimony, or any domestic
relationship. Domestic violence, is, per se, not a
criminal offence but is defined extensively and
comprehensively to include various conditions. The
woman exposed to such domestic violence is given the
right to move to Court for any of the reliefs outlined in
Section 12 through either a comprehensive proceeding,
claiming maintenance, right to residence, compensation
etc. or even move to Court seized of any other pending

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 12 of 33
proceeding, such as divorce and maintenance etc.
(Section 26). Section 17 has, for the first time, enacted a
right to residence in favor of such women. The
Act being a beneficial one, the Court should adopt a
construction to its provisions which advances the
parliamentary intention rather than confining it. If the
latter course is adopted the result would be to defeat the
object of the law. As noticed earlier, domestic violence
is per se not an offence but its incidence or occurrence
enables a woman to approach the Court for more than
one relief. The Court is empowered to grant ex-parte
relief and ensure its compliance, including by directing
the police authorities to implement the order,
particularly those relating to residence etc. If such an
order is violated by the respondent (a term defined in
the widest possible terms, to include female relatives of
the husband or the male partner etc), such action would
constitute a punishable offence, which can be tried in a
summary manner under Section 31 of the Act.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

8.4. In Nidhi Kaushik v. Union of India, (2013) 203 DLT 722, the
Division Bench of this Court (in which I was one of the member)
examined the nature of proceedings under the D.V. Act. This Court
held that the reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 of the D.V. Act can be
sought in a Civil Court, a Family Court or a Criminal Court and the
concerned Court can formulate its own procedure under Section 28(2)
of the D.V. Act. Relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced
hereunder:-

“19.Nature of proceedings under D.V. Act
19.1 D.V. Act was enacted to provide a remedy in
civil law for the protection of woman from being
victims of the domestic violence as noted in the
Statement of Object and Reasons.

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 13 of 33

19.2 The object of the D.V. Act appears to be that
Section 498A IPC dealing with the cruelty to the
women is not an appropriate remedy because with the
arrest of the husband and his family members, leads
to such acrimony that it becomes difficult for the
parties to live together again. Secondly, there was no
provision to protect the women from further cruelty
and to protect her being outstayed from matrimonial
home. D.V. Act empowers the Magistrate to pass a
protection order and appoint a protection officer to
protect the women from further violence. The
Magistrate is also empowered to pass an injunction
order to restrain the women from being thrown out
from her matrimonial home. The Magistrate is also
empowered to pass appropriate orders for
maintenance and compensation to the women. In
proceedings under Section 12 of the D.V. Act, the
Magistrate is empowered to award the reliefs under
Sections 8 to 23 of the Act. Since the proceedings
under Section 12 of the D.V. Act are civil in nature, it
does not aggravate the situation which happens with
the arrest of the husband and his family members
under Section 498A IPC. The breach of the
protection order under Section 18 amounts to an
offence under Section 31 of the D.V. Act. However, if
there is no breach of the protection order under
Section 18, the proceedings remain civil in nature.
19.3 The proceedings under Sections 12 and 18
to 23 of D.V. Act are purely civil in nature. The
reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 of the D.V. Act can be
sought in the Civil Court, Family Court or Criminal
Court as they are civil in nature and have nothing to
do with the conviction for any offence as provided in
Section 26(1) of D.V. Act.

19.4 The Court dealing with proceedings under
Sections 12, 18 to 23 can formulate its own procedure
under Section 28(2) of the D.V. Act. Thus, any
departure from the provisions of Code of Criminal

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 14 of 33
Procedure does not vitiate the proceedings initiated
under Section 12.

xxx xxx xxx
19.9 Section 31 of the Act provides for

punishment only if a person commits breach of
protection order passed under Section 18 or an order
of interim protection passed under Section 23 of the
Act. Thus, commission of acts of domestic violence by
themselves do not constitute any offence punishable
under the Act and it is only the breach of the order
passed by the Magistrate either under Section 18 or
under Section 23 of the Act which has been made
punishable under Section 31 of the Act. No criminal
liability is thus incurred by a person under this Act
merely on account of his indulging into acts of
domestic violence or depriving a woman from use of
the shared household. It is only the reach of the
orders passed under Sections 18 and 23 of the Act,
which has been made punishable.”

