03.12.2019

In the High Court at Calcutta
Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction
Appellate Side

W.P. No.21526 (W) of 2019

Sanmay Banerjee
Vs.
State of West Bengal and others

Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya,
Mr. Kallol Basu,
Mr. Samim Ahmed,
Mr. Sabyasachi Chatterjee,
Mr. Sourav Mondal,
Mr. Pintu Karar,
Mr. Akashdeep Mukherjee,
Ms. Saloni Bhattacharya,
Mr. R. Singh,
Ms. Debolina Sarkar,
Mr. Koustav Bagchi.
…for the petitioner.

Mr. Sirsanya Bandhopadhyay,
Mr. Arka Kumar Nag.
…for the State.

The petitioner claims to be a freelance journalist and a

whistleblower, who runs two vernacular newspapers and

YouTube channels. It is the contention of the petitioner that

due to his exposure of corruption in political quarters, he has

earned the wrath of the ruling party and has been constantly

subjected to threats. The cause of action of the present writ

petition arose when the petitioner was allegedly picked up
2

around 7.30‐7.45 p.m. on October 17, 2019 without any prior

notice, by the Officer‐in‐Charge of the Khardah Police

Station, along with hoodlums of the local ruling party, and

was subjected to tremendous torture within the precincts of

the Khardah Police Station and mercilessly beaten up the

petitioner against all established norms of human rights.

Ultimately, the petitioner was taken into custody by the

Purulia District Cyber Crime Police Station at around 4.30

a.m. and purportedly arrested in connection with Purulia

District Cyber Crime Police Station Case No. 2 of 2019 dated

September 23, 2019 under Sections 465/Section469/Section500/Section504/Section505(1)(b)

of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as

“the SectionIPC”), read with Section 66 of the Information

Technology Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as “the SectionIT

Act”).

During interrogation, the petitioner was allegedly

asked to admit that he had manipulated and manufactured

documents, including some forged appointment letter issued

by the West Bengal Board of Primary Education. The

Inspector‐in‐Charge of the Khardah Police Station, it is

alleged, took the lead role in perpetrating torture upon the

petitioner, which will easily be revealed from the CCTV

footage of the Khardah Police Station of the relevant date.
3

Although the petitioner was produced ultimately before the

Chief Judicial Magistrate, Purulia on October 18, 2019, the

bail application of the petitioner was rejected and October

20, 2019 was fixed as the date for production of the

petitioner. On the latter date, the Chief Judicial Magistrate

granted bail to the petitioner. According to the petitioner, he

had to be admitted to a hospital under acute mental and

physical condition after his release on bail and had to be

treated in the hospital till November 3, 2019.

Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner

argues that the sections under which the petitioner was

allegedly booked were either non‐cognizable or bailable or

both, in which case the police cannot initiate investigation on

their own, without an order of the competent Magistrate.

Most of the charges were also unrelated to the acts alleged to

have been done by the petitioner.

It is next argued that no notice under Section 41A of

the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as

“the SectionCrPC”) was issued by the Khardah police station,

whereas a notice under the said provision had been served

upon the petitioner by the Nandigram Police Station for a

similar case against the petitioner.
4

By placing reliance upon the judgment of SectionArnesh

Kumar vs. State of Bihar and another, reported at (2014) 8 SCC

273, it is submitted that the said judgment stipulated inter

alia that a notice of appearance in terms of Section 41A of the

CrPC has to be served on the accused within two weeks

from the date of institution of the case, which may be

extended by the Superintendent of Police of the District for

reasons to be recorded in writing, in case of offences having

punishment of less than seven years of imprisonment.

Moreover, it was held that failure to comply with the

directions aforesaid shall, apart from rendering the police

officers concerned liable for departmental action, they shall

also be liable to be punished for contempt of court, to be

instituted before the High Court having territorial

jurisdiction.

It was further held that authorizing detention without

recording reasons by the Judicial Magistrate shall also be

liable for departmental action by the appropriate High

Court. It was further added that the directions given therein

shall not only apply to the cases under 498A SectionIPC of Section 4

of the Dowry Prohibition Act, as in that case, but also such

cases where offence is punishable with imprisonment for a
5

term which may be less than seven years or which may

extend to seven years, whether with or without fine.

