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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 29TH DAY OF JUNE 2018
PRESENT
THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BUDIHAL R.B.
AND
THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE B.A. PATIL
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.566/2013
C/W
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.194/2013
C/W
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.181/2013
IN CRL.A.NO.566/2013
BETWEEN:
State by Women Police Station
Davangere. …APPELLANT
(By Smt. B.G.Namitha Mahesh, HCGP)
AND:
1. B.V.Kumar
S/o Eerojirao @ B.Veerappa
40 years
2. Smt.Shanthamma @ Shantabai
W/o Eerojirao, 64 years
3. Eerojirao @ B.Veerappa
S/o B.Somanna, 69 years
All are r/o 3rd Main
2
9TH Cross, Vinobhanagara
Davangere – 577 001. …RESPONDENTS
(By Sri C.V.Nagesh, Senior Counsel for
Sri K.Raghavendra, Advocate)
This Criminal Appeal is filed under Section 377 Cr.P.C.,
praying to modify the judgment and order of conviction of
sentence dated 23.01.2013 passed by the II Additional District
and Sessions Judge, Davanagere in S.C. No.16/2009 and
impose adequate sentence against the respondents/accused for
the offence p/u/s 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and etc.
IN CRL.A. NO.194/2013
BETWEEN:
1. Smt.Shanthamma
Aged about 65 years
W/o Sri Eeroji Rao
2. Sri Eeroji Rao @ Veerappa
Aged about 70 years
S/o Somanna
Both are residents of the premises
Bearing No.1631/3
9th Cross, III Main
Vinobhanagara
Davanagere. …APPELLANTS
(By Sri C.V.Nagesh, Senior Counsel for
Sri K.Raghavendra, Advocate)
AND:
The State of Karnataka
By the Station House Officer
Women Police Station
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Davanagere …RESPONDENT
(By Smt. B.G.Namitha Mahesh, HCGP)
This Criminal Appeal is filed under Section 374 (2)
Cr.P.C., praying to set aside the judgment dated 23.01.2013
passed by the II Additional District and Sessions Judge,
Davanagere in S.C. No.16/2009 – convicting the
appellants/accused for the offence p/u/s 498A R/W 34 of IPC
and Sec.3, 4 6 of D.P.Act and etc.
IN CRL. A. NO.181/2013
BETWEEN:
Sri B.V.Kumar
Aged about 40 years
S/o Eerojirao
Merchant by Profession
Resident of the premises
Bearing No.1631/3
9th Cross, Vinobhanagara
Davanagere. …APPELLANT
(By Sri C.V.Nagesh, Senior Counsel for
Sri K.Raghavendra, Advocate)
AND:
The State of Karnataka
By the Station House Officer
Women Police Station
Davanagere. …RESPONDENT
(By Smt. B.G.Namitha Mahesh, HCGP)
This Criminal Appeal is filed under Section 374(2)
Cr.P.C., praying to set aside the judgment dated 23.01.2013
passed by the II Additional District and Sessions Judge,
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Davanagere in S.C. No.16/2009 – convicting the
appellant/accused for the offence p/u/s 498A, 304(B), 302,
506 and 201 R/W 34 of IPC and Sec.3, 4 6 of D.P.Act and
etc.
These Criminal Appeals having been heard and reserved
for judgment on 12.06.2018 and coming on for pronouncement
of judgment this day, BUDIHAL R.B. J., delivered the
following:-
JUDGMENT
Since the above three appeals are against the same
judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated
23.1.2013 passed by the II Additional District and
Sessions Judge, Davanagere in S.C. No.16/2009 and
since the common questions of law and facts are involved
in all the appeals, they are taken up together to dispose of
them by this common judgment, in order to avoid the
repetition of facts and law.
2. Criminal Appeal No.181/2013 is preferred by the
appellant-accused No.1 being aggrieved by the judgment
and order dated 23.1.2013 passed by the II Additional
District and Session ad Judge in S.C. No.16/2009
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convicting him for offences punishable under Sections
498A, 304(B), 302, 506, 201 read with Section 34 of IPC
and under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of Dowry Prohibition Act
and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- and in
default of payment of fine, to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of two months on the first
count; sentencing him to undergo further rigorous
imprisonment for a period of seven years and to pay a fine
of Rs.10,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to
undergo further rigorous imprisonment for a period of one
year on the second count; sentencing him to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of
Rs.20,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years on the
third count; sentencing him to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of one year on the fourth count;
and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
a period of two years and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- and
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in default of payment of fine, to undergo further rigorous
imprisonment for a period of one month on the fifth count;
and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
a period of five years and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- and
in default of payment of fine, to undergo further rigorous
imprisonment for a period of one year for the offence
punishable under Section 3 of the DP Act; sentencing him
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six
months and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default of
payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a
period of two months for the offences punishable under
Sections 4 and 6 of the DP Act and the above sentences
shall have to run concurrently.
3. Criminal Appeal No.194/2013 is preferred by
accused Nos.2 and 3 being aggrieved by the judgment and
order dated 23.1.2013 passed by the II Additional District
and Sessions Judge, Davanagere in S.C. No.16/2009
convicting the appellants-accused Nos.2 and 3 for offences
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punishable under section 498A read with Section 34 of
IPC and under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of Dowry Prohibition
Act and sentencing each one of them to undergo simple
imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine
of Rs.2,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to
undergo further simple imprisonment for a period of
fifteen days for the offence punishable under Section 498A
of IPC and sentencing each one of them to under go simple
imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine
of Rs.5,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo
simple imprisonment for a period of one month for the
offences under sections 3, 4 and 6 of the DP Act and the
above sentences shall have to run concurrently.
4. Criminal. Appeal No.566/2013 is preferred by the
State as against the respondents-accused Nos.1 to 3
praying this Court to modify the judgment and order of
conviction and sentence dated 23.1.2013 passed by the II
Additional District and Sessions Judge, Davanagere, in
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S.C. No.16/2009 and to impose adequate sentence on the
respondents-accused for the offences punishable under
Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act (for short ‘the DP
Act’).
5. Brief facts of the case of prosecution as per the
complaint averments is that the father of the deceased
filed a complaint as per Ex.P.1 on 9.9.2008 stating that he
is having one male and three female children. His last
daughter the deceased Mamatha was given in marriage to
one Kumar – accused No.1, the son of Eeroji Rao, in the
year 2003. One month earlier to the marriage, there were
marriage talks. On the side of the bride Kubendroji Rao,
Chennaveeroji Rao, Shivaji Rao, Ningoji Rao were present
and on the side of the accused, accused No.1, his mother
Shantha Bai, his father EerojiRao and others were
present. The accused demanded Rs.2.00 lakh cash and
15 tolas of gold as dowry and the complainant has to
perform the marriage on his own expenses. For that, the
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people on the complainant side told that it is not possible
to pay the said amount presently, they will pay Rs.1.00
lakh cash, 10 tolas of gold and clothes and perform the
marriage and in future, they will pay the cash of
Rs.50,000/-. The accused persons agreed for the same.
On that day, Rs.1.00 lakh was given into the hands of
Eeroji Rao, the father of accused No.1 and on the day of
the marriage, 10 tolas of gold ornaments were given. After
the marriage, Mamatha was taken to her husband’s house
and she was residing along with her husband, in-laws and
sister-in-law (accused Nos.1 to 4) together in the same
house. For about six months, Mamatha was looked after
well. Thereafterwards, the accused persons started
insisting Mamatha to bring the remaining amount of
Rs.50,000/- and on that ground, they started to give ill
treatment, both physical and mental and when it became
intolerable, she came to Chennagiri and informed them of
the harassment. Thereafter, the complainant and
Kubendroji Rao brought back Mamatha to Davanagere. At
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that time, the accused persons i.e. the in-laws of the
deceased and her husband complained that she must
listen to their words in their house. At that time, the
complainant advised deceased and asked the accused to
treat her properly. One month thereafter, Mamatha alone
came to the house of the complainant and told that her
husband and in-laws driven her out from the house and
she also told that for petty things, they are assaulting her
and giving ill treatment. Then, the complainant allowed
her to stay in his house. Then the deceased Mamatha
filed a case in Davanagere Court seeking maintenance.
Six months thereafter, accused No.1 compromised the
matter before the Court by giving an undertaking that he
will look after Mamatha properly and thereafter, they got
one house at Vinoba Nagar and the couple was leading
their life. One year thereafter, the deceased was carrying
pregnancy and she gave birth to twins at Davanagere
Bapuji hospital. For about one year three months back,
the complainant brought his daughter for postnatal
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period. Even for one year, on the side of her husband,
nobody did come to see the children or for naming
ceremony. Thereafter, about three months back, accused
No.1 phoned them and told that he has arranged a
separate house and he will look after the deceased
properly. He made galata stating that let the complainant
keep Mamatha in their house and provide her food.
Because of that reason, the complainant and his wife took
the deceased Mamatha to the rented house at
Vinobanagar, Davanagere and the complainant left his
wife Padma in the house of the accused. The wife of the
complainant came back to Davanagere for Gowri festival.
Then, the daughter of the complainant phoned to them
and informed that her husband continued the earlier ill
treatment and harassment and he has not discontinued
his old habits. She has also told them that at the instance
of his parents and his sister, he was giving ill treatment by
assaulting her. On 8.9.2008, at 10.15 p.m., accused No.1
phoned the complainant stating that there are burn
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injuries nearby the thigh of the deceased and it would be
alright and told that the complainant can come in the
morning. As the complainant became panic and
immediately, arranged one vehicle and himself, his wife,
his son Shivaji Rao and the complainant nephew one
Shivaji Rao and Kubendrojio Rao and member Revanna
came to Davanagere hospital in the mid-night. The
deceased Mamatha was admitted in ward No.73 and her
entire body was burnt and the skin was peeled off. She
was not in a position to speak and she was struggling. On
9.9.2008 at 7.30 a.m., they again went to see the deceased
Mamatha and enquired as to what had happened to her.
The deceased told that her husband, mother in law
Shanthamma, father-in-law Eeroji Rao and Sister-in-law
Gunavathi, by insisting her to bring the dowry amount
from her parental place, gave mental and physical ill
treatment and when became untolerable, the previous day
i.e. on 8.9.2008 at 9.00 p.m. she poured kerosene on her
body and lit fire to herself. Hence, the complainant
13
requested the police to take action against the accused,
who insisted his deceased daughter Mamatha to bring the
dowry amount and gave the physical and mental ill
treatment to her.
On the basis of the said complaint, the case came to
be registered in Crime No.44/2008 for the offences
punishable under Section 498A of IPC and Sections 3 and
4 of the DP Act.
6. After the completion of investigation, the
investigation officer filed the charge sheet against the
accused persons for the offences punishable under
Sections 498A, 304B, 302, 506, 201 read with Section 34
of IPC and Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the DP Act.
7. After hearing both sides, the learned Sessions
Judge, framed the charges as against the accused persons
for the said offences and when the charges were read over
and explained to the accused, the accused pleaded not
14
guilty and claimed to be tried and accordingly, the matter
was set down for recording the evidence.
8. The prosecution in support of its case, examined
33 witnesses and produced 51 documents and got marked
material objects M.Os.1 and 2.
On the side of the defence, no witnesses were
examined, but the documents, Exs.D.1 to D.7 got marked.
The accused were examined under Section 313 of
Cr.P.C. and their statements came to be recorded.
9. After hearing the arguments of both sides and
after considering the materials on record, the learned
Sessions Judge held accused No.1 guilty for the offences
punishable under Sections 498A, 304B, 302, 506, 201
read with section 34 of IPC and Sections 3,4 and 6 of the
DP Act and held accused Nos.2 and 3 guilty for the
offences punishable under Section 498A read with Section
34 of IPC and sections 3, 4 and 6 of the DP Act and he has
15
acquitted accused Nos.2 and 3 for the offences punishable
under section 304B, 302, 506 and 201 read with section
34 of IPC. Accused No.4 is acquitted from all the charges.
10. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order of
conviction and the sentence for the said offences, the
appellants-accused have preferred Crl. Appeal
Nos.181/2013 and 194/2013 challenging the legality and
correctness of the said judgment and order of conviction
on the grounds as mentioned in the appeal memorandum
of their respective appeals. The State has also filed Crl.A.
No.566/2013 to modify the impugned judgment and order
of conviction and sentence and to impose adequate
sentence on the respondents-accused for the offence
punishable under Section 3 of the DP Act.
11. We have heard the arguments of the learned
Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the learned
counsel on record for the appellants-accused in respect of
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their appeals and also we have heard the learned HCGP
for the State.
12. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the
appellants-accused made submission that the learned
Sessions Judge is not right in convicting the appellant-
accused No.1 for the offence punishable under Section
302 of IPC so also for the offence punishable under
Section 304B of IPC. If the learned Sessions Judge was of
the opinion that it was the case of suicidal death for dowry
harassment as contended by the prosecution, then it rules
out the possibility of committing the murder of the
deceased Mamatha. If the learned Sessions Judge was of
the opinion that the material indicates that it was accused
No.1 who committed the murder of the deceased and held
that it was the homicidal death, then in that case, it rules
out the possibility of offence punishable under Section
304B of IPC. There are four types of deaths. They are
(i) natural, (ii) homicidal, (iii) suicidal death, and
17
(iv) accidental death. The learned Senior Advocate, taking
us through the materials of the case through the paper
book as well as the original records, submitted that the
death of the deceased was not at all the homicidal death.