(Emphasis Supplied)
8.5. In Rattan Deep v. Sushma 2016 (2) RCR (Civil) 798 (Delhi),
the Division Bench of this Court held that reliefs under Sections 18 to
22 of the D.V. Act can be sought in any legal proceedings before a
Civil Court, a Family Court or a Criminal Court. Relevant portion of
the said judgment is reproduced hereunder:-

“Under Section 26 of the P.W.D.V. Act, 2005, it was
open to the respondent to seek any relief available under
Sections 18 to 22 of the enactment in “any legal
proceeding before a Civil Court, Family Court or a
Criminal Court” affecting the aggrieved person and the
respondent.”

(Emphasis Supplied)
8.6. In Bipin Prataprai Bhatt v. Union of India (2010) 3 GLH 276,
the husband challenged the constitutional validity of Section 26(1) of

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 15 of 33
the D.V. Act on the ground that it is violative of Article 20(1) of the
Constitution. The Division Bench of Gujarat High Court dismissed
the petition holding that the proceedings under Sections 18 to 22 of the
D.V. Act are civil in nature and have nothing to do with the conviction
for any offence. Article 20(1) is attracted only in matter of conviction
for any offence and it does not relate to a civil relief which may be
granted without any conviction. The Court further held that the reliefs
under Sections 18 to 22 of the D.V. Act can be sought even from a
Civil Court as provided in Section 26 as the reliefs are civil in nature.

The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder:

“9. From Sec.26(1) of Domestic Violence Act, it will be
evident that the aggrieved person can ask for relief in
other suits and legal proceedings as available u/Secs. 18,
19, 20, 21 and 22 of the said Act.

Sec. 18 empowers the Magistrate to pass a protection
order prohibiting respondents from committing any act of
domestic violence, aiding or abetting in the commission
of acts of domestic violence, entering a place of
employment of the aggrieved person, etc.
Under Sec.19, the Magistrate, on being satisfied that
domestic violence has taken place, may pass a residence
order restraining the respondents from dispossessing or
in any other manner disturbing the possession of the
aggrieved person from the shared household, irrespective
of legal or equitable interest of women in the shared
household, etc.
Sec. 20 deals with monetary reliefs which empowers the
Magistrate to direct the respondents to pay to the
aggrieved women to meet the expenses incurred and
losses suffered by aggrieved person and any child of the
aggrieved person as a result of the domestic violence.

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 16 of 33

Under Sec.21, the custody order of the child or children
of the aggrieved person or the person making an
application on her behalf can be passed by a Magistrate.
Under Sec.22, the Court is also empowered to pay
compensation.

10. Sec.23 empowers the Magistrate to grant interim and
ex-parte orders; including the power vested u/Secs. 18,
19, 20, 21 and 22 of the Domestic Violence Act.
All the aforesaid reliefs can be granted under other suits
and legal proceedings in view of Sec.26 of the Domestic
Violence Act, relevant portion of which is quoted
hereunder:…

xxx xxx xxx
From the aforesaid provisions of Domestic Violence Act,
it will be evident that the reliefs granted are civil in
nature and have nothing to do with the conviction for any
offence.

From the aforesaid provisions, it will be evident that
Art.20(1) is attracted only in the matter of conviction for
any offence and it do not relate to civil relief as may be
granted without any conviction.

11. As it will be evident that Secs. 18 to 22 of the
Domestic Violence Act relate to relief, which can be
sought for even from civil court and they are civil in
nature, the petitioner cannot derive the advantage of
Art.20(1) of the Constitution to challenge the validity of
Sec.26 of the Domestic Violence Act.”

