IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
SHIMLA
Cr.M.M.O. No.12 of 2015
.
Judgment Reserved on: 06.07.2018
Date of decision: 10.08.2018
Yadwinder Singh Others ….Petitioners
Versus
State of H.P. Others ….Respondents
Coram
The Hon’ble Mr.Justice Sandeep Sharma,Judge.
Whether approved for reporting ? Yes.
For the Petitioner: Mr.R.K. Sharma, Senior Advocate with
Mr.Rakesh Kanoujia and Ms.Vidushi
Sharma, Advocates.
For Respondents 12: Mr.S.C. Sharma and Mr.Dinesh
Thakur, Additional Advocate Generals
with Mr.Amit Kumar Dhumal, Deputy
Advocate General.
For Respondent No.3: Mr.Ramakant Sharma, Senior
Advocate with Mr.Dinesh Bhatia,
Advocate.
Sandeep Sharma,J.
By way of instant petition filed under Section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short Cr.P.C.), a
prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioners to quash
FIR No.224, dated 7.10.2014, under Sections 498-A, 406,
506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and
consequent proceedings thereto.
Whether the reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgement? Yes.
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2. Before adverting to the factual matrix of the
present case, it may be noticed that Mr.R.K. Sharma,
learned Senior Counsel representing the petitioners,
.
confined his challenge to the jurisdiction of the Police at
Nalagarh or Baddi in the State of Himachal Pradesh to
investigate into the allegations leveled in the above referred
FIR. Mr.Sharma, while making his submissions, fairly
submitted that in case this Court, after having perused
material adduced on record, comes to the conclusion that
Police of Nalagarh/Baddi, Himachal Pradesh has jurisdiction
to investigate into allegations levelled into FIR, in that
eventuality, other prayer made in the petition for quashing of
FIR may also be considered. In view of aforesaid specific
prayer/submission made by learned Senior Counsel
representing the petitioners, this Court shall consider issue
with regard to jurisdiction of Nalagarh/Baddi Police to
investigate into the allegations levelled in the FIR at first
instance and in case, it comes to the conclusion that Police
Station, named as above, has jurisdiction, the second prayer
made in the petition, as referred hereinabove, shall be
examined accordingly.
3. In nutshell, facts of the case, for having bird’s
eye view, are that on 31.01.2013, an arranged marriage was
solemnized between petitioner No.4 namely; Akashdeep and
respondent No.3 namely; Nikita at Ropar, Punjab as per Sikh
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rites (hereinafter referred to as ‘petitioner-husband
respondent-wife’). It appears that immediately after marriage
certain differences cropped up between the petitioner-
.
husband and respondent-wife as well as their families and
after shorter duration couple also lived separately from their
parents in a separate house at Tara Singh Nagar,
Jallandhar, Punjab (for short ‘Pb’), however, they could not
get along for long. On the basis of allegations of beatings,
allegedly given by petitioner-husband and his parents to
respondent-wife, complaint was lodged with the Police
Authorities as well as Deputy Commissioner of Jallandhar
(Pb), who subsequently referred the matter to Women Cell,
Jallandhar (Pb). Allegedly on 4.8.2014, respondent-wife
came to Nalagarh, whereafter her father got her medically
examined at Chawla Hospital, Mohali on 5.8.2014. On
6.8.2014, respondent-wife again went back to her house at
Jallandhar (Pb), however, by that time allegedly petitioner-
husband had removed all the articles/things from her house.
On 17.8.2014 and thereafter on 24.8.2014 Women Cell at
Jallandhar (Pb) called both the petitioner-husband and
respondent-wife for re-conciliation, but no progress could be
made. Subsequently, on 27.8.2014, respondent-wife lodged
a complaint with SHO, Police Station, Nalagarh, District
Solan, Himachal Pradesh, which was forwarded to Women
Cell, Baddi. Women Cell, Baddi, after having respondent-
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wife medically checked, summoned all the petitioners. Since
on 7.10.2014, petitioner-husband refused to arrive at
amicable settlement, if any, with respondent-wife,
.
respondent-wife lodged complaint, dated 7.10.2014 and got
her statement recorded under Section 154 Cr.P.C., alleging
therein ill treatment given by the petitioner-husband after
marriage. She alleged in FIR that after solemnization of her
marriage with petitioner-husband, she was repeatedly
subjected to ill-treatment and harassment by the petitioners,
while she was living with them in her matrimonial home at
Jallandhar.
rRespondent-wife also alleged that petitioners,
on various occasions, demanded money, jewellery etc. and
despite having their demands fulfilled by her father, she was
not only abused with filthy language, but was also given
beatings. She further alleged that during pregnancy she had
stomachache and her mother made her consume some
medicines, as a consequence of which child in her womb
died. She also alleged that repeatedly she was teased by
saying that she has not brought appropriate dowry, whereas
her younger sister-in-law has brought sufficient dowry with
her. In the FIR, referred hereinabove, respondent-wife
alleged that petitioners, named hereinabove, apart from
causing physical and mental agony also gave her beatings
and extended threats to do away with her life. On the basis
of aforesaid statement recorded under Section 154 Cr.P.C.,
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Police at Police Station, Nalagarh, registered FIR bearing
No.224 against the petitioners under Sections 498-A, 406,
506 read with Section 34 IPC.
.
4. At this stage, it may be noticed that after lodging
of aforesaid FIR (Annexure P-14), police allegedly recorded
supplementary statement of respondent-wife under Section
161 Cr.P.C. dated 7.10.2014, which has been annexed as
Annexure R-3 with reply of respondents No.1 2, wherein
she alleged that she alongwith her mother Smt.Neelam and
father Shailinder Singh remained present during
investigation and on 26.8.2014 her husband Akashdeep
Singh, father-in-law Yadwinder Singh, mother-in-law Ranjit
Kaur and Devar (brother-in-law) Gaurav visited her parental
house at Nalagarh and asked her that they will resolve the
matter amicably by way of compromise, but, she told them
that she has filed a complaint before the police and police
shall settle the matter. Upon this, persons named in FIR got
adamant and started hurling abuses on her and also
extended threats to her to do away with her life.
