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Yadwinder Singh & Others vs State Of H.P. & Others on 10 August, 2018

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
SHIMLA

Cr.M.M.O. No.12 of 2015

.
Judgment Reserved on: 06.07.2018

Date of decision: 10.08.2018

Yadwinder Singh Others ….Petitioners

Versus

State of H.P. Others ….Respondents

Coram
The Hon’ble Mr.Justice Sandeep Sharma,Judge.

Whether approved for reporting ? Yes.

For the Petitioner: Mr.R.K. Sharma, Senior Advocate with

Mr.Rakesh Kanoujia and Ms.Vidushi
Sharma, Advocates.

For Respondents 12: Mr.S.C. Sharma and Mr.Dinesh
Thakur, Additional Advocate Generals

with Mr.Amit Kumar Dhumal, Deputy
Advocate General.

For Respondent No.3: Mr.Ramakant Sharma, Senior
Advocate with Mr.Dinesh Bhatia,

Advocate.

Sandeep Sharma,J.

By way of instant petition filed under Section

482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short Cr.P.C.), a

prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioners to quash

FIR No.224, dated 7.10.2014, under Sections 498-A, 406,

506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and

consequent proceedings thereto.

Whether the reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgement? Yes.

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2. Before adverting to the factual matrix of the

present case, it may be noticed that Mr.R.K. Sharma,

learned Senior Counsel representing the petitioners,

.

confined his challenge to the jurisdiction of the Police at

Nalagarh or Baddi in the State of Himachal Pradesh to

investigate into the allegations leveled in the above referred

FIR. Mr.Sharma, while making his submissions, fairly

submitted that in case this Court, after having perused

material adduced on record, comes to the conclusion that

Police of Nalagarh/Baddi, Himachal Pradesh has jurisdiction

to investigate into allegations levelled into FIR, in that

eventuality, other prayer made in the petition for quashing of

FIR may also be considered. In view of aforesaid specific

prayer/submission made by learned Senior Counsel

representing the petitioners, this Court shall consider issue

with regard to jurisdiction of Nalagarh/Baddi Police to

investigate into the allegations levelled in the FIR at first

instance and in case, it comes to the conclusion that Police

Station, named as above, has jurisdiction, the second prayer

made in the petition, as referred hereinabove, shall be

examined accordingly.

3. In nutshell, facts of the case, for having bird’s

eye view, are that on 31.01.2013, an arranged marriage was

solemnized between petitioner No.4 namely; Akashdeep and

respondent No.3 namely; Nikita at Ropar, Punjab as per Sikh

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rites (hereinafter referred to as ‘petitioner-husband

respondent-wife’). It appears that immediately after marriage

certain differences cropped up between the petitioner-

.

husband and respondent-wife as well as their families and

after shorter duration couple also lived separately from their

parents in a separate house at Tara Singh Nagar,

Jallandhar, Punjab (for short ‘Pb’), however, they could not

get along for long. On the basis of allegations of beatings,

allegedly given by petitioner-husband and his parents to

respondent-wife, complaint was lodged with the Police

Authorities as well as Deputy Commissioner of Jallandhar

(Pb), who subsequently referred the matter to Women Cell,

Jallandhar (Pb). Allegedly on 4.8.2014, respondent-wife

came to Nalagarh, whereafter her father got her medically

examined at Chawla Hospital, Mohali on 5.8.2014. On

6.8.2014, respondent-wife again went back to her house at

Jallandhar (Pb), however, by that time allegedly petitioner-

husband had removed all the articles/things from her house.

On 17.8.2014 and thereafter on 24.8.2014 Women Cell at

Jallandhar (Pb) called both the petitioner-husband and

respondent-wife for re-conciliation, but no progress could be

made. Subsequently, on 27.8.2014, respondent-wife lodged

a complaint with SHO, Police Station, Nalagarh, District

Solan, Himachal Pradesh, which was forwarded to Women

Cell, Baddi. Women Cell, Baddi, after having respondent-

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wife medically checked, summoned all the petitioners. Since

on 7.10.2014, petitioner-husband refused to arrive at

amicable settlement, if any, with respondent-wife,

.

respondent-wife lodged complaint, dated 7.10.2014 and got

her statement recorded under Section 154 Cr.P.C., alleging

therein ill treatment given by the petitioner-husband after

marriage. She alleged in FIR that after solemnization of her

marriage with petitioner-husband, she was repeatedly

subjected to ill-treatment and harassment by the petitioners,

while she was living with them in her matrimonial home at

Jallandhar.

rRespondent-wife also alleged that petitioners,

on various occasions, demanded money, jewellery etc. and

despite having their demands fulfilled by her father, she was

not only abused with filthy language, but was also given

beatings. She further alleged that during pregnancy she had

stomachache and her mother made her consume some

medicines, as a consequence of which child in her womb

died. She also alleged that repeatedly she was teased by

saying that she has not brought appropriate dowry, whereas

her younger sister-in-law has brought sufficient dowry with

her. In the FIR, referred hereinabove, respondent-wife

alleged that petitioners, named hereinabove, apart from

causing physical and mental agony also gave her beatings

and extended threats to do away with her life. On the basis

of aforesaid statement recorded under Section 154 Cr.P.C.,

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Police at Police Station, Nalagarh, registered FIR bearing

No.224 against the petitioners under Sections 498-A, 406,

506 read with Section 34 IPC.

.

4. At this stage, it may be noticed that after lodging

of aforesaid FIR (Annexure P-14), police allegedly recorded

supplementary statement of respondent-wife under Section

161 Cr.P.C. dated 7.10.2014, which has been annexed as

Annexure R-3 with reply of respondents No.1 2, wherein

she alleged that she alongwith her mother Smt.Neelam and

father Shailinder Singh remained present during

investigation and on 26.8.2014 her husband Akashdeep

Singh, father-in-law Yadwinder Singh, mother-in-law Ranjit

Kaur and Devar (brother-in-law) Gaurav visited her parental

house at Nalagarh and asked her that they will resolve the

matter amicably by way of compromise, but, she told them

that she has filed a complaint before the police and police

shall settle the matter. Upon this, persons named in FIR got

adamant and started hurling abuses on her and also

extended threats to her to do away with her life.

Subsequently, police got respondent-wife medically

examined from Medical Officer, ESI Hospital, Jharmajri,

Tehsil Baddi, District Solan, H.P., who, after conducting

M.L.C. dated 22.8.2014, opined the alleged injury suffered

by respondent-wife to be grievous and on the basis of

aforesaid M.L.C., police added Section 325 IPC in the FIR.

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Police, after completion of investigation in the aforesaid FIR,

presented challan in the Court of learned Additional Chief

Judicial Magistrate, Nalagarh, which is pending

.

adjudication.

5. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioners

vehemently argued that there is/was no territorial

jurisdiction with Police Station at Nalagarh to carry out the

investigation into the allegations contained in FIR because

bare reading of the contents of abovementioned FIR clearly

reveals that none of the alleged incident of cruelty, criminal

breach of trust and voluntary causing hurt, if any, had taken

place at Nalagarh, as such, Police Station at Nalagarh had

no jurisdiction to investigate into the FIR. In support of

aforesaid arguments learned Senior Counsel invited the

attention of this Court to Section 171 Cr.P.C. and also

placed reliance upon judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex

Court in

Amarendu Jyoti and Others vs. State of

Chhattisgarh, (2014)12 SCC 362. Mr.Sharma, learned

Senior Counsel further argued that otherwise also perusal of

allegations contained in FIR nowhere suggests that case, if

any, is made out against the petitioners under Sections 498-

A, 406, 506 read with Section 34 IPC because there is no

allegation that the petitioners ever raised demand for dowry.

He further argued that though in the FIR, respondent-wife,

has alleged that she was repeatedly teased on account of less

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dowry brought by her, but there is nothing on record that

she was subjected to cruelty as defined by Section 498-A of

IPC by the petitioners.

.

6. Lastly, Mr.Sharma, while making this Court to

peruse contents of FIR, made a serious attempt to persuade

this Court to agree with his contention that no incident of

beatings or maltreatment took place at Nalagarh, rather all

alleged incidents, if are presumed to be correct, happened at

Jallandhar prior to lodging of FIR at Nalagarh. Mr.Sharma

further submitted that there is no explanation available on

record that why respondent-wife forgot to mention about

alleged hurling of abuses and extension of threats by the

petitioners on 26.8.2014 at Nalagarh, while getting her first

statement recorded under Section 154 Cr.P.C. on the basis

of which FIR No.224 came to be registered against the

petitioners. Mr.Sharma, while referring to the supplementary

statement recorded by Police after lodging of FIR, contended

that Police at Nalagarh is hand-in-glove with respondent-

wife, who is a local resident of the area and she solely with a

view to falsely implicate the petitioners in a case purposely

got the supplementary statement recorded so that

jurisdiction at Nalalgarh is made out. Mr.Sharma further

contended that there is no allegation, either in the impugned

FIR or in other proceedings initiated by petitioner-husband

in different Courts at Nalagarh, that petitioners kept on

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harassing her even after her leaving Jallandhar and, as

such, there was no occasion for police at Nalagarh to take

cognizance of the contents of allegations contained in the

.

FIR. Mr.Sharma forcefully contended that dispute, if any,

between petitioner-husband and respondent-wife is purely

matrimonial and respondent-wife, solely with a view to teach

lesson to the petitioner-husband as well as her family

members i.e. petitioners No.1 to 3, has concocted false story

and petitioners have been falsely implicated in the case.

While referring to the MLC, adduced on record by the police

to conclude that petitioner-husband was given beatings at

Jallandhar, Mr.Sharma contended that alleged incident had

occurred on 3.8.2014 whereafter admittedly respondent-wife

appeared before Women Cell at Jallandhar and no such

incident was ever reported, hence no much importance can

be attached to such MLC, which was subsequently obtained

after 23 days of the alleged incident. With the aforesaid

submissions, Mr.Sharma prayed that FIR lodged by police of

Nalagarh as well as consequent proceedings pending in the

Court at Nalagarh may be quashed and set aside.

7. While refuting the aforesaid submissions having

been made by Mr.R.K.Sharma, learned Senior Counsel

representing the petitioners, Mr.Ramakant Sharma, learned

Senior Counsel, representing respondent-wife (respondent

No.3 herein), contended that in view of the contents of the

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FIR, Police of Police Station, Nalagarh, rightly investigated

the matter and lodged FIR against the petitioners.

Mr.Sharma further argued that a clear cut case under

.

Sections 498-A, 406, 506, 325 read with Section 34 IPC is

made out against the petitioners.

8. While referring to the allegations contained in

FIR., Mr.Ramakant Sharma argued that though initial

statement recorded under Section 154 Cr.P.C., on the basis

of which formal FIR came to be lodged against the

petitioners, itself reveals the commission of offence at

Nalagarh, but even otherwise supplementary statement

recorded on the same day clearly suggests that petitioners

not only hurled abuses to the respondent-wife at Nalagarh,

rather, while leaving her house, they extended threats to do

away with her life and, as such, FIR rightly came to be

lodged at Police Station Nalaglarh.

9. While refuting the submissions of learned Senior

Counsel that no case, if any, is made out against the

petitioners under Section 498-A, Mr.Ramakant Sharma,

strenuously argued that it is quiet apparent from the

contents of FIR that respondent-wife specifically alleged

against the petitioners that she was repeatedly teased and

harassed by the petitioners on account of bringing less

dowry and, as such, police rightly inserted Section 498-A in

the FIR. While making this Court to peruse supplementary

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statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. of the

respondent-wife, Mr.Sharma argued that the petitioners

continued to commit offence punishable under aforesaid

.

Sections even after respondent-wife had left her matrimonial

house at Jallandhar and, as such, even on that account also

Police at Nalagarh is/was well within its right to take

cognizance of the above allegations contained in the FIR.

10. Lastly, Mr.Sharma contended that since

pursuant to investigation conducted by the Police at

Nalalgarh in FIR No.224, challan stands filed in the

competent Court of law at Nalagarh, this Court may not

accede to prayer of quashing made on behalf of petitioners

while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482

Cr.P.C. Mr.Sharma further argued that though this Court

enjoys vast powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., but such

powers are required to be exercised sparingly, carefully or

with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the

tests specifically laid down under Section 482 Cr.P.C. itself.

He further submitted that exercise of inherent powers should

not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution.

11. Mr.Sharma argued that supplementary

statement and evidence collected by police during

investigation makes it amply clear that the offence under

Section 498A IPC is made out against the petitioners and it

is not necessary that there should be demand of dowry for

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the purpose of attracting provision of Section 498A IPC as

has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in K.V. Prakash

Babu vs. State of Karnataka, (2017)11 SCC 176 and Bhaskar

.

Lal Sharma and Another vs. Monica and Others, (2014)3 SCC

383.

12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and

gone through the record of the case.

13. As has been noticed hereinabove, this Court at

first instance shall consider issue with regard to jurisdiction

of Nalagarh/Baddi Police to investigate into allegations

contained in the FIR.

14. In nutshell case, as projected by the petitioners,

is that the Police Station, Nalagarh has/had no territorial

jurisdiction to investigate the allegations levelled in the

impugned FIR and, as such, consequent action, if any,

pursuant to same, deserves to be quashed and set aside.

15. Before ascertaining the correctness and merit of

submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, it

would be profitable to take note of the following provisions of

law:-

“11. Sections 177, 178 and 181 of Code of
Criminal Procedure read as under:

“177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial.–

Every offence shall ordinary be
inquired into and tried by a court
within whose local jurisdiction it was
committed.

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178. Place of inquiry or trial.–(a) When it is
uncertain in which of several local
areas an offence was committed, or

(b) where an offence is committed partly

.

in one local area and party in another,

or

(c) where an offence is a continuing
one, and continues to be committed in

more local areas than one, or

(d) where it consists of several acts
done in different local areas, it may be
inquired into or tried by a Court having
jurisdiction over any of such local

areas.

