Supreme Court of India Vishwanat vs Sau. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal on 4 July, 2012Author: D Misra Bench: Deepak Verma, Dipak Misra
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4905 OF 2012
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 16528 of 2007)
Vishwanath S/o Sitaram Agrawal …..â€¦â€¦..Appellant
Sau. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal â€¦â€¦â€¦Respondent
J U D G M E N T
DIPAK MISRA, J.
2. The marriage between the appellant and the respondent was solemnized on the 30th of April, 1979 as per the Hindu rites at Akola. In the wedlock, two sons, namely, Vishal and Rahul, were born on 23.9.1982 and 1.11.1984 respectively. As the appellant-husband felt that there was total discord in their marital life and compatibility looked like a mirage, he filed a petition for divorce under Section 13(1) (ia) of The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for brevity â€˜the Actâ€™).
3. It was the case of the appellant before the court of first instance that the respondent-wife did not know how to conduct herself as a wife and daughter-in-law and despite persuasion, her behavioural pattern remained unchanged. The birth of the children had no impact on her conduct and everything worsened with the efflux of time. The behaviour of the respondent with the relatives and guests who used to come to their house was far from being desirable and, in fact, it exhibited arrogance and lack of culture and, in a way, endangered the social reputation of the family. That apart, she did not have the slightest respect for her mother-in-law. Despite the old lady being a patient of diabetes and hyper tension, it could not invoke any sympathy from the respondent and hence, there was total absence of care or concern.
4. As pleaded, in the month of March, 1990, there was a dacoity in the house where the appellant was staying and, therefore, they shifted to the ginning factory and eventually, on 17.3.1991, shifted to their own three storeyed building situate in Gandhi Chowk. Even with the passage of time, instead of bringing maturity in the attitude of the respondent, it brought a sense of established selfishness and non-concern for the children. Whim and irrationality reigned in her day-to-day behaviour and frequent quarrels became a daily affair. As misfortune would have it, on 23.1.1994, the mother of the appellant died and the freer atmosphere at home gave immense independence to the respondent to make the life of the appellant more troublesome. The appellant and his father were compelled to do their personal work as the entire attention of the servants was diverted in a compulsive manner towards her. Her immature perception of life reached its zenith when on certain occasions she used to hide the keys of the motorcycle and close the gate so that the appellant could not go to the office of the factory to look after the business. Frequent phone calls were made to the factory solely for the purpose of abusing and causing mental agony to the appellant. As asserted, the appellant and his sons used to sleep on the second floor whereas the respondent used to sleep in the bedroom on the third floor and their relationship slowly but constantly got estranged. As the cruelty became intolerable, the appellant visited his in-laws and disclosed the same but it had no effect on her behaviour. Eventually, on 1.5.1995, the respondent was left at the house of her parents at Akola and the appellant stayed in his house with the two sons. As the factual matrix would unveil, on 24.7.1995, a notice issued by her advocate was published in the daily â€œLokmatâ€� stating, inter alia, that the appellant is a womaniser and addicted to liquor. On 11.10.1995, at 4.00 p.m., the respondent came to the house of the appellant at Gandhi Chowk and abused the father, the children and the appellant. She, in fact, created a violent atmosphere in the house as well as in the office by damaging the property and causing mental torture to the appellant and also to the family members which compelled the appellant to lodge a complaint at the Police Station, Chopda. It was alleged that she had brought gundas and certain women to cause that incident. The said untoward incident brought the A.S.P., Jalgaon, to the spot. The publication in the newspaper and the later incident both occurred during the pendency of the divorce petition and they were incorporated by way of amendment. On the aforesaid basis, it was contended that the respondent had treated the appellant with cruelty and hence, he was entitled to a decree for divorce.
5. The asseverations made in the petition were controverted by the respondent stating that she was always respectful and cordial to her in- laws, relatives and the guests as was expected from a cultured daughter-in- law. They led a happy married life for 16 years and at no point of time she showed any arrogance or any behaviour which could remotely suggest any kind of cruelty. She attended to her mother-in-law all the time with a sense of committed service and at no point of time there was any dissatisfaction on her part. She disputed the allegation that she had hidden the keys of the motorcycle or closed the gate or repeatedly called the appellant on phone at the office to abuse him or to disturb him in his work. It is her stand that the appellant owns an oil mill, ginning factory and a petrol pump at Chopda and had sold certain non-agricultural land by demarcating it into small plots. The appellant, as alleged, joined the computer classes which were run by one Neeta Gujarathi in the name and style of â€œOm Computer Servicesâ€� and gradually the appellant started spending much of his time at the computer centre instead of attending to his own business in the factory. When the respondent became aware of the intimacy, she took serious objection to the same and therefrom their relationship became bitter.