(Emphasis Supplied)
8.7. In Jaydipsinh Prabhatsinh Jhala v. State of Gujarat, 2010
CriLJ 2462, the Gujarat High Court considered the question as to
whether the proceedings under D.V. Act are of criminal nature and
whether the Magistrate has the power to recall the summons issued to
the respondent. The Gujarat High Court held that the Magistrate is
empowered to recall the summons in view of Section 28(2) of the
D.V. Act which empowers the Court to lay down its own procedure.

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 17 of 33

Relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder.

“2.1 Second question is the nature of proceedings that
the Magistrates conduct under the Act and the
procedure that has to be adopted for the same. In other
words, question is whether the proceedings under the
Act are strictly of criminal nature……….

xxx xxx xxx

10. For the purpose of securing justice to such
oppressed women, who complain of domestic violence,
wide powers are given to the Magistrate permitting him
to pass appropriate orders, which the Magistrate can
pass in an application under sub-section (1) of
section 12 of the said Act. Said powers include passing
an order for residence to an aggrieved person or even
removing the respondent from the shared household.
Such powers include grant of monitory relief and
compensation, powers of handing over the custody of
children to the aggrieved person. The Act specifically
empowers the Magistrate to pass such orders by way of
interim direction or even ex-parte interim orders.
Section 26 of the Act as already noted permits the Civil
Court, Family Court or Criminal Court, where any
legal proceeding are pending to grant any of the reliefs
available under Sections 18 to 22 of the said Act.
Though Section 28 of the Act provides that all
proceeding under Sections 12 and 18 to 23 and for the
offence under Section 31 of the said Act shall be
governed by the provisions of the code of criminal
procedure, 1973, sub-section (2) of section 28 clearly
provides that nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall
prevent the Court from laying down its own procedure
for disposal of an application under Section 12 or under
sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the said Act. In other
words, though procedure to be followed in the said
proceedings is that provided under the Code of
Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate can still lay down
his own procedure while dealing with the applications
under sub-section (1) of section 12 or while considering

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 18 of 33
grant of interim or ex-parte ad-interim relief orders
under sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Act. Thus
whole purpose of this legislation appears to be to
provide for a smooth machinery to ensure justice to
oppressed women by cutting through legal red-tapism
and passing such orders as may be found necessary in
the interest of justice in the facts of the case.

xxx xxx xxx

20. In so far as the second question is concerned,
introduction to the objects and reasons provides that in
order to provide a remedy in civil law, Bill is introduced
in the Parliament. Again in Para Nos.2 3 of the
objects and reasons also, it is stated that existing civil
law does not address to the phenomenon of domestic
violence and, therefore, to provide a remedy under civil
law to protect a woman from being victim of domestic
violence, the Bill is introduced. Predominantly thus aim
of the legislature is to provide civil remedies to a
woman who is subjected to domestic violence.

21. Apart from the statement of objects and reasons
even the different provisions contained in the Act make
it clear that predominantly the rights and remedies
created under the Act are in the nature of civil rights.
Barring Sections 31 and 33, which provide for penalty
for breach of protection order and Protection Officer
not discharging his duties respectively, there are no
other penal provisions in the Act. On the other hand, the
act provides for remedies to a woman subjected to
domestic violence, empowers the Magistrate to pass
variety of orders to make such remedies effective. All
these proceedings are in the nature of civil remedy.

22. It is true that the procedure to be adopted by the
Magistrate while dealing with the application under
Section 12 of the Act and other provisions are governed
by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure as
provided under sub-section (1) of section 28 of the Act.
However, under sub-section (2) of Section 28 of the Act,
it is clarified that the Magistrate while disposing of the

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 19 of 33
application under Section 12 of the Act or under sub-
section (2) of Section 23 of the Act may also lay down
his own procedure for disposal.