181. Place of trial in case of certain
r offences.–

(1) Any offence of being a thug, or
murder committed by a thug, of

dacoity, of dacoity with murder, of
belonging to a gang of dacoits, or of
escaping from custody, may be inquired
into or tried by a Court within whose
local jurisdiction the offence was

committed or the accused person is
found.

(2) Any offence of kidnapping or

abduction of a person may be inquired
into or tried by a Court within whose
local jurisdiction the person was

kidnapped or abducted or was
conveyed or concealed or detained.

(3) Any offence of theft, extortion or

robbery may be inquired into or tried by
a Court within whose local jurisdiction
the offence was committed or the stolen
property which is the subject of the
offence was possessed by any person
committing it or by any person who
received or retained such property
knowing or having reason to believe it
to be stolen property.

(4) Any offence of criminal
misappropriation or of criminal breach
of trust may be inquired into or tried by

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a Court within whose local jurisdiction
the offence was committed or any part
of the property which is the subject of
the offence was received or retained, or
was required to be returned or

.

accounted for, by the accused person.

(5) Any offence which includes the
possession of stolen property may be
inquired into or tried by a Court within

whose local jurisdiction the offence
was committed or the stolen property
was possessed by any person who
received or retained it knowing or
having reason to believe it to be stolen
property.”

16.

Close scrutiny of aforesaid provisions of law

clearly suggests that Section 177 Cr.P.C. lays down a general

rule with regard to place where a case can be inquired into

and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was

committed, whereas Sections 178 and 181 Cr.P.C. are

exception to the aforesaid general rule contained in Section

177 Cr.P.C. Sub-section (c) of Section 178 Cr.P.C. provides

that where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to

be committed in more local areas than one, it may be

inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any

of such local areas. Sub-section (4) of Section 181 Cr.P.C.

lays down that any offence of criminal misappropriation or of

criminal breach of trust may be inquired into or tried by a

Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was

committed or any part of the property which is the subject of

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the offence was received or retained, or was required to be

returned or accounted for, by the accused person.

17. In the case at hand, bare perusal of FIR lodged

.

by respondent-wife clearly suggests that all the alleged

incidents with respect to cruelty, voluntary causing hurt and

breach of trust, had allegedly occurred at Jallandhar (Pb)

and not at Nalagarh (HP). Similarly, cruelty and humiliating

treatment, alleged to have been given by the petitioner-

husband to respondent-wife on account of bringing less

dowry, is also alleged to have taken place at her matrimonial

home at Jallandhar (Pb) and not at Nalagarh (HP). FIR in

question nowhere reveals that demands of money, gifts and

jewellery were ever made at Nalagarh, rather as per own case

set up by respondent-wife she was allegedly given beatings

by her husband and other family members at Jallandhar

and subsequently the matter on the complaint of

respondent-wife came to be referred to the Women Cell at

Jallandhar. As per contents of FIR, on 17.8.2014 and

thereafter on 24.8.2014, Women Cell at Jallandhar, called

both the petitioner-husband and respondent-wife for

reconciliation and subsequently on 27.8.2014, respondent-

wife lodged complaint with SHO, Police Station, Nalagarh,

which ultimately came to be forwarded to Women Cell,

Baddi. Though respondent-wife has alleged in the FIR that

on various occasions, petitioners demanded money and

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jewellery and abused her, but all such alleged incidents

allegedly happened at Jallandhar (Pb) and not at Nalagarh

(HP). Respondent-wife also alleged in the FIR that during

.

pregnancy, she had stomach-ache and her mother made her

consume some medicines, as a consequence of which child

in her womb died, but, such incident, if any, also happened

at Jallandhar. There is no narration of incident, if any,

occurred at Nalagarh. Respondent-wife has alleged that on

account of beatings given by her husband to her at

Jallandhar, her father got her medically examined at Chawla

Hospital, Mohali on 5.8.2014 and Women Cell, Baddi (HP),

taking note of aforesaid alleged incident of beatings, which

had happened at Jallandhar (Pb), got respondent-wife

medically examined by Medical Officer in Himachal Pradesh

and thereafter added Section 325 IPC in the FIR.

18. Having carefully perused the contents of FIR

lodged with Police Station, Nalagarh, dated 7.8.2014, this

Court is persuaded to agree with contention of Shri R.K.

Sharma, learned Senior Counsel representing the petitioner-

husband, that since none of the alleged incident of cruelty,

criminal breach of trust and voluntary causing hurt had

taken place at Nalagarh and, as such, Nalagarh Police had

no jurisdiction to investigate into the FIR. True, it is, that

respondent-wife subsequently on 7.10.2014, got her

supplementary statement recorded under Section 161

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Cr.P.C., (Annexure R-3, annexed with the reply of

respondents No.1 and 2), alleging therein that on 26.8.2014

her husband Akashdeep Singh, father-in-law Yadwinder

.

Singh, mother-in-law Ranjit Kaur and Devar (brother-in-law)

Gaurav visited her parental house at Nalagarh and asked her

to resolve the matter amicably by way of compromise, but,

when she told them that she has filed complaint before the

police, they got adamant and started hurling abuses on her

and also extended threats to her to do away with her life.

But, now question, which remains to be adjudicated, is

whether allegations contained in supplementary statement of

respondent-wife, recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., can be

read in continuation to FIR dated 7.10.2014. Admittedly

respondent-wife in her initial statement under Section 154

Cr.P.C. chose not to allege that on 26.8.2014, her husband

Akashdeep Singh, father-in-law Yadwinder Singh, mother-in-

law Ranjit Kaur and Devar (brother-in-law) Gaurav, hurled

abuses and extended threats to her at Nalagarh. Needless to

say, investigating agency can make addition or deletion in

FIR, on the basis of investigation, and, as such, there

appears to be no force in the arguments of Shri R.K.

Sharma, learned Senior Counsel, that supplementary

statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. cannot be

read as a part of FIR, dated 7.10.2014, filed at the behest of

respondent-wife at Nalagarh. Careful perusal of record,

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especially statement of parents of respondent-wife recorded

at the time of lodging FIR on 7.10.2014, nowhere suggests

that alleged incident of 26.8.2014 was ever reported to the

.

police at first instance, even if, for the sake of arguments, it

is presumed and accepted that respondent-wife forgot to

mention aforesaid alleged incident of 26.8.2014, while

lodging FIR, dated 7.10.2014, but, it cannot be accepted that

parents of respondent-wife, whose statements were also

recorded at the time of lodging FIR on 7.8.2014, also

inadvertently failed to state with regard to alleged incident of

26.8.2014.

r Documents adduced on record, especially

reply/status report filed by investigating agency, while

opposing bail of bail petitioners, nowhere suggests that

alleged incident, if any, happened/occurred on 26.8.2014

was ever brought to the notice of Court, who was dealing

with the application for grant of bail made on behalf of the

petitioners. Apart from above, there is no mention, if any, of

aforesaid incident of 26.8.2014 in the other proceedings

initiated by respondent-wife against the petitioner-husband

under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005

and under Section 125 Cr.P.C. for maintenance. Even in the

statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., respondent-

wife simply alleged that on 26.8.2014, she was extended

threats and hurled abuses by the petitioners, but there is no

allegation that the petitioners demanded dowry and when

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their demand was not fulfilled, they insulted her, rather

respondent-wife has stated that the petitioners asked her to

get the dispute settled amicably.

