FormNo.J(1)
INTHEHIGHCOURTATCALCUTTA
CriminalRevisionalJurisdiction
AppellateSide
Present:
TheHon’bleJusticeMadhumatiMitra
C.R.R.3566of2018
With
CRAN1348of2019
SriKrishnenduDasThakur
Vs.
TheStateofWestofBengalAnr..
AdvocateforthePetitioner:Mr.SivaProsadGhose
Mr.ChandraBhanuSinha
Mr.RohitKumarShaw
AdvocatefortheOppositePartyno.2:Mr.AnandKesari
Mr.SekharMukherjee
Judgmenton:28.06.2019
MadhumatiMitra,J.:
ThepetitionerhasfiledthepresentapplicationunderSectionArticle227ofthe
ConstitutionofIndiareadwithSection482oftheCodeofCriminalProcedure,
prayingforquashing/settingasidetheimpugnedorderdated10thOctober,2018
passedbytheLearnedAdditionalSessionJudge,HowrahinCriminalAppeal
no.82of2017andtheorderofrejectionoftheprayerforstayofthe
Mis.ExecutionCaseno.298of2016pendingbeforetheLearnedJudicial
Magistrate,HowrahMunicipalCourt,HowraharisingoutofMiscellaneousCase
no.27836/2014underSection12oftheProtectionofWomenfromSectionDomestic
ViolenceAct,2005.
InMiscellaneousCaseno.27836/2014underSection12oftheProtection
ofWomenfromSectionDomesticViolenceAct,thepetitionerwasdirectedbytheLearned
MagistratetopayRs.3,000/-permonthformaintenanceandRs.800/-per
monthforrentofalternativeaccommodationonandfrom5thOctober,2015to
theoppositeparty.Thereafterthepetitionerinitiatedamatrimonialsuitpraying
fordissolutionofhismarriagewithhiswifeandobtainedexpartedecreeof
divorceon23rdFebruary,2016.Afterthedecreeofdivorcethepetitionerfiledan
applicationunderSection25oftheProtectionofWomenfromSectionDomesticViolence
Act,2005prayingforalteration/modificationorrevocationoftheorderdated5th
October,2015,passedbytheLearnedMagistrategrantingmaintenanceandrent
foralternativeaccommodationinconnectionwithMiscellaneousCase
no.27836/2014onthegroundthathismarriagewiththeoppositepartywas
dissolvedbyadecreeofdivorceon23rdFebruary,2016andheisnotliableto
payanyamounttooppositepartyintermsoftheorderdated5thOctober2015.
Itisthespecificcontentionofthepetitionerthatafterthedecreeofdivorceheis
nolongerin’domesticrelation’withtheoppositepartyno.2.
AlltheLearnedCounselappearingforthepartiesadvancedtheir
argumentswiththehelpofaseriesofdecisions.Beforedelvingdeepintothe
matter,itwouldbebettertodealwiththerelevantSectionsandProvisionsofthe
ProtectionofWomenfromSectionDomesticViolenceAct,2005.
Section25ofthesaidActreadsasunder:
“Durationandalterationoforders-(1)Aprotectionordermadeunder
Section18shallbeinforcetilltheaggrievedpersonappliesfordischarge.
(2)IftheMagistrate,onreceiptofanapplicationfromtheaggrievedpersonor
therespondent,issatisfiedthatthereisachangeinthecircumstancesrequiring
alteration,modificationorrevocationofanyordermadeunderthisAct,hemay,for
reasonstoberecordedinwritingpasssuchorder,ashemaydeemappropriate.”
Section25consistsoftwoparts.Sub-Section1ofSection25oftheAct
2005dealswiththeprotectionordermadeunderSection18oftheAct.The
secondpart,thatisSub-Section2ofSection25speaksaboutalteration,
modificationorrevocationofanyordermadeunderthisAct.SofarasSub-
Section1ofSection25isconcerned,onlytheaggrievedpersonmayapplyfor
dischargeofprotectionorderpassedunderSection18oftheAct.
OntheotherhandSub-Section2ofSection25providesthattheaggrieved
personortherespondentmayapproachbeforetheMagistratebyfilingan
applicationforalteration,modificationorrevocationofanyordermadeunder
thisAct.IfanysuchapplicationisfiledbeforetheMagistrateprayingfor
alteration,modificationorrevocationofanyordermadeunderthisActeitherby
theaggrievedpersonorbytherespondentthentheMagistratemayforreasonsto
berecordedinwritingpassorder,ashemaydeemappropriate.Sub-Section2of
Section25hasconferredrightbothontheaggrievedpersonandtherespondent
toapproachbeforetheMagistrateforalteration,modificationorrevocationofany
ordermadeunderthisAct.Sub-Section1ofSection25isrestrictedonlytothe
protectionordersunderSection18oftheAct.TherecourseunderSub-Section1
ofSection25canbeavailedofonlybytheaggrievedpersonnotbythe
respondent.Whereas,Sub-Section2ofSection25dealswiththealteration,
modificationandrevocationofanyordermadeundertheActandrecoursecan
betakenbothbytheaggrievedpersonandtherespondent.Thescopeof
applicationofSub-Section2ofSection25ismuchwiderthanSub-Section1of
Section25.