Subsequently, police got respondent-wife medically
examined from Medical Officer, ESI Hospital, Jharmajri,
Tehsil Baddi, District Solan, H.P., who, after conducting
M.L.C. dated 22.8.2014, opined the alleged injury suffered
by respondent-wife to be grievous and on the basis of
aforesaid M.L.C., police added Section 325 IPC in the FIR.
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Police, after completion of investigation in the aforesaid FIR,
presented challan in the Court of learned Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Nalagarh, which is pending
.
adjudication.
5. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioners
vehemently argued that there is/was no territorial
jurisdiction with Police Station at Nalagarh to carry out the
investigation into the allegations contained in FIR because
bare reading of the contents of abovementioned FIR clearly
reveals that none of the alleged incident of cruelty, criminal
breach of trust and voluntary causing hurt, if any, had taken
place at Nalagarh, as such, Police Station at Nalagarh had
no jurisdiction to investigate into the FIR. In support of
aforesaid arguments learned Senior Counsel invited the
attention of this Court to Section 171 Cr.P.C. and also
placed reliance upon judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in
Amarendu Jyoti and Others vs. State of
Chhattisgarh, (2014)12 SCC 362. Mr.Sharma, learned
Senior Counsel further argued that otherwise also perusal of
allegations contained in FIR nowhere suggests that case, if
any, is made out against the petitioners under Sections 498-
A, 406, 506 read with Section 34 IPC because there is no
allegation that the petitioners ever raised demand for dowry.
He further argued that though in the FIR, respondent-wife,
has alleged that she was repeatedly teased on account of less
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dowry brought by her, but there is nothing on record that
she was subjected to cruelty as defined by Section 498-A of
IPC by the petitioners.
.
6. Lastly, Mr.Sharma, while making this Court to
peruse contents of FIR, made a serious attempt to persuade
this Court to agree with his contention that no incident of
beatings or maltreatment took place at Nalagarh, rather all
alleged incidents, if are presumed to be correct, happened at
Jallandhar prior to lodging of FIR at Nalagarh. Mr.Sharma
further submitted that there is no explanation available on
record that why respondent-wife forgot to mention about
alleged hurling of abuses and extension of threats by the
petitioners on 26.8.2014 at Nalagarh, while getting her first
statement recorded under Section 154 Cr.P.C. on the basis
of which FIR No.224 came to be registered against the
petitioners. Mr.Sharma, while referring to the supplementary
statement recorded by Police after lodging of FIR, contended
that Police at Nalagarh is hand-in-glove with respondent-
wife, who is a local resident of the area and she solely with a
view to falsely implicate the petitioners in a case purposely
got the supplementary statement recorded so that
jurisdiction at Nalalgarh is made out. Mr.Sharma further
contended that there is no allegation, either in the impugned
FIR or in other proceedings initiated by petitioner-husband
in different Courts at Nalagarh, that petitioners kept on
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harassing her even after her leaving Jallandhar and, as
such, there was no occasion for police at Nalagarh to take
cognizance of the contents of allegations contained in the
.
FIR. Mr.Sharma forcefully contended that dispute, if any,
between petitioner-husband and respondent-wife is purely
matrimonial and respondent-wife, solely with a view to teach
lesson to the petitioner-husband as well as her family
members i.e. petitioners No.1 to 3, has concocted false story
and petitioners have been falsely implicated in the case.
While referring to the MLC, adduced on record by the police
to conclude that petitioner-husband was given beatings at
Jallandhar, Mr.Sharma contended that alleged incident had
occurred on 3.8.2014 whereafter admittedly respondent-wife
appeared before Women Cell at Jallandhar and no such
incident was ever reported, hence no much importance can
be attached to such MLC, which was subsequently obtained
after 23 days of the alleged incident. With the aforesaid
submissions, Mr.Sharma prayed that FIR lodged by police of
Nalagarh as well as consequent proceedings pending in the
Court at Nalagarh may be quashed and set aside.
7. While refuting the aforesaid submissions having
been made by Mr.R.K.Sharma, learned Senior Counsel
representing the petitioners, Mr.Ramakant Sharma, learned
Senior Counsel, representing respondent-wife (respondent
No.3 herein), contended that in view of the contents of the
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FIR, Police of Police Station, Nalagarh, rightly investigated
the matter and lodged FIR against the petitioners.
Mr.Sharma further argued that a clear cut case under
.
Sections 498-A, 406, 506, 325 read with Section 34 IPC is
made out against the petitioners.
8. While referring to the allegations contained in
FIR., Mr.Ramakant Sharma argued that though initial
statement recorded under Section 154 Cr.P.C., on the basis
of which formal FIR came to be lodged against the
petitioners, itself reveals the commission of offence at
Nalagarh, but even otherwise supplementary statement
recorded on the same day clearly suggests that petitioners
not only hurled abuses to the respondent-wife at Nalagarh,
rather, while leaving her house, they extended threats to do
away with her life and, as such, FIR rightly came to be
lodged at Police Station Nalaglarh.
9. While refuting the submissions of learned Senior
Counsel that no case, if any, is made out against the
petitioners under Section 498-A, Mr.Ramakant Sharma,
strenuously argued that it is quiet apparent from the
contents of FIR that respondent-wife specifically alleged
against the petitioners that she was repeatedly teased and
harassed by the petitioners on account of bringing less
dowry and, as such, police rightly inserted Section 498-A in
the FIR. While making this Court to peruse supplementary
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statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. of the
respondent-wife, Mr.Sharma argued that the petitioners
continued to commit offence punishable under aforesaid
.