23. In view of the nature of the proceedings before the
Magistrate and in view of the procedural flexibility
provided by the legislature to the Magistrate in deciding
the applications under Section 12(1) of the Act, it
cannot be stated that the Magistrate is bound by the
straight jacket formula or procedure laid down under
the Code of Criminal Procedure. In a given case, it
would be open for the Magistrate to make deviation
therefrom as may be found necessary in the interest of
justice.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

8.8. In Vijaya Baskar v. Suganya Devi, MANU/TN/3477/2010 the
Madras High Court examined the scope of D.V. Act and held that the
term civil law used in the Statement of Object and Reasons of the Act
is not an empty formality and would exemplify and demonstrate that
the proceedings in the first instance should be civil in nature. The
legislature was conscious of the fact that the enforcement of a criminal
law on the husband and relatives would have deleterious effect in the
matrimonial relationship. The object of the D.V.Act is that the victim
lady should be enabled by law to live in a family atmosphere at her
matrimonial house. It is not the intention of the said enactment to
enable the lady to get snapped once and for all her relationship with
her husband or the husband’s family and for that, civil law and civil
remedies are most efficacious and appropriate. The High Court
referred to Rule 6(5) of the D.V. Rules which provides that the
application under Section 12 shall be dealt with and enforced in the
same manner as laid down in Section 125 Cr.P.C. The Court further

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 20 of 33
observed that the violation of protection orders would constitute an
offence under Section 31 and Section 32 of the D.V. Act which
provides that such violation would amount to a cognizable and non-

bailable offence. Relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced
hereunder:

“11. Paramount, it is, to consider the gamut and the
scope of the Act, namely The Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005; certain excerpts from the
objects and reasons are of immense importance which
would run thus:

“2. The phenomenon of domestic violence is widely
prevalent but has remained largely invisible in the public
domain. Presently, where a women is subjected to cruelty
by her husband or his relatives, it is an offence under
Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. The civil law
does not however address this phenomenon in its
entirety.

3. It is, therefore, proposed to enact a law keeping in
view the rights guaranteed under articles 14, 15 and 21
of the Constitution to provide for a remedy under the
civil law which is intended to protect the woman from
being victims of domestic violence and to prevent the
occurrence of domestic violence in the society.”

12. The term „civil law‟ twice used therein is not an
empty formality and that would exemplify and
demonstrate, display and convey that the proceedings at
the first instance should be civil in nature. The legislators
were conscious of the fact that all of a sudden if criminal
law is enforced on the husband and his relatives,
certainly that might boomerang and have deliterious
effect in the matrimonial relationship between the
husband and wife. The object of the Act is that the victim
lady should be enabled by law to live in the matrimonial
family atmosphere in her husband/in-laws’ house. It is
not the intention of the said enactment to enable the lady
to get snapped once and for all her relationship with her

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 21 of 33
husband or the husband’s family and for that, civil law
and civil remedies are most efficacious and appropriate
and keeping that in mind alone in the Act, the initiation
of action is given the trappings of civil proceedings
which the authorities including the Magistrate
responsible to enforce the said Act should not lose sight
of.

13. The status of the respondents should not be treated as
that of accused and that would spoil the very tenor and
tone with which the Act has been drafted. Keeping that in
mind alone, Section 13 of the Act would contemplate only
service of notice on the respondents and Rule 6(5) of the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules,
would contemplate that the applications under Section 12
shall be dealt with inconformity with Section 125 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

14. It is obvious that the proceedings under Section 125
Cr.P.C are not in stricto senso criminal proceedings.

15. After the passing of the protection order, if there is
any violation, then only, such violation would constitute
an offence under Section 31 of the said Act and Section
32 of the Act would indicate that such violation would
amount to a cognizable and non-bailable offence.”

