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Sri Umesh vs State Of Karnataka on 27 January, 2020

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 27th DAY OF JANUARY, 2020

BEFORE
THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE B.A.PATIL

CRIMINAL PETITION No.627/2020
c/w
CRIMINAL PETITION No.5910/2018

IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.627/2020:
BETWEEN:

Sri Umesh
S/o Lingahanumaya
Aged about 39 years
Opp. OTI College, Arakere Post,
Antharasanahalli, Kasaba Hobli,
Tumakuru-572 106.
…Petitioner
(By Sri Bhargav G., Advocate for
Sri C.R.Gopalaswamy, Advocate)
AND:

1. State of Karnataka
by Women’s Police Station
Davanagere City Sub-Division,
Davanagere,
Represented by State Public Prosecutor
High Court Building
Bengaluru-560 001.

2. Smt. Shailashree V.H.,
D/o S.V.Hanumanthappa
Aged about 30 years
R/at No.5039/25, 7th Cross
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2nd Main, S.S.Badavane
Davanagere-577 004.
…Respondents
(By Sri Vijayakumar Majage, Addl. SPP for R1;
Smt. Saritha Kulkarni, Advocate for R2)

This Criminal Petition is filed under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C praying to quash the entire proceedings in
C.C.No.1108/2019 (Crime No.79/2018) for the offences
punishable under Sections 498A, 506, 504, 342 r/w
Section 34 of IPC and also under Sections 3 and 4 of
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, pending on the file of the II
Additional Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Davanagere as far
as the petitioner is concerned.

IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.5910/2018:

BETWEEN:

1. Smt. Sowbhagya A.L.
W/o Sri Gangadharaiah B.S.
Aged about 48 years

2. Sri Gangadharaiah B.S. @ Gangappa
S/o late Sri Siddappa
Aged about 51 years

Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 are
Residing at Bendone Village
Mallekavu Post, C.N.Durga Hobli
Koratagere Taluk, Tumakuru-572 129.

3. Sri Nagesh A.L.
S/o late Sri Lingahanumaiah
Aged about 27 years
Working at CIPLA Company
Presently residing at K.R.Puram
Bengaluru-560 036.
-3-

Permanent R/o Antharasanahalli,
Arakere Post, Kasaba Hobli,
Tumakuru District-572 106.
…Petitioners
(By Sri Bhargav G., Advocate for
Sri C.R.Gopalaswamy, Advocate)

AND:

1. State of Karnataka
by Women’s Police Station
Davanagere City Sub-Division, Davanagere,
Represented by State Public Prosecutor
High Court Building
Bengaluru-560 001.

2. Smt. Shailashree V.H.,
D/o S.V.Hanumanthappa
Aged about 30 years
R/at No.5039/25, 7th Cross
2nd Main, S.S.Badavane
Davanagere-577 004.
…Respondents
(By Sri Vijayakumar Majage, Addl. SPP for R1;
Smt. Saritha Kulkarni, Advocate for R2)

This Criminal Petition is filed under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C praying to quash the registration of FIR by the first
respondent-Police vide Crime No.79/2018 for the offences
punishable under Sections 498A, 506, 504, 342 r/w
Section 34 of IPC and also under Sections 3 and 4 of
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, pending on the file of the
judicial Magistrate First Class-III, Davanagere as far as the
petitioner is concerned.

These Criminal Petitions coming on for Orders, this
day the Court made the following:-
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ORDER

The learned Additional SPP is directed to take notice

to respondent No.1 in both the petitions.

Smt.Saritha Kulkarni takes notice to respondent No.2

in Criminal Petition No.627/2020. Registry is directed to

print her name.

2. Petitioners – accused No.1 Sri. Umesha, accused

Nos.2 Smt.Sowbhagya A.L. W/o Sri.Gangadharaiah B.S.,

accused No.3 Sri.Gangadharaiah B.S. S/o late

Sri.Siddappa, accused No.4 Sri.Nagesh A.L. S/o late

Sri.Lingahanumaiah, Smt.Shailashree V.H. – complainant-

respondent No.2 and the learned Additional SPP are

present before the Court.

3. Today, they have filed a compromise petition in

both the cases along with affidavit reporting the

compromise. The said compromise petition in both the

cases being signed by petitioners-accused Nos.1 to 4 and

respondent No.2-complainant. In the said compromise
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petition it has been contended that petitioner-accused No.1

and complainant- respondent No.2 have mutually agreed to

get their marriage dissolved which was solemnized on

9.11.2016 and as per the order of the Family Court,

Davanagere it has been dissolved on 18.12.2019.