.

19. Having carefully perused the contents of the FIR

including supplementary statement recorded under Section

161 Cr.P.C. of respondent-wife, dated 7.10.2014, this Court

has no hesitation to conclude that Police of Police Station,

Nalagarh, has/had no jurisdiction to conduct investigation of

allegations as recorded in FIR because all the alleged

incidents, as narrated in the FIR, actually occurred/

happened at Jallandhar and not at Nalagarh and it is only

Police Station at Jallandhar, who has/had the jurisdiction to

conduct investigation, pursuant to complaint, if any, lodged

by respondent-wife at Jallandhar (Pb). At this stage, it

would be appropriate to place reliance upon judgment

rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Amarendu Jyoti’s case

supra, wherein it has held as under:-

“5. Aggrieved by the rejection of the application
Under Section 482 of the Code, the Appellants

have approached this Court by way of special
leave to appeal. The main contention on
behalf of the Appellants was that the F.I.R.
did not disclose a continuing offence. The
offence, if any, was alleged to have been
committed only at Delhi and there was no
question of any offence having been
committed after Respondent 2 went to stay at
Ambikapur. The learned counsel for the
appellants relied on the decision of this Court
in Manish Ratan v. State of M.P., (2007)1 SCC
262.

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6. In Manish Ratan case, in the complaint, the
incident was said to have taken place in
Jabalpur. The wife had left her matrimonial
house and started residing at Datia. The
criminal revision filed by the accused,

.

questioning the jurisdiction of the Court at

Datia, was dismissed opining that the offence
was a continuing one, and therefore, the
Datia Court had jurisdiction to take
cognizance. The High Court held that the

Court at Datia also has jurisdiction to try the
case since the harassment to the wife
continued at the place where she was
residing with her father “since she was forced
to live at her father’s place on account of the
torture of the in-laws and as such it can

safely be said that there was also a mental
cruelty.” This conclusion of the High Court
was dubbed as curious by this Court since the
High Court found earlier that “there is
nothing in the complaint to show that any

maltreatment was given to the Appellant at
Datia. The allegations, which I may repeat

here, are that the maltreatment was given
within a specific period at Jabalpur.” After
looking at the decided cases on the point i.e.
Sujata Mukherjee v. Prashant Kumar
Mukherjee, (1997)5 SCC 30, State of Bihar v.

Deokaran Nenshi, (1972)2 SCC 890, Y.
Abraham Ajith v. Inspector of Police, (2004)8
SCC 100 and Ramesh v. State of T.N., (2005)3
SCC 507, this Court held that the order of the
High Court was unsustainable, and therefore,

set it aside. It is not only that in the interest
of justice, while setting aside the order of the

High Court, this Court also directed the
transfer of the criminal case pending in the
Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Datia,
where the wife was staying with her father to

the Court of the Judicial, Jabalpur (vide para

18).

7. Relying on the judgment of this Court in
Manish Ratan case , the learned counsel for
the appellants contended that the offence in
the present case cannot be considered to be a
continuing offence, if any, and must be taken
to have been complete at Delhi and no cause
of action can be said to have arisen at
Ambikapur. As must necessarily be, the
application of law and the consequences
must vary from case to case.

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8. The core question thus is whether the
allegations made in the FIR constitute a
continuing offence.

9. We find from the FIR that all the incidents

.

alleged by the complainant in respect of the

alleged cruelty are said to have occurred at
Delhi. The cruel and humiliating words
spoken to the 2nd respondent, wife by her
husband, elder brother-in-law and elder

sister-in-law for bringing less dowry are said
to have been uttered at Delhi. Allegedly,
arbitrary demands of lakhs of rupees in
dowry have been made in Delhi. The incident
of beating and dragging Respondent 2 and
abusing her in filthy language also are said

to have taken place at Delhi. Suffice it to say
that all overt acts, which are said to have
constituted cruelty have allegedly taken
place at Delhi.

10. The allegations as to what has happened at
Ambikapur are as follows:

“No purposeful information has been received
from the in-laws of Kiran even on contacting
on telephone till today. They have been
threatened and abused and two years have
been elapsed and the in-laws have not shown

any interest to call her to her matrimonial
home and since then Kiran is making her
both ends meet in her parental home. To get
rid of the ill-treatment and harassment of

the in-laws of Kiran, the complainant is
praying for registration of an FIR and
request for immediate legal action so that

Kiran may get appropriate justice.”

11. We find that the offence of cruelty cannot be
said to be a continuing one as contemplated

by Sections 178 and 179 of the Code. We do
not agree with the High Court that in this
case the mental cruelty inflicted upon
Respondent 2 “continued unabated” on
account of no effort having been made by the
appellants to take her back to her
matrimonial home, and the threats given by
the appellants over the telephone. It might be
noted incidentally that the High Court does
not make reference to any particular piece of
evidence regarding the threats said to have
been given by the appellants over the
telephone. Thus, going by the complaint, we
are of the view that it cannot be held that the

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21

Court at Ambikapur has jurisdiction to try
the offence since the appropriate Court at
Delhi would have jurisdiction to try the said
offence. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.”

.

20. Applying the aforesaid exposition of law laid

down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Amarendu Jyoti’s case

supra, argument advanced by Mr.Ramakant Sharma,

learned Senior Counsel representing the respondent-wife,

that alleged offence of cruelty is continuing one, deserves

outright rejection. Contention of Shri Ramakant Sharma,

that bare perusal of supplementary statement of respondent-

wife recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. suggests that

petitioners continued to commit offence punishable under

the aforesaid provisions, is not at all tenable because there is

no mention, if any, with regard to demand of dowry, beatings

and criminal breach of trust, if any, at Nalagarh, rather

contents of FIR suggest beyond doubt that all the alleged

incidents, as narrated in the FIR in question, allegedly

happened at Jallandhar.

21. As has been noticed hereinabove, even if, it is

presumed that the respondents-wife had suffered fracture on

account of beatings given by her husband, alleged incident

also happened at Jallandhar and not at Nalagarh. Mere

medical examination of respondent-wife within the territorial

jurisdiction of Nalagarh Police shall not confer any territorial

jurisdiction upon the Police at Nalagarh to investigate the

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
22

incident, which actually happened beyond its territorial

jurisdiction.

22. Similarly, this Court sees no reason to agree

.

with the contention of Mr.Ramakant Sharma, learned Senior

Counsel, that mental cruelty inflicted upon respondent-wife

continued on account of persistent demand made by the

petitioners to bring the dowry, because there is no whisper,

if any, in the FIR that after departure of respondent-wife

from Jallandhar to her parental house, demand, if any, was

ever raised for dowry by the petitioners, rather respondent-

wife in her supplementary statement categorically stated to

the police that petitioners on 26.8.2014 had come to her

house and asked her to settle the matter amicably. Though

in her supplementary statement, she mentioned that the

petitioners, while leaving her parental house, extended

threats and hurled abuses to her, but there is no plausible

explanation rendered on record by respondent-wife that what

prevented her from narrating this incident to police at first

instance while getting her statement recorded under Section

154 Cr.P.C., on the basis of which formal FIR came to be

lodged at Nalagarh on 7.10.2014.

