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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 18 OF 2019
1. Sandeep s/o Sushilkumar Navlani
Aged about 32 years, Occ. Private Job
R/o. Florida River Bank, 602
Apartment, Near Renuka Mata Mandir,
Keshaw Nagar, Mudhwa, Pune.
At present R/o. 66, Tidke Layout,
Sada Hari Niwas, Baput Colony,
Rajapeth, Distt. Amravati.
2. Sushil s/o Balchand Navlani
Aged about 53 years, Occ. Business,
R/o. 66, Tidke Layout, Sada Hari Niwas,
Bapu Colony, Rajapeth,
Distt. Amravati.
3. Kiran w/o Sushil Navlani
Aged about 53 years, Occ. Housewife
R/o. 66, Tidke Layout, Sada Hari Niwas,
Bapu Colony, Rajapeth,
Distt. Amravati.
4. Vijaya Navlani
Aged about 30 years, Occ. Private Job
R/o. Florida River Bank, 602
Apartment, Near Renuka Mata Mandir,
Keshaw Nagar, Mudhwa, Pune.
5. Manoj Menghnani
Aged about 45, Occ. Business,
R/o. Rajaram Nagar, Sindhi Colony,
Jalgaon.
6. Rahul s/o Sushilkumar Navlani
Aged about 27 years, Occ. Nil,
R/o. Florida River Bank, 602
Apartment, Near Renuka Mata Mandir,
Keshaw Nagar, Mudhwa, Pune. …. PETITIONERS
// VERSUS //
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1. State of Maharashtra,
Through Secretary, Department of
Education, Mantralaya, Mumbai.
2. The Commissioner of Police,
Amravati City, Amravati.
3. State of Haryana
Women Cell, IMT Manesar,
Gurgaon (Gurugram),
Haryana – 122 001.
4. The Commissioner of Police,
Sohna Road, New Rajiv Chowk,
Civil Line, Gurgaon (Gurugram),
Haryana – 122 051.
5. Bhavya w/of Sandeep Navlani
Ageda bout 30 years, Uttam Niwas,
Sindhi Colony, Opposit Shashtri
Nagar G.P.O. Jodhpur,
Rajasthan. …. RESPONDENTS
Mr. P.V. Navlani, Advocate for petitioners.
Mr. B.M. Lonare, APP for respondent Nos.1 2.
Mr. U.M. Aurangabadkar, ASGI for respondent Nos. 3 4.
Mr. P.P. Mahalle, Advocate for respondent No. 5.
_
CORAM : SUNIL B. SHUKRE AND
MILIND N. JADHAV, JJ.
Date of reserving the judgment : 07.01.2020.
Date of Pronouncing the Judgment : 17.01.2020.
JUDGMENT: [PER MILIND N. JADHAV, J.]
1. Heard. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard
finally by consent.
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2. By the present petition, the petitioners are seeking to
quash and set aside FIR No.13/2019, registered with respondent
No.3 i.e. Women Cell, IMT, Manesar, Gurgaon (Gurugram),
Haryana, for offence punishable under the provisions of Section
498(A), 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1861.
The petition came to be filed on 08.01.2019, inter alia, seeking to
restrain the respondent No.3-State of Haryana and respondent
No.4-Commissioner of Police, Gurgaon (Gurugram), Haryana, from
proceeding with the investigation of complaints bearing No.16551/
CP/2018 dated 10.12.2018 and bearing No.16491/CP/2018 dated
08.12.2018 filed by respondent No.5 (wife) of the petitioner No.1
with Police Station Gurgaon, Haryana. The petitioner No.2 is the
father-in-law of respondent No.5. The petitioner No.3 is the mother-
in-law of respondent No.5. The petitioner Nos.4 6 are the sister-
in-law and brother-in-law of respondent No.5, whereas the
petitioner No.5 is the maternal uncle of petitioner No.1.