Sections even after respondent-wife had left her matrimonial
house at Jallandhar and, as such, even on that account also
Police at Nalagarh is/was well within its right to take
cognizance of the above allegations contained in the FIR.
10. Lastly, Mr.Sharma contended that since
pursuant to investigation conducted by the Police at
Nalalgarh in FIR No.224, challan stands filed in the
competent Court of law at Nalagarh, this Court may not
accede to prayer of quashing made on behalf of petitioners
while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
Cr.P.C. Mr.Sharma further argued that though this Court
enjoys vast powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., but such
powers are required to be exercised sparingly, carefully or
with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the
tests specifically laid down under Section 482 Cr.P.C. itself.
He further submitted that exercise of inherent powers should
not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution.
11. Mr.Sharma argued that supplementary
statement and evidence collected by police during
investigation makes it amply clear that the offence under
Section 498A IPC is made out against the petitioners and it
is not necessary that there should be demand of dowry for
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the purpose of attracting provision of Section 498A IPC as
has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in K.V. Prakash
Babu vs. State of Karnataka, (2017)11 SCC 176 and Bhaskar
.
Lal Sharma and Another vs. Monica and Others, (2014)3 SCC
383.
12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and
gone through the record of the case.
13. As has been noticed hereinabove, this Court at
first instance shall consider issue with regard to jurisdiction
of Nalagarh/Baddi Police to investigate into allegations
contained in the FIR.
14. In nutshell case, as projected by the petitioners,
is that the Police Station, Nalagarh has/had no territorial
jurisdiction to investigate the allegations levelled in the
impugned FIR and, as such, consequent action, if any,
pursuant to same, deserves to be quashed and set aside.
15. Before ascertaining the correctness and merit of
submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, it
would be profitable to take note of the following provisions of
law:-
“11. Sections 177, 178 and 181 of Code of
Criminal Procedure read as under:
“177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial.–
Every offence shall ordinary be
inquired into and tried by a court
within whose local jurisdiction it was
committed.
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178. Place of inquiry or trial.–(a) When it is
uncertain in which of several local
areas an offence was committed, or
(b) where an offence is committed partly
.
in one local area and party in another,
or
(c) where an offence is a continuing
one, and continues to be committed inmore local areas than one, or
(d) where it consists of several acts
done in different local areas, it may be
inquired into or tried by a Court having
jurisdiction over any of such localareas.
181. Place of trial in case of certain
r offences.–
(1) Any offence of being a thug, or
murder committed by a thug, ofdacoity, of dacoity with murder, of
belonging to a gang of dacoits, or of
escaping from custody, may be inquired
into or tried by a Court within whose
local jurisdiction the offence wascommitted or the accused person is
found.
(2) Any offence of kidnapping or
abduction of a person may be inquired
into or tried by a Court within whose
local jurisdiction the person waskidnapped or abducted or was
conveyed or concealed or detained.
(3) Any offence of theft, extortion or
robbery may be inquired into or tried by
a Court within whose local jurisdiction
the offence was committed or the stolen
property which is the subject of the
offence was possessed by any person
committing it or by any person who
received or retained such property
knowing or having reason to believe it
to be stolen property.
(4) Any offence of criminal
misappropriation or of criminal breach
of trust may be inquired into or tried by16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
13a Court within whose local jurisdiction
the offence was committed or any part
of the property which is the subject of
the offence was received or retained, or
was required to be returned or.
accounted for, by the accused person.
(5) Any offence which includes the
possession of stolen property may be
inquired into or tried by a Court withinwhose local jurisdiction the offence
was committed or the stolen property
was possessed by any person who
received or retained it knowing or
having reason to believe it to be stolen
property.”
16.
Close scrutiny of aforesaid provisions of law
clearly suggests that Section 177 Cr.P.C. lays down a general
rule with regard to place where a case can be inquired into
and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was
committed, whereas Sections 178 and 181 Cr.P.C. are
exception to the aforesaid general rule contained in Section
177 Cr.P.C. Sub-section (c) of Section 178 Cr.P.C. provides
that where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to
be committed in more local areas than one, it may be
inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any
of such local areas. Sub-section (4) of Section 181 Cr.P.C.
lays down that any offence of criminal misappropriation or of
criminal breach of trust may be inquired into or tried by a
Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was
committed or any part of the property which is the subject of
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the offence was received or retained, or was required to be
returned or accounted for, by the accused person.
17. In the case at hand, bare perusal of FIR lodged
.
by respondent-wife clearly suggests that all the alleged
incidents with respect to cruelty, voluntary causing hurt and
breach of trust, had allegedly occurred at Jallandhar (Pb)
and not at Nalagarh (HP). Similarly, cruelty and humiliating
treatment, alleged to have been given by the petitioner-
husband to respondent-wife on account of bringing less
dowry, is also alleged to have taken place at her matrimonial
home at Jallandhar (Pb) and not at Nalagarh (HP). FIR in
question nowhere reveals that demands of money, gifts and
jewellery were ever made at Nalagarh, rather as per own case
set up by respondent-wife she was allegedly given beatings
by her husband and other family members at Jallandhar
and subsequently the matter on the complaint of
respondent-wife came to be referred to the Women Cell at
Jallandhar. As per contents of FIR, on 17.8.2014 and
thereafter on 24.8.2014, Women Cell at Jallandhar, called
both the petitioner-husband and respondent-wife for
reconciliation and subsequently on 27.8.2014, respondent-
wife lodged complaint with SHO, Police Station, Nalagarh,
which ultimately came to be forwarded to Women Cell,
Baddi. Though respondent-wife has alleged in the FIR that
on various occasions, petitioners demanded money and
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jewellery and abused her, but all such alleged incidents
allegedly happened at Jallandhar (Pb) and not at Nalagarh
(HP). Respondent-wife also alleged in the FIR that during
.