Learned senior counsel for the petitioner next argues

that the FIR was registered on the basis of a complaint

lodged by the Assistant Public Prosecutor of the

Raghunathpur Court, who was in no way connected with

the allegations made. The nature of the allegations revolved

around alleged forgery and cyber crimes, although the

persons against whom such offences were alleged to have

been committed, did not come forward to lodge any

complaint. Certain offences pertaining to inciting the public

against the State were also clubbed with other charges in the

complaint, merely because there was criticism of the Chief

Minister, other Ministers and a Member of Parliament,

although none of them lodged any complaint in that regard.

It is argued that the Assistant Public Prosecutor of

Raghunathpur had no locus standi to lodge the complaint at

all, particularly regarding forgery of documents and

regarding the statements made in the petitioner’s YouTube

channels being incorrect.

Although Ministers have certain privileges under the

law, Members of Parliament do not have such privileges, in

any event, according to the petitioner.
6

That apart, it is argued that the acts of the police were

in patent violation of human rights.

Moreover, the FIR, on the face of it, ought to be

quashed, since none of the offences could be investigated in

law by the police of their own and most of those offences

alleged were, in any event, ex facie not applicable to the acts

of the petitioner as complained of.

Learned senior counsel for the petitioner cites a

judgment reported at (2017) 11 SCC 731 [SectionCommon Cause and

others vs. Union of India and others], which, in turn, relied on

SectionState of Haryana and others vs. Bhajan Lal and others [(1992)

Supp (1) SCC 335]. In the said judgments, the circumstances

and principles regarding quashing of FIRs were discussed.

Based on the said judgments, learned senior counsel submits

that where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint,

even if taken at their face value and accepted in their

entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out

a case against the accused, the FIR can be quashed.

The same principle applied to allegations in the FIR

and other materials accompanying the FIR if those did not

disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by

police officers under Section 156(1) of the CrPC, except
7

under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section

155(2) of the CrPC.

Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR

or complaint, and the evidence collected in support of the

same, do not disclose the commission of any offence and

make out a case against the accused or where the allegations

in the FIR constitute only a non‐cognizable offence, no

investigation is permitted by a police officer without an

order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2)

of the CrPC.

The same principles for quashing of FIR also applies

to situations where the allegations made in the FIR were so

absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no

prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is

sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. Where

a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides

and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with

an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused

and with a view to spite him due to private and personal

grudge, the FIR ought to be quashed.

In the present case, it is submitted, the petitioner was

the victim of a political vendetta since the petitioner had
8

rubbed up functionaries of the State Government the wrong

way.

It is further argued that the Fundamental Right of the

petitioner of freedom of speech and expression, as engrafted

in SectionArticle 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, was squarely

violated by the action of the police and as such, the FIR

ought to be quashed and necessary action ought to be taken

against the alleged perpetrators of the criminal action against

the petitioner. Relying on a judgment of a co‐ordinate bench

of this court reported at 2012 SCC OnLine Cal 8661 [SectionTamalika

Ponda Seth vs. State of West Bengal Ors.], learned senior

counsel submits that in the event the FIR disclosed no

offence, the same could be stayed as an interim measure.

In reply, learned counsel for the

respondents/authorities argues that the investigation is still

at a nascent stage and ought not to be stayed at this

premature juncture. It is argued that there are several

safeguards available to the petitioner under the SectionCrPC, such

as Section 173(3), which permits further investigation,

Section 216, under which the court can alter the charges,

Section 221, which provides for measures in case it is

doubtful as to what offence has been committed and Section

222, as regards the reduction of offences to minor ones upon
9

investigation, all of which provide sufficient relief to the

petitioner even at the stage of further investigation.

As such, it would be premature to stay the

investigation altogether at this initial stage, which would

give an undue boost to the illegal activities of the petitioner

and would prevent the police from gathering sufficient

evidence and conducting a proper investigation in the

matter.

It is further argued on behalf of the respondents‐

authorities that the petitioner was produced before the

concerned Judicial Magistrate and his bail was refused at

first and subsequently granted. As such, the detention of the

petitioner was not unlawful.

Arnesh Kumar (supra), it is argued, was rendered in

connection with an anticipatory bail matter and there was no

question of detention. As such, the guidelines laid down

therein do not apply to the present case, where there was an

order by the Magistrate subsequent to detention, sanctioning

such detention further.