6. It was alleged by the respondent that she was disturbed after knowing about the involvement of the appellant with another lady despite having an established family life and two adolescent sons and, therefore, she was compelled to make phone calls to make enquiries about his whereabouts. As the interference by the respondent was not appreciated by the appellant, he took the respondent on 1.5.1995 to Akola and left her at her parental house and never cared to bring her back to her matrimonial home. Her willingness to come back and stay with the husband and children could not get fructified because of the totally indifferent attitude shown by the appellant. Her attempts to see the children in the school became an exercise in futility, as the husband, who is a trustee of the school, managed to ensure that the boys did not meet her. It was further alleged that the said Neeta lived with him as his mistress and when the respondent came to know about it, she went to Chopda to ascertain the same and coming to know that Neeta was in the house of the appellant, she made an effort to enter into the house but she was assaulted. This resulted in gathering of people of the locality and the appellant-husband, as a counter-blast, lodged a complaint at the police station. The Deputy Superintendent of Police arrived at the scene and found that Neeta was inside the house and thereafter she was taken back to her house by the police. Because of the involvement of the appellant with the said Neeta, he had concocted the story of cruelty and filed the petition for divorce.
7. The learned trial Judge framed as many as four issues. The two vital issues were whether the appellant had been able to prove the alleged cruelty and whether he was entitled to take disadvantage of his own wrong. The appellant, in order to prove the allegation of cruelty, examined ten witnesses and on behalf of the respondent, eight witnesses were examined. The learned trial Judge, analysing the evidence on record, came to hold that there was conjugal relationship till 1.5.1995; that there was no substantial material on record to demonstrate that the respondent had behaved with immaturity immediately after marriage; that in the absence of cogent evidence, it was difficult to hold that the respondent had troubled the husband and his parents; that the evidence of PW-3, Ramesh, was not worthy of acceptance as he is close and an interested witness; that the allegation that whenever she used to go to her parental home, she was granting leave to the servants was not acceptable; that the appellant should have examined some of the servants including the maid servant but for some reason or other had withheld the best evidence; that the plea that the respondent was not looking after her mother-in-law who was suffering from paralysis from 1984 has not been proven; that the allegation that the respondent was hiding the uniforms of the children and not treating them well had not been proven because the version of Vishal could not be accepted as he was staying with the father and, therefore, it was natural for him to speak in favour of the father; that the stand that the respondent was hiding the keys of the motorcycle and crumpling the ironed clothes of the appellant did not constitute mental cruelty as the said acts, being childish, were enjoyed by the appellant-husband; that the factum of abuse by the respondent on telephone had not been established by adducing reliable evidence; that the respondent and the appellant were sleeping on the third floor of the house and hence, she was sleeping with him in the bedroom and the allegation that he was deprived of sexual satisfaction from 1991 was unacceptable; that from the witnesses cited on behalf of the respondent, it was demonstrable that her behaviour towards her sons and in-laws was extremely good; that even if the allegations made by the appellant were accepted to have been established to some extent, it could only be considered as normal wear and tear of the marital life; that the plea of mental cruelty had not been proven as none of the allegations had been established by adducing acceptable, consistent and cogent evidence; that the notice published in the daily â€œLokmatâ€� on 28.7.1995 and the later incident dated 11.10.1995 being incidents subsequent to the filing of the petition for divorce, the same were not to be taken into consideration.
8. The learned trial Judge further returned the finding that the appellant was going to learn computer and taking instructions from Neeta Gujarathi and the plea that she was engaged as a Computer Operator in his office was not believable as no appointment letter was produced; that the stand that she was paid Rs.1200/- per month was not worthy of any credence as she was operating a computer centre; that from the evidence of the witnesses of the respondent, namely, RW-3 to RW-5, it was clear that Neeta Gujarathi was living with the appellant in his house and he had developed intimacy with her and, therefore, the subsequent events, even if analysed, were to be so done on the said backdrop; that the allegation that there was a gathering and they were violent and broke the windows was really not proven by adducing credible evidence; that the testimony of the witnesses of the respondent clearly reveal that Neeta was inside the house of the appellant and effort was made to bring her out from the house and no damage was caused to the property; that on that day, the police had come in the mid night hours and taken out Neeta from the house of the appellant and left her at her house; that the notice which was published in â€œLokmatâ€� was to protect the interest of the sons in the property and basically pertained to the appellantâ€™s alienating the property; that the public notice was not unfounded or baseless and the question of defaming him and thereby causing any mental cruelty did not arise; that the allegations made in the application for grant of interim alimony that the appellant is a womaniser and is addicted to liquor cannot be considered for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that the husband was meted with cruelty; that the allegations made in the written statement having been found to be truthful, the same could not be said to have caused any mental cruelty; that the cumulative effect of the evidence brought on record was that no mental cruelty was ever caused by the respondent; and that the husband could not take advantage of his own wrong. Being of this view, the learned trial Judge dismissed the application with costs and also dismissed the application of the respondent-wife for grant of permanent alimony.
9. Grieved by the aforesaid decision, the appellant-husband preferred Civil Appeal No. 23 of 1999. The first appellate court appreciated the evidence, dealt with the findings returned by the trial court and eventually came to hold that the cumulative effect of the evidence and the material brought on record would go a long way to show that the appellant had failed to make out a case of mental cruelty to entitle him to obtain a decree for divorce. The aforesaid conclusion by the appellate court entailed dismissal of the appeal.