pregnancy, she had stomach-ache and her mother made her
consume some medicines, as a consequence of which child
in her womb died, but, such incident, if any, also happened
at Jallandhar. There is no narration of incident, if any,
occurred at Nalagarh. Respondent-wife has alleged that on
account of beatings given by her husband to her at
Jallandhar, her father got her medically examined at Chawla
Hospital, Mohali on 5.8.2014 and Women Cell, Baddi (HP),
taking note of aforesaid alleged incident of beatings, which
had happened at Jallandhar (Pb), got respondent-wife
medically examined by Medical Officer in Himachal Pradesh
and thereafter added Section 325 IPC in the FIR.
18. Having carefully perused the contents of FIR
lodged with Police Station, Nalagarh, dated 7.8.2014, this
Court is persuaded to agree with contention of Shri R.K.
Sharma, learned Senior Counsel representing the petitioner-
husband, that since none of the alleged incident of cruelty,
criminal breach of trust and voluntary causing hurt had
taken place at Nalagarh and, as such, Nalagarh Police had
no jurisdiction to investigate into the FIR. True, it is, that
respondent-wife subsequently on 7.10.2014, got her
supplementary statement recorded under Section 161
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Cr.P.C., (Annexure R-3, annexed with the reply of
respondents No.1 and 2), alleging therein that on 26.8.2014
her husband Akashdeep Singh, father-in-law Yadwinder
.
Singh, mother-in-law Ranjit Kaur and Devar (brother-in-law)
Gaurav visited her parental house at Nalagarh and asked her
to resolve the matter amicably by way of compromise, but,
when she told them that she has filed complaint before the
police, they got adamant and started hurling abuses on her
and also extended threats to her to do away with her life.
But, now question, which remains to be adjudicated, is
whether allegations contained in supplementary statement of
respondent-wife, recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., can be
read in continuation to FIR dated 7.10.2014. Admittedly
respondent-wife in her initial statement under Section 154
Cr.P.C. chose not to allege that on 26.8.2014, her husband
Akashdeep Singh, father-in-law Yadwinder Singh, mother-in-
law Ranjit Kaur and Devar (brother-in-law) Gaurav, hurled
abuses and extended threats to her at Nalagarh. Needless to
say, investigating agency can make addition or deletion in
FIR, on the basis of investigation, and, as such, there
appears to be no force in the arguments of Shri R.K.
Sharma, learned Senior Counsel, that supplementary
statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. cannot be
read as a part of FIR, dated 7.10.2014, filed at the behest of
respondent-wife at Nalagarh. Careful perusal of record,
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especially statement of parents of respondent-wife recorded
at the time of lodging FIR on 7.10.2014, nowhere suggests
that alleged incident of 26.8.2014 was ever reported to the
.
police at first instance, even if, for the sake of arguments, it
is presumed and accepted that respondent-wife forgot to
mention aforesaid alleged incident of 26.8.2014, while
lodging FIR, dated 7.10.2014, but, it cannot be accepted that
parents of respondent-wife, whose statements were also
recorded at the time of lodging FIR on 7.8.2014, also
inadvertently failed to state with regard to alleged incident of
26.8.2014.
r Documents adduced on record, especially
reply/status report filed by investigating agency, while
opposing bail of bail petitioners, nowhere suggests that
alleged incident, if any, happened/occurred on 26.8.2014
was ever brought to the notice of Court, who was dealing
with the application for grant of bail made on behalf of the
petitioners. Apart from above, there is no mention, if any, of
aforesaid incident of 26.8.2014 in the other proceedings
initiated by respondent-wife against the petitioner-husband
under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005
and under Section 125 Cr.P.C. for maintenance. Even in the
statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., respondent-
wife simply alleged that on 26.8.2014, she was extended
threats and hurled abuses by the petitioners, but there is no
allegation that the petitioners demanded dowry and when
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their demand was not fulfilled, they insulted her, rather
respondent-wife has stated that the petitioners asked her to
get the dispute settled amicably.
.
19. Having carefully perused the contents of the FIR
including supplementary statement recorded under Section
161 Cr.P.C. of respondent-wife, dated 7.10.2014, this Court
has no hesitation to conclude that Police of Police Station,
Nalagarh, has/had no jurisdiction to conduct investigation of
allegations as recorded in FIR because all the alleged
incidents, as narrated in the FIR, actually occurred/
happened at Jallandhar and not at Nalagarh and it is only
Police Station at Jallandhar, who has/had the jurisdiction to
conduct investigation, pursuant to complaint, if any, lodged
by respondent-wife at Jallandhar (Pb). At this stage, it
would be appropriate to place reliance upon judgment
rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Amarendu Jyoti’s case
supra, wherein it has held as under:-
“5. Aggrieved by the rejection of the application
Under Section 482 of the Code, the Appellantshave approached this Court by way of special
leave to appeal. The main contention on
behalf of the Appellants was that the F.I.R.
did not disclose a continuing offence. The
offence, if any, was alleged to have been
committed only at Delhi and there was no
question of any offence having been
committed after Respondent 2 went to stay at
Ambikapur. The learned counsel for the
appellants relied on the decision of this Court
in Manish Ratan v. State of M.P., (2007)1 SCC
262.16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
19
6. In Manish Ratan case, in the complaint, the
incident was said to have taken place in
Jabalpur. The wife had left her matrimonial
house and started residing at Datia. The
criminal revision filed by the accused,.
questioning the jurisdiction of the Court at
Datia, was dismissed opining that the offence
was a continuing one, and therefore, the
Datia Court had jurisdiction to take
cognizance. The High Court held that theCourt at Datia also has jurisdiction to try the
case since the harassment to the wife
continued at the place where she was
residing with her father “since she was forced
to live at her father’s place on account of the
torture of the in-laws and as such it cansafely be said that there was also a mental
cruelty.” This conclusion of the High Court
was dubbed as curious by this Court since the
High Court found earlier that “there is
nothing in the complaint to show that anymaltreatment was given to the Appellant at
Datia. The allegations, which I may repeathere, are that the maltreatment was given
within a specific period at Jabalpur.” After
looking at the decided cases on the point i.e.