3. The petitioner No.1 and respondent No.5 got married as
per Hindu rites and rituals on 16/11/2016 at Amravati. Both,
petitioner No.1 and respondent No.5 are highly educated and were
working with good companies. In the year 2013, the petitioner No.1
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went to USA for work. The respondent No.5 continued with her job
upto 11/01/2017 and thereafter stayed for two months with the
parents of the petitioner No.1 at Amravati. Thereafter, in the month
of April, she stayed with her maternal aunt and after getting VISA
proceeded to USA to stay with the petitioner No.1 on 25.04.2017.
The petitioner No.4 who is the sister of petitioner No.1 resides at
Pune. She is a divorcee and resides with her brother and has also
taken up a job in Pune. The petitioner No.6 is the younger brother
of the petition No.1 and is admittedly suffering from thalassemia
major, due to which, he is required to undergo blood transfusion,
after every 8 to 10 days.
4. Mr. P.V. Navlani, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the petitioners submitted that for the first one and half year, after
marriage the relationship between petitioner No.1 and respondent
No.5 were cordial. Thereafter, friction arose between the two.
Petitioner No.1 visited India (Amravati) on 29.08.2018 since the
petitioner No.3 i.e. his mother had fractured her rib and was unwell
due to rising friction between petitioner No.1 and respondent No.5.
He submitted that, at the then time, respondent No.5 had also
desired to visit India but instead stayed back in USA with her
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relatives. He submitted that, in the meanwhile, petitioner No.1 also
got his job transferred to India and started working from Amravati
and therefore, requested respondent No.5 to return back to India.
He submitted that respondent No.5 did not cooperate and instead
wanted the petitioner No.1 to return to USA, as she wanted to
deliver their first child in USA, in order to procure automatic
citizenship. He submitted that petitioner No.1 tried very hard to
persuade respondent No.5 to return back to India, but she did not
listen. He submitted that on 19.10.2018, the brother of respondent
No.5 informed petitioner No.1 about the abortion carried out by
respondent No.5 in India. He submitted that the petitioner No.1 was
not aware that respondent No.5 had returned back to India, at the
then time as also about the abortion which was carried out by
respondent No.5 in her 22nd week of pregnancy. He submitted that
the petitioner No.1, was therefore, very agitated and threatened the
brother of respondent No. 5, that he would initiate criminal action
against his family, in respect of the above.
5. Shri Navlani, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner submitted that because of the above incident and as a
counter blast to the same, the respondent No.5 was forced to lodged
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a false complaint against the petitioners with the Commissioner of
Police at Amravati (respondent No.2) and with the Commissioner of
Police at Gurgaon (respondent No.4). The petitioner No.1, was
summoned by respondent No.3 on 26.11.2018 for recording his
statement. He submitted that petitioner No.1, thereafter sent by e-
mail his complaint to respondent Nos.3 4 against the respondent
No.5 and her family members. On 09.12.2018, the petitioner was
summoned by the respondent No.2 (Commissioner of Police at
Amravati) for the purpose of enquiry upon the complaint lodged by
respondent No.5 for recording his statement. The petitioner No.1
cooperated in the said enquiry. He submitted that, thus, there were
two authorities namely respondent No.2 respondent No.4, who
were investigating into the complaint of respondent No. 5
simultaneously, one at Gurgaon and the other at Amravati.
Therefore, the petitioner No.1 informed respondent No.3 that he
would refrain from attending the enquiry, any further. He submitted
that once the enquiry was commenced with by respondent No.2 at
Amravati, there was no reason for respondent No.3 to have insisted
upon conducting the same enquiry at Gurgaon. He submitted that
the petitioners were all along willing to cooperate in the enquiry. He
submitted that respondent No.2 (Commissioner of Police at
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Amravati) had already recorded the statement of the petitioner
No.1 on 13.12.2018 and that the petitioner was always willing to
cooperate with any further investigation if so required.