23. This Court has no hesitation to agree with the

contention of Shri Ramakant Sharma, learned Senior

Counsel, that since respondent-wife was mentally disturbed

at the time of lodging FIR, she forgot to mention incident on

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23

26.8.2014, but, as has been noticed above, there is nothing

in the statement of parents of respondent-wife, recorded

pursuant to lodging of FIR on 7.10.2014, with regard to

.

alleged incident of 26.8.2014, and, as such, there appears to

be some force in the arguments of Mr.R.K Sharma, learned

Senior Counsel for the petitioners that Police at Nalagarh,

solely with a view to have jurisdiction to inquire into the

contents of FIR, dated 7.10.2014, purposely got the

supplementary statement of respondent-wife recorded after

lodging of FIR on 7.10.2014. Even if it is presumed to be

correct that on 26.8.2014 petitioners had hurled abuses or

extended threats to the respondent-wife, case, if any, could

be registered against the petitioners under Section 506 read

with Section 34 IPC at Nalagarh and not under Section 498-

A, 406 325 IPC.

24. Since no specific allegations are contained in the

FIR with regard to demand of dowry by the petitioners at

Nalagarh, no case could be registered against the petitioners

under Section 498-A IPC at Police Station, Nalagarh. So far

as offence under Section 406 IPC is concerned, it is evident

from the perusal of FIR that there is no allegation that any

article, given at the time of marriage, was entrusted/given to

the petitioners at Nalagarh. It is also not the case of

respondent-wife that dowry articles etc. entrusted to the

petitioners at Jallandhar were promised to be returned back

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
24

at Nalagarh or were demanded to be returned back at

Nalagarh. As far as commission of offence, if any, under

Section 325 IPC is concerned, which subsequently came to

.

be added in FIR, at the cost of repetition, it may be stated

that incident of beatings, in which respondent-wife allegedly

suffered grievous injury, had allegedly happened/occurred at

Jallandhar, as per own statement of respondent-wife and as

such police at Nalagarh has/had no jurisdiction to register a

case against the petitioner-husband on this account also at

police station, Nalagarh(HP).

25.

Mr. Ramakant Sharma, learned Senior Counsel

representing the respondent-wife, in support of his

contention that in view of allegations contained in FIR as

well as supplementary statement made by the respondent-

wife on the same day, Police at Nalagarh had jurisdiction to

investigate the matter, placed reliance upon the following

judgments:-

(i) Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC
349, (Para-6).

(ii) Sunita Kumari Kashyap vs. State of Bihar
and Another, (2011)11 SCC 301 (Para-17).

(iii) Y.Abraham Ajith and Others vs. Inspector of
Police, Chennai and Another, (2004)8 SCC 100
(para-8).

(iv) State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Suresh Kaushal
and another, 2002 Crl.L.J. 217 (paras 6 7).

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25

26. Mr.Sharma further contended that perusal of

FIR as well as supplementary statement of respondent-wife

made on 7.10.2014 and evidence collected by police during

.

investigation makes it amply clear that offence under Section

498-A IPC is made out against the petitioners and as such

police at Nalagarh had jurisdiction to look into the

allegations leveled by the respondent-wife. He further

argued that it is not necessary that there should be demand

of dowry for the purpose of attracting provisions of Section

498-A IPC, as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the

judgments reported in K.V. Prakash Babu vs. State of

Karnataka, (2017)11 SCC 176 and Bhaskar Lal Sharma and

Another vs. Monica and Others, (2014)3 SCC 383.

27. Before adverting to the aforesaid law relied

upon by learned Senior Counsel representing the

respondent-wife, it may be observed that at this stage Court

is not considering sustainability of charge, if any, and

allegation against the petitioners with regard to commission

of offence, if any, under Section 498-A, 406 and 506 IPC,

rather endeavour of Court is to explore answer to the

question whether police at Nalagarh has/had jurisdiction to

investigate into the allegations contained in the FIR lodged at

the behest of respondent-wife and whether Court at

Nalagarh has/had jurisdiction to continue with the

proceedings based upon the investigation carried out by the

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26

Police at Nalagarh, pursuant to FIR dated 7.10.2014 lodged

by respondent-wife.

28. Having carefully perused facts of the case before

.

Hon’ble Apex Court in case reported in Kartar Singh’s case

supra, this Court is of the view that the same are not

applicable in the present facts and circumstances of the

case. As has been already observed above, it is always open

for investigating agency to take into consideration

subsequent developments/facts, if any, collected during

investigation, but question before this Court is that what

prevented respondent-wife i.e. complainant from disclosing

facts which were otherwise in her knowledge at the time of

lodging FIR. True, it is, that one can forget mentioning

certain facts at the time of lodging first report, but as has

been observed in the earlier part of the judgment that it is

not only respondent-wife who forgot to mention with regard

to alleged incident of 26.8.2014, rather her parents, who also

in their statements recorded at the time of lodging FIR on

7.10.2014 failed to mention factum with regard to alleged

incident of 26.8.2014, wherein petitioners had allegedly

hurled abuses and extended threats to respondent-wife.

Otherwise also Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case supra, has

not returned specific finding that every supplementary

statement recorded by the complainant after lodging of FIR is

required to be taken into consideration, rather in the case

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27

before the Hon’ble Apex Court facts were altogether different,

wherein complainant had forgot to mention the name of

driver, who was also present at the site of occurrence at the

.

time of alleged incident and as such his name was

subsequently disclosed by the complainant in her

supplementary statement.

29. Similarly, judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex

Court in Sunita Kumari Kashyap’s case supra, is also not

applicable in the present case because in that case

complainant-wife had specifically alleged that while she was

in her matrimonial house at Ranchi and was pregnant, she

was forcibly left at her parental house at Gaya by her

husband, who thereafter continued to harass her.

Complainant also alleged that even after birth of child,

respondent-husband continued to harass her at Gaya by

raising new demand that unless her father gives his house at

Gaya to him she will not be taken to Gaya. Hon’ble Apex

Court having perused record, more particularly complaint

filed on behalf of the wife, arrived at a conclusion that there

was ill-treatment and cruelty at the hands of her husband

and his family members at the matrimonial home at Ranchi

and because of their actions and threat she was forcibly

taken to her parental home at Gaya where she initiated the

criminal proceedings against them for offences punishable

under Sections 498A and 406/34 IPC and Sections 3 and 4

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28

of the D.P. Act. Hon’ble Apex Court, in view of specific

assertion by the appellant-wife about the ill-treatment and

cruelty at the hands of the husband and his relatives at

.