Sujata Mukherjee v. Prashant Kumar
Mukherjee, (1997)5 SCC 30, State of Bihar v.
Deokaran Nenshi, (1972)2 SCC 890, Y.
Abraham Ajith v. Inspector of Police, (2004)8
SCC 100 and Ramesh v. State of T.N., (2005)3
SCC 507, this Court held that the order of the
High Court was unsustainable, and therefore,set it aside. It is not only that in the interest
of justice, while setting aside the order of theHigh Court, this Court also directed the
transfer of the criminal case pending in the
Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Datia,
where the wife was staying with her father tothe Court of the Judicial, Jabalpur (vide para
18).
7. Relying on the judgment of this Court in
Manish Ratan case , the learned counsel for
the appellants contended that the offence in
the present case cannot be considered to be a
continuing offence, if any, and must be taken
to have been complete at Delhi and no cause
of action can be said to have arisen at
Ambikapur. As must necessarily be, the
application of law and the consequences
must vary from case to case.
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8. The core question thus is whether the
allegations made in the FIR constitute a
continuing offence.
9. We find from the FIR that all the incidents
.
alleged by the complainant in respect of the
alleged cruelty are said to have occurred at
Delhi. The cruel and humiliating words
spoken to the 2nd respondent, wife by her
husband, elder brother-in-law and eldersister-in-law for bringing less dowry are said
to have been uttered at Delhi. Allegedly,
arbitrary demands of lakhs of rupees in
dowry have been made in Delhi. The incident
of beating and dragging Respondent 2 and
abusing her in filthy language also are saidto have taken place at Delhi. Suffice it to say
that all overt acts, which are said to have
constituted cruelty have allegedly taken
place at Delhi.
10. The allegations as to what has happened at
Ambikapur are as follows:
“No purposeful information has been received
from the in-laws of Kiran even on contacting
on telephone till today. They have been
threatened and abused and two years have
been elapsed and the in-laws have not shownany interest to call her to her matrimonial
home and since then Kiran is making her
both ends meet in her parental home. To get
rid of the ill-treatment and harassment ofthe in-laws of Kiran, the complainant is
praying for registration of an FIR and
request for immediate legal action so thatKiran may get appropriate justice.”
11. We find that the offence of cruelty cannot be
said to be a continuing one as contemplatedby Sections 178 and 179 of the Code. We do
not agree with the High Court that in this
case the mental cruelty inflicted upon
Respondent 2 “continued unabated” on
account of no effort having been made by the
appellants to take her back to her
matrimonial home, and the threats given by
the appellants over the telephone. It might be
noted incidentally that the High Court does
not make reference to any particular piece of
evidence regarding the threats said to have
been given by the appellants over the
telephone. Thus, going by the complaint, we
are of the view that it cannot be held that the16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
21Court at Ambikapur has jurisdiction to try
the offence since the appropriate Court at
Delhi would have jurisdiction to try the said
offence. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.”
.
20. Applying the aforesaid exposition of law laid
down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Amarendu Jyoti’s case
supra, argument advanced by Mr.Ramakant Sharma,
learned Senior Counsel representing the respondent-wife,
that alleged offence of cruelty is continuing one, deserves
outright rejection. Contention of Shri Ramakant Sharma,
that bare perusal of supplementary statement of respondent-
wife recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. suggests that
petitioners continued to commit offence punishable under
the aforesaid provisions, is not at all tenable because there is
no mention, if any, with regard to demand of dowry, beatings
and criminal breach of trust, if any, at Nalagarh, rather
contents of FIR suggest beyond doubt that all the alleged
incidents, as narrated in the FIR in question, allegedly
happened at Jallandhar.
21. As has been noticed hereinabove, even if, it is
presumed that the respondents-wife had suffered fracture on
account of beatings given by her husband, alleged incident
also happened at Jallandhar and not at Nalagarh. Mere
medical examination of respondent-wife within the territorial
jurisdiction of Nalagarh Police shall not confer any territorial
jurisdiction upon the Police at Nalagarh to investigate the
16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
22
incident, which actually happened beyond its territorial
jurisdiction.
22. Similarly, this Court sees no reason to agree
.
with the contention of Mr.Ramakant Sharma, learned Senior
Counsel, that mental cruelty inflicted upon respondent-wife
continued on account of persistent demand made by the
petitioners to bring the dowry, because there is no whisper,
if any, in the FIR that after departure of respondent-wife
from Jallandhar to her parental house, demand, if any, was
ever raised for dowry by the petitioners, rather respondent-
wife in her supplementary statement categorically stated to
the police that petitioners on 26.8.2014 had come to her
house and asked her to settle the matter amicably. Though
in her supplementary statement, she mentioned that the
petitioners, while leaving her parental house, extended
threats and hurled abuses to her, but there is no plausible
explanation rendered on record by respondent-wife that what
prevented her from narrating this incident to police at first
instance while getting her statement recorded under Section
154 Cr.P.C., on the basis of which formal FIR came to be
lodged at Nalagarh on 7.10.2014.