6. Mr. P.V. Navlani, learned counsel for the petitioner
further submitted that on 26.01.2019, respondent No.3 registered
the offence against the petitioners by FIR No.13/2019 for offence
punishable under the provision of Section 498(A), 323 read with
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1861. Being aggrieved the
petitioners immediately approached the Court, on the above
ground. He submitted that the principal ground made out in the
petition was that major cause of action had occurred either at
Amravati or Jodhpur or in the USA, and therefore, the respondent
No.2 (Commissioner of Police at Amravati) had jurisdiction to
investigate the case and register. The offence, if made out. He
submitted that petitioner No.1’s complaint against respondent No.5
for carrying out abortion without the consent of the petitioner No.1
in the 22nd week of pregnancy, in collusion with and involving her
family was lodged with the Rajapeth Police Station, District
Amravati. He submitted that on 15.02.2019, the petitioner No.1 was
summoned by respondent No.4, at Gurgaon in respect of enquiry
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arising out of FIR No.13/2019 registered with the respondent No.3
for the offence punishable under Sections 498(A), 323 read with
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. He submitted that the entire
cause of action had arisen either at Amravati, Jodhpur or USA and
therefore, the respondent Nos.3 4 did not have jurisdiction to
investigate the case at Gurgaon. He submitted that filing of two
complaints at two different places with respect to the same offence
was impermissible in law and was solely done with a view to harass
the petitioner No.1 and his family members. He submitted that
registration of offence with respondent No.3 was a colourable
exercise of power and therefore, deserved to be quashed by this
Hon’ble Court. He submitted that the petitioner No.1 was ready and
willing to cooperate in any enquiry in all respects. His final
submission was that, looking at the vagueness of the allegations
made in the FIR by respondent No.5, it was in the interest of justice
to quash the FIR which was filed against the petitioners at Gurgaon,
more specifically, considering the facts and circumstances of the
present case.
7. Mr. B.M. Lonare, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor
appearing on behalf of respondent No.2 submitted that the
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allegation of abortion made by petitioner No.1 against respondent
No.5 was found to be false upon making enquiry with the Medical
Officer. He submitted that miscarriage had taken place, as such,
cognizable offence was not made out against respondent No.5. He
submitted that the respondent No.5 had filed the complaint and
registered FIR with Manesar Police Station, Gurgaon (Gurugram),
Haryana, under the provisions of Section 498(A) of the Indian Penal
Code.
8. Mr. P.P. Mahalle, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
respondent No.5 refuted the submissions and contentions advanced
on behalf of the petitioners and reiterated that respondent No.5 was
not treated well and that petitioner Nos.2 to 6 treated the
respondent No. 5 like a house-maid. He submitted that on several
instance, petitioner No.3 would call upon the petitioner No.1 to
treat the respondent No.5 in a cruel and dominant manner. She
submitted that this act of the petitioner No.3 was supported by
petitioner No.4, which led to constant quarrels between the
petitioner No.1 and respondent No.5. He submitted that after the
respondent No.5 became pregnant and went to USA to reside with
petitioner No.1, petitioner No.3 continuously insisted that
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respondent No.5 return to India. He referred to and relied upon
complaint dated 12.11.2018, which narrated details of ill-treatment
given to respondent No.5, by the petitioners. He submitted that on
09.08.2018, relationship between petitioner No.1 and respondent
No. 5 resulted in such a situation that respondent No.5 had to seek
medical opinion and visit the hospital in USA, wherein the
concerned Dr. opined that there were signs of threatened
miscarriage. He referred to the diagnosis of the respondent No.5
dated 09.08.2018 in support of his above charge. He submitted that
despite the above and the health of the respondent No.5 not
keeping well, on 27.08.2018, the petitioner No.1 without informing
respondent No.5 deserted her during the period of her pregnancy
and returned back to India without informing her. He submitted
that while respondent No.5 was in the USA entirely on her own,
petitioner No.1 did not send any money and respondent No.5 was
left at the mercy of her near relatives to arrange money for
purchasing a ticket to come back to India. He submitted that on her
return from the USA, respondent No.5 started residing with her
parents who were themselves residing with her brother at Gurgaon
in Haryana. He submitted that since 2010, the parents of
respondent No.5 had shifted to Gurgaon along with the brother of
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respondent No.5. Prior to 2010, respondent No.5 was residing with
her parents in Jodhpur. He submitted that all efforts taken by her
parents and family members to mediate with petitioner No.1 failed
thereby leading to stress during her pregnancy. He submitted that
medical complications which had arisen due to stress was of such a
life threatening extent that, there was threat to the life of
respondent No.5 and it was only under such circumstances, the
inevitable abortion and/or miscarriage had occurred or taken place.