(Emphasis Supplied)
8.9. Rajkumar v. Sarita, 2009 (1) Mh.L.J. 466, relied upon by the
respondent, supports the petitioner. In the above case, the Bombay
High Court held that reliefs under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22 of
the D.V. Act can be sought in any legal proceedings before a Civil
Court, Family Court or a Criminal Court, affecting the aggrieved
person and the respondent; whether such proceeding was initiated
before or after the commencement of this Act. Relevant portion of the
judgment is reproduced hereunder:-

“12. Reading of the aforesaid provisions would go to
show that Section 26 provides that any relief available

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 22 of 33
under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 can also be sought
in any legal proceedings, before a Civil Court, Family
Court or a Criminal Court, affecting the aggrieved
person and the respondent; whether such proceeding
was initiated before or after the commencement of this
Act.”

8.10. In Sudhannya K.N. v. Umasanker Valsan, (2013) 1 KLT 375,
the wife filed the petition before the Family Court under Section 18(2)
of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 for past
maintenance. In the aforesaid proceedings, the wife filed an
application under Section 26 of the D.V. Act seeking reliefs under
Section 18 and 19 of the D.V. Act. The Family Court dismissed the
application holding that it does not have the jurisdiction to pass an
interim order under Section 18 and 19 of the D.V. Act. The Gujarat
High Court held that the Family Court had the power to pass an
interim order. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced
hereunder:-

“11…………In our opinion Section 26 of the D.V. Act
gives option to the aggrieved person, the beneficiary of
the legislations, to approach either the Magistrate
under Section 12 of the Act or the Family Court if the
person needs the reliefs contemplated under Sections
19, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the D.V. Act.

xxx xxx xxx

13………. The power to grant interim orders should be
conceded to all courts having power to pass final orders
as the very purpose of passing the interim orders is to
prevent a situation of the final order becoming
meaningless.

xxx xxx xxx
…………We set aside the impugned order and hold that
the Family Court has power in view of Section 26 of the

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 23 of 33
D.V. Act to pass interim protection orders as well as
interim residence orders”

(Emphasis Supplied)

8.11. In Naorem Shamungou Singh v. Moirangthem Guni Devi,
AIR 2014 Mani 25, the Manipur High Court held that the D.V. Act
provides the remedies available under Civil law. The Court further
held that though Section 28(1) of the D.V. Act provides that all
proceedings shall be governed by provisions of Cr.P.C. but Section
28(2) empowers the Court to lay down its own procedure for disposal
of the application under Sections 12 and 23(2) of the D.V. Act. The
flexibility has been given to the Court as the proceedings under
Sections 12 and 18 to 23 provide civil remedies whereas Section 31
provides a criminal offence. Relevant portion of the said judgment is
reproduced hereunder:

“11. In this context, it may be noted that Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 was enacted
by the Parliament keeping in view that phenomenon of
domestic violence which is widely prevalent has
remained largely invisible in the public domain and even
though there is a specific offence under section 498-A of
the Indian Penal Code dealing with cruelty by husband
and relatives, there is no civil law to address this issue.
The Parliament keeping in mind the said aspect and to
provide the remedy under the Civil law which is intended
to protect the women from being victims of domestic
violence and to prevent occurrence of domestic violence,
enacted the said law as evident from the Statement of
Objects and Reasons, …

The Statement of Objects and Reasons indicates that
various issues arising out of and relating to domestic
violence are sought to be dealt with by enacting the said
law and by providing remedies which are normally

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 24 of 33
available under the civil law. Therefore, even if Section
28(1) of the Act provides that the proceedings under
sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and offences under
section 31 shall be governed by the provisions of Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, in view of different remedies
which one can obtained under Section 12 of the Act,
some of which are of civil in nature, the Act itself has
provided under sub-section (2) of Section 28 that nothing
in sub-section (1) shall prevent the Court from laying
down its own procedure for disposal of an application
under section 12. Therefore, the Legislature has
introduced an element of flexibility in the procedure to be
adopted while dealing with application under section 12
of the Act. This is, perhaps, because of the intention of
the Legislature in seeking to provide civil remedies also
under the said Act. Code of Criminal Procedure had
been enacted primarily to provide a fair procedure to
deal with the offences punishable under various penal
Acts and is geared to find out the guilt or innocence of
the person, who has been charged of any offence. Many
of the reliefs contemplated under the Act are of civil
nature which cannot normally granted by the Criminal
Court, but only by a Civil Court. That is the reason why
the Legislature incorporated sub-section (2) in Section
28 permitting the Court to lay down its own procedure
for disposal of an application under section 12 of the Act.