Ranchi and of the fact that because of their action, she was

taken to her parental home at Gaya by her husband with a

threat of dire consequences for not fulfilling their demand of

dowry, arrived at a conclusion that in view of Sections 178

and 179 of the Code, the offence in this case was a

continuing one having been committed in more local areas

and one of the local areas being Gaya, the learned Magistrate

at Gaya has jurisdiction to proceed with the criminal case

instituted therein. Hon’ble Apex Court further held that the

offence was a continuing one and the episode at Gaya was

only a consequence of continuing offence of harassment or

ill-treatment meted out to the complainant. Hon’ble Apex

Court, having perused allegations of the complainant, held

that it is a continuing offence of ill-treatment and

humiliation meted out to the appellant at the hands of all

the accused persons, therefore, undoubtedly clause (c) of

Section 178 of the Code is clearly attracted.

30. However, facts of the case at hand are clearly

distinguishable. In the case at hand allegations contained in

FIR that respondent-wife was ill-treated and harassed by

petitioners for bringing less dowry, but definitely there is

nothing in the FIR that complainant/respondent-wife was ill-

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29

treated by her husband at her parental house and even after

her departure from matrimonial house, all the petitioners

kept on raising demand for dowry, rather supplementary

.

statement made by the respondent-wife itself suggests that

after registration of FIR at Nalagarh, petitioners made an

attempt for amicable settlement but same was not

acceptable to the respondent-wife. In the case supra before

Hon’ble Apex Court complainant-wife was able to show that

alleged offence of cruelty continued not at place called Gaya

rather at a number of places, but as has been discussed

herein above, respondent-wife in the case at hand has not

been able to show commission of offence, if any, at Nalagarh.

31. In the other case relied upon on behalf of the

respondents i.e. State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Suresh

Kaushal and another, 2002 Crl.L.J. 217, allegation was that

wife was subjected to physical torture when she was in the

family way and she had to be taken back to her parental

house at Jabalpur. The miscarriage took place while she was

at Jabalpur. Section 313 IPC came to be included in the

charge as the cumulative effect of all the allegations ending

with the consequence of the miscarriage which took place at

Jabalpur. High Court at Jabalpur having perused record

arrived at a conclusion that the Court at Jabalpur has no

jurisdiction at all for trying the case. Learned Single Judge

dealing with the case observed that alleged offence under

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30

Section 313 IPC was committed outside the city of Jabalpur

and as such courts at Jabalpur therefore, have no

jurisdiction to take cognizance of the aforesaid offences

.

against the Petitioners. Learned Single Judge further

observed that the competency of the Court to take

jurisdiction is determined by the place in which the offence

is alleged to have been committed and held that it is settled

law that the Magistrate, within whose local jurisdiction the

offence is alleged to have been committed is authorized to

take cognizance, and either to try the case himself or to

commit it to the Court of Sessions. Learned Single Judge

further arrived at a conclusion that since the alleged offence

has not been committed within the local jurisdiction of the

Magistrate at Jabalpur, the learned Judge to whom the case

has been committed by the learned Magistrate of Jabalpur

has no power to try the petitioners for the alleged offences

which were allegedly committed wholly outside the local

limits of his jurisdiction. However, Hon’ble Apex Court,

while interpreting provisions contained in Section 179

Cr.P.C., observed that the said section contemplates two

courts having jurisdiction and the trial is permitted to take

place in any one of those two Courts. One is the court within

whose local jurisdiction the act has been done and the other

is the court within whose local jurisdiction the consequence

has ensued. Hon’ble Apex Court further held that when the

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31

allegation is that the miscarriage took place at Jabalpur it

cannot be contended that the court at Jabalpur could not

have acquired jurisdiction as the acts alleged against the

.

accused took place at Indore. Hon’ble Apex Court further

held that apart from above, when the High Court found that

the courts at Jabalpur had no jurisdiction, the course

adopted by the High Court by quashing the entire criminal

proceedings is not permissible in law, rather the High Court

should have transferred the case to the court which it found

to be vested with jurisdiction and observed that we cannot

appreciate the course adopted by the High Court in quashing

the whole criminal proceedings against the accused.

32. Having carefully perused facts of the case which

were before Hon’ble Apex Court as well as ratio laid down by

Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case supra this Court is of the

view that same is not applicable in the present facts and

circumstances wherein admittedly there is no specific

allegation, if any, with regard to incident of cruelty, criminal

breach of trust and ill-treatment by the petitioners at

Nalagarh, rather, respondent-wife of her own volition left her

matrimonial home at Jallandhar and came back to her

parental house at Nalagarh.

33. In the case at hand allegation contained in the

FIR itself suggests that complainant herself left the house of

the husband on 4.8.2014 on account of alleged dowry

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32

demand made by the husband and other family members.

As noticed above, there is not a whisper about allegation of

any dowry demand made at Nalagarh and, as such, logic of

.

Section 178(c) Cr.P.C. cannot be applied. Hon’ble Apex

Court in Y.Abraham Ajith’s case supra, reiterated the well

established common law/Rules referred to in Halsbury’s

Laws of England (Vol. IX para 83) that the proper and

ordinary venue for the trial of a crime is the area of

jurisdiction in which, on the evidence, the facts occur and

which is alleged to constitute the crime. The Hon’ble Apex

Court in Y.Abraham Ajith’s case supra has held as under:-

“8. Sections 177 to 186 deal with venue and
place of trial. Section 177 reiterates the well-
established common law rule referred to in

Halsbury’s Laws of England (Vol. IX para 83)
that the proper and ordinary venue for the
trial of a crime is the area of jurisdiction in
which, on the evidence, the facts occur and
which are alleged to constitute the crime.

There are several exceptions to this general
rule and some of them are, so far as the

present case is concerned, indicated in
Section 178 of the Code which read as
follows:

“Section 178 Place of inquiry or trial.–

(a) When it is uncertain in which of several
local areas an offence was committed,
or

(b) where an offence is committed partly in
one local area and partly in another, or

(c) where an offence is continuing one, and
continues to be committed in more local
areas than one, or

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33

(d) where it consists of several acts done in
different local areas, it may be inquired
into or tried by a Court having
jurisdiction over any of such local
areas.”

.

9. “All crime is local, the jurisdiction over the

crime belongs to the country where the crime
is committed”, as observed by Blackstone. A
significant word used in Section 177 of the
Code is “ordinarily”. Use of the word indicates

that the provision is a general one and must
be read subject to the special provisions
contained in the Code. As observed by the
Court in Purushottamdas Dalmia v. State of
West Bengal, (AIR 1961 SC 1589),

L.N.Mukherjee V. State of Madras (AIR 1961
SC 1601), Banwarilal Jhunjhunwalla and
Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. (AIR 1963 SC
1620) and Mohan Baitha and Ors. v. State of
Bihar and Anr. (2001 (4) SCC 350), exception
implied by the word “ordinarily” need not be

limited to those specially provided for by the

law and exceptions may be provided by law
on consideration or may be implied from the
provisions of law permitting joint trial of
offences by the same Court. No such exception
is applicable to the case at hand.

10. As observed by this Court in State of Bihar v.

Deokaran Nenshi and Anr. (AIR 1973 SC 908),
continuing offence is one which is susceptible
of continuance and is distinguishable from

the one which is committed once and for all,
that it is one of those offences which arises
out of the failure to obey or comply with a

rule or its requirement and which involves a
penalty, liability continues till compliance,
that on every occasion such disobedience or
non-compliance occurs or recurs, there is the

offence committed.