In this connection, he brought to our notice that there are
more than one dying declaration said to have been left by
the deceased. So far as the oral dying declarations are
concerned, there is no consistency in the said declarations
said to have been made by the deceased before P.Ws.1 to
3, 13 and also before P.W.9. He submitted that looking to
the materials produced on the side of the prosecution,
they clearly show that the said oral dying declarations
relied upon by the prosecution to the effect that it was the
accused who committed the murder of the deceased by
pouring kerosene and lit fire to her, are totally
inconsistent and contradictory of each other. The learned
Senior Advocate also submitted that it is an admitted case
of the prosecution itself that when the deceased was taken
to the hospital, the Taluka Executive Magistrate (P.W.26)
18
recorded her dying declaration (Ex.P.20) in the hospital in
the presence of the doctor. Drawing our attention to the
said dying declaration (Ex.P.20) so also our attention to
the oral evidence of P.Ws.13 and 26, he submitted that
these materials clearly go to show that it is not the case of
homicidal death. The dying declaration (Ex.P.20) and the
oral evidence of P.Ws.13 and 26 also rules out of the
possibility that it is a suicidal death. So far as the oral
evidence of P.Ws.13 and 26 is concerned, there is nothing
on record to believe their oral evidence so also the
contents of Ex.P.20. The prosecution has not at all
treated these two witnesses as hostile for the purpose of
making suggestion that they colluded with the accused
persons and giving false evidence to the effect that the
deceased gave the dying declaration as per Ex.P.20 and
that she never gave such declaration as per contents of
Ex.P.20 and it is a concocted document prepared by
P.Ws.13 and 26 in collusion with the accused persons.
The learned Senior Advocate also submitted that looking
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to the contents of the dying declaration (Ex.P.20) and the
oral evidence of the other witnesses to which he has
drawn our attention so also the other documents at
Exs.P.32, 33, 50 and the oral evidence of P.Ws.13, 14, 20,
26, 27, 28, they show that it is not a suicidal death.
Learned Senior Advocate referring to these materials
submitted that the oral evidence of the said witnesses as
well as the contents of the documents Exs.P.20, 32, 33, 50
clearly show that it was a case of accidental death. The
dying declaration that too in the written form under
Ex.P.20 is at the earliest point of time which is supported
by the other materials like the oral evidence of the
prosecution witnesses so also the documents produced by
the prosecution itself. Hence, the learned Senior Advocate
submitted that there is nothing on record to show that the
dying declaration under Ex.P.20 is a concocted document
and in reality, it is a case of suicidal death and homicidal
death as observed by the learned Sessions judge. When
the oral dying declarations relied upon by the prosecution
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are more than one in number and there are so many
inconsistencies and contradictions, in such oral dying
declarations, it cannot be held that they are trust worthy
and truthful and can be relied upon by the Court. In this
connection, the learned Senior Advocate for the appellant-
accused relied upon the following judgments of the
Hon’ble Apex Court:
1. (1993) 1 SCC 1 – KAMLA (SMT.) Vs. STATE OF
PUNJAB.
2. (2007) 13 SCC 112 – MEHIBOOBSAB ABBASABI
NADAF Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA
3. (2004)12 SCC 244 – CHINNAMMA Vs. STATE OF
KERALA
4. (2007)9 SCC 148 – SANJAY VS. STATE OF
MAHARASHTRA
13. The learned Senior Advocate submitted that the
prosecution has tried to book a false case against the
21
appellants-accused falsely implicating them stating that it
is a case of suicidal death on the allegation that the
deceased was subjected to ill treatment and harassment in
connection with the dowry amount of Rs.50,000/-. He
drew our attention to the document Ex.P.21 and
submitted that so far as the history of the case is
concerned the word ‘accidental’ has been scored out and
in its place; it is written as ‘suicidal’ one. There is no
initial of anybody to this correction made. He also
submitted that it is a mistake through over sight while
making mention in the said document and it can be
accepted by the Court, if there is proper explanation to
that effect. The learned Senior Advocate submitted that
the same mistake cannot be carried out in the other
documents also. Even in Ex.P.32-OPD Slip of Chigteri
District hospital Davanagere, wherein, in the history
column, the word ‘accidental’ is scored out and above
that, it is mentioned as ‘suicidal’ and there also no initial
of anybody is formed. Regarding this correction scoring
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out the word ‘accidental’ and writing as ‘suicidal’, it is for
the prosecution to explain as to at what point of time this
was made, by whom it was made, why it was corrected
like that and what is the basis for the said correction.
Looking to the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, it is
not explained during the course of trial. In connection
with the said material, the learned Senior Advocate drew
our attention to one more document Ex.P.50 and the sub
marking under Ex.P.50A wherein in the column, history of
the case, the word ‘accidental burn’ is still appearing and
in this document, there is no mention of suicidal burns as
it is seen in other two documents at Exs.P.21 and P.32.
Hence, referring to this document and the other two
documents Exs.P.21 and P.32, learned Senior Advocate
made submission that the prosecution tried to meddle
with the Courts of justice which is a serious matter to be
taken judicial notice about the same. Hence, all these
materials coupled with the oral evidence of the
prosecution witnesses more particularly, the evidence of
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P.Ws.1 to 3, 9, 10, 13 and 26, there is no consistency in
the case of prosecution for establishing the alleged
offences under Sections 302 and 304B of IPC and that the
entire materials clearly show that it was an accidental
death. Learned Senior Advocate also made submission
that looking to the evidence of Head Constable (P.W.23), it
goes to show that during night on 8.9.2008 itself, even
earlier to recording the dying declaration under Ex.P.20,
the women police visited the hospital and recorded the
statement of the deceased Mamatha and obtained her
signature to the said statement, but the same has not
been produced before the Court along with the charge
sheet material. It has been suppressed from producing
before the Court. Therefore, it raises a reasonable doubt
as to the case of prosecution that the alleged offence is
either under Section 302 of IPC or under Section 304B of
IPC that it is a suicidal death. Therefore, because of non-
production of the said document, an adverse inference has
to be drawn as against the case of prosecution. The
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learned Senior Advocate also submitted that the
investigation officer (P.W.33) deposed in his evidence that
though he verified the investigation file, the said statement
was not available in the said file. As the said statement
was not favourable, the prosecution suppressed the said
material.
The learned Senior Advocate further made the
submission that during the course of the trial, the
prosecution set up a new case that, as accused No.1
posed threat to the deceased Mamatha that in case, she
tells before anybody that it was the accused who poured
kerosene and lit fire to her, then he will not spare her
children and because of that reason, she made the
statement under Ex.P.20 falsely making a mention that
she herself poured kerosene and lit fire herself. So far as
this contention of the prosecution is concerned, learned
Senior Advocate made submission that P.W.8 is the driver
of the auto rickshaw and the materials goes to show that
in the said auto, the injured Mamatha and accused No.1
25
only were travelled and nobody else. He also made the
submission that P.W.8 has not at all made any such
statement before the Court on oath that while such
travelling in his auto rickshaw, accused No.1 posed the
threat to the deceased. No witnesses have deposed that
the deceased made such statement due to the threat
posed by accused No.1 and for that reason, she gave false
statement and hence, it is mentioned as accidental death.
Learned Senior Advocate further submitted that such
contention of the prosecution is not supported by any
material. Hence, the entire materials, if we peruse
properly, they will not make out the case either under
Section 302 of IPC or under Section 304B of IPC that is
either homicidal death or suicidal death, but they go to
show that it is an accidental death.
With regard to the offence under Section 498A of IPC
is concerned, the learned Senior Advocate submitted that
if the wife who has been subjected to cruelty or ill
treatment and if she is alive, then in that case, the first
26
part of Section 498A would be made applicable. Drawing
our attention to the relevant paragraphs in the judgment
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of GIRIDHAR
SHANKAR TAWADE Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
reported in 2002 SCC (Cri) 971, at para Nos. 16 to 18, he
submitted that the factual story in the reported decision is
aptly made applicable to the case on hand. Hence,
looking to the said judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, it
cannot be said that the prosecution has proved the alleged
offence under Section 498A of IPC. He also drew our
attention to the evidence of P.Ws.1, 2 and 9 regarding the
alleged negotiation in the house of P.W.1 in respect of the
marriage between the deceased and accused No.1. But,
referring to the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3, he made
submission that their evidence goes to show that the said
negotiations or talks took place in the house of accused
and not in the house of P.W.1. Regarding the ornaments
of 10 tolas of gold said to have been given by the parents
of the deceased to the accused, the learned Senior
27
Advocate drew our attention to the evidence of P.Ws.1 and
3 and made the submission that these witnesses have
admitted that there is such a customary practice in their
community to give the gold ornaments to the bride as well
as the bride groom. Even regarding the 10 tolas of gold
ornaments, again there is no consistency in the case of
prosecution as to whether they were given to the accused
No.1 or they were given to the bride or some ornaments to
accused and some ornaments to the bride.
Learned Senior Advocate drew our attention to the
evidence of P.W.1 and made submission that P.W.1 is a
retired employee and earlier to this marriage, he
performed the marriage of his two daughters also.
Therefore, it is for the prosecution to show the source of
income of P.W.1 to perform the marriage of his other two
daughters and the financial capacity of P.Ws.1 and 3 to
pay such amount of Rs.1.00 lakh at a time to the accused
persons. Hence, he submitted that regarding the source
of income and the actual payment of Rs.1.00 lakh, there is
28
no acceptable and worth believable material placed on
record by prosecution.
So far as the case filed between the couple as
against each other, learned Senior Advocate submitted
that the case was filed in the year 2005 i.e., three years
earlier to the alleged incident. There is no material to
show that immediately prior to her death, the deceased
was subjected to the ill treatment and harassment so as to
abet her to commit suicide. He also submitted that, at
this stage, the possibility of the deceased committing
suicide has been ruled out in view of the evidence of the
witnesses already referred above. Drawing our attention
to the documents i.e., the undertaking given before the
police and referring to the contents of the said documents,
the learned Senior Advocate submitted that the deceased
Mamatha was also advised by her parents as well as by
the police so also accused No.1 was advised to treat her
properly henceforth. Therefore, only on this basis, it
cannot be said that the prosecution has established the
29
fact that there was ill treatment and harassment as
defined under section 498A of IPC. Hence, he submitted
that the judgment and order of conviction passed by the
learned Sessions Judge as against accused Nos.2 and 3
for the offence under section 498A of IPC is also not
sustainable in law.
Lastly, the learned Senior Advocate submitted that
the entire material is to be considered and appreciated by
the Court to see the cumulative effect emerging out of the
said material. In this connection, he relied upon the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of STATE
OF PUNJAB VS. PARVEEN KUMAR reported in 2006(2)
SCC (Criminal) 146 and submitted that the judgment
and order of conviction for the offences of murder and
dowry death and the other offences against accused No.1
and also against accused Nos.2 and 3 are illegal and not
sustainable in law. Hence, he submitted to allow both the
appeals by acquitting accused Nos.1 to 3 for the said
offences. He also submitted that as there is no merit in
30
the appeal preferred by the State and hence, the same is
to be dismissed.
14. Per contra, learned High Court Government
Pleader appearing for the State submitted that the dying
declaration under Ex.P.20 is not the declaration made by
the deceased on her free will and volition. She submitted
that as accused No.1 threatened her that if the deceased
made disclosure of accused pouring kerosene and litting
fire to her, then he will not spare her children and because
of that reason, she made such a declaration. Therefore,
the said dying declaration under Ex.P.20 cannot be relied
upon by the Court.
The learned HCGP also made submission that
materials show that when P.Ws.1, 2, 3 and 10 came to the
hospital where the injured was admitted, it was crossing
the mid night and it was on 9.9.2008, in the early
morning. As the deceased was not in a position to speak
and give the statement, again at 7.30 a.m., they went back
31
to the hospital and enquired her, at that time, the
deceased made statement that it was the accused person
who poured kerosene and lit fire to her. Hence, the
learned HCGP made submission that the contention of the
other side that the aforesaid witnesses went to the
hospital during the night on 8.9.2008 itself is not correct.
She drew our attention to the contents of Ex.P.1 and made
submission that it clearly goes to show that P.Ws.1, 2, 3
and 10 went to the hospital in the morning at about 7.30
on 9.9.2008.
Learned HCGP further submitted that earlier, the
deceased filed maintenance case against accused No.1
wherein the maintenance of Rs.1,700/- per month was
already granted to the deceased. Looking to the evidence
of P.Ws.1 to 3 and 10, all the witnesses have spoken about
the payment of dowry amount and even the independent
witnesses have also spoken about the demand and
acceptance of the dowry amount by the accused. She
made submission that the father of the deceased (P.W.1)
32
in his evidence has deposed that he was having the
capacity to pay the dowry amount and the ornaments.
Hence, with the help of the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 and 10,
the prosecution was able to prove even the offences
punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act.