He submitted that all along when respondent No.5 was in hospital,
petitioner No.1 nor the other petitioners or their family members
visited respondent No.5. He submitted that the original complaint
was filed by respondent No.5 with respondent No.4. He submitted
that a carbon copy of the said complaint was sent by respondent
No.5 to respondent No.2 for information of the fact that the said
complaint was filed against petitioner No.1 at Gurgaon. He
submitted that since petitioner No.1 was residing in Amravati,
respondent No.5 had sent copy of complaint lodged at Gurgaon,
Haryana to respondent No.2 at Amravati. He submitted that
respondent No.5 wanted to pursue her complaint filed at Gurgaon,
Haryana, and it was never the intention of respondent No.5 to
either file the complaint at Amravati and/or pursue the same at
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Amravati. He therefore, submitted that, it was never the intention of
respondent No.5 to file a second FIR on the basis of the complaint
copy which was forwarded to respondent No.2 at Amravati. He
submitted that it was the prerogative of respondent No.5 to pursue
her complaint which she had lodged at the place of her choice
inasmuch as, the suffering of cruelty and mental trauma which
respondent No.5 was carrying was evident when she was residing
with her parents at Gurgaon, Haryana. He placed reliance upon the
judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rupali Devi
vs. State of Uttar Pradesh decided on 09.04.2019 and reported in
(2019) 5 SCC 384 in support of the proposition that respondent
No.5 was entitled to lodge, maintain and pursue her complaint
which was filed at Manesar, Gurgaon, Haryana under Section
498(A) of the Indian Penal Code in view of the facts and
circumstances of respondent No.5’s case, which clearly amounted to
cruelty, both physical and mental trauma as well. He placed reliance
on paragraph Nos. 12 to 16 of the above judgment which read thus:
“12. Section 498A of the Penal Code was introduced by the
Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983. In addition to
the aforesaid amendment in the Penal Code, the provisions of
Sections 174 and 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
relating to inquiries by police in case of death by suicides and
inquiries by magistrates into cause of such deaths were also
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schedule to Cr.PC, the offence under Section 498-A was made
cognizable and non-bailable. Of considerable significance is the
introduction of Section 113-A in the Evidence Act by the
Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983 providing for
presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman to
be drawn if such suicide had been committed within a period
of seven years from the date of marriage of the married woman
and she had been subjected to cruelty. Section 113-A is in the
following terms:
“113-A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married
woman.- When the question is whether the commission of
suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any
relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed
suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her
marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband
had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having
regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such
suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of
her husband.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” shall
have the same meaning as in section 498-A of the Indian Penal
Code (45 of 1860).”
13. The object behind the aforesaid amendment, undoubtedly,
was to combat the increasing cases of cruelty by the husband
and the relatives of the husband on the wife which leads to
commission of suicides or grave injury to the wife besides
seeking to deal with harassment of the wife so as to coerce her
or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for
any property, etc. The above stated object of the amendment
cannot be overlooked while answering the question arising in
the present case. The judicial endeavour must, therefore,
always be to make the provision of the laws introduced and
inserted by the Criminal Laws (Second Amendment) Act, 1983
more efficacious and effective in view of the clear purpose
behind the introduction of the provisions in question, as
already noticed.
14. “Cruelty” which is the crux of the offence under Section 498-
A IPC is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary to mean “The
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outrage (Abuse, inhuman treatment, indignity)”. Cruelty can be
both physical or mental cruelty. The impact on the mental health
of the wife by overt acts on the part of the husband or his
relatives; the mental stress and trauma of being driven away
from the matrimonial home and her helplessness to go back to
the same home for fear of being ill-treated are aspects that
cannot be ignored while understanding the meaning of the
expression “cruelty” appearing in Section 498-A of the Penal
Code. The emotional distress or psychological effect on the wife,
if not the physical injury, is bound to continue to traumatize the
wife even after she leaves the matrimonial home and takes
shelter at the parental home. Even if the acts of physical cruelty
committed in the matrimonial house may have ceased and such
acts do not occur at the parental home, there can be no doubt
that the mental trauma and the psychological distress cause by
the acts of the husband including verbal exchanges, if any, that
had compelled the wife to leave the matrimonial home and take
shelter with her parents would continue to persist at the parental
home. Mental cruelty borne out of physical cruelty or abusive
and humiliating verbal exchanges would continue in the
parental home even though there may not be any overt act of
physical cruelty at such place.
15. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, as
the object behind its enactment would indicate, is to provide a
civil remedy to victims of domestic violence as against the
remedy in criminal law which is what is provided under Section
498-A of the Penal Code. The definition of the “domestic
violence” in the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act, 2005 contemplates harm or injuries that endanger the
health, safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental or
physical, as well as emotional abuse. The said definition would
certainly, for reasons stated above, have a close connection with
Explanations (a) (b) to Section 498-A of the Penal Code,
which define “cruelty”. The provisions contained in Section 498-
A of the Penal Code, undoubtedly, encompass both mental as
well as the physical well-being of the wife. Even the silence of
the wife may have an underlying element of an emotional
distress and mental agony. Her sufferings at the parental home
though may be directly attributable to commission of acts of
cruelty by the husband at the matrimonial home would,
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to distinct offences committed at the parental home where she
has taken shelter. The adverse effects on the mental health in
the parental home though on account of the acts committed in
the matrimonial home would, in our considered view, amount to
commission of cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A at
the parental home. The consequences of the cruelty committed
at the matrimonial home results in repeated offences being
committed at the parental home. This is the kind of offences
contemplated under Section 179 Cr.P.C which would squarely
be applicable to the present case as an answer to the question
raised.
16. We, therefore, hold that the courts at the place where the
wife takes shelter after leaving or driven away from the
matrimonial home on account of acts of cruelty committed by
the husband or his relatives, would, dependent on the factual
situation, also have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint alleging
commission of offences under Section 498-A of the Penal Code.”
9. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the
respective parties, perused the pleadings and copy of complaint
dated 12.11.2018 and FIR bearing No.13/2019 dated 26.01.2019.
At the outset, we find that the cause of action in respect of incidents
which have been narrated in the complaint and the FIR have arisen
either in the USA or at Gurgaon, Haryana, save and except the fact
that the marriage of petitioner No.1 was solemnised with
respondent No.5 at Amravati. The various acts of cruelty which have
been claimed to have been committed by petitioner while he was
living with respondent No.5 in the USA are outside the territorial
jurisdiction of this Court. Briefly before heading to the USA,
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respondent No.5 had resided along with petitioner Nos. 2 to 6 at
Amravati, before joining the petitioner No.1 in the USA. During this
period, we find that the allegations and charges which have been
levelled by respondent No.5 against petitioner Nos.2, 4 to 6 cannot
be proved as they do not find any mention or reference either in the
complaint or in the FIR. Further, petitioner No.4 who is sister of
petitioner No.1and sister-in-law of respondent No.5 was admittedly
residing at Pune and not at Amravati. There is no specific charge,
claim or any allegation whatsoever against petitioner No.6, who is
the younger brother of the petitioner No.1 and is a cronic patient of
thalassemia major, requiring constant medical attention and blood
transfusion every 8 to 10 days.
10. We find that the mental torture and trauma which has
been expressed and narrated by the respondent No.5 in her detailed
complaint dated 12.11.2018, filed with the Police Station at
Manesar, Gurgoan, Haryana, has primarily leveled charges against
petitioner No.1 and petitioner No.3 i.e. mother of the petitioner
No.1 and mother-in-law of respondent No.5 in particular. After
perusing the copy of complaint in detailed, we find that the incident
of abortion or miscarriage, which had unfortunately taken place in
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the 22nd week of pregnancy would undoubtedly leave a scar in the
life of respondent No.5 considering that respondent No.5 was left
abandoned and deserted in the USA by petitioner No.1, during her
pregnancy. Further the act of returning back to India without
informing respondent No.5, who was pregnant needs to be
deprecated, if found to be true after investigation. We also find that
petitioner No.1 has repeatedly stated that he had to return back to
India for shouldering the responsibility of his family and it was not
possible for the petitioner No.1 to continue living in the USA and
therefore, he returned back to India and started living with his
family at Amravati. We find that petitioner No.1 returned back to
Amravati and started working from Amravati. However, we are not
in agreement with the proposition expressed by the petitioners that
the probe and investigation of the complaint filed by the respondent
No.5 ought to be taken over by the respondent No.2 i.e.