11. A similar plea relating to continuance of the
offence was examined by this Court in Sujata
Mukherjee (Smt.) v. Prashant Kumar
Mukherjee (1997 (5) SCC 30). There the
allegations related to commission of alleged
offences punishable under Section 498-A, 506
and 323 IPC. On the factual background, it
was noted that though the dowry demands
were made earlier the husband of the
complainant went to the place where
complainant was residing and had assaulted

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34

her. This Court held in that factual
background that clause (c) of Section 178 was
attracted. But in the present case the factual
position is different and the complainant
herself left the house of the husband on

.

15.4.1997 on account of alleged dowry

demands by the husband and his relations.
There is thereafter not even a whisper of
allegations about any demand of dowry or
commission of any act constituting an offence

much less at Chennai. That being so, the
logic of Section 178 (c) of the Code relating to
continuance of the offences cannot be
applied.

12. The crucial question is whether any part of

the cause of action arose within the
jurisdiction of the Court concerned. In terms
of Section 177 of the Code it is the place
where the offence was committed. In essence
it is the cause of action for initiation of the

proceedings against the accused.

13. While in civil cases, normally the expression
“cause of action” is used, in criminal cases as
stated in Section 177 of the Code, reference is
to the local jurisdiction where the offence is
committed. These variations in etymological

expression do not really make the position
different. The expression “cause of action” is
therefore not a stranger to criminal cases.

14. It is settled law that cause of action consists

of bundle of facts, which give cause to
enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a

court of law. In other words, it is a bundle of
facts, which taken with the law applicable to
them, gives the allegedly affected party a
right to claim relief against the opponent. It

must include some act done by the latter
since in the absence of such an act no cause
of action would possibly accrue or would
arise.”

34. Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment referred

hereinabove has categorically held that it is settled law that

cause of action consists of bundle of facts, which give cause

to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a Court of law. In

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35

other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law

applicable to them, gives the allegedly affected party a right

to claim relief against the opponent. It must include some

.

act done by the latter since in the absence of such an act no

cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise. Most

importantly in the judgment referred above Hon’ble Apex

Court has categorically held that in terms of Section 177, it

is the place where the offence was committed and in essence

it is the cause of action for initiation of the proceedings

against the accused. In the case at hand, there is not even a

whisper of allegation about the demand of dowry much less

at Nalagarh, as such, this Court has no hesitation to

conclude that the logic of Section 178(c) of the Code relating

to continuance of the offences cannot be applied in the

present facts and circumstances of the case.

35. Having closely examined/analyzed the facts of

the case at hand, it is amply clear that exceptions to the

general rule, as provided in Sections 178 and 182 Cr.P.C.,

are not applicable in the case in hand. Police Station at

Nalagarh has/had no jurisdiction to conduct investigation of

the allegations levelled in the impugned FIR. Jurisdiction, if

any, to inquire into the contents as contained in FIR, is/was

with police station at Jallandhar, as all the incidents

happened/occurred at Jallandhar (Punjab) and not at

Nalagarh (Himachal Pradesh). Since respondent-wife before

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36

lodging FIR at Nalagarh had lodged complaint at Women

Cell, Jallandhar, she could pursue the same at Jallandhar

and definitely, on the basis of allegations contained in FIR in

.

question lodged at Nalagarh, no case could be registered

against the petitioners at Nalagarh.

36. As far as another contention of Shri Ramakant

Sharma, learned Senior Counsel that since the proceedings,

consequent to lodging of FIR in question at Nalagarh, are

pending adjudication before competent Court of law at

Nalagarh, the instant petition, is not maintainable, also

deserves to be rejected because once it stands established on

record that Police Station, Nalagarh, has/had no territorial

jurisdiction to inquire into the contents of FIR lodged at the

behest of respondent-wife, no consequential proceedings

pursuant to the investigation carried out by Police at

Nalagarh in the FIR can be allowed to sustain. Since, this

Court has arrived at definite conclusion that Police has/had

no territorial jurisdiction to investigate contents of impugned

FIR, Court at Nalagarh is/was not competent to take

cognizance of investigation/challan filed by the police and as

such same also deserves to be quashed and set aside.

37. Reliance placed upon judgment of Hon’ble Apex

Court in State of Bihar and another etc. etc. vs. Shri P.P.

Sharma and another etc. etc., AIR 1991 SC 1260 is wholly

mis-placed and it does not fit into the present facts and

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37

circumstances of the case and as such same cannot be

applied.

38. In the case supra, Hon’ble Apex Court observed

.

that mere allegations of mala-fide against the informant

based on the facts after the lodging of the FIR were of no

consequence and could not be made basis for quashing the

proceedings. Hon’ble Apex Court further held that simply

because the Investigating Officer, while acting bonafidely

ruled out certain documents as irrelevant, cannot be ground

to assume that he acted malafidely. No doubt, in the present

case Hon’ble Apex Court held that when the police report

under Section 173 Cr.P.C. is forwarded to the Magistrate

after completion of investigation and the material collected

by the investigating officer is under the gaze of judicial

scrutiny, the High Court would do well to discipline itself not

to undertake quashing proceedings at that stage in exercise

of its inherent jurisdiction, but the aforesaid observation

made by the Hon’ble Apex Court is altogether in different

context and in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.

39. In the case before Hon’ble Apex Court there were

allegations of malafide against the informant and

investigating officer and Hon’ble Apex Court held that the

same cannot be basis for quashing the proceedings because

non-annexing of certain documents being irrelevant by the

investigating officer cannot be a ground to assume that he

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38

acted malafidely. Hon’ble Apex Court, on the basis of

material before it, arrived at a conclusion that the dominant

purpose for registering the case against the respondents was

.

to have an investigation done into the allegations contained

in the FIR and in the event of there being sufficient material

in support of the allegations to present the charge sheet

before the court. Similarly, there is no material to show that

the dominant object of registering the case was the character

assassination of the respondents or to harass and humiliate

them. Hon’ble Apex Court set aside the judgment passed by

High Court
r of Patna, wherein it had quashed the

proceedings. But, in the present case when it is quiet

apparent that police at Nalagarh had no jurisdiction to look

into the allegations contained in the FIR, consequential

proceeding, if any, initiated pursuant to report presented

under Section 173 Cr.P.C. by the police at Nalagarh cannot

be allowed to sustain, hence aforesaid judgment relied upon

by the learned Senior Counsel has no application. Had the

Police at Nalagarh(HP) jurisdiction to look into the contents

of FIR lodged at the behest of respondent-wife and on the

basis of investigation carried out by the police challan was

presented in the competent Court of law, definitely aforesaid

judgment could be applied and it could be concluded that

since challan stood filed, Court cannot interfere while

exercising powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. But in the

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39

present case facts are otherwise as has been discussed

hereinabove and as such this case has no application.

40. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Shri P.P. Sharma’s

.

case supra held as under:-

“33. The above order was brought to the notice of
the Patna High Court but the High Court

refused to be persuaded to adopt the same
course. We are of the considered view that at
a stage when the police report under S.173
Cr. P.C. has been forwarded to the Magistrate
after completion of the investigation and the

material collected by the investigating officer
is under the gaze of judicial scrutiny, the
High Court would do well to discipline itself
not to undertake quashing proceedings at
that stage in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction. We could have set aside the High
rCourt judgment on this ground alone but

elaborate argument having been addressed by
the learned counsel for the parties we
thought it proper to deal with all the aspects
of the case.”

41. There cannot be any quarrel with the argument

advanced by Mr.Ramakant Sharma, learned Senior Counsel

that by now it is well settled that High Court while exercising

power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. though has wide powers

but those are to be exercised sparingly, carefully or with

caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests

specifically laid down under Section 482 Cr.P.C. itself.

Mr.Sharma in support of aforesaid submission also placed

reliance upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court

in Ghanshyam Sharma vs. Surendra Kumar Sharma and

Others, (2014)13 SCC 401 (para-8), Suresh Chandra Swain vs.

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40

State of Orissa, 1988 Crl.L.J. 1175 (para-11(3)) and Varala

Bharath Kumar vs. State of Telangana and Another, (2017)9

SCC 413 (para-7). Since in all the judgments referred

.

hereinabove similar principle of law has been laid down by

the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court would only be dealing

with the latest judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in

Varala Bharath Kumar’s case supra.

42. In the aforesaid judgment Hon’ble Apex Court

has held that extra ordinary power under Article 226 or

inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure can be exercised by the High Court, either to

prevent abuse of process of the court or otherwise to secure

the ends of justice. Hon’ble Apex Court though in the

aforesaid judgment has observed that while exercising power

under Section 482 or under Article 226 in such matters, the

court does not function as a Court of Appeal or Revision but

held that inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code

though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully or with

caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests

specifically laid down under Section 482 itself. It is to be

exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial

justice, for the administration of which alone courts exist.

The Hon’ble Apex Court further held that the Court must be

careful and should see that its decision in exercise of its

power is based on sound principles. The inherent powers

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
41

should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution.

But, on the top of everything, Hon’ble Court has categorically

held that no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to

.

cases in which the High Court will exercise its extra ordinary

jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage. It

would be profitable to take note of following paras of the

aforesaid judgment:-

“6. It is by now well settled that the
extraordinary power under Article 226 or
inherent power under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure can be exercised by the
High Court, either to prevent abuse of process

of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice. Where allegations made in the First

Information Report/the complaint or the
outcome of investigation as found in the
Charge Sheet, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do
not prima facie constitute any offence or

make out the case against the accused; where
the allegations do not disclose the
ingredients of the offence alleged; where the
uncontroverted allegations made in the First

Information Report or complaint and the
material collected in support of the same do
not disclose the commission of offence

alleged and make out a case against the
accused; where a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala fide and/or
where the proceeding is maliciously

instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with
a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge, the power under Article 226
of the Constitution of India or under Section
482 of Code of Criminal Procedure may be
exercised.

7. While exercising power under Section 482 or
under Article 226 in such matters, the court
does not function as a Court of Appeal or
Revision. Inherent jurisdiction under Section
482 of the Code though wide has to be
exercised sparingly, carefully or with caution

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
42

and only when such exercise is justified by
the tests specifically laid down under Section
482 itself. It is to be exercised ex debito
justitiae to do real and substantial justice,
for the administration of which alone courts

.

exist. The court must be careful and see that

its decision in exercise of its power is based
on sound principles. The inherent powers
should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate
prosecution. Of course, no hard and fast rule

can be laid down in regard to cases in which
the High Court will exercise its extra
ordinary jurisdiction of quashing the
proceedings at any stage.”

43. Before considering application of aforesaid law

laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the present facts and

circumstances of the case, it may be observed that in the

case at hand this Court has not examined the material

available on record with a view to ascertain the correctness

of allegation contained in the FIR, rather attempt, if any, by

this Court is to arrive at conclusion that “whether, in view of

allegation contained in the FIR, Police at Nalagarh has

jurisdiction or not?” In the earlier part of the judgment, it is

made clear that second prayer for quashing of FIR would

depend upon answer to the first question.

44. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the

case, as has been discussed above, this Court has arrived at

a conclusion that Police at Nalagarh has/had no jurisdiction

to enquire into the contents of FIR and as such there is no

occasion for this Court to go into the correctness of the

allegation as well as sustainability of charge, if any, framed

against the petitioners. As has been noticed hereinabove,

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
43

inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is to be exercised

sparingly, carefully or with caution and only when such

exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down under

.

Section 482 Cr.P.C. itself. True, it is, that it should be

exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial

justice. Judgment referred to hereinabove nowhere suggests

that power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised by

the Court at all, rather exercise of it would depend upon the

facts of the case before it. Hon’ble Apex Court in the

aforesaid judgment has held that inherent power should not

be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. But, what is

legitimate prosecution depends upon facts of the particular

case. In the case at hand, as has been, elaborately

discussed hereinabove clearly suggests that Police at

Nalagarh has/had no authority/jurisdiction to investigate

into allegations contained in FIR, which admittedly took

place at Jallandhar and as such Courts at Nalagarh

have/had no jurisdiction to continue with the proceedings,

which are apparently based upon the investigation carried

out by police at Nalagarh and as such same cannot be

allowed to sustain. Since police at Nalagarh had no

jurisdiction, as has/had been held hereinabove, proceedings

if any pending before Courts at Nalagarh cannot be allowed

to sustain.

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
44

45. Consequently, in view of above, present petition

is allowed and the FIR dated 7.10.2014 as well as

consequent proceedings are quashed and set aside, however,

.

respondent-wife is at liberty to initiate action, if any, against

the petitioners, on account of allegations contained in

impugned FIR but at Jallandhar(Pb), either by lodging fresh

FIR or by pursuing complaint filed by her at Women Cell

Jallandhar.

46. Needless to say that this Court has only

examined/analyzed material adduced on record by the

respective parties to ascertain whether Police at Nalagarh

has/had jurisdiction to investigate into contents of FIR and

as such this Court may not be understood to have returned

findings, if any, qua the sustainability of offence/charge, if

any, made out against the petitioners under Sections 498-A,

406 and 506 IPC which shall be considered and decided by

the Court of competent jurisdiction, if required and desired.

47. Interim order, if any, is vacated. All the

miscellaneous applications are disposed of.

August 10, 2018 (Sandeep Sharma)
(aks) Judge.

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP

1 thought on “Yadwinder Singh & Others vs State Of H.P. & Others on 10 August, 2018

  1. A very good judgement by the HOn’ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh. Very well explained as well to avoid any chances of doubt. It is a must for the society, when the misuse of such laws has risen to a great extent, which is subsequently damaging the family structure of India. It has been remarked by the Hon’ble Apex court at many instances about the same and has been recommended to the Parliament as well for considering to bing about somechanges in such laws, but Parliament and other administrative oraganisation are hardly paying any heed to the importance of changes much needed.

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