Petitioner-accused No.1 has agreed to pay a sum of

Rs.5,50,000/- as a permanent alimony to respondent No.2

for full and final settlement. In pursuant to this

Rs.5,00,000/- has already been paid by petitioner-accused

No.1 to respondent No.2-complainant and for the

remaining amount of Rs.50,000/-, accused No.1 has

issued a post dated cheque. It is agreed that respondent

No.2-complainant shall withdraw Crl.Misc.No.134/2018

and she has no objection to quash the proceedings in

C.C.No.1108/2019. The said compromise petition has been

endorsed by the learned counsel for the petitioners and the

respondent No.2-complainant.

4. At this juncture, it is worth to mention here itself a

decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of J.Ramesh
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Kamath and Others Vs. Mohana Kurupt and Others,

reported in (2016) 12 SCC 179, wherein the Hon’ble Apex

Court has laid down certain principles as to under what

circumstances the Court can quash the proceedings or

compound the offences even in respect of a non-

compoundable offences, wherein it has been held as

under:-

“Held, power vested in High Court under S.482
is not limited to quashing proceedings within
ambit and scope of S.320 of Cr.P.C., – In Gian
Singh, (2012) 10 SCC 303, it was clearly
expounded that quashing of criminal proceedings
under S.482 of Cr.P.C., could also be based on
settlements between private parties, and could
also be on a compromise between the offender
and victim – Only that, the above power did not
extend to crimes against the society – Further,
jurisdiction vested in High Court under S.482
Cr.P.C., for quashing criminal proceedings was
held to be exercisable in criminal cases having
an overwhelming and predominatingly civil
flavour, particular offences arising from
commercial, financial, mercantile, civil,
partnership, or such like transactions, or even
offences arising out of matrimony relating to
dowry, etc., or family disputes where wrong is
basically private or personal. In all such cases,
parties should have resolved their entire dispute
by themselves, mutually.”

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5. The Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the

principles of law laid down in the case of Gian Singh Vs.

State of Punjab and another reported in (2012) 10 SCC

303, wherein it has been observed that the Court can

exercise the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. depending

upon the facts and circumstances of each case and

compound the offence. In the case of Narinder Singh and

others Vs. State of Punjab and another reported in

(2014) 6 SCC 466, it has been observed as under:

“8. We find that there are cases where the power of
the High Court under Section 482 of the Code to
quash the proceedings in those offences which
are uncompoundable has been recognized. The
only difference is that under Section 320(1) of the
Code, no permission is required from the Court in
those cases which are compoundable though the
Court has discretionary power to refuse to
compound the offence. However, compounding
under Section 320(1) of the Code is permissible
only in minor offences or in non-serious offences.
Likewise, when the parties reach settlement in
respect of offences enumerated in Section
320(2) of the Code, compounding is permissible
but it requires the approval of the Court. Insofar
as serious offences are concerned, quashing of
criminal proceedings upon compromise is within
the discretionary powers of the High Court. In
such cases, the power is exercised under Section
482 of the Code and proceedings are quashed.

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Contours of these powers were described by this
Court in B.S.Joshi v. State of Haryana which
has been followed and further
explained/elaborated in so many cases
thereafter, which are taken note of in the
discussion that follows hereinafter.

9. At the same time, one has to keep in mind the
subtle distinction between the power of
compounding of offences given to the Court
under Section 320 of the Code and quashing of
criminal proceedings by the High Court in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction conferred
upon it under Section 482 of the Code. Once it is
found that compounding is permissible only if a
particular offence is covered by the provisions
of Section 320 of the Code and the Court in such
cases is guided solitarily and squarely by the
compromise between the parties, insofar as
power of quashing under Section 482of the Code
is concerned, it is guided by the material on
record as to whether the ends of justice would
justify such exercise of power, although the
ultimate consequence may be acquittal or
dismissal of indictment. Such a distinction is
lucidly explained by a three-Judge Bench of this
Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab. Lodha, J.
speaking for the Court, explained the difference
between the two provisions in the following
manner: (SCC pp.340-41, paras 57 59).

“57. Quashing of offence or criminal
proceedings on the ground of settlement
between an offender and victim is not the
same thing as compounding of offence.
They are different and not interchangeable.

Strictly speaking, the power of
compounding of offences given to a court
-9-

under Section 320 is materially different
from the quashing of criminal proceedings
by the High Court in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction. In compounding of offences,
power of a criminal court is circumscribed
by the provisions contained in Section
320 and the court is guided solely and
squarely thereby while, on the other hand,
the formation of opinion by the High Court
for quashing a criminal offence or criminal
proceeding or criminal complaint is guided
by the material on record as to whether the
ends of justice would justify such exercise
of power although the ultimate
consequence may be acquittal or dismissal
of indictment.