Section2(a)oftheAct,definedtheterm’aggrievedperson’.
“aggrievedperson”meansanywomanwhois,orhasbeen,ina
domesticrelationshipwiththerespondentandwhoallegestohave
beensubjectedtoanyactofdomesticviolencebytherespondents.
WhereasrespondenthasbeendefinedinSection2(q):-
“respondent”meansanyadultmalepersonwhois,orhasbeen,
inadomesticrelationshipwiththeaggrievedpersonandagainst
whomtheaggrievedpersonhassoughtanyreliefunderthisAct:
Providedthatanaggrievedwifeorfemalelivinginarelationship
inthenatureofmarriagemayalsofileacomplaintagainsttherelative
ofthehusbandorthemalepartner.
InviewoftheprovisionascontainedinSub-Section2ofSection25,itcan
bepresumedthattheorderpassedundertheActisnotperpetualinnatureand
theorderpassedunderthisActmaybealtered,modifiedorrevoked,ifthereisa
changeinthecircumstancesandforthatpurposetheaggrievedpersonorthe
respondentmayapproachbeforetheMagistrateundertheAct.Ifsuchprayeris
madetheMagistratemayforreasonstoberecordedinwritingpassedsuch
order,ashemaydeemappropriate.
Now,thequestioncomesastowhetherafteradecreeofdivorcebyaCourt
ofcompetentjurisdiction,thedomesticrelationshipbetweenthehusbandand
wifewouldcontinueinviewoftheprovisionofthisAct.Inthisconnection,the
definitionofdomesticrelationshipasmentionedunderSection2(f)oftheAct
may,becitedhere:-
“domesticrelationship”meansarelationshipbetweentwo
personswholiveorhave,atanypointoftime,livedtogetherinashared
household,whentheyarerelatedbyconsanguinity,marriageor
througharelationshipinthenatureofmarriage,adoptionorarefamilymemberslivingtogetherasajointfamily.
Nodoubt,herethepartiesi.e.theaggrievedpersonandtherespondent
wererelatedwitheachotherbymarriage.Itisthecontentionofthehusband
thatheisnolongerindomesticrelationshipwiththewifeandassuchthe
interimorderunderSection23oftheActpassedbytheMagistraterequirestobe
revoked.Section23oftheActspeaksaboutgrantofinterimorder.Inviewof
Sub-Section1ofSection23oftheAct,Magistratemaypasssuchinterimorder,
ashedeemsjustandproperinconnectionwithanyproceedingsbeforehim
underthisAct.
AnorderpassedbytheMagistrateunderSection23oftheActshallremain
inforceunlessanduntilitisaltered,modifiedorrevokedeitherbythe
MagistrateunderSection25oftheActorbytheAppellateCourtunderSection
29oftheActinconnectionwithanappealpreferredeitherbytheaggrieved
personorbytherespondent.
Intheinstantcase,theprayerforalteration,modificationorrevocationof
theinterimorderunderSection25oftheActwasrejectedbytheLearned
Magistrateandthereaftersaidorderofrejectionhasbeenaffirmedinappeal.
Thatmeanstherearetwoconcurrentdecisionsagainstthepresentpetitioner
passedbytheLearnedCourtsbelow.
DuringthecourseofthehearingtheLearnedAdvocateappearingforthe
oppositepartyhascontendedthatinviewofthedecisioninKrishna
BhatacharjeeVs.SarathiChoudhuryandanotherreportedin2016Cri.L.J.
330thewifedoesnotceasetobeanaggrievedpersonbecausemerelythatthe
husbandobtainedadecreefordivorcefromaCivilCourt.Ihavegonethrough
thedecisionasreferredbytheLearnedCounselappearingfortheoppositeparty.
FromParagraphs18and22,ofthesaiddecisionitappearsthataquestionwas
raisedbeforetheHon’bleApexCourtastowhetherthewifeceasedtobean
aggrievedpersonbecauseofthedecreeofjudicialseparation.Inthesaid
judgmentparticularlyinparagraph22Hon’bleApexCourt,hasmadea
distinctionbetweenadecreeofdivorceanddecreeofjudicialseparation.