12. Thus, it is clear that even though section 28(1)
specifically provides that all proceedings under section
12 shall be governed by the provisions of Cr.P.C., 1973,
it is directory in nature and any departure from the
provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure will not vitiate
a proceeding initiated under section 12. Therefore, this
Court will hold that the Courts while dealing with
proceedings under section 12 of the Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 shall abide by the
provisions of Cr.P.C., 1973 as far as possible. However,
any departure from the provisions of Cr.P.C. will not
have the effect of vitiating the proceeding in view of the

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 25 of 33
fact that the statute itself specifically provides for the
Court to lay down its own procedure for disposal of an
application under section 12.”

(Emphasis Supplied)
8.12. In Narayan Babi Salgaonkar v. Jayshree @ Manasi Narayan
Salgaonkar 2017 SCC Online Bom 723, the Bombay High Court
considered the question whether the application under Section 26 of
the D.V. Act is maintainable in the divorce proceedings. The Bombay
High Court considered the Division Bench judgment of this Court in
Nidhi Kaushik v. Union of India (supra) and held the application
under Section 26 of the D.V. Act to be maintainable in the divorce
proceedings. The husband raised the similar objection as raised by the
respondent before this Court that the Family Court has no jurisdiction
to entertain the application under Section 26 of the D.V. Act which
can be considered only by the Magistrate. The Bombay High Court
rejected this argument. The Bombay High Court further held that the
appeal under Section 29 of the D.V. Act shall not lie to the Court of
Sessions. Relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced hereunder:-

2. ………the following questions arise in the present
petition:–

(i) Whether an application under Section 26 of the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
(for short, D.V. Act) is maintainable in a suit for
divorce, which is purely a civil proceeding?

xxx xxx xxx

8. Mr. Vaz, the Counsel for the petitioner has made the
following submissions in support of this petition:–

a) That an application under Section 26 of the D.V. Act
is not maintainable in a civil proceeding instituted by
the petitioner, seeking relief of divorce, which is again
purely civil in nature. The Civil Court, therefore,

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 26 of 33
exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining the application
under Section 26 of the D.V. Act;

b) In support of the aforesaid, Mr. Vaz refers to the
scheme of the D.V. Act, and lays emphasis upon Section
27 to submit that it is only the Court of Judicial
Magistrate, First Class or the Metropolitan Magistrate,
as the case may be, who shall be competent to grant
protection orders or other orders under the D.V. Act.
Mr. Vaz also makes reference to Section 28 to submit
that the procedure to be adopted for considering grant
of reliefs under Sections 18 to 23 shall be governed by
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. On this basis,
Mr. Vaz submits that the application under Section 26
was not maintainable and in case Jayashree was
desirous of seeking any relief under the D.V. Act, it was
for her to institute proceedings before the concerned
Judicial Magistrate, First Class under Section 12 of the
D.V. Act.

xxx xxx xxx

12. The first question to be determined is whether an
application under Section 26 of the Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short,
D.V. Act) is maintainable in a suit for divorce, which is
purely a civil proceeding?

xxx xxx xxx

15. Provisions of Section 26, therefore, make it clear
that the aggrieved person is entitled to seek reliefs as
available under Sections 18 to 22 of the D.V. Act in any
legal proceedings before a Civil Court, Family Court or
a Criminal Court in addition to and along with other
reliefs that may have been applied for in such a suit or
legal proceedings. It is not necessary that an aggrieved
person, in order to obtain reliefs under Sections 18 to
22, has to necessarily take out proceedings in Section
12 of the D.V. Act alone. If there are legal proceedings
whether initiated before or after the commencement of
the D.V. Act before a Civil Court, Family Court or
Criminal Court, it is always open to the aggrieved