It is also the contention of learned HCGP that P.Ws.1
to 3 have spoken about the cruelty meted out by the
accused to the deceased Mamatha. In this connection,
she drew our attention to the complaint (Ex.P.3) filed by
the deceased Mamatha to the CPI, Chennagiri, wherein it
was stated that the accused assaulted the deceased and
she has taken the treatment. In that connection also, the
learned HCGP made submission that the document
Ex.P.29 clearly goes to show that the injuries were
sustained by the deceased Mamatha.
It is also the submission of the learned HCGP that if
it is the contention of the accused that the death is
accidental death and as the kerosene oil was leaking out
33
from the kerosene stove and there was accidental fire to
the saree of the deceased Mamatha, then the investigation
officer could have mentioned in the spot mahazar (Ex.P.2)
about the material object – kerosene stove. But in the spot
mahazar (Ex.P.2), there is no mention that there was
kerosene stove in the house of the accused No.1. This has
been noticed by the learned Sessions Judge and hence,
the learned Sessions Judge has not relied upon Ex.P.20 to
hold that it is an accidental death.
Drawing our attention to the statements of the
deceased as well as accused No.1 before the police in the
year 2005 and the evidence of the doctor (P.W.18) who
treated the deceased in the year 2005, and Ex.P.29 and
the history furnished in Ex.P.29, the learned HCGP
submitted that it is important for appreciating the case of
prosecution as well as the defence of the accused and
hence, there was cruel treatment meted out to the
deceased. It is also the submission of the learned HCGP
that if the burns are accidental burns, then there could
34
not have been the burns on the entire body. The post
mortem report goes to show that the entire body was
burnt and it is 80% burns.
The learned HCGP further submitted that there was
only one dying declaration of deceased stating that
accused No.1 poured kerosene on her and lit fire to her
and there are no more than one dying declarations as
contended by the other side. She submitted that the oral
dying declaration implicating accused NO.1 is consistent
and no explanation has been offered by the accused as to
how the accident has taken place. Hence, all these
aspects were considered by the learned Sessions Judge
and he rightly came to the conclusion in holding that the
accused persons are guilty for the respective offences
mentioned above.
Lastly, the learned HCGP submitted that there is no
merit in both appeals of the accused and submitted to
dismiss the appeals preferred by them. She further
submitted that the learned Sessions Judge has also held
35
that the prosecution has proved the offences punishable
under Sections 3, 4, and 6 of Dowry Prohibition Act.
Therefore, the punishment imposed as against the
accused for the said offences is inadequate and not
proportionate to the gravity and nature of the offences.
Hence, she submitted that the appeal preferred by the
State seeking enhancement of the sentence may be
allowed.
15. In reply to the arguments of the learned HCGP
that the spot mahazar (Ex.P.2) does not contain that there
was kerosene stove in the house, learned Senior Advocate
counsel for the appellants made submission that looking
to the statement of the witnesses, it shows that when the
deceased sat on the floor by taking the plate for having the
food, at that time, accused No.1 came, poured kerosene
and lit fire to her. The investigation officer has also not
mentioned in the spot mahazar (Ex.P.2) about the plate
used for taking the meals by the deceased which was said
36
to have been lying at the said place. He also made
submission that one of the witnesses has spoken that
even there was one plastic bucket at the said place. The
said plastic bucket has also not been mentioned by the
investigation officer in Ex.P.2. Therefore, it is the
contention of learned Senior Advocate that if the
investigation officer has not mentioned in Ex.P.2 about
some of the articles that does not mean that those articles
were not there. Hence, he submitted that the said
contention of the learned HCGP has no force and the same
may be rejected.
16. We perused the grounds urged in the appeal
memorandum in all the three appeals, judgment and order
of conviction passed by the learned Sessions Judge in
respect of accused Nos.1 to 3 wherein accused No.4 has
been acquitted and also the grounds in the appeal
memorandum of the appeal preferred by the state seeking
enhancement of the sentence, the oral evidence of the
37
prosecution witnesses and the documents produced and
also the documents marked on behalf of the defence, the
decisions relied upon by learned Senior Advocate on
behalf of accused Nos.1 to 3 in the respective two appeals
and also considered the oral submissions made by the
learned Senior Advocate for the appellants so also the
learned HCGP for the State.
17. It is the contention of the learned Senior
Advocate Sri C.V. Nagesh that the learned Sessions Judge
has wrongly convicted the appellant-accused No.1 for the
offences punishable under Sections 302 and 304B of IPC.
It is his contention that the death is neither homicidal nor
suicidal, but it is accidental death. Therefore, it is his
contention that the findings recorded by the learned
Sessions Judge holding that accused No.1 committed the
offences under Sections 302 and 304B of IPC are totally
illegal and not sustainable in law. In respect of the said
contention, let us examine the materials placed on record.
38
18. The prosecution has relied upon the dying
declaration in the written form produced under Ex.P.20.
We have perused the said document Ex.P.20, which was
given by the deceased Mamatha recorded by the Taluka
Executive Magistrate, Davanagere. Looking to this
document, on the top of the said document, the doctor
(P.W.13) has endorsed that the injured is competent to
give the statement. Below that, he has put his signature
dated 8.9.2008 and time is also mentioned by the Doctor
as 11.45 p.m. Perusing Ex.P.20, in answer to column
No.14 on the over leaf of Ex.P.20, it is mentioned that
Mamatha W/o. Kumar, married about four years back and
they are having two children and in the house, her
husband, children together leading happy life. The
relationship between the couple is cordial. The mother-in-
law and father-in-law are residing separately. After the
meals, she went to boil the milk and curry (saaru). She
went to start the kerosene stove and from the hole of the
kerosene stove, the kerosene oil came out and she was
39
caught with the fire. As the child was weeping, it was not
come to her knowledge that there was fire to her.
Thereafterwards, it extended to her whole body.
Thereafter, her husband came and tried to extinguish the
fire. Her husband and no other persons are responsible
for the same. This incident took place accidentally.
Therefore, for this situation, no other persons are
responsible and she is telling these things. Below that, it
is signed in English as CS Mamatha. It also bears an
endorsement of the Taluka Executive Magistrate,
Davanagere. The date is put as ‘8.9’. It also bears
endorsement ‘in my presence, the said statement is
recorded’ and below that, it is signed by the doctor which
is marked as per Ex.P.20(d). So this document-Ex.P.20
goes to show that the said incident is accidental in nature.
Let us examine the oral evidence of the doctor
(P.W.13) and also the evidence of Taluka Executive
Magistrate (P.W.26), in whose presence the dying
declaration (Ex.P.20) is said to have been recorded.
40
P.W.13 is Doctor N.G. Jayaprakash, Senior Medical
Officer, CG Hospital, Davanagere. He has deposed in his
evidence that since two and a half years, he is working in
the said hospital as a Senior Medical Officer. In all, there
are 28 medical officers. It is a big hospital. Many medico
legal cases will be reported from the said hospital. He
further deposed that on 8.9.2008, it was his turn to be
present at the time of recording the dying declaration. At
about 11.15 p.m., from the OPD section, within the
premises of their hospital, he received the phone call
informing him that in one MLC case, Tahsildar is coming
to record the dying declaration and he was informed to
come to the hospital. By the time, he reached the
hospital, the Tahsildar and Taluka Executive Magistrate
Sri Nagahanumayya of Davanagere came to their hospital.
When enquired with the Tahsildar, Tahsildar told him that
he has to record the dying declaration of one Mamatha
C.S. who is admitted in the burns ward in the said
hospital. Then they all went to the burns ward. The
41
injured Mamatha having the burn injuries was getting
treatment in the said ward. After going there, he talked to
Mamatha and enquired with her and he has ascertained
from her that whether she is mentally able to answer the
questions and whether she is capable to talk and answer
to his questions. Mamatha gave the answers properly and
perfectly. From her answers, he got it confirmed that she
is capable to give her statement. Then he informed to the
Tahsildar that Mamatha is capable to give her statement
and the Tahsildar can record her statement. Before the
Taluka Executive Magistrate proceeding to record the
statement, he made an endorsement on the said proforma
which was brought by the Tahsildar that the injured is
capable to give the statement and below that, he put his
signature. Then the Tahsildar enquired with the injured
and recorded the statement given by the injured. P.W.13
has deposed that he has seen the said statement which is
under Ex.P.20. His signature with the endorsement on
the top of Ex.P.20 is as per Ex.P.20(a). He further
42
deposed that in his presence, Mamatha gave the
statement before the Tahsildar as to what was stated
below column No.14. In para Nos.8 and 9 of his
deposition, P.W.13 has also deposed in detail as to what
was stated by the deceased at column No.14 of Ex.P.20.
The said portion of the statement is together marked as
Ex.P.20(b) and he has identified the signature of Mamatha
as per Ex.P.20(c) and for that, the Tahsildar put
endorsement that in his presence the statement is
recorded and he identified it as Ex.P.20(d). P.W.13 has
further deposed that at the end of page Nos.2 and 3, the
Tahsildar has put his signature by placing the seal there
as per Exs.P.20(e) and (f). Looking to the cross
examination on behalf of the accused, it was submitted
that there was no cross examination.
Let us come to the evidence of P.W.26 – one Sri
Nagahanumaiah G.H., who is the Tahsildar and Taluka
Executive Magistrate. He has deposed in his evidence in
the examination in chief that from 11.4.2008 to
43
21.11.2008, he worked as Tahsildar and Taluka Executive
Magistrate, Davanagere. While he was so working, he
received the requisition letter dated 8.9.2008 from
Davanagere City Extension Police Station. The said letter
is as per Ex.P.36 and his signature is as per Ex.P.36(b).
By the said letter, the police requested him to record the
dying declaration of Mamatha, wife of Kumar who is
getting treatment in the Chigteri District hospital because
of the burn injuries. Accordingly, on the same day in the
morning, he went to the said hospital and enquired
Mamatha from 11.45 a.m. up to 12.00 noon and he
recorded her statement. He called the duty doctor
Jayaprakash and enquired him as to whether the injured
is capable to give the statement. After examining the
injured, the doctor confirmed him that she is capable to
give the statement. He recorded the statement of
Mamatha as per Ex.P.20. In the beginning, Dr.
Jayaprakash made an endorsement as per Ex.P.20(a).
Then P.W.26 recorded the statement of Mamatha in his
44
own hand writing and he read over the same to Mamatha
and obtained her signature and he also put his signature
to the same. Dr. Jayaprakash, at the end, again made an
endorsement that in his presence, the statement was
recorded. The statement given by Mamatha is already
marked as per Ex.P.20(b) and her signature is Ex.P.20(c)
and signature of the doctor is Ex.P.20(d) and his
signature is Ex.P.20(e).
In the cross examination by the accused person,
P.W.26 has deposed that looking to the statement of
Mamatha under Ex.P.20(b), it is contrary to the statement
of Chinnojirao and Gopalakrishna recorded during the
inquest mahazar proceedings. He has further deposed
that he recorded the statement of Mamatha in the form of
dying declaration on 8.9.2008 in the night from 11.45 to
12.00 hours. When the document at Exs.P.30, P.32 and
P.36 were shown to P.W.26, after seeing those documents,
he said ‘yes’. It was suggested that the inquest mahazar
(Ex.P.4) was not prepared correctly, but the said
45
suggestion has been denied by the witness. The witness
has also denied that Ex.P.4 was prepared mechanically.
He has further denied the suggestion that in order to
falsify the truth of the statement of the injured Mamatha
given under Ex.P.20(b) and to defeat the same,
thereafterwards, Ex.P.4 has been created.
19. Even looking to the oral evidence of the Doctor
(P.W.13) and the Taluka Executive Magistrate (P.W.26), it
is consistently deposed that the statement of the deceased
Mamatha was recorded by Taluka Executive Magistrate
(P.W.26) in the presence of the doctor (P.W.13) and even
before the commencement of recording of the said
statement, P.W.26 obtained the opinion of P.W.13 as to
whether the deceased Mamatha was capable to give such
statement or not. P.W.13 after examining the deceased
Mamatha confirmed that she was capable to give such
statement and the same he had informed to the witness
P.W.26 and to that extent; there is endorsement on the
46
right top corner of Ex.P.20. Therefore, this goes to show
that every care has been taken by the Taluka Executive
Magistrate (P.W.26) before recording the statement of the
deceased under Ex.P.20.
Looking to the cross examination, doctor (P.W.13)
was not at all cross examined as the counsel submitted
that there is no cross examination. Therefore, the
evidence deposed by the doctor (P.W.13) remains
unchallenged. Even so far as the cross examination of
Taluka Executive Magistrate (P.W.26), he has consistently
deposed about he recording the statement of the deceased
Mamatha on 8.9.2008 at 11.45 p.m. to 12.00 mid night.
It is no doubt true that in his examination in chief though
P.W.26 has deposed that he went to the hospital in the
morning and recorded the statement at 11.45 a.m. to
12.00 noon but when the documents were shown to the
witness in the cross examination, he has confirmed that it
was on 8.9.2008 in between 11.45 p.m. to 12.00 mid
night. Therefore, with regard to the day and time of
47
recording of the dying declaration of the deceased
Mamatha has also been established with satisfactory and
cogent material produced by the prosecution. Therefore,
there is nothing on record to disbelieve the document
Ex.P.20, the oral evidence of P.Ws.13 and 26 in
connection with the dying declaration of deceased
Mamatha.
