HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR

S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 3942/2016

Veena Bajaj W/o Late Shri Om Prakash Bajaj, aged about 63
years, by Caste Hindu Khatri, resident of 202, Samprat Tower,
Behind Hotel Grand Bhagwati, Bodakdev, Ahmedabad, Gujarat.
—-Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan through P.P.
2. Smt. Daman Sital W/o Shri Ashish Bajaj, D/o Shri Surjeet
Singh Sital, by Caste Arora Sikh, resident of Flat No.G-1, Sardar
Tarasingh Apartment, Pratap Nagar Housing Board, Manu Marg,
Thana Kotwali, Alwar.
—-Respondent

Connected With
S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 1360/2016
Veena Bajaj W/o Late Shri Om Prakash Bajaj, aged about 63
years, by Caste Hindu Khatri, resident of 202, Samprat Tower,
Behind Hotel Grand Bhagwati, Bodakdev, Ahmedabad, Gujarat.

—-Petitioner
Versus
State Of Rajasthan Through Pp

—-Respondent

For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sandeep Bhagwati
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Ramesh Choudhary, PP

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA

Order

22/01/2020

1. The petitioner, by way of criminal misc. petitions, challenges

the cognizance taken by the competent Court on the ground that

as the cognizance has been taken on 11.12.2013 while the FIR

was lodged on 26.4.2010, the cognizance is barred by limitation

as provided under the provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C.

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2. Learned counsel submits that as the offence under Section

498-A IPC is punishable by three years imprisonment, the

provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C. would apply for taking cognizance

under Section 498-A IPC as well as for offence under Section 406

IPC. Learned counsel replies on the judgment in the case of Zandu

Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. Ors. Versus Mohd. Sharaful Haque

Anr. reported in 2005 (1) SCC 122.

3. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor submits that in view of

the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of

Sarah Mathew and Ors. Versus Institute of Cardio Vascular

Diseases by its Director K.M. Cherian and Ors. reported in 2014

(2) SCC 62, in the provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C. for computing

the period of limitation is the date when the criminal complaint is

filed or the date of institution of prosecution of criminal

proceedings and therefore, the provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C.

would not have application.

4. I have considered the submissions made by the learned

counsel for the parties and perused the material available on

record.

5. In the judgment in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. Ors.

(supra), the Supreme Court has held as under:

“15. The learned Magistrate has issued process in
respect of offence under Section 418 IPC. The
punishment provided for said offence is imprisonment
for three years. The period of limitation in terms of
Section 468(2)(c) is 3 years. That being so, the Court
could not have taken cognizance of the offence.
Section 473 of the Code provides for extension of
period in certain cases. This power can be exercised
only when the Court is satisfied on the facts and in the

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circumstances of the case that the delay has been
properly explained or that it is necessary to do so in
the interest of justice. Order of learned Magistrate
does not even refer to either Section 468 or Section
473 of the Code. High Court clearly erred in holding
that the complaint was not hit by limitation. As noted
above, there was not even a reference that the letter
dated 5.12.2001 was in response to the letter of
complainant dated 24.11.2001. The factual position
clearly shows that the complaint was nothing but a
sheer abuse of the process of law and this is a case
where the power under Section 482 should have been
exercised. The High Court unfortunately did not take
note of the guiding principles as laid down in Bhajan
Singh’s case (supra), thereby rendering the judgment
indefensible. The judgment of the High Court is set
aside, the proceedings initiated by the complaint
lodged are quashed. The appeal is allowed.”

6. A Five Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Sarah Mathew

(supra) examined the law with regard to the provisions of Section

468 Cr.P.C. and after discussing the law at length held as under:

“30. As we have already noted in reaching this
conclusion, light can be drawn from legal maxims.
Legal maxims are referred to in Bharat Kale, Japani
Sahoo and Vanka Radhamanohari (Smt.). The object
of the criminal law is to punish perpetrators of crime.
This is in tune with the well known legal maxim
‘nullum tempus aut locus occurit regi’, which means
that a crime never dies. At the same time, it is also
the policy of law to assist the vigilant and not the
sleepy. This is expressed in the Latin maxim
‘vigilantibus et non dormientibus, jura subveniunt’.
Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure
which provides limitation period for certain types of
offences for which lesser sentence is provided draws

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support from this maxim. But, even certain offences
such as Section 384 or 465 of the Indian Penal Code,
which have lesser punishment may have serious social
consequences. Provision is, therefore, made for
condonation of delay. Treating date of filing of
complaint or date of initiation of proceedings as the
relevant date for computing limitation under Section
468 of the Code is supported by the legal maxim
‘actus curiae neminem gravabit’ which means that the
act of court shall prejudice no man. It bears repetition
to state that the court’s inaction in taking cognizance
i.e. court’s inaction in applying mind to the suspected
offence should not be allowed to cause prejudice to a
diligent complainant. Chapter XXXVI thus presents the
interplay of these three legal maxims. Provisions of
this Chapter, however, are not interpreted solely on the
basis of these maxims. They only serve as guiding
principles.

51. 41. In view of the above, we hold that for the
purpose of computing the period of limitation under
Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the
relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or
the date of institution of prosecution and not the date
on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. We further
hold that Bharat Kale which is followed in Japani Sahoo
lays down the correct law. Krishna Pillai will have to be
restricted to its own facts and it is not the authority for
deciding the question as to what is the relevant date
for the purpose of computing the period of limitation
under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”

7. In view of the aforesaid, if the facts of the present case are

examined, then it is clear that the criminal complaint filed by the

complainant under Sections 406 and 498A IPC will have to be

examined on facts for the question of limitation. The complaint

has been filed on 26.4.2010 and the allegations levelled in the

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complaint are in relation to the incident, which occurred in 2010

itself. Thus, it cannot be said that the complaint filed by the

complainant was beyond limitation. Hence, the provisions of

Section 468 Cr.P.C. shall not be attracted in the present case and

the cognizance and subsequent order of framing of the charges

would, therefore, not be said to be in any manner illegal and

vitiated on the ground of limitation.

8. In view of the aforesaid, the criminal misc. petitions are

wholly misconceived and the same are accordingly dismissed.

9. All the pending applications stand dismissed.

(SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA),J

SUNIL SOLANKI /19/23-24

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