59. B.S.Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma
and Shiji do illustrate the principle that the
High Court may quash criminal
proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise
of its inherent power under Section 482 of
the Code and Section 320 does not limit or
affect the powers of the High Court
under Section 482. Can it be said that by
quashing criminal proceedings in
B.S.Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma
and Shiji this Court has compounded the
non-compoundable offences indirectly? We
do not think so. There does exist the
distinction between compounding of an
offence under Section 320 and quashing of
a criminal case by the High Court in
exercise of inherent power under Section

482. The two powers are distinct and
different although the ultimate
consequence may be the same viz.

– 10 –

acquittal of the accused or dismissal of
indictment.”

10. Apart from narrating the interplay of Section
320 and Section 482 of the Code in the manner
aforesaid, the Court in Gian Singh case also
described the extent of power under Section
482 of the Code in quashing the criminal
proceedings in those cases where the parties
had settled the matter although the offences are
not compoundable. In the first instance it was
emphasized that the power under Section 482 of
the Code is not to be resorted to, if there is
specific provision in the Code for redressal of the
grievance of an aggrieved party. It should be
exercised very sparingly and should not be
exercised as against the express bar of law
engrafted in any other provision of the Code. The
Court also highlighted that in different situations,
the inherent power may be exercised in different
ways to achieve its ultimate objective. Formation
of opinion by the High Court before it exercises
inherent power under Section 482 on either of
the twin objectives, (i) to prevent abuse of the
process of any court, or (ii) to secure the ends of
justice, is a sine qua non.

11. As to under what circumstances the criminal
proceedings in a non- compoundable case be
quashed when there is a settlement between the
parties, the Court provided the following
guidelines: (Gian Singh case, SCC pp.340-41.
para 58)

“58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal
proceeding having regard to the facts that

– 11 –

the dispute between the offender and the
victim has been settled although the
offences are not compoundable, it does so
as in its opinion, continuation of criminal
proceedings will be an exercise in futility
and justice in the case demands that the
dispute between the parties is put to an
end and peace is restored; securing the
ends of justice being the ultimate guiding
factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which
have harmful effect on the public and
consist in wrongdoing that seriously
endangers and threatens the well-being of
the society and it is not safe to leave the
crime-doer only because he and the victim
have settled the dispute amicably or that
the victim has been paid compensation, yet
certain crimes have been made
compoundable in law, with or without the
permission of the court. In respect of
serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity,
etc. or other offences of mental depravity
under IPC or offences of moral turpitude
under special statutes, like the Prevention
of Corruption Act or the offences committed
by public servants while working in that
capacity, the settlement between the
offender and the victim can have no legal
sanction at all. However, certain offences
which overwhelmingly and predominantly
bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil,
mercantile, commercial, financial,
partnership or such like transactions or the
offences arising out of matrimony,
particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the
family dispute, where the wrong is
basically to the victim and the offender and
the victim have settled all disputes

– 12 –

between them amicably, irrespective of the
fact that such offences have not been made
compoundable, the High Court may within
the framework of its inherent power, quash
the criminal proceeding or criminal
complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the
face of such settlement, there is hardly any
likelihood of the offender being convicted
and by not quashing the criminal
proceedings, justice shall be casualty and
ends of justice shall be defeated. The
above list is illustrative and not exhaustive.
Each case will depend on its own facts and
no hard-and-fast category can be
prescribed.”

12. Thereafter, the Court summed up the legal
position in the following words: (Gian Singh case,
SCC pp.342-43, para 61)

“61. The position that emerges from the above
discussion can be summarized thus: the
power of the High Court in quashing a
criminal proceeding or FIR or a complaint in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is
distinct and different from the power given
to a criminal court for compounding the
offences under Section 320 of the Code.
Inherent power is of wide plentitude with
no statutory limitation but it has to be
exercised in accord with the guidelines
engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure
the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse
of the process of any court. In what cases
power to quash the criminal proceeding or
complaint or FIR may be exercised where

– 13 –

the offender and the victim have settled
their dispute, would depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case and no
category can be prescribed. However,
before exercise of such power, the High
Court must have due regard to the nature
and gravity of the crime. Heinous and
serious offences of mental depravity or
offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.
cannot be fittingly quashed even though
the victim or victim’s family and the
offender have settled the dispute. Such
offences are not private in nature and have
a serious impact on society. Similarly, any
compromise between the victim and the
offender in relation to the offences under
special statutes like the Prevention of
Corruption Act, or the offences committed
by public servants while working in that
capacity, etc., cannot provide for any basis
for quashing criminal proceedings involving
such offences. But the criminal cases
having overwhelmingly and
predominatingly civil flavour stand on a
different footing for the purposes of
quashing, particularly the offences arising
from commercial, financial, mercantile,
civil, partnership or such like transactions
or the offences arising out of matrimony
relating to dowry, etc. or the family
disputes where the wrong is basically
private or personal in nature and the
parties have resolved their entire dispute.
In this category of cases, the High Court
may quash the criminal proceedings if in
its view, because of the compromise
between the offender and the victim, the
possibility of conviction is remote and bleak

– 14 –

and continuation of the criminal case
would put the accused to great oppression
and prejudice and extreme injustice would
be caused to him by not quashing the
criminal case despite full and complete
settlement and compromise with the victim.
In other words, the High Court must
consider whether it would be unfair or
contrary to the interest of justice to
continue with the criminal proceeding or
continuation of the criminal proceeding or
continuation of the criminal proceeding
would tantamount to abuse of process of
law despite settlement and compromise
between the victim and the wrongdoer and
whether to secure the ends of justice, it is
appropriate that the criminal case is put to
an end and if the answer to the above
question(s) is in the affirmative, the High
Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to
quash the criminal proceeding.”