20. No doubt, during the course of arguing the case,
the learned HCGP submitted that the dying declaration
under Ex.P.20 given by Mamatha was not at all given on
her free will and volition and it is induced by the threat
posed by accused No.1 while taking her to the hospital in
an auto rickshaw of P.W.8 that she has to tell that the
incident is accidental in nature and she should not tell
that it is he who poured the kerosene and lit fire to her.
In case, she tells before anybody that it was accused No.1
who poured kerosene and lit fire to her, then in that case,
he will not spare her daughter and going to kill the
48
daughter also and because of the said fear, the deceased
Mamatha made such a statement before the Tahsildar
under Ex.P.20. But to support this contention, the
prosecution has not placed any material, even the
prosecution has not treated P.Ws.13 and 26 as hostile
witnesses at least to make the suggestion that the dying
declaration under Ex.P.20 is not of the free will and
volition of the deceased Mamatha and it is because of the
said threat induced to her by accused No.1 and the
document Ex.P.20 is a concocted document. Unless and
until, there is some material brought on record to show
that the dying declaration under Ex.P.20 is the result of
such inducement, the contention of the learned HCGP
cannot be accepted at all.
21. Regarding the contention that the dying
declaration (Ex.P.20) of the deceased was the out come of
the threat given to her by accused No.1 as contended, let
us examine the oral evidence of the driver of the auto
49
rickshaw (P.W.8) in whose auto rickshaw, the injured sent
to the hospital accompanied by accused No.1. It is no
doubt true that it is the contention of the prosecution that
one Hanumanthappa (P.W.11) also travelled in the said
auto rickshaw and he has heard accused No.1 giving the
threat to the deceased to give the statement in such a
fashion as it is recorded under Ex.P.20.
One Venkatesh (P.W.8), who is the driver of the auto
rickshaw, has deposed in his evidence that by the side of
his house, the accused Kumar along with his wife and
children was staying in a rented house. The deceased
Mamatha is the wife of Kumar and on the date of the
incident at 10.00 p.m., when he slept in his house, he was
made to woke up stating that in the neighbouring house,
there was incident of burns. He came outside and the
accused Kumar after covering the body of his wife with the
rug brought her outside. She sustained burn injuries.
P.W.8 has further deposed that in his auto rickshaw,
accused No.1 took deceased to Davanagere C.G. Hospital.
50
He was the driver of the auto. People gathered there were
talking that because of the stove burst, there was fire to
her. The police recorded his statement. He does not know
that before the incident, accused Nos.2 to 4 coming to the
house of accused No.1 and picking up quarrel with
deceased Mamatha. This witness was treated as hostile
and when cross examined by the Public Prosecutor, he
denied the suggestion that on the date of the incident at
about 8.00 p.m. accused Nos.2 to 4 came to the house of
accused No.1 and along with accused No.1, they picked
up quarrel with the deceased Mamatha stating that she
made them to attend to the Court. He denied the further
suggestion that by making such galata, accused Nos.2
and 3 went out of the house. He has further deposed that
he does not know that after they went out, there was
quarrel going on between the husband and wife. He
denied the suggestion that after hearing the said galata
and after some time, they heard the screaming voice of
Mamatha and went there and knocked the door and
51
forcibly they pushed and made the door to open. He
denied the further suggestion that at that time, himself,
his son Raju and one Hanumanthappa were present, he
denied the further suggestion that thereafter when the
door was tapped, Mamatha came out having the flames on
her body and it is they who extinguished the fire. He
denied the suggestion that though he has given his
statement before the COD investigation officers under
Ex.P.16, but at the instance of the accused, he is giving
false evidence. He also deposed that he has not gone
inside the house of the accused in order to ascertain
about the bursting of the stove. He denied further
suggestion that at the instance of the accused persons, he
is falsely deposing that the fire to Mamatha is because of
the stove burst.
22. So looking to the evidence of the driver of auto
rickshaw (P.W.8) in whose auto, the deceased was taken
to the hospital by accused No.1 Kumar he never stated in
52
his evidence that while so going accused No.1 posed life
threat to the injured Mamatha that she has to give
statement that the fire is an accidental fire to her and not
to tell before anybody that it is he poured kerosene and lit
fire to her. And further he threatened her that incase she
tells the truth before anybody he will not spare the
daughter and he will kill the daughter also.
23. Another witness as per the prosecution case in
this regard is one Hanumanthappa (P.W.11), the
neighbour, who is also said to have traveled in the auto
rickshaw of P.W.8. Perusing the evidence of the said
Hanumanthappa, he has deposed in his evidence that he
knows all the four accused persons. His house is at 2nd
main 9th Cross, Vinoba nagar, Davanagere. About three
years back, the accused persons took the said house on
mortgage. In the said house, accused No.1 Kumar and his
wife and children were staying. Accused Nos.2 to 4
coming to the said house often and going back. When the
53
couple was staying in the house, they were alright. But on
8.9.2008 at 8.00 p.m. there was galata going on in the
house of accused No.1. The injured Mamatha was
screaming. The neighbours went there and tapped the
door. Accused No.1 Kumar came and opened the door.
They saw the fire on the whole body of the wife of accused
No.1 and the body was burning. They extinguished the
fire with the help of the bed sheet. Then they sent the
injured in an auto rickshaw to the government hospital.
In the said auto, Venkatesh (P.W.8), his son and another
Manjunath also went. In the meantime, accused No.3
Eeroji Rao came there. Then himself and said Eeroji Rao
went to the hospital. Then they and accused persons
phoned to the father of the deceased and informed about
the same calling him to come immediately. Accused No.1
was in the hospital. After some time, the family members
of the deceased came and he consoled them. Then, he
came back to his house. When the fire took place,
accused No.1 Kumar, his wife and two children were
54
inside the house. After the door was opened by accused
No.1, they have seen the fire. While getting the treatment
and after 2-3 days after the incident, Mamatha expired in
the hospital. He has further deposed that as the door was
closed, it was not known to them as to whether Mamatha
set fire to herself or accused No.1 set fire to her. When
CID police enquired him, he gave the statement. Prior to
that when other accused persons came to the said house,
he has not seen any galata going on. The prosecution
requested the Court to treat this witness as hostile
witness. Accordingly, he was treated as hostile witness
and cross examined by the Public Prosecutor.
In the cross examination, P.W.11 has deposed that
he has not given the statement before the police as per
Ex.P.18 and P.18(a). He has also deposed that he has not
stated before the police that at that time, himself and his
neighbour Venkatesh and husband of Mamatha by name
Kumar, all together took Mamatha in the auto rickshaw of
Venkatesh (P.W.8) and went to C.G. Hospital at
55
Davanagere and on the way, accused No.1 threatened
Mamatha that she should not tell before anybody that
accused No.1 poured kerosene and lit fire to her and in
case, she tells as such, then he will set fire to her
daughter also and burn her. P.W.11 has further deposed
that he has also not stated before the police that accused
told deceased that she should tell that when she was
starting the kerosene stove, at that time, the fire caught
her and stating so, the accused threatened her and
thereafter, they took the deceased to C.G. hospital and
admitted”. He has not stated so before the investigation
officer as per Ex.P.18(b). Therefore, looking to this
evidence of Hanumanthappa (P.W.11), the neighbour, he
has also not supported the case of prosecution that in his
presence, accused No.1 threatened the deceased while
traveling in the auto rickshaw. But on the contrary, the
evidence of P.W.11 goes to show that he has not at all
traveled in the said auto rickshaw. Therefore, the
contention of the prosecution that because of such threat
56
posed by accused No.1 to deceased, she gave the
statement under Ex.P.20 before the Taluka Executive
Magistrate. Therefore, it is not her dying declaration given
voluntarily and of her free will and volition and it is not
supported by any such material. Therefore, the argument
of the learned HCGP in respect of the written dying
declaration (Ex.P.20) and the evidence of P.Ws.8, 11, 13
and 26 are against the prosecution case itself. Therefore,
the contention of HCGP cannot be acceptable.
24. It is also the case of prosecution as per the
evidence of one of the witnesses i.e., Hanumanthappa
(P.W.11) that in the auto rickshaw, the injured was sent
along with Venkatesh (P.W.8-the driver of the auto), his
son and another Manjunath. Therefore, it is necessary to
refer to the evidence of P.W.6-Manjunath and P.W.7-Raju,
the son of driver of the auto rickshaw-Venkatesh. Looking
to the evidence of Manjunath (P.W.6), he has deposed that
during that night, when they were having the dinner, at
57
that time, there was galata going on and after hearing the
same, he came out. In front of his house, there was the
house of the accused. When they saw, the accused
Kumar and his wife came, and the entire body of deceased
was burnt. While coming out, they themselves put the
bed sheet on the body of the deceased. He has further
deposed that the accused Kumar took the deceased to the
hospital in an auto rickshaw. He also went on his bike.
When enquired, he came to know that because of the
burst of the stove, there were the burn injuries. The
police have not recorded his statement. So this witness
was also treated as hostile. When examined by the Public
Prosecutor, he denied the suggestion that he extinguished
the fire and he also traveled in the auto rickshaw of
Venkatesh (P.W.8).
Coming to the evidence of Raju (P.W.7), he has
deposed in his evidence that by the side of his house, the
accused was staying in a rented house with his wife and
children. He does not know as to how the husband and
58
wife were living when so staying. He does not know that
there used to be quarrel between them. On the date of
the incident, at about 10.30 p.m., there was galata in the
house of Kumar. When he went to the said house, the
door was being tapped. 4-5 persons were present there.
Then he went back inside his house. Later, he came to
know that it was the case of burning. The police as well
as COD police enquired and recorded his statement. At
the request of the Public Prosecutor, this witness was also
treated as hostile and when cross examined, nothing has
been elicited from his mouth to show that he had also
traveled in the auto rickshaw of his father (P.W.8) along
with injured and accused No.1, and at that time, accused
No.1 gave threat to deceased that she should not tell that
he poured kerosene and lit fire to her and she should say
before the others that it was the case of accidental burns.
Therefore, these are all the materials so far as the dying
declaration under Ex.P.20 recorded by the Taluka
59
Executive Magistrate (P.W.26) in the presence of doctor
(P.W.13).
25. We have also referred to the relevant material in
the evidence of the witnesses with regard to the contention
of the prosecution that the dying declaration given under
Ex.P.20 is not voluntary and not because of free will and
volition. The contention of the prosecution is against
their own material that the dying declaration under
Ex.P.20 is not voluntary and because of free volition.
Therefore, such contention cannot be accepted.
26. Apart from the written dying declaration, there
is more than one oral dying declaration of the deceased,
even according to the case of prosecution. Let us refer to
the materials placed on record in this regard.
Siddoji Rao (P.W.1), is the complainant and father of
the deceased. He has deposed in his evidence in the
examination in chief that on the date of the incident
60
during night at 9.45 hours, accused No.1 came to his
house and at that time, his wife Anitha called him for the
meal and accused No.1 told the deceased Mamatha that
he already had the meal and asked the deceased Mamatha
to have the meal. When the deceased sat to have the
meal, at that time, the accused poured kerosene on her
body and lit fire to her. This was told by Mamatha when
he enquired with his daughter.
Kubendroji Rao (P.W.2), who is the relative of P.W.1
and the deceased, has deposed in his evidence in the
examination in chief, at para No.10 of his deposition, that
at that time, they spoken to the deceased and she was in a
position to talk and she spoke to them and told before
them that the family members of her husband poured
kerosene oil on her body and set fire to her. When they
enquired as to what had happened further, she told that
her husband Kumar, father-in-law Eeroji Rao, mother-in-
law Shantha Bai and sister-in-law Gunavathi, they all
burnt her.
61
Smt. Padma (P.W.3), the mother of the deceased
Mamatha, has deposed in her evidence in the examination
in chief at para Nos.16 and 17 that during the night itself,
Kubendroji Rao (P.W.2), Chennaveeroji Rao, Shivaji Rao,
herself and her husband (P.W.1) came to C.G. Hospital at
Davanagere. They saw Mamatha was getting treatment in
the said hospital for the burn injuries sustained and she
was not having the consciousness. After one hour, she
talked with them properly. P.W.3 has further deposed
that Mamatha also told that during the night when she sat
for having the meal, at that time, her husband poured
kerosene on her body and lit fire to her. Two days
Mamatha was alive and thereafter, while getting the
treatment, she succumbed to the burn injuries in the
hospital.
Ningoji Rao (P.W.9) has deposed in his evidence in
the examination-in-chief that in the year 2008, he came to
know that husband of the deceased set fire to her.
62
C.K. Revanna (P.W.10) has deposed in his evidence
in the examination-in-chief that after the mother-in-law,
father-in-law and the sister-in-law of the deceased went
from the house of the deceased; the deceased called her
husband to have the meal and at that time, accused No.1
told her that he had the meal and asked her to have the
meal. At that time, the deceased went inside and she put
the food in the plate and sat for having the meal. At that
time, accused No.1 brought kerosene oil in a plastic bottle
poured on the body of the deceased and then, set fire to
her. In para No.10, P.W.10 has also deposed that they
were informed that at about 8.30 p.m., galata was going
on in the house of Kumar. Therefore, they had the
suspicion that accused No.1-Kumar might have poured
the kerosene and lit fire to the deceased Mamatha.