It is also sought to be established by learned counsel

for the respondents‐authorities that paragraph no. 8.2 of

Arnesh Kumar (supra) itself provides for the Magistrate
10

passing an order sanctioning continuance of detention

beyond 24 hours, which was done in the present case.

It is further argued that the order under Section 167,

SectionCrPC, passed by the Magistrate for further detention of the

petitioner, was never challenged at any point of time and has

attained finality.

It is to be presumed that the judicial power conferred

on the Magistrate under Section 167 of the CrPC was

exercised only after proper satisfaction as regards due

compliance in all regards, including prior notice to the

petitioner.

Learned counsel for the respondents‐authorities

submits that the petitioner’s argument as to applicability of

SectionArticle 144 of the Constitution of India, by virtue of which all

authorities are to act in aid of the Supreme Court’s

directives, is not squarely applicable in the matter.

It is further argued that Arnesh Kumar (supra) also

contemplated criminal contempt and not a civil contempt,

for which appropriate steps could have been taken by the

petitioner, but have not. The petitioner, under SectionArticle 226,

cannot pray for such a relief. In this context, learned counsel

places the provisions of Sections 2(c) and Section2(d) to distinguish
11

between a criminal and a civil contempt. It is further argued

that the form prescribed for criminal contempt applications,

as provided in the Rules of this court, have not been

followed in the present case. Moreover, it is argued, the

petitioner, if so keen to punish the police officer concerned,

ought also to have sought for a departmental enquiry against

the Magistrate concerned, but deliberately did not do so for

reasons best known to the petitioner.

Relying upon paragraph no. 11.6 of the Arnesh Kumar

(supra), it is submitted that a notice under Section 41A of the

CrPC was to be served under the said paragraph. In the

present case, however, the notice was repeatedly sought to

be served on the petitioner but was eluded by the petitioner

under various pretexts. As such, the issuance of the said

notice ought to be deemed sufficient service in the peculiar

facts of the case, thus rendering the argument of the

petitioner as regards non‐compliance of Section 41A, SectionCrPC

fruitless.

In conclusion, learned counsel for the respondents‐

authorities submits that, in the event the writ petition is not

dismissed but entertained and/or any interim protection is

granted to the petitioner, the respondents‐authorities shall

use an affidavit‐in‐opposition to controvert the facts alleged
12

in the writ petition and to bring the necessary documents on

record.

The first feature of the present case, which defies

logic, is that the complainant, on the basis of whose

allegations the FIR‐in‐question was registered, was in no

way connected with the alleged offences, nor the victim of

any of those. The complainant was an Assistant Public

Prosecutor of the State in the Raghunathpur Court.

A bare perusal of the offences with which the

petitioner was charged shows that all offences under the SectionIPC

were non‐cognizable offences, apart from Section 469 of the

IPC, which was cognizable but bailable. As such, the police

could not, of its own, commence investigation on any of such

allegations.

That apart, a bare perusal of the sections mentioned in

the FIR reveals that those do not stand a moment’s scrutiny,

at least on the complaint of the Assistant Public Prosecutor,

who was in no way connected with the matter.

The first charge slapped on the petitioner was under

Section 465 of the IPC, which pertains to commission of

forgery. The next offence alleged, under Section 469 of the

IPC, pertains to forgery being committed, intending that the
13

document or electronic record forged shall harm the

reputation of any party, or knowing that it is likely to be

used for that purpose.

It is evident that, by merely viewing the YouTube

channels‐in‐question, the complainant could not have any

idea about whether the document shown therein were

forged or forged for the purpose of harming the reputation

of anybody. The complaint lodged does not indicate any

basis whatsoever for the wild apprehension of the

complainant that such documents were forged.

As far as Section 500 of the IPC is concerned, the same

relates to defamation of another and is even compoundable

by the person defamed, if she/he agreed to have the charge

dropped against the accused. Section 504 of the IPC provides

about intentional insult with the intent to provoke breach of

the peace. Such insult has to be intentional, giving

provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be

likely that such provocation will cause him to break the

public peace, or to commit any other offence.

Pertaining to both the aforesaid sections, being

Sections 500 and Section504, the persons against whom the

defamation or the insults were allegedly committed, have
14

not come up with any allegation whatsoever in that regard.