Inparagraph22ofthesaidjudgmentHon’bleSupremeCourtobservedas
under:
“Inviewoftheaforesaidpronouncement,itisquiteclearthatthereisa
distinctionbetweenadecreefordivorceanddecreeofjudicialseparation;
intheformer,thereisaseveranceofstatusandthepartiesdonot
remainashusbandandwife,whereasinthelater,therelationship
betweenhusbandandwifecontinuesandthelegalrelationship
continuesasithasnotbeensnapped.Thusunderstood,thefinding
recordedbythecourtsbelowwhichhavebeenconcurredbytheHigh
Courtthatthepartieshavingbeenjudicialseparated,theappellantwifehasceasedtobean”aggrievedperson”iswhollyunsustainable”.
InthesaiddecisionofKrishnaBhatacharjeeVs.SarathiChoudhury
andanotherthewifeapproachedforreliefundertheAct.Thesaidreliefunder
Section12oftheActof2005wasrefusedonthegroundthatthewifeceasedto
bean’aggrievedperson’duetojudicialseparation.Thefactualsituationofthe
presentcaseisdistinguishablefromthefactsofthedecisionasreferredbythe
oppositeparty.Inthepresentcasetheoppositepartyhadalreadybeengranted
maintenanceandrentforalternativeaccommodationandthehusbandprayedfor
revocationofthatorderonthegroundofdivorce.
LearnedCounselfortheoppositepartyhasreferredanotherdecisioninA.
AshokVardhanReddyOrs.Vs.SmtP.SavithaandAnotherreportedin
2012Cri.L.J.3462andcontendedthattheinterimorderpassedunderSection23
oftheActinconnectionwithanapplicationunderSection12oftheProtectionof
WomenfromSectionDomesticViolenceAct,2005cannotbealtered,modifiedorrevoked
byanysubsequentdecreeofdivorceonthegroundthatatthetimeofpassing
theinterimorderunderSection23oftheActthepartieswereinjural
relationshipofmanandwife.
Thespecificcontentionofthepetitioneristhatafterthedecreeofthe
divorce,theoppositeparty-wifeceasedtobeanaggrievedpersonasenvisagedin
theprovisionsofSection2(a)oftheActof2005.Theoppositeparty-wifethough
hadbeeninthedomesticrelationwiththepetitionerbutthatrelationshiphas
beenlegallyterminatedbyadecreeofdivorcepassedbyaCourtofcompetent
jurisdiction.Afterthedecreeofdivorcetheoppositepartyno.2cannotbesaidto
beawomenwhoisorhasbeeninadomesticrelationshipwiththe
respondent/petitioner.Nowthestatusoftheoppositepartyno.2isadivorced
wifeasthematrimonialrelationshipbetweenthepartieshasbeenterminatedby
adecreeofdivorce.Afterthedecreeofthedivorcetheoppositepartycannotbe
consideredtobeanaggrievedpersonorindomesticrelationshipwiththepresent
petitioner.
Inboththedefinitionsofaggrievedpersonanddomesticrelationship,our
legislatureinitswisdomusepresenttenseandpresentperfecttense.Inorderto
bringanactionandtogetareliefundertheActtheaggrievedpersonhastoshow
thatsheisindomesticrelationshipwiththerespondentorhasbeenina
domesticrelationshipwithhim.
Sub-Section2ofSection25oftheActempowerstheMagistratetomodify,
alterorrevokeanyorderpassedundertheActwhenthereisachangeinthe
circumstances.
Themootquestionswhicharerequisitetobeconsideredare:-
1)Whethertheoppositepartyisrequiredtobecontinuedindomestic
relationshiptoexecuteanorderofmaintenancealreadygrantedin
herfavourundertheprovisionoftheActof2005;
2)Whetherchangeofmaritalstatusoftheoppositepartyno.2bya
decreeofdivorcecanbeconsideredtobeachangein
circumstancesasmentionedinSection25(2)oftheAct.
Boththequestionsareinterrelatedwitheachother.
Section25(2)oftheAct2005speaksabout’changeincircumstances’.
Circumstancesmeanafactorconditionconnectedwithorrelevanttoaneventor
action.Theterm’changeincircumstances’hasnotbeendefinedintheActof
2005.
ThewordschangeincircumstancesareusedinSectiontheCodeofCriminal
Procedure.Theexpression’changeincircumstances’inSection489Cr.P.C.now
Section127oftheCodeofCriminalProcedureiswideenoughtocoverthecostof
living,incomeoftheparties,etc.InbothSectiontheCodeofCriminalProcedureandthe
ProtectionofWomenfromSectionDomesticViolenceAct,2005,thewordschangein
circumstancesareusedinconnectionwithalterationofanorderofmaintenance.