Commissioner of Police at Amravati. On applying the ratio of the
case in Rupali Devi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh cited (supra), there is
no doubt in expressing a finding that the fact that respondent No.5
has chosen to file and pursue the complaint at Manesar Police
Station, Gurgaon, Haryana, is inconsonance with the provisions of
law. We cannot compell the respondent No.5 to pursue her case
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with respondent No.2, as per the convenience of the petitioners.
11. Shri Navlani, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners sought to draw our attention to the amended provisions
of Article 226 of the Constitution of India and more specifically
Clause-1(A), which was inserted in Article 226 by the Constitution
(15th) Amendment Act, 1963 and subsequently, renumbered as
Clause (2) by the Constitution (42 nd) Amendment Act, 1976. While
referring to the judgment in the case of Nawal Kishore Sharma vs.
Union of India in Civil Appeal No. 7414 of 2014 (arising out of SLP
© No.19549 of 2013) and decided on 7.8.2014. The amended
clause(2) now reads thus :
“226. Power of the High Courts to issue certain writs – 2. The
power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs
to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by
any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories
within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the
exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such
Government or authority or the residence of such person is notwithin those territories.
12. He submitted that on a plain reading of the amended
provisions in Clause (2), it was clear that this Court can issue a writ
against the authority located outside its territorial jurisdiction, if the
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cause of action had wholly or partially arisen within this Courts
territorial jurisdiction. He submitted that in the present case, some
cause of action had arisen in Amravati, inasmuch as the petitioner
No.1 and respondent No.5 had got married in Amravati and
respondent No.5 had resided with the family members of petitioner
No.1 i.e. petitioner No.2 to 6 at Amravati for a brief period, after
marriage. He submitted that some of the allegations leveled by
respondent No.5 were during the said period and therefore, it was
well within the jurisdiction of this Court to consider the plea of the
petitioners in quashing and setting aside the FIR bearing
No.13/2019 registered with respondent No.3 at Manesar, Gurgaon,
Haryana, against the petitioners in the interest of justice. He
submitted that the petitioners were ready and willing to face the
enquiry and investigation in respect of any complaint and/or FIR
that would be lodged or even transferred to respondent No.2 at
Amravati. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the
filing of FIR by respondent No.5 at Manesar, Gurgoan, Haryana,
where she has been residing along with her parents, after her return
from USA and during which period the act of cruelty has been
charged against the petitioners cannot be said to be not available to
the respondent No.5. We find that the a substantial part of the cause
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of action had arisen in Gurgaon, Haryana and respondent No.5 is
therefore, within her right to lodge and pursue her complaint with
respondent No.3 in Haryana.
13. Shri Navlani, thereafter, referred to and relied upon the
judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Navinchandra N.
Majithia v. State of Maharashtra and others reported in 2000 AIR
SCW 3157 and drew our attention to paragraph No. 7 of the said
judgment. He submitted that it was wholly within the jurisdictional
power of this Court to exercise jurisdiction in relation to the
territories within which the cause of action had wholly arisen or had
arisen in part, no matter where the seat of the authority concerned
was located and as such, once again reiterated his submissions.
Paragraph Nos.7 and 13 of the above judgment are relevant and
reads thus.
“7. The object of the amendment by inserting clause (2) in the
Article was to supersede the decision of the Supreme Court in
Election Commission v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao (AIR 1953 SC
210) (supra) and to restore the view held by the High Courts in
the decisions cited above. Thus the power conferred on the
High Courts under Article 226 could as well be exercised by any
High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories
within which “the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises” and
it is no matter that the seat of the authority concerned is outside
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21/24amendment is thus aimed at widening the width of the area for
reaching the writs issued by different High Courts……….