The Court in Gian Singh case was categorical
that in respect of serious offences or other
offences of mental depravity or offence of merely
dacoity under special statute, like the Prevention
of Corruption Act or the offences committed by
Public Servant while working in that capacity.
The mere settlement between the parties would
not be a ground to quash the proceedings by the
High Court and inasmuch as settlement of such
heinous crime cannot have imprimatur of the
Court.”

– 15 –

6. Even in the case of Srinivasan Iyenger and

another vs. Bimla Devi Agarwal and others reported in

(2019) 4 SCC 456 at paragraph Nos.8 to 14 it has been

observed as under:

“8. During the hearing of these appeals, the
learned counsel for the appellants agreed to pay
to the original complainant a total sum of Rs
10,00,000 (Rupees Ten lakh only) towards the
full and final settlement of the claim of the
original complainant and it is agreed that, on
such payment, the claimant will not proceed with
the complaint any further and that the parties
may be permitted to compound the offences.

9. The learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the original complainant has stated that the
original complainant is agreeable to accept a
total sum of Rs 10,00,000 offered and that, on
such payment, the complainant has no objection
if the offences against the appellants are
compounded and the criminal proceedings
initiated against them are quashed.

10. The learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the original complainant has submitted
that the appellants may deposit a total sum of Rs
10,00,000 in the bank account of the original
complainant, the particulars of which are
already on record, and on doing so, the
appellants may be permitted to withdraw the
amount of Rs 3,75,000 plus interest if any,
already deposited by them.

– 16 –

11. Having heard the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the respective parties and
that now the parties have settled the dispute
amicably and that the dispute between the
parties seems to be having predominant element
of a civil dispute and the origin is predominantly
or overwhelmingly a civil dispute, we are of the
opinion that this is a fit case to exercise the
power under Article 142 of the Constitution of
India to meet the ends of justice.

12. We are of the opinion that on payment
of total sum of Rs 10,00,000 by the appellants to
the original complainant, as agreed between the
parties, the criminal proceedings be quashed,
considering the decisions of this Court
in Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of
Gujarat [Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat,
(2017) 9 SCC 641 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 1]
and Gian Singh v. State of Punjab [Gian
Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 :
(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1188 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160
: (2012) 2 SCC (LS) 988] .

13. In view of the above and for the
reasons stated above, we allow the parties to
compound the offences, even though the offences
alleged are non-compoundable, as the dispute
between the parties predominantly or
overwhelmingly seems to be of a civil nature and
that the dispute is a private one and between the
two private parties. Accordingly, it is ordered
that on payment of a sum of Rs 10,00,000 by the
appellants to the original complainant to be
deposited in the bank account of the original
complainant within a period of two weeks, the
criminal proceedings being CR Case No. 40-C of
2014 pending in the Court of the learned CJM,

– 17 –

Tinsukia, stand quashed. On furnishing proof of
deposit of Rs 10,00,000, the Registry to return
the amount of Rs 3,75,000 along with interest, if
any, to the appellants herein, which the
appellants have deposited pursuant to the earlier
order of this Court.

14. The present appeals stand disposed of
accordingly in terms of the above.”

7. When both the parties have entered into

compromise and the charges leveled against the

petitioners-accused are under Section 498A, 506, 504, 342

r/w 34 of IPC and also under Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry

Prohibition Act, in view of the decision in the case of Gian

Singh quoted supra and as respondent No.2 and petitioner-

accused No.1 have dissolved the marriage and has also

paid permanent alimony of Rs.5,50,000/- and when the

matter has been settled out of Court, I am of the

considered opinion that if the proceedings are continued it

amounts to nothing but waste of judicial time and no

useful purpose is going to be served.

– 18 –

8. In the light of the discussion held by me above,

both the petitions are allowed and the proceedings in

C.C.No.1108/2019 (Crime No.79/2018) pending on the file

of II Additional Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Davanagere,

for the offences punishable under Sections 498A, 506, 504,

342 r/w 34 of IPC and also under Sections 3 and 4 of

Dowry Prohibition Act are hereby quashed.

Sd/-

JUDGE

*AP/-

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