UseofsamewordsinsimilarconnectioninasubsequentActgivesrisetoa
presumptionthattheyareusedtocarrythesamemeaningasintheearlier
statute.Moreoverwhenthesaidwordsusedintheearlierstatutehavebeen
interpretedbytheHigherCourtsonseveraloccasions,thenuseofsamewordsin
similarcontextinasubsequentstatutewillgiveriseinfavourofthepresumption
thattheParliamentintendsthesameinterpretationshouldalsobefollowedfor
constructionofthosewordsinthelaterenactment.
ThetermwifehasnotbeendefinedintheActof2005.
Explanantion(b)ofSub-Section1ofSection125SectionoftheCodeofCriminal
Proceduresaysthatwifeincludesawomanwhohasbeendivorcedbyorhas
obtainedadecreeofdivorcefromherhusbandandhasnotremarried.
Admittedly,theoppositepartyno.2hadbeeninadomesticrelationship
withthepetitioneri.e.husbandandwife.Oppositepartyno.2gottheorderof
maintenanceandrentforalternativeaccommodationwhileshewasindomestic
relationshipwiththepetitionerandshewasanaggrievedpartywithinthe
meaningoftheActof2005.’Changeincircumstances’and’changeofmarital
status’arequitedifferent.Divorcedwifehasarighttoclaimandget
maintenanceallowance.Hersaidrightcontinuestillherremarriage.Inviewof
Explanation(b)toSub-Section(1)Section125oftheCodeofCriminalProcedure
awomandivorced,byherhusbandundertheSectionHinduMarriageAct,continuesto
enjoythestatusofawifeforthepurposeofclaimingmaintenanceallowances
fromherex-husband,ifsheisunabletomaintainherselfandshehasnot
remarried.
FromcopyofthejudgmentpassedinMATSuitno.103/2015(Previous
no.345/2015)itappearsthatthedecreeofdivorcewasgrantedunderthe
provisionofSectionHinduMarriageAct.Nowthestatusoftheoppositepartyno.2is
divorcedwifeofaHinduex-husband.Inviewoftheprovisionsascontainedin
Explanation(b)toSub-Section(1)ofSection125Cr.P.C.,aHindudivorcedwife
isentitledtogetmaintenancefromherex-husband.ItistruethattheProtection
ofWomenfromDomesticViolenceActdoesnotcontainanyprovisionsimilarto
thatofExplanation(b)toSub-Section(1)ofSection125Cr.P.C.
Thedomesticrelationshipbetweentheoppositepartyno.2(aggrieved
person)andthepetitioner(respondent)wasverymuchalivewhentheopposite
partyno.2madecomplaintofdomesticviolence.Theorderofmaintenanceand
rentforalternativeaccommodationwhichwaspassedinfavourofoppositeparty
no.2willcontinueunlessanduntilthereischangeincircumstancesas
mentionedinSection25(2)oftheActof2005.Decreeofdivorcedoesnotdeprive
thewifefromthereliefgrantedinherfavourundertheprovisionsoftheActof
2005.Afterdecreeofdivorcetheoppositepartyno.2hasbecome’divorcedwife’.
Moreover,ourlawrecognisestherightofadivorcedwifetoget
maintenancetillherremarriage.SectionThisActof2005providesadditionalrightsand
remediestotheaggrievedperson.Ifthecontentionofthepetitionerisaccepted
thenthewifewillbeforcedtoapproachbeforetheMagistratetogetmaintenance
underSection125oftheCodeofCriminalProcedure.Whatisneededisthatthe
existenceofdomesticrelationshipasdefinedintheActisnecessarytobringan
actionandtogetreliefundertheActof2005.Existenceofdomesticrelationship
isnotneededtoexecutetheordergrantedunderSection12oftheActof2005
andthedivorcedwifewhogotanorderofmaintenanceandotherreliefunderthe
Actof2005priortothedecreeofdivorceisentitledtoexecutethesameifsheis
unabletomaintainherselfandshehasnotremarriedandforotherreasons.
Forthereasonsmentionedabove,Idonotfindanysubstanceandforcein
theapplicationfiledbythepetitioner.
Consequently,theapplicationisdismissed.
Re:C.R.A.N.1348of2019.
InviewofthejudgmentpassedinC.R.R.3566of2018theapplication
becomesinfructuousandstandsdismissed.
UrgentPhotostatcertifiedcopyofthisjudgmentbesuppliedtotheparties,
ifappliedfor,uponcompliancewithallformalities.
(MadhumatiMitra,J.)