10. Being dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the learned appellate Judge, the husband preferred Second Appeal No. 683 of 2006 before the High Court. The learned single Judge of the High Court came to hold that there were concurrent findings of fact and no substantial question of law was involved. However, the learned single Judge observed that the sons of the parties had grown up and have been married; that the parties had no intention to patch up the matrimonial discord; and that the marriage had been irretrievably broken but that could not be considered by the High Court but only by the Apex Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. Expressing the aforesaid view, he did not admit the appeal and dismissed the same.
11. We have heard Mr. Arvind V. Sawant, learned senior counsel for the appellant-husband, and Mr. Vivek C. Solshe, learned counsel for the respondent-wife.
12. At the very outset, we would like to make it clear that though the learned single Judge of the High Court has expressed the view that the parties are at logger heads and have shown no inclination to patch the matrimonial rupture and the sons have grown up and got married and with the efflux of time, the relationship has been further shattered and hence, the marriage is irretrievably broken and only this Court can grant divorce in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution, yet we are not going to take recourse to the same and only address ourselves whether a case for divorce has really been made out.
13. At this juncture, we may note with profit that the learned senior counsel for the appellant exclusively rested his case on the foundation of mental cruelty. It is his submission that if the evidence of the husband and other witnesses are scrutinized in an apposite manner along with the stand and stance taken in the written statement, it will clearly reveal a case of mental cruelty regard being had to the social status of the appellant. It is urged by him that the trial court as well as the appellate court have not given any credence to the evidence of some of the witnesses on the ground that they are interested witnesses though they are the most natural witnesses who had witnessed the cruel behaviour meted to the appellant.
14. It is the submission of the learned senior counsel for the appellant that the court of first instance as well as the appellate court have failed to take into consideration certain material aspects of the evidence and the appreciation of evidence being absolutely perverse, the High Court would have been well advised to scan and scrutinize the same but it declined to admit the appeal on the ground that there are concurrent findings of fact. It is canvassed by him that this Court, in exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution, can dislodge such concurrent findings of facts which are perverse, baseless, unreasonable and contrary to the material on record.
15. The learned counsel for the respondent, resisting the aforesaid submissions, contended that the view expressed by the High Court cannot be found fault with as the courts below have, at great length, discussed the evidence and appreciated the same with utmost prudence and objectivity and there is nothing on record to show that any material part of the evidence has been ignored or something extraneous to the record has been taken into consideration. It is highlighted by him that the stand put forth by the wife in her written statement having been established, the same cannot be construed to have constituted mental cruelty. Lastly, it is put forth that the appellant has created a dent in the institution of marriage and made a maladroit effort to take advantage of his own wrong which should not be allowed.
16. First, we shall advert to what actually constitutes â€˜mental crueltyâ€™ and whether in the case at hand, the plea of mental cruelty has been established and thereafter proceed to address whether the courts below have adopted an approach which is perverse, unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence on record and totally unacceptable to invite the discretion of this Court in exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution to dislodge the same.
17. The expression â€˜crueltyâ€™ has an inseparable nexus with human conduct or human behaviour. It is always dependent upon the social strata or the milieu to which the parties belong, their ways of life, relationship, temperaments and emotions that have been conditioned by their social status. In Sirajmohamedkhan Janmohamadkhan v. Hafizunnisa Yasinkhan and another, a two-Judge Bench approved the concept of legal cruelty as expounded in Sm. Pancho v. Ram Prasad wherein it was stated thus: –
â€œConception of legal cruelty undergoes changes according to the changes and advancement of social concept and standards of living. With the advancement of our social conceptions, this feature has obtained legislative recognition that a second marriage is a sufficient ground for separate residence and separate maintenance. Moreover, to establish legal cruelty, it is not necessary that physical violence should be used.
Continuous ill-treatment, cessation of marital intercourse, studied neglect, indifference on the part of the husband, and an assertion on the part of the husband that the wife is unchaste are all factors which may undermine the health of a wife.â€�
It is apt to note here that the said observations were made while dealing with the Hindu Married Womenâ€™s Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act (19 of 1946). This Court, after reproducing the passage, has observed that the learned Judge has put his finger on the correct aspect and object of mental cruelty.
18. In Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, while dealing with â€˜crueltyâ€™ under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act, this Court observed that the said provision does not define â€˜crueltyâ€™ and the same could not be defined. The â€˜crueltyâ€™ may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical, the court will have no problem to determine it. It is a question of fact and degree. If it is mental, the problem presents difficulty. Thereafter, the Bench proceeded to state as follows: –
â€œFirst, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of the cruel treatment. Second, the impact of such treatment on the mind of the spouse. Whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other. Ultimately, it is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse. There may, however, be cases where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or the injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted.â€�
19. After so stating, this Court observed about the marked change in life in modern times and the sea change in matrimonial duties and responsibilities. It has been observed that when a spouse makes a complaint about treatment of cruelty by the partner in life or relations, the court should not search for standard in life. A set of facts stigmatized as cruelty in one case may not be so in another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions. It may also depend