It begs explanation as to how the Assistant Public Prosecutor

of the Raghunathpur Court could have an inkling of an idea

as to whether the statements were perceived to be

defamatory by the recipients of such alleged defamatory

statements or insults, or would cause the victims of the acts

to break public peace or commit any other offence.

No basis for such bald allegation has also been

disclosed in the complaint.

Next taking into consideration Section 505(1)(b) of the

IPC, which is one of the other provisions under which the

investigation was apparently started by the police, the same

relates to publication or circulation of any statement, rumor

or report with intent to cause, or likely to cause fear or alarm

to the public, or to any section of the public whereby any

person may be induced to commit an offence against the

State or against the public tranquility.

It is not clear at all as to how the criticism of the State

Government and its functionaries and a Member of

Parliament could be deemed to be publication of a statement

likely to cause fear or alarm to the public at all, let alone
15

whereby such person may be induced to commit an offence

against the State or against the public tranquility.

In this context, it has to be noted that there is a

common misconception of identifying the ‘State’ with the

‘Government’. This may be a fallout of the failure of the

Indian polity to implement the Constitutional vision as to

separation of powers between the three wings of the

Government, in particular among the Legislature and the

Executive.

‘State’, as commonly understood, is a body or

association of people which comprises a polity and is an

independent political entity having sovereignty. There may

be different forms of governance in running the State.

However, unlike the political fiction of a ‘State’, generally

having geographical boundaries, a Government is a

dispensation which runs the bureaucratic administration of

the State at a particular point of time and cannot be

identified with the State itself.

Particularly in a multi‐party democracy like India, it is

often seen that the ideologies of political parties in control of

the State machinery acquire pre‐dominance over the actual

will of the public, although on paper elected representatives
16

of the people run the Government. As such, it would be an

infinitely risky proposition to equate the State with the

Government in power, since that would be the very

antithesis of a democracy.

The people always have a right to criticize the

dispensation running the administration of the country,

being the Government or the Executive. Even the Judiciary

and the Legislature are not exempt from fair criticism. That

is what the freedom of speech and expression, as enshrined

in the Constitution, is all about.

However, to say that transmission made in a website

channel, making certain allegations against some persons,

who happen to be Ministers or Members of Parliament, does

not and cannot tantamount to a publication or circulation of

a statement instigating people to commit an offence against

the ‘State’ or against the ‘public tranquility’. Such allegations

are of personal nature and, if aggrieved, the persons

concerned could very well have approached the police

authorities with legitimate complaints. In the absence of any

such complaint by the said persons, it would be attributing

to the said functionaries of the Government or a Member of

Parliament the sovereignty associated with the concept of
17

‘State’, which was never contemplated by the framers of the

Constitution or law‐makers.

In fact, it is criticism which helps in good governance

and keeps a leash on public functionaries, providing a

touchstone for the Executive to test the worth of their public

endeavours.

In such view of the matter, the inclusion of Section

505(1)(b) of the IPC in the FIR is ex facie not maintainable.

As regards Sections 500 and Section504 of the IPC, those

relate to defamation against particular persons and insults

made to particular persons knowing that the person is likely

to break public peace or to commit any other offence.

No ingredient in the acts of the petitioner, as alleged

in the complaint and FIR, satisfies the criteria of Sections 500

and Section504 of the IPC. As such, there is no basis to the

allegations of defamation or intentional insult, as envisaged

in Sections 500 and Section504, in the complaint, on the basis of

which the police started investigation.

Taking into account Sections 465 and Section469, the question

of the complainant having direct knowledge or even indirect

information about any forgery being committed, merely on

perusal of a video clipping on a social media, is incredible to
18

even the most gullible among us. Such allegations are

baseless, in so far as they relate to forgery of documents

which the complainant did not even have the scope of going

through. The complaint did not even disclose any basis of

the complainant’s source of knowledge, or reasons for

apprehension, as to the documents shown on the petitioner’s

social media channels being forged.

Hence, all the offences under the SectionIPC, on which

investigation was started against the petitioner, were ex facie

baseless and could not be the ground of a valid First

Information Report.

As regards Section 66 of the IT Act, the said section is

restricted in operation to a person dishonestly or

fraudulently doing any act referred to in Section 43 of the

said Act and does not go any further.