In addition to the oral evidence of the above said
prosecution witnesses, the prosecution has also relied
upon the documentary evidence, Ex.P.27 and Ex.D.1,
wherein on page No.2 of the said document in the last
63
paragraph, it is mentioned that immediately, the
complainant went nearby the house and enquired with the
neighbours and came to know that accused No.1 Kumar,
his parents and his sister, together poured kerosene and
lit fire to the deceased Mamatha.
This is all the evidence of the prosecution in support
of the contention of the prosecution that it is the
homicidal death.
27. It is also the contention of the prosecution that
it is a suicidal death. There is a charge under Section
304-B of IPC that because of the ill treatment meted out to
the deceased Mamatha in connection with the payment of
remaining dowry amount of Rs.50,000/-, she committed
suicide and hence, it is a dowry death as per the
contention of the prosecution. In support of this
contention that it is the suicidal death, the prosecution
has led the evidence.
64
Ningoji Rao (P.W.9) has deposed in his evidence in
the cross examination at para No.4 that he has not stated
before the investigation officer that the previous day night
at 9.00 p.m., the deceased informed that she poured
kerosene on herself and lit fire to herself. He has not
stated accordingly as per Ex.D.6.
C.K.Revanna (P.W.10) has deposed in his evidence in
the cross examination at para No.3 that he has not stated
before the police that as the ill treatment becomes
untolerable, the previous day at about 9.00 p.m., the
deceased poured kerosene on herself and lit fire to herself
and he has not stated that the deceased Mamatha told
before him as such, as per Ex.D7.
28. The prosecution also wanted to rely upon the
documentary evidence regarding the suicidal death i.e.,
Ex.P.21 – the MLC register extract. In the said document,
in front of H/o – it is mentioned suicidal burn. So also,
65
the another document at Ex.P.32 wherein also, in front of
H/o, it is mentioned as suicidal burn.
But it is the contention of the defence that the
incident in question is neither homicidal nor suicidal but
it is the accidental in nature.
29. Before proceeding to appreciate the evidence of
the prosecution witnesses regarding the oral dying
declaration of the deceased so also some documents
produced by the prosecution, let us have the clear idea
about the dying declaration.
The basis of the rule as to dying declaration was
explained in the early case of R Vs. WOOD COCK (1789 1
Leach 500: 168 E.R.352 (page No.160). The brief facts
of the case in the said reported decision are that, the
prisoner was charged with the murder of the wife. Her
statement as to circumstance of death was recorded by a
magistrate. Death came 48 hours after this. She
consistently and rationally repeated the circumstances of
66
the ill treatment meted out to her. But she remained
conscious till the last moment and did not seen at all to be
aware of her approaching dissolution.
Holding the statement to be relevant Eyre C.B. first
explained the general principle;
The general principal on which this species of
evidence is admitted is that they are declarations made in
extremity, when the party is at the point of death, and
when every hope of this word is gone; when every motive
to falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the
most powerful considerations to speak the truth.
So this is the general principle explained by Eyre
C.B. Therefore, solemnity is the basis that the court can
rely upon the dying declaration. Therefore, the dying
declaration if satisfactorily proved that it is truthful,
voluntary and reliable, then it can be the sole basis for
conviction without seeking any corroboration as laid down
in Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act. But at the
same time, the Court has to keep in mind that dying
67
declaration is a statement made by the declarant not on
oath and the person making the dying declaration not
subjected to cross examination also. Therefore, the Court
will have to be cautious before accepting the dying
declaration that it is worth believable. Keeping these
principles in mind, let us examine the oral evidence led by
the prosecution to which we have already made our
reference above.
Regarding the said oral dying declarations, even with
regard to the contention of the prosecution that it is the
homicidal death of deceased Mamatha, there is no
consistency, one witness is deposing that it is accused
No.1 Kumar, the husband of Mamatha poured kerosene
and lit fire to her. The another witness is deposing that it
is all the four accused persons poured kerosene on
Mamatha and lit fire to her. Looking to the evidence of
P.Ws.9 and 10 as per Exs.D.6 and D.7, it goes to show
that the deceased made the statement before the said
witnesses that it is she herself poured kerosene and lit fire
68
on her. No doubt P.Ws.9 and 10 have deposed in the
cross examination that they have not given a statement
before the investigation officer as per Exs.D.6 and D.7.
But looking to the evidence of the investigation officer, the
defence has not confronted those portions of evidence
under Exs.D.6 and D.7 to know from the investigation
officer that whether the witnesses have stated so or not.
But apart from that, looking to the very evidence of
P.W.1, the complainant who is the father of the deceased,
in the oral evidence he has deposed that when he
enquired his daughter Mamatha, she told him that when
she was having the meal, her husband poured kerosene
and lit fire to her. Whereas, in the complaint Ex.P.1,
P.W.1 has deposed that on 8.9.2008, at 10.15 p.m., his
son-in-law accused No.1 phoned and informed him that
there is a small burn injury at the thigh portion to
Mamatha and he need not worry and he can come in the
morning. But as he was afraid, he immediately arranged
one vehicle and himself and his wife and his son Shivaji
69
Rao and his nephew another Shivaji Rao and Kubendroji
Rao and member Revanna (P.W.10), came in the midnight
to C.G. hospital Davanagere. Mamatha was admitted in
ward No.73, the entire body was burnt, skin was peeled off
and she was not in a position to speak and she was
struggling. It is also mentioned in the complaint (Ex.P.1)
that on 9.9.2008 at 7.30 a.m., they went to see Mamatha
and asked as to what had happened to her. She told
before them that her husband, mother-in-law
Shanthamma, father-in-law Eeroji Rao and Sister-in-law
Gunavathi insisted her to bring the dowry amount and
gave physical and mental ill treatment to her. When it
became intolerable, on the previous day at 9.00 p.m., she
poured kerosene on herself and lit fire to herself.
Ex.P.27/Ex.D.1 is the complaint about which we
have already made the reference that it is all the four
accused persons poured kerosene and lit fire to the
deceased. Looking to these materials by P.W.1 himself,
there are three versions and there is no consistency and
70
totally, they are contradictory of each other. So also
looking to the evidence of P.Ws.2, 3, 4, 9 and 10, again
there is inconsistency with the oral evidence of P.W.1 so
also the contents of Ex.P.1 the complaint and Ex.P.27,
another complaint submitted before the office of the
Tahsildar.
30. Apart from this, if we look into the documents,
MLC register extract (Ex.P.21) so also the MLC card
(Ex.P.32) issued from Chigteri District Hospital
Davanagere, in both these documents, in front of the
column H/o. originally, it was written as accidental. But
the word ‘accidental’ has been scored out and above that,
it is mentioned as ‘suicidal burns’. For making such
corrections, there is no initial of anybody. There is no
explanation offered by the prosecution as to who made
such corrections, why it was made and at what point of
time, the said correction was made. Absolutely, no
material has been placed by the prosecution. Therefore,
71
this itself raises a doubt in the mind of the Court as to
why such a correction has been made scoring the word
‘accidental’ and above the same making a mention as
‘suicidal burn’. If it is presumed that in Ex.P.21, the MLC
extract, through over sight it is written so, but the said
mistake cannot be in all the other documents also.
When the investigation officer was asked about this
correction, during the course of cross examination, the
witness though admitted that there were such corrections
made, but he has not investigated as to who made such
correction and why the correction was made. Looking to
the evidence of P.W.33-investigation officer it is clear that
he verified Ex.P.21, after recording the evidence of Dr.
Ganesh Babu. The investigation officer has further
deposed that while writing the history, Dr. Ganesh Babu,
originally written as ‘accidental’ and then, he scored it and
above that, he has written ‘suicidal burns’. The witness
admitted it as true. Similarly in Ex.P.32, while writing
about the history, the witness admitted that firstly it was
72
written as ‘accidental’ and then it was scored out and
above that, it was mentioned as ‘suicidal burns’ as per
Ex.P.32(c). In Ex.P.33 on page No.1, at the downwards,
at the complaint column in front of H/o. it is written as
‘suicidal burn’. Therefore, the documents Exs.P.21 and
P.32 so also P.33 go to show that the corrections are made
in the said documents and in place of ‘accidental’ it is
mentioned as ‘suicidal burn’.
As per the evidence of P.W.33-investigation officer
during the course of cross examination, he has also
deposed and admitted that in Ex.P.50 in front of H/o., it is
written as ‘accidental burns’ and it is still as it is.
Therefore, the documents Exs.P.21, P.32 and P.50 are
consistent with Ex.P.20-the dying declaration and the oral
evidence of the doctor (P.W.13) and Taluka Executive
Magistrate (P.W.26) who recorded the dying declaration
under Ex.P.20. We have also perused the decision relied
upon by the learned Senior Advocate in case of SANJAY
73
Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA reported in (2007) 9 SCC
148. In para No.16, Their Lordships have held as under:
“In our opinion, in view of the different
dying declarations, it would not be safe to
uphold the conviction of the appellant and we
have to give him the benefit of doubt. It cannot
be said in this case that the prosecution has
proved the appellant’s guilt under section 306
IPC of abetting the suicide beyond reasonable
doubt.”
31. We have also perused the decision in case of
CHINNAMMA Vs. STATE OF KERALA reported in
(2004)12 SCC 244. In para No.6 of the said decision,
Their Lordships have held as under:
“6. We will now examine the contents of
the second dying declaration, Ex. P-10 recorded
by the Magistrate on 14.7.1989. It should be
noted here that this was a statement recorded
about six days after the incident in question
during which time she was being looked after in
the hospital by her father and other relatives.
This statement of the deceased was recorded in
74
the presence of the Duty Doctor who had
certified her to be conscious and coherent to
give a statement. In this statement which is in
the form of questions and answers, the
deceased told the Magistrate that on last
Saturday (8.7.1989), she took food for piglings
from the kitchen of her husband’s house, and
as soon as she entered the kitchen, she got a
beating on the back of her head. That was by
her sister-in-law whose name is Chinnamma.
She then fell down and became unconscious.
She then states that while she was
unconscious, the flames started and there was
smell of kerosene. To a question asked by the
Magistrate, she states that it was her sister-in-
law who beat her, therefore, she suspects that
her sister-in-law set her body on fire. While
answering a question as to who all were
attending on her, she said that her father,
mother, two brothers, two sisters and her
husband were attending on her. In regard to
the reason for the attack, she states that there
was some talk that she had done some evil
magic on her husband; therefore, her husband
was not loving his sister (the appellant) after
75
their marriage. A careful consideration of this
dying declaration made about fourteen days
before her death, shows that in this statement
she states that when she entered the kitchen,
she was struck on the back of her head which
she assumes was by her sister-in-law (the
appellant). She then states that she became
unconscious thereafter and when she regained
consciousness, she saw flames and smelt
kerosene. She also says that she suspected her
sister- in-law of having set her on fire. The
motive given for this attack by the appellant in
this dying declaration was that the appellant
had suspected the deceased of having cast
certain evil magic on her husband because of
which he stopped loving his sister, the
appellant. A comparison of these two dying
declarations, in our opinion, shows certain
glaring contradictions. In the first dying
declaration, we have noticed that there was an
incident on the previous day when she desired
to go to her mother’s house and got dressed up
for the same. Her husband did not allow her to
go to her mother’s house. But the next day,
when she got dressed again to go to her
76
mother’s house, the appellant came and
standing behind her, hit her on the back of her
head when she fell on the floor and she saw the
appellant taking kerosene which was kept in
the room and pouring it on her chest and
thereafter she felt the heat and ran outside the
house and fell unconscious. The factum of she
having seen the appellant taking out the
kerosene from the room and pouring the same
on her was not spoken to by her in her second
dying declaration. This fact has some relevance
while appreciating the correctness of the two
dying declarations because if really she was
conscious and had seen the appellant take the
kerosene and pouring the same on her, she
would not have forgotten to mention it again in
her second dying declaration. Again, while she
was certain that it was her sister-in-law (the
appellant) who poured the kerosene on her and
set her on fire as per her first dying declaration;
in the second dying declaration, she was not so
sure because she says that she only suspected
the appellant of having set her on fire. This is
because she had earlier stated in that
statement that she became unconscious when
77
her sister-in- law had hit her on the head. Even
the motives given in the two dying declarations
are entirely different. These contradictions, in
our opinion, create grave suspicion in our
minds whether the injury suffered by the
deceased was really because of the act of the
appellant or was a figment of the imagination of
the deceased. This suspicion of ours becomes
all the more stronger if we notice the evidence
of PW-11 who treated her in the first instance
when she was taken to Kanjirappally Hospital.
