* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment delivered on: 11.01.2018
+ CRL.REV.P. 748/2016 Crl. M.A. 17954/2016, 17810/2017,
VISHAL KAPUR ….. Petitioner
YASHNA KAPUR ANR. ….. Respondents
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner : Dr. M.K. Gehlaut and Mr. Sanjay
For the Respondents : Ms. Deepika V. Marwah, Ms. Gayatri
Puri and Ms. Upasana Goel, Advs.
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE SANJEEV SACHDEVA
SANJEEV SACHDEVA, J. (ORAL)
1. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 29.08.2016
whereby the application of the respondents under Section 127 Cr. P.C.
has been allowed and the application of the petitioner under Section
340 Cr. P.C. has been dismissed.
2. With regard to the application under Section 127 Cr. P.C. it is
noticed that by order dated 02.05.2013 respondent no. 1 (wife) was
awarded maintenance in the sum of Rs. 15,000/- and respondent no. 2
(daughter of petitioner) was awarded maintenance in the sum of Rs.
CRL.REV.P. 748-2016 Page 1 of 5
2,000/-. Vide the impugned order, learned trial court has enhanced the
maintenance to Rs. 15,000/- for the daughter.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that respondent no. 2
had attained the age of majority on 13.09.2014 and as such under
Section 125 Cr. P.C., she on attaining the age of majority, is no longer
entitled to any maintenance.
4. Learned counsel for the respondents had relied on the decision
of the Supreme Court in ‘Jagdish Jugtawat Vs. Manju Lata Ors.’
(2002) 5 SCC 422.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the said
judgment does not notice the provisions of Section 125 CrPC and as
such should not be treated as a precedent in law and is not liable to be
6. I am unable to accept the contentions of learned counsel for the
petitioner. The law laid down by the Supreme Court has to be
followed. The Supreme Court in Jagdish Jugtawat has specifically
noticed the provisions of Section 125 Cr. P.C. and that Section 125
does not fix the liability of parents to maintain children beyond
attainment of majority, but recognizes the right of a minor girl for
maintenance from parents after attaining majority till her marriage
under Section 20(3) of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act.
Noticing the two provisions, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of
the High Court which, though accepted the legal position that under
CRL.REV.P. 748-2016 Page 2 of 5
Section 125 Cr. P.C. a minor daughter is entitled to maintenance only
till she attains the majority, declined to interfere with the order passed
by the Family Court.
7. The facts of the present case are identical to the facts in Jagdish
Jugtawat. Though in the instant case, respondent no. 2 who had
attained majority on 13.09.2014, the Family Court had still granted
maintenance. It is an admitted position that respondent no. 2 is not
married and is still studying.
8. In this view of the matter and keeping in view the provisions of
Section 20(3) of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act and the law
as laid down by the Supreme Court in Jagdish Jugtawat, I find no
reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the trial court.
9. Coming to the application under Section 340 Cr. P.C. of the
petitioner which has been rejected by the impugned order. The said
application was premised on the contention of the petitioner that
respondent no. 1 was employed and was receiving remuneration. To
establish the said contention, the petitioner has placed on record
certain photographs contending that petitioner no. 1 was teaching and
the photographs depicted – petitioner standing in front of students.
10. The trial court dismissed the application holding as under:-
“32. From the above, it is amply clear that before
invoking the provisions of Section 340 Cr. P.C., two
ingredients must be fulfilled. First, a person files a false
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affidavit and secondly, the opinion has been tendered by
the Court that it is expedient in the interest of justice to
make an injury.
33. It be seen that the hub of the provision is formation
of an opinion by the Court that it is expedient in the
interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into an
offence which appears to have been committed. In order
to form such opinion, the Court is empowered to hold a
34. As has been observed (Supra), it is pointed out that
pictures placed on record shows the presence of non
applicant in front of the children but it cannot be said
with impunity or authority that non applicant is receiving
money out of the services rendered by her.
35. The non applicant has placed on record certain
letters dated 16.01.2014, 26.02.2015 and 18.01.2016
which shows that Yashna Kapur is voluntarily serving
towards the organization Mogly’s.
36. No document whatsoever has been placed on
record which could show if she is receiving any salary or
amount towards her services rendered for social work. It
appears that probono she is serving in an organization
Mogly’s. Moreover, it is a disputed question of fact if she
is working as a Teacher for remuneration or honorary
which can be only decided during the course of trial. At
this stage, no prima facie view can be formed if Yashna
Kapur is getting any remuneration from the said
37. In view of foregoing reasons and discussions, it
would not be expedient in the interest of justice that an
inquiry be initiated against Smt. Yashna Kapur. No
ground is made out for the indulgence of the Court.”
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11. The trial court has noticed that there is no prima facie evidence
to establish that respondent no. 1 was receiving any salary or any
amount towards the services being rendered as social work. The
contention of respondent no. 1 was that respondent no. 1 is not
gainfully employed as a Teacher and is engaged in spiritual
Satsang/Chanting at 3/42, Shanti Niketan, New Delhi and has been
voluntarily without remuneration visiting their school at Gurgaon for
the purpose of spiritual guidance in the form of storytelling and
12. In view of the above, learned Judge was of the view that no
prima view could be formed that respondent no. 1 had made any false
averments and as such it was not found expedient to initiate inquiry. I
find no reason to interfere with the impugned order rejecting the
application under section 340 Cr PC.
13. In view of the above, I find no merit in the petition. The petition
is accordingly dismissed. Consequently, the interim order dated
18.11.2016 stand vacated.
Crl. M.A. 18628/2017 (under Section 340 Cr.P.C.)
14. Learned counsel for the petitioner seeks leave to withdraw the
application. The application is dismissed as withdrawn.
SANJEEV SACHDEVA, J
JANUARY 11, 2018/’rs’
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