23. This Court has no hesitation to agree with the
contention of Shri Ramakant Sharma, learned Senior
Counsel, that since respondent-wife was mentally disturbed
at the time of lodging FIR, she forgot to mention incident on
16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
23
26.8.2014, but, as has been noticed above, there is nothing
in the statement of parents of respondent-wife, recorded
pursuant to lodging of FIR on 7.10.2014, with regard to
.
alleged incident of 26.8.2014, and, as such, there appears to
be some force in the arguments of Mr.R.K Sharma, learned
Senior Counsel for the petitioners that Police at Nalagarh,
solely with a view to have jurisdiction to inquire into the
contents of FIR, dated 7.10.2014, purposely got the
supplementary statement of respondent-wife recorded after
lodging of FIR on 7.10.2014. Even if it is presumed to be
correct that on 26.8.2014 petitioners had hurled abuses or
extended threats to the respondent-wife, case, if any, could
be registered against the petitioners under Section 506 read
with Section 34 IPC at Nalagarh and not under Section 498-
A, 406 325 IPC.
24. Since no specific allegations are contained in the
FIR with regard to demand of dowry by the petitioners at
Nalagarh, no case could be registered against the petitioners
under Section 498-A IPC at Police Station, Nalagarh. So far
as offence under Section 406 IPC is concerned, it is evident
from the perusal of FIR that there is no allegation that any
article, given at the time of marriage, was entrusted/given to
the petitioners at Nalagarh. It is also not the case of
respondent-wife that dowry articles etc. entrusted to the
petitioners at Jallandhar were promised to be returned back
16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
24
at Nalagarh or were demanded to be returned back at
Nalagarh. As far as commission of offence, if any, under
Section 325 IPC is concerned, which subsequently came to
.
be added in FIR, at the cost of repetition, it may be stated
that incident of beatings, in which respondent-wife allegedly
suffered grievous injury, had allegedly happened/occurred at
Jallandhar, as per own statement of respondent-wife and as
such police at Nalagarh has/had no jurisdiction to register a
case against the petitioner-husband on this account also at
police station, Nalagarh(HP).
25.
Mr. Ramakant Sharma, learned Senior Counsel
representing the respondent-wife, in support of his
contention that in view of allegations contained in FIR as
well as supplementary statement made by the respondent-
wife on the same day, Police at Nalagarh had jurisdiction to
investigate the matter, placed reliance upon the following
judgments:-
(i) Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC
349, (Para-6).
(ii) Sunita Kumari Kashyap vs. State of Bihar
and Another, (2011)11 SCC 301 (Para-17).
(iii) Y.Abraham Ajith and Others vs. Inspector of
Police, Chennai and Another, (2004)8 SCC 100
(para-8).
(iv) State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Suresh Kaushal
and another, 2002 Crl.L.J. 217 (paras 6 7).
16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
25
26. Mr.Sharma further contended that perusal of
FIR as well as supplementary statement of respondent-wife
made on 7.10.2014 and evidence collected by police during
.
investigation makes it amply clear that offence under Section
498-A IPC is made out against the petitioners and as such
police at Nalagarh had jurisdiction to look into the
allegations leveled by the respondent-wife. He further
argued that it is not necessary that there should be demand
of dowry for the purpose of attracting provisions of Section
498-A IPC, as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the
judgments reported in K.V. Prakash Babu vs. State of
Karnataka, (2017)11 SCC 176 and Bhaskar Lal Sharma and
Another vs. Monica and Others, (2014)3 SCC 383.
27. Before adverting to the aforesaid law relied
upon by learned Senior Counsel representing the
respondent-wife, it may be observed that at this stage Court
is not considering sustainability of charge, if any, and
allegation against the petitioners with regard to commission
of offence, if any, under Section 498-A, 406 and 506 IPC,
rather endeavour of Court is to explore answer to the
question whether police at Nalagarh has/had jurisdiction to
investigate into the allegations contained in the FIR lodged at
the behest of respondent-wife and whether Court at
Nalagarh has/had jurisdiction to continue with the
proceedings based upon the investigation carried out by the
16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
26
Police at Nalagarh, pursuant to FIR dated 7.10.2014 lodged
by respondent-wife.
28. Having carefully perused facts of the case before
.
Hon’ble Apex Court in case reported in Kartar Singh’s case
supra, this Court is of the view that the same are not
applicable in the present facts and circumstances of the
case. As has been already observed above, it is always open
for investigating agency to take into consideration
subsequent developments/facts, if any, collected during
investigation, but question before this Court is that what
prevented respondent-wife i.e. complainant from disclosing
facts which were otherwise in her knowledge at the time of
lodging FIR. True, it is, that one can forget mentioning
certain facts at the time of lodging first report, but as has
been observed in the earlier part of the judgment that it is
not only respondent-wife who forgot to mention with regard
to alleged incident of 26.8.2014, rather her parents, who also
in their statements recorded at the time of lodging FIR on
7.10.2014 failed to mention factum with regard to alleged
incident of 26.8.2014, wherein petitioners had allegedly
hurled abuses and extended threats to respondent-wife.
Otherwise also Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case supra, has
not returned specific finding that every supplementary
statement recorded by the complainant after lodging of FIR is
required to be taken into consideration, rather in the case
16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
27
before the Hon’ble Apex Court facts were altogether different,
wherein complainant had forgot to mention the name of
driver, who was also present at the site of occurrence at the
.
time of alleged incident and as such his name was
subsequently disclosed by the complainant in her
supplementary statement.