It is seen from the wound certificate Ext. P-11
given by this doctor that when he examined the
deceased for the first time at Kanjirappally
Hospital, she stated that she suffered the injury
due to accidental burning while preparing food
for the piglings. This very important aspect of
the case was rejected by both the courts below
on the ground that the entry made in the
wound certificate might not have been a correct
entry because the witnesses who took her to
the hospital, had stated that she was not in a
fit condition to talk. But then we should
remember that this is an entry made in a
document regularly maintained and the doctor
78
had no reason whatsoever to make an incorrect
entry, and no question was asked to this doctor
when he was in the witness box as to the
correctness of the entry, therefore, due weight
should be given to the contents of this wound
certificate and the courts below ought not to
have rejected the same on the basis of oral
evidence given by certain witnesses. It is also
very relevant to mention here that the deceased
was prevented from going to her mother’s
house by her husband on 7.7.1989 and the
deceased being adamant in spite of protest
from her husband, had decided to go to her
mother’s house again on 8.7.1989 which
indicates that there may be reasons other than
the alleged enmity entertained by the appellant
for suffering by the burn injuries which
ultimately led to her death. From the material
on record, we are also unable to find any strong
motive which would have induced the appellant
to commit such a heinous crime of burning her
sister-in-law to death. The conduct of the
appellant in being present with the deceased
right through the journey to the hospital also
indicates otherwise. There is another important
79
aspect of the case which was not considered by
the two courts below properly i.e. it is the case
of the deceased that she was beaten on the
back of her head with a firewood, consequent to
which she fell down and had lost her
consciousness. Though during the course of
inquest of the dead body, it was noticed that
there was a contusion on the head, the doctor
who examined the deceased before she died as
also the doctor who conducted the post
mortem, did not notice any such injury on the
head which indicates that the first part of the
attack on the deceased by the appellant could
be concocted. At any rate, the prosecution has
failed to establish the first part of the attack by
the appellant on the head of the deceased.
Learned counsel appearing for the State,
however, contended that because of the burn
injuries, the doctors might not have noticed the
head injury caused by the attack with a
firewood on the head of the deceased. We have
perused the medical report which shows that
all the burn injuries suffered by the deceased
were below the neck and on the limbs and so
far as the head is concerned, there was no burn
80
injury. The absence of any injury at the back of
the head of the deceased as also non-recovery
of the firewood which was used in the assault
on the deceased indicates that the first part of
the dying declaration is not true. In this
background, the second part of the dying
declaration that she fell down and became
unconscious also cannot be believed. These
discrepancies would indicate that her
statement made to the doctor, PW-11 that she
suffered burn injuries accidentally while
cooking becomes more probable. Be that as it
may, the abovementioned facts create a doubt
in our mind as to the truthfulness of the
contents of the dying declaration as also the
possibility of she being influenced by her
parents in making the dying declaration cannot
be ruled out”.
32. We have also perused another decision relied
upon by the learned Senior Advocate in case of
MEHIBOOBSAB ABBASABI NADAF Vs. STATE OF
KARNATAKA reported in (2007)13 SCC 112, the relevant
81
paragraph is para No.7, wherein Their Lordships have
held as under:
“Conviction can indisputably be based on
a dying declaration. But before it can be acted
upon, the same must be held to have been
rendered voluntarily and truthful. Consistency
in the dying declaration is the relevant factor
for placing full reliance there upon. In this
case, the deceased herself had taken
contradictory and inconsistent stand in
different dying declarations. They, therefore,
should not be accepted on their face value,
caution, in this behalf, is required to be
applied.”
33. We have further perused another decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of KAMLA VS. STATE OF
PUNJAB reported in (1993)1 SCC 1. Para No.8 of the said
decision is relevant, which reads as under:
“8. If we examine all these dying
declarations one by one we notice glaring
inconsistencies as to who exactly poured
kerosene oil ad set fire or whether she caught
82
fire accidentally. Suicide however is ruled out.
In Ex. PB/2 recorded by P.W. 2 the deceased
stated that her mother-in-law sprinkled
kerosene from behind and burnt her. In the
next statement Ex. DA recorded by Dr. Jaison
Chopra, C.W. 1, she is alleged to have stated
that her clothes got burnt catching fire from the
stove, thereby indicating that it was an
accident. In the third statement Ex. PJ
recorded by C.W. 2 she was rather vague as to
who exactly poured kerosene and set fire on her
and she only stated that it could be possible
that her mother-in-law and father-in-law might
have set the fire after pouring kerosene oil. On
September 30, 1979 Ex.PD was recorded in the
presence of three doctors, P.W. 7, P.W. 3 and
C.W.I wherein she stated that she turned to the
store and she heard her mother-in-law and
father-in-law talking behind her and suddenly
they poured kerosene and they set her on fire.
The trial court and the High Court discarded
the other statements and relied only on
Ex.PB/2 recorded by P.W. 2 wherein she
implicated only her mother-in-law. So far Ex.
DA recorded by C.W.I is concerned, the High
83
Court pointed out that C.W. 1 was also present
when Ex.PD was recorded and that at any rate
there was no occasion for C.W. 1 to record such
statement and that he must have done the
same at the instance of the accused. After
having carefully examined the record and facts
and circumstances, we do not think that a
remark of this nature against C.W. 1, a
responsible doctor is called for. The mere fact
that C.W. 1 Dr. Jaison Chopra was present
when Ex. PD was recorded on the next day
does not necessarily mean that he could not
have recorded Ex. DA-on the previous day. As a
matter of fact, even in Ex. PD recorded by a
team of doctors, she implicated both mother-in-
law and father-in-law whereas in Ex.PB/2 she
implicated only her mother-in-law. This itself
shows that she was bent upon implicating both
of them at a later stage. In this context it is also
noteworthy that D.W. 2, the husband of the
deceased supported the plea of the accused. He
deposed that both the accused namely his
mother and father were away to Dandi Swami
Mandir on the day of occurrence and that at
about 8.15 A.M. he heard the shrieks raised by
84
the deceased from the kitchen. He picked up a
blanket and went running into the kitchen
apprehending that she might have caught fire
due to busting of the gas cylinder. He covered
her with the blanket and brought her out and
his clothes also caught fire and he became
unconscious and regained consciousness in the
hospital. In the cross-examination by the
prosecution he denied the suggestion that he
made a false statement with a view to save his
parents. The deceased in all her dying
declarations has clearly stated that her
husband namely D.W. 2 came and rescued her.
Therefore, D.W. 2’s evidence cannot simply be
brushed aside on the ground that he might
have given such a version to save his parents
and his evidence further shows that the
occurrence could be due to accident. Viewed
from this angle also the version given in the
statement made before C.W. 1 in Ex. DA that it
was due to accident, is not improbable. In Ex.
PJ she only expressed a suspicion against both
her mother-in-law and father-in-law. The
accused examined D.W. 1 Satpal an attesting
witness of the statement Ex. PJ. He supported
85
the defence version. Thus it can be seen that
there are glaring inconsistencies in these dying
declarations. Both the courts below, however,
held that P.W. 2 Dr. Rupinder Singh is a
reliable and independent witness, therefore the
statement recorded by him has to be accepted
and accordingly convicted the appellant. We
must observe that P.W. 2 simply recorded the
statement of the deceased but the contents of
that statement have to be subjected to a close
scrutiny in the light of many other
circumstances since the conviction has to be
based on the sole dying declaration Ex.PB/2. A
dying declaration should satisfy all the
necessary tests and one such important test is
that if there are more than one dying
declaration they should be consistent
particularly in material particulars. Just like
P.W. 2, P.W. 7, P.W. 3 and C.W.I are also
respectable doctors and independent witnesses
who spoke about the contents of Ex. PD in
which she implicated both her father-in-law
and mother-in-law specifically as having
participated in the crime. Under these
circumstances, the irresistible conclusion is
86
that the dying declarations are inconsistent
and in such a situation we just cannot pick out
one statement namely Ex.PB/2 and base the
conviction of the appellant on the sole basis of
such a dying declaration. The courts have
cautioned that in view of the fact that the
maker of the statement cannot be cross-
examined, the dying declaration should be
carefully scrutinised. In the instant case the
deceased was wavering for the reasons best
known to her. The inconsistency between
Ex.PB/2 and Ex. PD is enough to manifest the
same. That being so, we do not think that
either Dr. Jaison Chopra, C.W. 1 or S.I. Vidya
Sagar, C.W. 2 who claimed to have recorded Ex.
DA and Ex. PJ should be blamed. Having given
our earnest consideration, we feel that under
these circumstances it is highly unsafe to
convict the appellant on the sole basis of the
dying declaration Ex.PB/2 recorded by P.W. 2.
In the result the conviction and sentence
passed against the appellant are set aside and
the appeal is allowed. If she is on bail, her bail
bonds shall stand cancelled”.
87
34. We have also perused one more decision
reported in case of STATE OF PUNJAB VS. PARVEEN
KUMAR reported in 2006(2) SCC (Criminal) 146. The
relevant paragraph is para No.10, which reads as under:
“While appreciating the credibility of the
evidence produced before the court, the Court
must read the evidence as a whole and come to
a conclusion as to its genuineness and
truthfulness. The mere fact that two different
versions are given but one name is common in
both of them cannot be a ground for
convicting the named person. The Court must
be satisfied that the dying declaration is
truthful. If there are two dying declarations
giving two different versions, a serous doubt is
created about the truthfulness of the dying
declarations. It may be that if there was any
other reliable evidence on record, this Court
could have considered such corroborative
evidence to test the truthfulness of the dying
declarations. The two dying declarations,
however, in the instant case, stand by
themselves, there is no other reliable evidence
on record by reference to which their
88truthfulness can be tested. It is well settled
that one piece of unreliable evidence cannot be
used to corroborate another piece of unreliable
evidence. The High Court while considering the
evidence on record has rightly applied the
principles laid down by this Court in
Thurukanni Pompiah Vs. State of Mysore and
Kushal Rao Vs. State of Bombay. “
35. Therefore, looking to the above referred
decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court cited by the learned
Senior Advocate and also the principles enunciated in the
above said decisions, after perusing the material, we are of
the opinion that so far as the oral dying declarations, said
to have been made by the deceased Mamatha in front of
the prosecution witnesses referred above, there is total
inconsistency, they are self contradictory and they are not
said to be truthful and not worth believable. The said oral
dying declarations will not inspire confidence of this
Court. Therefore, they cannot be relied upon in convicting
the accused persons. The written dying declaration under
89
Ex.P.20, coupled with the oral evidence of P.Ws.13 and 26
so also the documents Ex.P.21 and P.32, is reliable that it
is the dying declaration made by the deceased Mamatha,
wherein it is stated that she caught fire accidentally to her
saree when she was boiling the milk and curry and as the
boy was weeping and attention was drawn towards him,
the fire covered her entire body. There is no reason for us
to disbelieve the evidence of P.Ws.13 and 26 as the
prosecution itself has relied upon their evidence. Ex.P.20
has been proved with the help of worth believable material
and it rules out the possibility of the death either as
homicidal or suicidal but it is because of the accidental
burns.
36. We have perused the evidence of C.K. Revanna
(P.W.10). In his examination in chief, at para No.12,
P.W.10 has deposed that from there, at 11.30 a.m., P.W.1
came to women’s police station and he lodged one
complaint. The PSI after receiving the said complaint,
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asked P.W.1 that he can wait nearby the hospital and he
will send his staff. Thereafter, at about 12.30 noon, two
police constables came to hospital. At that time, Mamatha
stated before the police in detail as to what had happened.
To the said statement, the police obtained her signature
and went back to the police station. Therefore, this is
another dying declaration said to have been given by the
deceased Mamatha in detail and her signature is also
obtained to the said statement. But it has not been
produced before the Court to make it clear to the Court to
know as to what had been stated by the deceased
Mamatha in the said statement. In this connection, the
defence has also cross examined the investigation officer
(P.W.33) who has deposed in his evidence that when he
took up the file of the investigation, the women police
station diary and the statement of the deceased were not
at all in the file. Therefore, the oral evidence of the
investigation officer also makes it clear that the statement
given by the deceased before the women police which was
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in detail and which was signed by her has been ultimately
suppressed by the police and not produced before the
Court. Therefore, it raises a reasonable doubt in the mind
of the Court as to the case of the prosecution that it is
either homicidal death or suicidal death. Apart from that,
an adverse inference has to be drawn against the case of
prosecution under the provisions of Indian evidence Act
that had they produced the said statement, the contents
of the statement of Mamatha would have gone against the
case of prosecution and that was the reason, they have
withheld the said document.
37. There is also charge against the appellant-
accused No.1 that he along with that all the other
accused persons including accused No.4 Gunavati who
has been acquitted from the case were giving physical and
mental harassment to deceased Mamatha in connection
with the additional dowry amount of Rs.50,000/-.
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38. Let us examine the material produced by the
prosecution to ascertain whether the prosecution has
placed cogent and acceptable material in proof of the
charge and whether the learned Sessions Judge is correct
in relying on such material and coming to the conclusion
that prosecution proved the charge for the offence under
Section 498A of IPC.