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 27 of 33
person to apply for reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 of the
D.V. Act, in such suit or legal proceedings…………

16. The answer will be same if the matter is examined
from yet another perspective. Although normally the
procedure for obtaining reliefs under the D.V. Act is to
institute the proceedings before a Magistrate, as defined
under Section 2(i) of the D.V. Act and further, in terms
of Section 28 of the D.V. Act, the proceedings under
Sections 12, 18 to 23 and 31 shall be governed by the
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
yet, the proceedings under the D.V. Act are essentially
civil in nature. Therefore, there is no question of any
anomaly, if it is held that an application under Section
26 of the D.V. Act is maintainable in a suit for divorce,
which is purely a civil proceeding.

xxx xxx xxx

20. The Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Ms.
Nidhi Kaushik (supra), after detailed analysis of the
provisions of the D.V. Act, has held that the proceedings
under the D.V. Act are essentially of civil nature.

xxx xxx xxx

22. Therefore, upon consideration of the provisions
under Section 26 of the D.V. Act and the principles in
the aforesaid decisions, it will have to be held that an
application under Section 26 of the D.V. Act is very
much maintainable in a suit for divorce, which is purely
a civil proceeding. The first question stands answered
accordingly.

xxx xxx xxx

35. Accordingly, it will have to be held that the Civil
Court or a Family Court entertaining an application
under Section 26 of the D.V. Act will have to consider
whether the case of domestic violence, prima facie or
otherwise, has been made out before any reliefs in terms
of Sections 18 to 22 of the D.V. Act is actually granted
to the aggrieved person. If it is proposed to grant
interim relief or ad interim relief, then, a prima facie
case may suffice.

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 28 of 33

xxx xxx xxx

39. Section 26 of the D.V. Act merely provides that the
Civil Court or the Family Court is also empowered to
grant reliefs under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the
D.V. Act in any legal proceedings before it, affecting the
aggrieved person and the respondent whether such
proceedings were initiated before or after the
commencement of the D.V. Act. This means that the
Civil Court or the Family Court when it considers
whether or not to grant reliefs under Sections 18, 19,
20, 21 and 22 of the D.V. Act does not lose its essential
character as Civil Court or a Family Court as the case
may be. By granting relief or for that matter, by refusing
relief under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the D.V.
Act, the Civil Court or the Family Court is not
converted into a Magistrate as defined under Section
2(i) of the D.V. Act. At least for the purpose of Section
29 of the D.V. Act, it cannot, therefore, be said that the
orders made by the Civil Court or the Family Court
either granting or refusing reliefs under Sections 18, 19,
20, 21 and 22 of the D.V. Act can be regarded as orders
made by the Magistrate as defined under Section 2(i) of
the D.V. Act. Therefore, against such orders, an appeal
will not lie to the Court of Sessions under Section 29 of
the D.V. Act. The remedy against such orders will be the
remedy, which is otherwise available against orders
made by the Civil Court or the Family Court.

xxx xxx xxx

43. Upon cumulative consideration of the aforesaid, it
will have to be held that as against the orders made by
the Civil Court or the Family Court in an application
under Section 26 of the D.V. Act, granting or refusing
reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 of the D.V. Act, an
appeal will not lie under Section 29 of the D.V. Act to
the Court of Sessions.

xxx xxx xxx

50. Accordingly, this petition is disposed of with the
following order:–

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 29 of 33

(a) An application under Section 26 of the D.V. Act is
held maintainable in a suit for divorce, which is purely
a civil proceeding. Accordingly, the application at
Exhibit D-9 made by Jayashree was maintainable
before the Civil Court in the present case.

(Emphasis Supplied)

9. Summary of principles
9.1. D.V. Act provides a remedy in civil law for the protection of
victims of the domestic violence as noted in the Statement of Object
and Reasons.