29. Similarly, judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex
Court in Sunita Kumari Kashyap’s case supra, is also not
applicable in the present case because in that case
complainant-wife had specifically alleged that while she was
in her matrimonial house at Ranchi and was pregnant, she
was forcibly left at her parental house at Gaya by her
husband, who thereafter continued to harass her.
Complainant also alleged that even after birth of child,
respondent-husband continued to harass her at Gaya by
raising new demand that unless her father gives his house at
Gaya to him she will not be taken to Gaya. Hon’ble Apex
Court having perused record, more particularly complaint
filed on behalf of the wife, arrived at a conclusion that there
was ill-treatment and cruelty at the hands of her husband
and his family members at the matrimonial home at Ranchi
and because of their actions and threat she was forcibly
taken to her parental home at Gaya where she initiated the
criminal proceedings against them for offences punishable
under Sections 498A and 406/34 IPC and Sections 3 and 4
16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
28
of the D.P. Act. Hon’ble Apex Court, in view of specific
assertion by the appellant-wife about the ill-treatment and
cruelty at the hands of the husband and his relatives at
.
Ranchi and of the fact that because of their action, she was
taken to her parental home at Gaya by her husband with a
threat of dire consequences for not fulfilling their demand of
dowry, arrived at a conclusion that in view of Sections 178
and 179 of the Code, the offence in this case was a
continuing one having been committed in more local areas
and one of the local areas being Gaya, the learned Magistrate
at Gaya has jurisdiction to proceed with the criminal case
instituted therein. Hon’ble Apex Court further held that the
offence was a continuing one and the episode at Gaya was
only a consequence of continuing offence of harassment or
ill-treatment meted out to the complainant. Hon’ble Apex
Court, having perused allegations of the complainant, held
that it is a continuing offence of ill-treatment and
humiliation meted out to the appellant at the hands of all
the accused persons, therefore, undoubtedly clause (c) of
Section 178 of the Code is clearly attracted.
30. However, facts of the case at hand are clearly
distinguishable. In the case at hand allegations contained in
FIR that respondent-wife was ill-treated and harassed by
petitioners for bringing less dowry, but definitely there is
nothing in the FIR that complainant/respondent-wife was ill-
16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
29
treated by her husband at her parental house and even after
her departure from matrimonial house, all the petitioners
kept on raising demand for dowry, rather supplementary
.
statement made by the respondent-wife itself suggests that
after registration of FIR at Nalagarh, petitioners made an
attempt for amicable settlement but same was not
acceptable to the respondent-wife. In the case supra before
Hon’ble Apex Court complainant-wife was able to show that
alleged offence of cruelty continued not at place called Gaya
rather at a number of places, but as has been discussed
herein above, respondent-wife in the case at hand has not
been able to show commission of offence, if any, at Nalagarh.
31. In the other case relied upon on behalf of the
respondents i.e. State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Suresh
Kaushal and another, 2002 Crl.L.J. 217, allegation was that
wife was subjected to physical torture when she was in the
family way and she had to be taken back to her parental
house at Jabalpur. The miscarriage took place while she was
at Jabalpur. Section 313 IPC came to be included in the
charge as the cumulative effect of all the allegations ending
with the consequence of the miscarriage which took place at
Jabalpur. High Court at Jabalpur having perused record
arrived at a conclusion that the Court at Jabalpur has no
jurisdiction at all for trying the case. Learned Single Judge
dealing with the case observed that alleged offence under
16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
30
Section 313 IPC was committed outside the city of Jabalpur
and as such courts at Jabalpur therefore, have no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the aforesaid offences
.
against the Petitioners. Learned Single Judge further
observed that the competency of the Court to take
jurisdiction is determined by the place in which the offence
is alleged to have been committed and held that it is settled
law that the Magistrate, within whose local jurisdiction the
offence is alleged to have been committed is authorized to
take cognizance, and either to try the case himself or to
commit it to the Court of Sessions. Learned Single Judge
further arrived at a conclusion that since the alleged offence
has not been committed within the local jurisdiction of the
Magistrate at Jabalpur, the learned Judge to whom the case
has been committed by the learned Magistrate of Jabalpur
has no power to try the petitioners for the alleged offences
which were allegedly committed wholly outside the local
limits of his jurisdiction. However, Hon’ble Apex Court,
while interpreting provisions contained in Section 179
Cr.P.C., observed that the said section contemplates two
courts having jurisdiction and the trial is permitted to take
place in any one of those two Courts. One is the court within
whose local jurisdiction the act has been done and the other
is the court within whose local jurisdiction the consequence
has ensued. Hon’ble Apex Court further held that when the
16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
31
allegation is that the miscarriage took place at Jabalpur it
cannot be contended that the court at Jabalpur could not
have acquired jurisdiction as the acts alleged against the
.
accused took place at Indore. Hon’ble Apex Court further
held that apart from above, when the High Court found that
the courts at Jabalpur had no jurisdiction, the course
adopted by the High Court by quashing the entire criminal
proceedings is not permissible in law, rather the High Court
should have transferred the case to the court which it found
to be vested with jurisdiction and observed that we cannot
appreciate the course adopted by the High Court in quashing
the whole criminal proceedings against the accused.
32. Having carefully perused facts of the case which
were before Hon’ble Apex Court as well as ratio laid down by
Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case supra this Court is of the
view that same is not applicable in the present facts and
circumstances wherein admittedly there is no specific
allegation, if any, with regard to incident of cruelty, criminal
breach of trust and ill-treatment by the petitioners at
Nalagarh, rather, respondent-wife of her own volition left her
matrimonial home at Jallandhar and came back to her
parental house at Nalagarh.
33. In the case at hand allegation contained in the
FIR itself suggests that complainant herself left the house of
the husband on 4.8.2014 on account of alleged dowry
16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
32
demand made by the husband and other family members.