P.W.1 Siddojirao is the father of deceased Mamatha
and father-in-law of accused No.1. He has deposed that
accused persons are the native of Davangere and he is the
native of Channagiri. Earlier to the marriage, accused
persons came to his house and they liked his daughter
Mamatha. One month prior to the marriage, talks were
held in the house of complainant at Channagiri wherein
accused persons and some other persons from the side of
the accused were also present. At that time, from the side
of bride P.W.2, Kubendroji Rao-C.W.2, Shivaji Rao and his
relative Ningoji Rao were also present. At the time of
marriage talks, accused demanded Rs.2 lakhs cash and
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15 tholas of gold as dowry. The complainant told that it is
not possible to pay that much amount and gold. Then his
relatives and other family members asked him to agree for
Rs.1.5 lakhs cash and 10 tholas of gold by way of dowry,
for which, both the parties have agreed. As decided, he
kept ready Rs.1 lakh cash and 10 tholas of gold. On the
date of marriage, as told by accused persons, he put 10
tholas of gold ornaments on his daughter and handed over
Rs.1 lakh cash to the hands of accused No.3 Eeroji Rao
and told the accused that remaining Rs.50,000/- he will
pay little later on the ground that he has some financial
problem, for which, accused also agreed. He further
deposed that for about three months after the marriage
his daughter was happy in the house of the accused.
Complainant also used to visit the house of the accused.
After some time, alleging that remaining Rs.50,000/- as
agreed was not given to the accused, they started giving
ill-treatment and harassment to her. Once the accused
persons had assaulted her and sent her out of the house.
94
Deceased Mamatha told before him that for the remaining
amount, accused were giving ill-treatment to her. When
accused assaulted his daughter, she had come to his
house. They advised her and sent her back to the house
of accused persons and also advised the accused persons
not to give ill-treatment to her and went back to
Channagiri. After that, for about 25 days her daughter
was looked after well by the accused, thereafter again
accused started assaulting her and sent her back to his
house. Then she was staying in his house. One or two
months thereafter accused No.1 filed the case seeking
divorce against Mamatha in the family Court at
Davangere. His daughter also filed maintenance case
wherein an amount of Rs.1,700/- per month was ordered
by the Court as against accused No.1. Then the accused
came for compromise. At that time, complainant told that
if accused No.1 arranges for separate house to Mamatha
and accused No.1, he will send his daughter. Accordingly,
accused No.1 took a separate house at Vinobhanagar, 9th
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cross, and accused No.1 and his daughter were staying in
the said house. Thereafter, his daughter became pregnant
and for some days, complainant asked his wife P.W.3 to
stay along with Mamatha in the house of accused No.1.
After one month, he brought his wife back as there was
nobody in the house of P.W.1. 2-3 days thereafter
Mamatha called them and informed that accused Nos.2
and 3 came to their house and abused her that she has
not brought the remaining amount and asked her to bring
the same. Thereafter, on 8.9.2008 at about 9.45 p.m,
accused No.1 called them and informed that Mamatha has
sustained some injuries and is admitted to the hospital
and asked him to come in the morning and then they went
to the hospital wherein his son-in-law accused No.1
Kumar and his father were present in the hospital.
39. In the cross-examination, he deposed that he
does not remember when he joined the service, but he
retired in the year 2002. He worked as ‘D’ Group
96
employee in the Agriculture department. When he retired
he was working as Attender. He cannot say what his total
salary was when he joined the service. So also, he cannot
say what his salary was at the time of his retirement. He
has deposed that four years prior to the marriage of
Mamatha he had performed the marriage of his daughter
Suma and six years earlier to that he performed the
marriage of another daughter Prema. He admitted the
suggestion that in Maratha community there is a
customary practice to give gold ornaments to the bride as
well as to the bridegroom. He does not know the
goldsmith who prepared the ornaments for the marriage of
Mamatha. Even he cannot say the year in which he got
the ornaments ready. He voluntarily deposed that to
perform the marriage of their daughters, out of his salary,
he got the ornaments ready in advance and he used to pay
to the goldsmith every month in connection with the said
ornaments. When he got prepared the ornaments, the
value of the gold for one savaran was Rs.10,000/-. He
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admitted the suggestion that one week prior to the
marriage of accused No.1, the marriage of accused No.4
Gunavathi was performed and witness shown ignorance to
the next suggestion that after the marriage accused No.4
is staying at Gokak in the house of her husband. Witness
shown his ignorance to the fact that the house of sister-in-
law of accused No.4 is in Poona and her name is Tulasa
Bai and Talasa Bai’s husband is one Suresh Rao
Kasbekar. He even shown his ignorance to the fact that he
does not know that because of ailments said Suresh Rao
Kasbekar has expired in the year 2006 and due to his
death, accused No.4 and her husband was staying at
Poona to look after her sister-in-law. P.W.1 further
deposed that in Ex.D1 there is no mention about payment
of the dowry amount, but on the date mentioned in the
seal, they made payment of dowry amount. He denied the
suggestion that he was not capable to pay the dowry in
the form of cash or kind out of his salary. He is having
landed property, house property, buffaloes and his wife is
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doing agriculture and dairy farming. But he has not given
any documents to show that there was land and dairy
farming. It is deposed that on the date of the marriage,
they put gold ornaments on Mamatha and eight days prior
to that, they have given Rs.1 lakh. He has deposed that
when COD police came for investigation he came to know
that the women police have got changed his complaint.
He has admitted that when his daughter was staying
separately at 9th cross house, there were no complaints.
P.W.2 Kubendroji Rao has deposed that the marriage
talks took place in the house of P.W.1 at Channagiri and
on the side of the bride, himself, Channa Veeroji Rao,
Shivaji Rao, Ningoji Rao and parents of bride were
present. On the side of accused, four accused persons
were present. In the marriage talks, accused No.3 Eeroji
Rao demanded Rs.2 lakhs cash and 15 tholas of gold and
also to perform the marriage. But P.W.1 did not agree for
the same. Then after negotiations, it was agreed to give
Rs.1.5 lakhs cash and 10 tholas of gold and also
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performance of marriage by P.W.1. Accused also agreed for
the same. Before marriage P.W.1 gave Rs.1 lakh to the
hands of Eeroji Rao, father of accused No.1 and at the
time of marriage, 10 tholas of gold ornaments were put on
bride and bridegroom. After the marriage, Mamatha was
staying in the house of her husband. They were living
happily for about one year. Thereafter, Mamatha started
to come to Channagiri often. The accused were insisting
her to bring further amount Rs.50,000/- which was
agreed at the time of marriage.
In the cross-examination, he deposed that he has
not stated as per Ex.D3 and D4. Earlier to the marriage,
he had not gone to the house of the accused. He does not
know who visited the house of the accused. Earlier to the
marriage, when the accused came to the house of P.W.1,
P.W.1 gave Rs.1 lakh cash into the hands of accused No.3
and at the time of marriage, 4 tholas of gold ornaments
were put on accused No.1 and 6 tholas of gold ornaments
to bride.
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P.W.3 Smt.Padma, mother of deceased Mamatha has
deposed in her evidence that one month prior to the
marriage, there were marriage talks. The said talks took
place in the house of Eeroji Rao at Davangere and earlier
to that accused came to Channagiri to their house and
after seeing her daughter they said that the alliance is
agreeable to them. She further deposed that, at the
marriage talks, accused No.3 and his family members
demanded Rs. 2 lakhs cash and 15 tholas of gold and to
bear the marriage expenses. Her husband told that it is
not possible to pay that much and the elders gathered
there negotiated to give Rs. 1.5 lakhs cash and 10 tholas
of gold in the form of ornaments to be put on bride. She
has further deposed that Rs.1 lakh cash was given by her
husband at the time of marriage into the hands of accused
No.3 Eeroji Rao.
In the cross-examination she has deposed that
during marriage talks, Basoji Rao was not present. Her
husband does not know which goldsmith has prepared 10
101
tholas of gold ornaments. She admitted the suggestion
that in their community there is a customary practice to
give gold ornaments and clothes to bride and bridegroom
according to ones capacity. Witness voluntarily deposed
that accused forcibly got the said things. When the
marriage talks took place in the house of Eeroji Rao,
herself and her husband were present. The cash and gold
were given at the time of marriage itself. She has admitted
the suggestion that accused No.1 was getting treatment to
her daughter at Mruthyunjay hospital for her pregnancy.
She admitted that one week prior to the marriage of
deceased Mamtha, marriage of accused No.4 was
performed. She also admitted that accused No.4’s sister-
in-law Tulasa Bai and her husband Surya Kumar were
staying in the house of Surya Kumar. But she has shown
ignorance that Surya Kumar has expired in the year 2006.
She denied the further suggestion that as Surya Kumar
expired, in order to look after the family affairs of Tulasa
Bai, accused No.4 Gunavati was staying at Poona.
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Ningoji Rao (P.W.9) has deposed in his evidence that
he knows P.W.1-complainant and his daughter Mamatha.
About 5-6 years back, the marriage of Mamatha was
performed with Kumar. Before the marriage, there was an
engagement talk and he was present in the engagement
talks, which took place in the house of P.W.1 at
Chennagiri. He knows accused Nos.2 to 4. Accused Nos.2
and 3 are the parents of accused No.1 and accused No.4 is
the younger sister of accused No.1. Accused Nos.1 to 3
were present in the marriage engagement talks. The
persons on the side of the accused demanded 15 tolas of
gold and Rs.2.00 lakh cash as dowry. P.W.1 told that it
was not possible for him to pay the said amount. After
discussions between both parties, it was agreed that the
cash of Rs.1.00 lakh and 10 tolas of gold is to be given to
accused persons. It was further agreed that the same was
to be given in the form of dowry. Before the marriage,
P.W.1 gave the amount that was agreed and the gold was
given in the form of ornaments at the time of marriage.
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P.W.1 told that remaining amount of Rs.50,000/- will be
paid later. After the marriage, Mamatha was alright for
about six months. Thereafterwards, quarrel started
between Mamatha and her husband for the remaining
amount of Rs.50,000/-. For the said remaining amount,
the husband of Mamatha and his parents were
presurrising Mamatha. Presurrise means they were
making attempts to compulsorily bring the same by
Mamatha. In the cross examination, he has deposed that
himself and the complainant belongs to the same caste
and in their caste, there is a practice/custom that the
persons on the side of bride groom to give varopachara to
the bridegroom. In his presence, there was a talk for the
payment of said varopachara. When the witness was
asked whether there were talks to give anything to the
bride, the witness answered that out of 10 tolas of gold,
one golden chain was to be given to Mamatha and
remaining 5 tolas of gold to be given to bride groom. The
marriage engagement talks took place 20 days before the
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marriage. After the marriage, he did not go to the house
where Mamatha was staying. He cannot say the day,
date, month and the year of payment of Rs.1.00 lakh by
P.W.1. Even he cannot say on which day, whether it was
full moon day or it was a new moon day (amavasya day),
the payment was made. He denied the suggestion that
there were no such talks for payment of dowry amount
and he is deposing falsely. So except the oral talks, there
is no list prepared in writing.
40. Coming to the oral evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 and 9
whose evidence we have already referred, we do not find
any consistency in their evidence. P.W.9 has deposed in
his evidence that it was agreed to pay Rs.1.00 lakh and 10
tolas of gold, whereas P.Ws.1 to 3 have deposed that it
was agreed to pay Rs.1,50,000/- cash and 10 tolas of
gold. Regarding the payment of cash of Rs.1.00 lakh,
again there is no consistency. The complainant (P.W.1)
has deposed in his evidence that Rs.1.00 lakh as well as
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the gold ornaments were given at the time of marriage.
P.W.9 has deposed that it was given earlier to the
marriage. P.W.2 has deposed that Rs.1.00 lakh was paid
earlier to the marriage. P.W.3, the mother of the
deceased, has deposed that Rs.1.00 lakh cash was given
by her husband at the time of marriage into the hands of
accused No.3-Eerojirao. Regarding the place of marriage
engagement talks, the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 shows
that it was taken place in the house of Channagiri,
whereas P.W.3 has deposed that it was in the house of
accused at Davanagere. There is no consistency as to
whether the agreed amount to be payable in the form of
cash is Rs.1.00 lakh or Rs.1,50,000/-. As per the case of
prosecution, the main reason for giving the ill treatment to
the deceased Mamatha by the accused is the non payment
of remaining dowry amount of Rs.50,000/- and for that
reason, they were insisting and giving the ill treatment,
both physical and mental. If the evidence of P.W.9 is
taken into consideration, the agreed amount itself is
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Rs.1.00 lakh. When that is so, the question of the
accused demanding the further amount of Rs.50,000/-
does not arise.
41. When it is the case of prosecution that the
complainant (P.W.1) gave Rs.1.00 lakh cash and 10 tolas
of gold by way of dowry which fact is denied by the
defence, the burden is on the prosecution to show the
sources of income for P.W.1. For that it is elicited during
the course of cross-examination of P.W.1 that he was
working as peon in the agricultural department and when
he retired, he was the attender. When he was asked
about the salary at the time of joining and retirement, he
has deposed that he is not able to say the same. He has
admitted that four years earlier to this incident, he
performed the marriage of daughter Prema. Six years
earlier to this incident, he performed the marriage of
another daughter Suma. Though P.W.1 has deposed that
they are having the agricultural property and his wife
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P.W.3 is doing dairy farming, vending of milk, but it was
seriously challenged in his cross examination and
admittedly, no documents were produced to show that
there was landed property and they were also doing dairy
farming.
Regarding the ornaments, when P.W.1 was asked, he
was not able to give the name of the goldsmith that from
whom they got prepared the ornaments nor they have
produced any receipts showing that the gold ornaments
were purchased in the shop. Therefore, looking to these
materials and as we have already observed, there is no
consistency in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses
and the evidence is not worth believable.