9.2. The aggrieved person can file the application for the reliefs
under the D.V. Act to the Magistrate under Section 12 of the D.V. Act.
9.3. If any suit or other legal proceedings affecting the aggrieved
person are pending before a Civil Court, Family Court or Criminal
Court, Section 26 gives an option to the aggrieved person to approach
such Court for reliefs under the D.V. Act. However, no independent
application is maintainable before the Civil Court or Family Court, if
no proceedings are pending before them affecting the aggrieved
person and the respondent.

9.4. The Civil Court, Family Court or Criminal Court dealing with
the application under Sections 18 to 22 of the D.V. Act can formulate
its own procedure under Section 28(2) of the D.V. Act. The word
‘Court’ in Section 28(2) of the D.V. Act includes Civil Court, Family
Court as well as the Criminal Court.

9.5. The Court shall formulate the procedure after completion of
pleadings in an application under Section 26 of the D.V. Act.
9.6. After completion of pleadings, the concerned Court shall
consider whether evidence is necessary to adjudicate the application

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 30 of 33
under the D.V. Act and if so, the Court shall frame the issues and
record the evidence. However, if no evidence is considered necessary,
the Court shall list the application for hearing.

10. Findings
10.1. In the present case, the Family Court is dealing with the petition
for dissolution of marriage filed by the petitioner under Section 13(1)
(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and therefore, the petitioner’s
application under Section 26 of the D.V. Act seeking reliefs under
Section 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the D.V. Act is maintainable before
the Family Court.

10.2. The Family Court is empowered to formulate its own procedure
for disposal of the petitioner’s application under D.V. Act. In that
view of the matter, it is not mandatory for the Family Court to follow
Cr.P.C.

10.3. The proper procedure for disposal of the petitioner’s application
under Section 26 of the D.V. Act after completion of pleadings is to
consider whether evidence is necessary to adjudicate the petitioner’s
application under Section 26 of the D.V. Act.

10.4. If the Court finds that the evidence is not necessary, the Court
shall list the application for hearing. However, if the evidence is
considered necessary, the Court shall frame the issues and record the
evidence along with the evidence in the divorce petition.
10.5. The respondent’s defence before the Family Court as well as
this Court that the Family Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the
petitioner’s application under Section 26 of the D.V. Act, is frivolous
and is rejected.

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 31 of 33

10.6. The respondent attempted to mislead this Court by raising a
frivolous defence with respect to the nature of proceedings under
Section 26 of the D.V. Act whereas the law is clear and well settled
that the Civil Court, Family Court and Criminal Court have
jurisdiction to entertain and try an application under Section 26 in
pending proceedings affecting the parties and the Court can formulate
its own procedure to conduct the proceedings.
10.7. The judgments cited by the respondent do not help the
respondent for the reasons given in para 6 above which are hereby
accepted.

11. Conclusion
11.1. The petition is allowed; the impugned order dated 28 th March,
2017 is set aside and the petitioner’s application under Order XIV
Rule 5 C.P.C. is remanded back to the Family Court.
11.2. The parties are directed to appear before the Family Court on
23rd April, 2018 when the Family Court shall fix the date for hearing
whether the evidence is necessary to adjudicate the petitioner’s
application.

11.3. The Family Court shall frame the issues if the evidence is
necessary to adjudicate the petitioner’s application under Section 26 of
the D.V. Act. However, if evidence is not necessary, the Family Court
shall proceed to hear the parties.

11.4. Considering the delay occasioned by the impugned order, the
Family Court is directed to expedite the hearing and disposal of the
petition and endeavour to decide the same within eight months.

12. Trial Court record be sent back forthwith.

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 32 of 33

13. Pending application is disposed of.

14. Copy of this judgment be given dasti to counsel for the
petitioner and respondent under signature of Court Master.

15. Copy of this judgment be sent to the Registrar General of this
Court who shall circulate it to all the Family Courts and the District
Judges.

J.R. MIDHA
(JUDGE)
APRIL 17,2018
dk/ak

CM(M) 750/2017 Page 33 of 33

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