13. We make it clear that the mere fact that FIR was registered
in a particular State is not the sole criterion to decide that no
cause of action has arisen even partly within the territorial
limits of jurisdiction of another State. Nor are we to be
understood that any person can create a fake cause of action or
even concoct one by simply jutting into the territorial limits of
another State or by making a sojourn or even a permanent
residence therein. The place of residence of the person moving
a High Court is not the criterion to determine the contours of
the cause of action in the particular writ petition. The High
Court before which the writ petition is filed must ascertain
whether any part of the cause of action has arisen within the
territorial limits of its jurisdiction. It depends upon the facts in
each case.”
15. We find that it has been categorically observed by the
Hon’ble Apex Court that the place of residence of persons moving a
High Court is not the criteria to determine the controversy and
cause of action in the particular Writ Petition and that the High
Court before which the writ petition is filed must ascertain whether
any part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial limits
of its jurisdiction. It further depends upon the facts in each case. It is
needless to mention here that a large number of events had taken
place in the USA. Similarly, while respondent No.5 was residing
with the petitioner at Amravati for a brief period, after her marriage
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and before proceeding to the USA, some part of the cause of action
had arisen at Amravati and admittedly after her return from the
USA, she resided with her parents at Gurgaon, during which period
another very important cause of action had arisen. This cause of
action had arisen at Gurgaon was in respect of the abortion or
miscarriage which had to be done in the 22 nd week of pregnancy of
respondent No.5 which would leave an indelible mark in the life of
the respondent No.5. Such an instance has been related by the
respondent No.5 to the cause of mental trauma and cruelty which
respondent No.5 had faced in the USA, immediately before
returning to India and residing with her parents at Gurgaon.
Therefore, we find that respondent No.5 was within her right to
pursue her complaint with respondent No.2 at Gurgaon, Haryana.
16. However, on a close analysis of the complaint dated
15.11.2018 and the FIR dated 26.01.2019. We find that insofar as
the roles of the petitioner No.2 and petitioner Nos.3 to 6 are
concerned, they cannot be indicted. This is so because the narration
of events of mental torture and charges which has been leveled by
respondent No.5 in the complaint and the FIR do not point a direct
finger to the role of these petitioners i.e. petitioner No.2 i.e. father-
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in-law and petitioner Nos.4 to 6 i.e. the two younger brothers of
petitioner No.1 and sister of the petitioner No.1. Further, there is
no direct or indirect allegation of any cruel act by these petitioners
which can amount to cruetly. On a close reading of the complaint
and FIR it can be best said that, it was petitioner No.1 and
petitioner No.3 i.e. the husband and mother-in-law of the
respondent No.5, who were in direct confrontation with respondent
No.5 and whatever the respondent No.5 has stated in her
complaint and FIR is directly indicting these two petitioners i.e. the
petitioner No.1 and petitioner No.3. We, therefore, would like to
quash and set aside the FIR bearing No.13/2019 registered with
respondent No.3 at Manesar, Gurgoan, Haryana, for the offences
punishable under Section 498(A), 323 read with Section 34 of the
Indian Penal Code insofar as the petitioner No.2 and petitioner
Nos.4 to 6 are concerned. This is because the complaint and the FIR
do not show any instance of involvement of these petitioners either
directly or indirectly concerning the respondent No. 5 in any act of
causing simple hurt by the petitioners to the respondent No.5, as
also any demand of dowry or money or causing any form of cruelty
whether physical or mental to the respondent No.5.
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17. In view of the above, FIR bearing No.13/2019 registered
with respondent No.3 i.e. Women Cell, IMT Manesar, Gurgaon
(Gurugram), Haryana, for the offences punishable under Section
498(A), 323 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code insofar as
petitioner No.2 and petitioner Nos. 4 to 6 are concerned is quashed
and set aside.
18. Insofar as the above FIR registered against the petitioner
Nos.1 and 3 is concerned, we direct that the same be carried to its
logical end in accordance with law by respondent Nos.3 4.
JUDGE JUDGE
Prity
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