42. It is also the prosecution case that the deceased
Mamatha made the statement before her parents about
the demand for the remaining amount of Rs.50,000/- and
in that connection, the accused giving the ill treatment
both physical and mental and because of that reason
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when the ill treatment was untolerable, she committed
suicide or the accused must have committed murder by
pouring the kerosene. When the death itself is because of
accidental fire, which we have already answered while
considering the dying declarations, it goes to the root of
the matter so far as the charge under Section 498A of IPC
is concerned.
43. Apart from that the conduct of accused No.1 is
very important in appreciating the case of the prosecution
as well as the defence of the accused. It has come in the
evidence of prosecution witnesses that it is the accused
who covered the body of the deceased Mamatha with the
bed sheet when they came out of the house and he
accompanied her taking her to the hospital in the auto
rickshaw of Venkatesh (P.W.8). It has also come in the
evidence of P.W.1 himself when they went to the hospital,
accused No.1 was present in the hospital and it has also
come through the mouth of another witness that when
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they went to the hospital, accused No.1 was applying the
ointment to the body of Mamatha. This conduct of
accused No.1 goes to show that immediately after the
incident, he took her to the hospital for immediate
treatment. If it was his real intention to commit the
murder of the deceased Mamatha because of dowry
amount of Rs.50,000/-, he could not have been assisted
the deceased by immediately attending and taking her to
treatment. Even it has come in the evidence of police
witnesses that they have apprehended accused Nos.1 and
3, in the house of accused No.3. This also goes to show
that accused No.1 never absconded. So this conduct of
accused No.1 is relevant under the provisions of Section 8
of the Indian Evidence Act. The learned Senior Advocate
has also relied upon one decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in case of GIRIDHAR SHANKAR TAWADE Vs.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA reported in 2002 SCC (CRI)
971. Para Nos.16 to 18 of the decision is relevant. They
read as under:
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“16. We have already noted Section 498-A
herein before in this judgment and as such we
need not delve into the same in greater detail
herein excepting recording that the same
stands attributed only in the event of proof of
cruelty by the husband or the relatives of the
husband of the woman. Admittedly, the finding
of the trial Court as regards the death negated
suicide with a positive finding of accidental
death. If suicide is rule out then in that event
applicability of Section 498-A can be had only
in terms of Explanation (b) thereto which in no
uncertain terms records harassment of the
woman and the Statute itself thereafter clarifies
it to the effect that it is not every such
harassment but only in the event of such a
harassment being with a view to coerce her or
any person related to her to meet any unlawful
demand for any property or valuable security or
is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand- there is
total absence of any of the requirements of the
Statute in terms of Section 498-A. The three
letters said to have been written and as noticed
earlier cannot possibly lend any credence to the
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requirement of the Statute or even a simple
demand for dowry.
17. As regards the core issue as to
whether charges under Sections 306 and 498-
A of the Indian Penal Code are independent of
each other and acquittal of one does not lead to
acquittal on the other, as noticed earlier, there
appears to be a long catena of cases in
affirmation thereto and as such further dilation
is not necessary neither we are included to do
so, but in order to justify a conviction under
the later provision there must be available on
record some material and cogent evidence.
Presently, we have on record two inconsistent
versions of the brother and the cousin, as such
no credence can be attributed thereon – the
documentary evidence (namely, those three
letters), in our view, falls short of the
requirement of the Statute: even on an
assumption of the fact that there is no
contradiction in the oral testimony available on
record, the cousin goes to the unfortunate girl’s
in-laws’ place and requests the husband to
treat her well-at best some torture and a
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request to treat her well. This by itself would
not bring home the charge under Section 498-
A. Demand for dowry has not seen the light of
the day.
18. A faint attempt has been made during
the course of submissions that Explanation (a)
to the section stands attracted and as such, no
fault can be attributed to the judgment. This, in
our view, is a wholly fallacious approach to the
matter by reason of the specific finding of the
trial Court and the High Court concurred
therewith that the death unfortunately was an
accidental death and not suicide. If suicide is
left out, then in that event question of
applicability of Explanation (a) would not arise –
neither the second limb to cause injury and
danger to life or limb or health would be
attracted. In any event the willful act or
conduct ought to be the proximate cause in
order to bring home the charge under Section
498-A and not dehors the same. To have an
event sometime back cannot be termed to be a
factum taken note of in the matter of a charge
under Section 498-A. The legislative intent is
113
clear enough to indicate in particular reference
to Explanation (b) that there shall have to be a
series of acts in order to be a harassment
within the meaning of Explanation (b). The
letters by themselves though may depict a
reprehensible conduct, would not, however,
bring home the charge of Section 498-A against
the accused. Acquittal of a charge under
Section 306, as noticed hereinbefore, though
not by itself a ground for acquittal under
Section 498-A, but some cogent evidence is
required to bring home the charge of Section
498-A as well, without which the charge cannot
be said to be maintained. Presently, we have no
such evidence available on record”.
44. The factual matrix of this case is squarely made
applicable to the facts of the present cases also. As we
have already observed that regarding the demand for
dowry amount and payment of Rs.1.00 lakh towards
dowry amount and 10 tolas of gold, there is no
consistency in the evidence of prosecution witnesses and
on the contrary, their evidence is contradictory of each
114
other. Therefore, the question of giving the ill treatment
and harassment to the deceased in connection with the
remaining dowry amount does not arise at all, that too
when it is established by the defence with acceptable and
cogent material that the death is the result of accidental
burns. Therefore, the contention of the prosecution that
the deceased was subjected to ill treatment and
harassment in connection with the dowry of Rs.50,000/-
and that was the main reason for her to take such a
drastic step, cannot be accepted.
45. No doubt, the prosecution has produced the
document Ex.P.3 which is the complaint by the deceased
Mamatha to the office of CPI, Chennagiri. It is dated
7.3.2005. The prosecution has also produced the other
document i.e., Ex.P.29. By this document, the
prosecution has relied upon the entry regarding the
history of assault that deceased Mamatha said to have
been assaulted by Kumar, then Eeroji Rao and
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Shanthamma on 6.3.2005 at 11.00 a.m. manhandling.
No doubt perusing the said document Ex.P.29, there are
five injuries said to have been sustained by her. The
prosecution has also relied upon the documents i.e., the
statements under Exs.P.39, 40, 41, 42 and 43. We have
perused the said statements given by accused Nos.1,
deceased Mamatha and the statement of Siddoji also. They
are the statements in connection with the incident in the
year 2005 i.e., three years earlier to the present incident.
Perusing the contents of the statements, no doubt, the
accused persons have undertaken that as decided
henceforth, they will treat Mamatha properly and they will
see that no ill treatment will be meted out to her. Looking
to the statement of the complainant (P.W.1), who is the
father of deceased Mamatha, he has also mentioned in his
statement that as decided, they will advise their daughter
and they will take her to the house of her husband and
they will give full co-operation for the understanding and
lead the happy life of couple. Ex.P.42 goes to show that it
116
is an endorsement issued by the police to the deceased
Mamatha wherein it is stated that for the compromise as
both were agreed and as both sides gave the statements
not to continue the enquiry, it was closed. Therefore,
these documents would show that the said incident was
closed by advising both the parties. Therefore, only
because of that incident, it cannot be contended by the
prosecution now that it also goes to prove the charge
under section 498A of IPC. There is no proximity of the
time to have the connection of previous incident with the
present incident. Apart from that, the advice was on both
sides. Even in the statement of P.W.1, it is mentioned
that he advised his daughter also and the matter was
accordingly closed. Under such circumstances, it cannot
be said that those materials go to show and go to prove
the charge under section 498A of IPC.
46. Another contention raised by the prosecution
during the course of arguments is that though in their
117
dying declaration (Ex.P.20), it is stated that as there was a
hole in the kerosene stove, the oil came out, caught fire to
the saree of the deceased Mamatha. But looking to the
contents of Ex.P.2, the spot mahazar, it shows that there
was a gas stove and there is no mention in Ex.P.2 about
the kerosene stove. Therefore, it is the contention of the
prosecution as argued by the learned HCGP that Ex.P.20
is not the dying declaration said to have been given by the
deceased Mamatha and therefore, it cannot be relied upon
by the Court. In this regard, we have perused the
contents of Ex.P.2-spot mahazar dated 10.9.2008, wherein
it is mentioned that towards southern side, from the store
room, there is a kitchen and the daily used provision was
kept there. The measurement of the said room is East-
West 10 ft. and North-South 6 ft. There is a gas stove and
cylinder. From the gas stove, at the distance of 1½ ft.,
there was one plastic bisleri bottle of the capacity of two
litres and at the bottom of the said bottle; there is blue
colour kerosene oil. There was also one match box
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manufactured by Key Company and there were match
sticks. The match sticks and the bisleri bottles were
packed separately. The incident took place on 8.9.2008 at
about 9.00 – 9.30 p.m. Therefore, two days after the
incident, the spot mahazar (Ex.P.2) was conducted by the
police. It was not made clear as to who gave the key of the
house to the police and how the police entered into the
said house. If the house was already opened, then
whether the police deputed any police official to keep till
the spot mahazar was conducted. There is no proper
evidence on the side of the prosecution. We have also
perused the evidence of witnesses in this connection.
P.W.1 has deposed in para No.26 that after lodging the
complaint, the police came and enquired with them.
During investigation, the police asked him to show the
residential house of deceased Mamatha. He has shown
the house. The police conducted the mahazar. At that
time himself, P.W.2 and Shjivaji Rao were present. There
was gas stove in the house. Two liters bottle having ½
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liter kerosene oil was also there. They all put signature to
the said mahazar (Ex.P.2). The police have seized the
kerosene bottle. The police had also seized one small
bucket. He has further deposed that whatever he had
stated before the Daffedar of the women police station was
also reiterated before the Court.
P.W.10, at para No.6 of his deposition in the
examination in chief, he has deposed that when mother-
in-law, father-in-law and sister-in-law of the deceased
went from the house, the deceased called her husband for
the meal. Accused No.1 told the deceased that he already
had the meal and asked her to go and have the same. At
that time, the deceased was sitting in the house having
the meals plate. At that time, the accused Kumar brought
the kerosene oil in a plastic bottle poured it on her and lit
fire to her.
Referring to these materials, in reply, it was
contended that as there was no mention of the kerosene
stove in the kitchen of the said house, Ex.P.20 cannot be
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disbelieved which is proved with cogent and satisfactory
evidence. It is also the contention that in the evidence of
P.Ws.1 and 10, it has come on record that police have also
seized one small bucket and when the incident occurred,
the deceased had the meals plate with food and she was
sitting to have the said food and at that time, accused
No.1 committed the said incident. If that is so, then the
spot mahazar (Ex.P.2) also should have contained about
the presence of lying of the small bucket so also the plate
with the food, which was lying on the floor of the house in
the kitchen, for which there is no mention in spot
mahazar (Ex.P.2). Therefore, the learned Senior Advocate
for the defence is justified in contending that it cannot be
believed that there was no kerosene stove, small plastic
bucket and the meals plate as it was not mentioned in
Ex.P.2. Hence, perusing these materials, both oral and
documentary, we are the opinion that the contentions of
the prosecution that there was no kerosene stove in the
house cannot be accepted only because that there is
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omission to mention about the same in spot mahazar
(Ex.P.2).
47. When the prosecution has failed to prove its case
beyond all reasonable doubt, then under such
circumstances considering the contentions of the learned
HCGP for enhancement of the sentence, does not survive
for consideration.
48. We have also perused the impugned judgment
and order passed by the learned Sessions Judge. Looking
to the reasons adopted by the learned Sessions Judge in
coming to the conclusions in convicting the appellants
accused Nos.1 to 3, it clearly goes to show that the learned
Sessions Judge has not at all considered the important
and materials aspects, both oral and documentary, while
coming to such conclusion. There was wrong reading of
the prosecution material and learned Sessions Judge has
wrongly come to the conclusion in convicting the
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appellant- accused Nos.1 to 3. Though it is the contention
of the prosecution that all the four accused together
poured kerosene and lit fire to the deceased Mamatha, on
the very evidence, accused No.4 Gunavathi has been
acquitted and her acquittal has not been challenged by
the prosecution. Hence, we are of the opinion that looking
to the entire material, both oral and documentary, and on
re-appreciating the same, the judgment and order of
conviction passed by the learned Sessions Judge is not
sustainable in law.
49. Hence, we pass the following order:
(i) The appeal preferred by accused No.1 in Criminal
Appeal No.181/2013 and the appeal preferred by accused
Nos.2 and 3 in Criminal Appeal No.194/2013 are hereby
allowed.
(ii) The judgment and order of conviction impugned
herein is set aside.
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(iii) Accused Nos.1 to 3 are acquitted of all the
charges leveled against them.
(iv) The jail authorities are hereby directed to release
the appellant-accused Nos.1 to 3 forthwith, if not required
in any other case.
(v) Criminal Appeal No.566/2013 preferred by the
State seeking enhancement of the sentence as prayed for
in the said appeal, is hereby dismissed.
Sd/-
JUDGE
Sd/-
JUDGE
Cs/bkp
Ct-Mhp/-