Section 43 of the IT Act entirely revolves around any

person, without permission of the owner or any other person

in charge of a computer, computer system or computer

network, committing the offences as mentioned therein.

Such offences are in the nature of unauthorized access,

causing damage, disruption of the system or preventing

access to the system and/or destruction or deletion of
19

information as well as stealing or concealing any computer

source code used for a computer resource with an intention

to cause damage.

Section 43 is in no way connected with the nature of

the offences alleged in the present case, since admittedly, the

petitioner was using his own equipment to run his social

media channels. As such, Section 66 of the IT Act could not

be attracted under any stretch of imagination.

That apart, as already discussed, the police did not

have any authority to start investigation independently on

such allegations, since all of them were either non‐

cognizable or bailable or both.

On the other aspect of the matter, as regards the

concerned Magistrate having granted permission for

detention of the petitioner beyond 24 hours under Section

167 of the CrPC, learned counsel for the respondents‐

authorities seeks to impress upon the court that, since the

said order was never challenged, the same has attained

finality and as such, the present writ petition is not

maintainable at this juncture, since it should be presumed

from such order that the police followed due procedure of

law.

20

However, the present writ petition is not confined to

mere technical violations of provisions of law but to an

assault on democratic rights of the petitioner as well. The

Fundamental Right of freedom of speech and expression, as

guaranteed by the Constitution of India under SectionArticle

19(1)(a), was prima facie thoroughly violated by the over‐

action of the police in the present case. Such suspicion gains

momentum all the more because all the persons, against

whom the allegations were made allegedly in the social

media channels, belong to the ruling dispensation of the

State of West Bengal and/or the political party running such

dispensation. Hence, it is rather peculiar that the police

sprang into action and nabbed the petitioner without

complying with Section 41A of the CrPC without any

instigation and without having any jurisdiction, on the face

of it, to commence investigation of its own.

Subsequent extension of the period of detention by a

Magistrate cannot retrospectively validate an erroneous act

of the police in starting the investigation in the first place

and registering the FIR at all. The Magistrate’s order under

Section 167 of the CrPC was at best final as regards the

extension of the period of detention and could not be

binding on any court any further than such limited scope.
21

Merely because the order of the Magistrate extending the

period of detention was not challenged, it does not mean

that the same lends credence or vindicates the

commencement of investigation and registration of FIR

against the present petitioner.

As regards the argument made, that this is only a

nascent stage of the investigation and it would always be

open to the courts and other authorities, if necessary, to alter

the charges or attribute minor offences in place of the major

offences alleged in the FIR, although learned counsel for the

respondents‐authorities is correct in submitting that Sections

173(3), Section2016, Section221 and Section222 permit further investigation, for the

court to alter the charges and for the remission of the

offences to minor ones, all of those powers are based on the

premise that the investigation started was legitimate and

lawful at its inception.

The argument, that the investigation is in a nascent

stage, is fallacious on the ground that the said subsequent

powers to alter the offences while submitting the charge‐

sheet or punishing the alleged offender, do not vindicate

retrospectively the erroneous commencement of the

investigation itself. In the event it is found on the face of it

that the commencement of the investigation was beyond the
22

jurisdiction of the police and was based on entirely fictitious

and baseless allegations, there cannot arise any question of

the investigation proceeding even for a moment, since the

investigation was bad ab initio. Subsequent damage control

exercises under the quoted provisions would be a mere

autopsy after the damage was already done by subjecting a

free citizen of India to unnecessary investigation and torture,

unlawfully restraining him and putting at stake her/his

personal liberty and freedom of speech and expression at the

drop of a hat.

The other contention raised by learned counsel for the

respondents‐authorities, as to Arnesh Kumar (supra) being

only applicable in cases of anticipatory bail, falls flat on a

meaningful reading of the said judgment and its ratio.

Although Arnesh Kumar (supra) emanated from a case of

anticipatory bail, clause 11 and its sub‐clauses of the

judgment make it clear that the endeavour of the Supreme

Court in the said judgment was to ensure that police officers

do not arrest the accused unnecessarily and the Magistrate

does not authorize detention casually and mechanically.

Only in order to ensure such observations, the directions

given in Arnesh Kumar (supra) find their proper context. Such

directions covered all offences, as mentioned in Clause 12 of
23

the judgment, which are punishable with imprisonment for a

term less than seven years or which may extend to seven

years, whether with or without fine. The principle laid down

in the sub‐clauses of clause 11 of Arnesh Kumar (supra) make

it very clear that those relate to instructions by the State

Governments to their police officers not to automatically

arrest, and for the police officers to be provided with a

check‐list containing the specified sub‐clauses under Section

41(1)(b)(ii). Clause 11.6 categorically provides that notice of

appearance in terms of Section 41A CrPC be served on the

accused within two weeks from the date of institution of the

case, which may be extended by the Superintendent of Police

of the District for reasons recorded in writing. Failure to

comply with such directions, as per clause 11.7 of the

judgment, apart from rendering the police officers concerned

liable for departmental action, also makes them liable to be

punished for contempt of court, to be instituted before the

High Court having territorial jurisdiction.

The argument of the respondents‐authorities as to

attempts having been made to serve a notice under Section

41A of the CrPC on the petitioner, which should satisfy the

tests laid down in Arnesh Kumar (supra), cannot be accepted
24

in view of clause 11.6 of the said decision contemplates

‘service’ of such a notice and not ‘attempts to serve’.

The argument, that the present writ petition is not in

the proper form of a contempt application as contemplated

in the Rules of this court, being in the nature of criminal

contempt, is neither here nor there, since, in the event

ingredients of contempt are found, there is no bar for the

court to take up the matter by converting the same to a

contempt petition as well.

The other argument, that the petitioner has not

complied with clause 11.8, for taking departmental action

against the Judicial Magistrate, who authorized detention

without recording reasons, does not hold water since that

was not a mandatory pre‐condition for the petitioner

approaching this court under SectionArticle 226 of the Constitution

for getting appropriate reliefs. It was the choice of the

petitioner, for the time being at least, not to take such action

against the Judicial Magistrate, which does not ipso facto

absolve the police authorities from their illegal action in

detaining the petitioner on frivolous grounds, that too on the

complaint of a person who, on the face of it, could not have

any direct knowledge of the allegations made, more so since

the allegations were baseless on the face of it and were not
25

even maintainable against the petitioner in the context of the

petitioner’s actions, on the basis of which such offences were

alleged.

Moreover, the action of the police in the present case

appears to be patently mala fide and reeks of political rather

than legal motivation, in view of all the persons who were

alleged to be victims of the petitioner’s act in the complaint

belonging to the present ruling dispensation of the state and

the complaint being lodged by an Assistant Public

Prosecutor of the Raghunathpur court, who ought not to be

affected in any manner with, or even any basis of knowledge

of, the offences alleged, particularly those of forgery, unless

the complainant perceived an allegiance owed by him to his

political nominators.

Since counsel for both sides painstakingly advanced

detailed arguments even on the prayer for interim

protection, this court had no other option but to go into such

a detailed discussion, as made above. However, it is made

clear that the findings made in this order are tentative as far

as the final disposal of the present writ petition is concerned

and are only made for the purpose of deciding on the ad

interim prayer and the prima facie maintainability of the writ

petition.

26

In the circumstances as discussed above, W.P.

No.21526(W) of 2019 is directed to be enlisted under the

heading “For Hearing” in the monthly list of January, 2020.

The respondents are directed to file their affidavit(s)‐in‐

opposition within a fortnight from date. Reply/replies, if any,

shall be filed within January 3, 2020.

During pendency of the writ petition, the

respondents‐authorities are restrained from acting upon

and/or taking any coercive measure against the petitioner on

the basis of the impugned FIR, annexed as Annexure P1 at

page 42 of the instant writ petition and the connected

complaint, annexed immediately thereafter, both dated

September 23, 2019. The operation of the said complaint and

the FIR shall remain stayed till disposal of the writ petition.

That apart, the respondents are directed to preserve

and secure the entire CCTV footage of the Khardah police

station from 12 Noon of October 17, 2019 till 12 Noon of

October 18, 2019 for production, if necessary, before this

court as and when called for, also during pendency of the

writ petition.

27

Urgent certified website copies of this order, if

applied for, be made available to the parties upon

compliance with the requisite formalities.

( Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J. )