As noticed above, there is not a whisper about allegation of
any dowry demand made at Nalagarh and, as such, logic of
.
Section 178(c) Cr.P.C. cannot be applied. Hon’ble Apex
Court in Y.Abraham Ajith’s case supra, reiterated the well
established common law/Rules referred to in Halsbury’s
Laws of England (Vol. IX para 83) that the proper and
ordinary venue for the trial of a crime is the area of
jurisdiction in which, on the evidence, the facts occur and
which is alleged to constitute the crime. The Hon’ble Apex
Court in Y.Abraham Ajith’s case supra has held as under:-
“8. Sections 177 to 186 deal with venue and
place of trial. Section 177 reiterates the well-
established common law rule referred to inHalsbury’s Laws of England (Vol. IX para 83)
that the proper and ordinary venue for the
trial of a crime is the area of jurisdiction in
which, on the evidence, the facts occur and
which are alleged to constitute the crime.
There are several exceptions to this general
rule and some of them are, so far as thepresent case is concerned, indicated in
Section 178 of the Code which read as
follows:
“Section 178 Place of inquiry or trial.–
(a) When it is uncertain in which of several
local areas an offence was committed,
or
(b) where an offence is committed partly in
one local area and partly in another, or
(c) where an offence is continuing one, and
continues to be committed in more local
areas than one, or16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
33
(d) where it consists of several acts done in
different local areas, it may be inquired
into or tried by a Court having
jurisdiction over any of such local
areas.”
.
9. “All crime is local, the jurisdiction over the
crime belongs to the country where the crime
is committed”, as observed by Blackstone. A
significant word used in Section 177 of the
Code is “ordinarily”. Use of the word indicatesthat the provision is a general one and must
be read subject to the special provisions
contained in the Code. As observed by the
Court in Purushottamdas Dalmia v. State of
West Bengal, (AIR 1961 SC 1589),L.N.Mukherjee V. State of Madras (AIR 1961
SC 1601), Banwarilal Jhunjhunwalla and
Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. (AIR 1963 SC
1620) and Mohan Baitha and Ors. v. State of
Bihar and Anr. (2001 (4) SCC 350), exception
implied by the word “ordinarily” need not belimited to those specially provided for by the
law and exceptions may be provided by law
on consideration or may be implied from the
provisions of law permitting joint trial of
offences by the same Court. No such exception
is applicable to the case at hand.
10. As observed by this Court in State of Bihar v.
Deokaran Nenshi and Anr. (AIR 1973 SC 908),
continuing offence is one which is susceptible
of continuance and is distinguishable fromthe one which is committed once and for all,
that it is one of those offences which arises
out of the failure to obey or comply with arule or its requirement and which involves a
penalty, liability continues till compliance,
that on every occasion such disobedience or
non-compliance occurs or recurs, there is theoffence committed.
11. A similar plea relating to continuance of the
offence was examined by this Court in Sujata
Mukherjee (Smt.) v. Prashant Kumar
Mukherjee (1997 (5) SCC 30). There the
allegations related to commission of alleged
offences punishable under Section 498-A, 506
and 323 IPC. On the factual background, it
was noted that though the dowry demands
were made earlier the husband of the
complainant went to the place where
complainant was residing and had assaulted16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
34her. This Court held in that factual
background that clause (c) of Section 178 was
attracted. But in the present case the factual
position is different and the complainant
herself left the house of the husband on.
15.4.1997 on account of alleged dowry
demands by the husband and his relations.
There is thereafter not even a whisper of
allegations about any demand of dowry or
commission of any act constituting an offencemuch less at Chennai. That being so, the
logic of Section 178 (c) of the Code relating to
continuance of the offences cannot be
applied.
12. The crucial question is whether any part of
the cause of action arose within the
jurisdiction of the Court concerned. In terms
of Section 177 of the Code it is the place
where the offence was committed. In essence
it is the cause of action for initiation of theproceedings against the accused.
13. While in civil cases, normally the expression
“cause of action” is used, in criminal cases as
stated in Section 177 of the Code, reference is
to the local jurisdiction where the offence is
committed. These variations in etymologicalexpression do not really make the position
different. The expression “cause of action” is
therefore not a stranger to criminal cases.
14. It is settled law that cause of action consists
of bundle of facts, which give cause to
enforce the legal inquiry for redress in acourt of law. In other words, it is a bundle of
facts, which taken with the law applicable to
them, gives the allegedly affected party a
right to claim relief against the opponent. Itmust include some act done by the latter
since in the absence of such an act no cause
of action would possibly accrue or would
arise.”
34. Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment referred
hereinabove has categorically held that it is settled law that
cause of action consists of bundle of facts, which give cause
to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a Court of law. In
16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
35
other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law
applicable to them, gives the allegedly affected party a right
to claim relief against the opponent. It must include some
.
act done by the latter since in the absence of such an act no
cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise. Most
importantly in the judgment referred above Hon’ble Apex
Court has categorically held that in terms of Section 177, it
is the place where the offence was committed and in essence
it is the cause of action for initiation of the proceedings
against the accused. In the case at hand, there is not even a
whisper of allegation about the demand of dowry much less
at Nalagarh, as such, this Court has no hesitation to
conclude that the logic of Section 178(c) of the Code relating
to continuance of the offences cannot be applied in the
present facts and circumstances of the case.
35. Having closely examined/analyzed the facts of
the case at hand, it is amply clear that exceptions to the
general rule, as provided in Sections 178 and 182 Cr.P.C.,
are not applicable in the case in hand. Police Station at
Nalagarh has/had no jurisdiction to conduct investigation of
the allegations levelled in the impugned FIR. Jurisdiction, if
any, to inquire into the contents as contained in FIR, is/was
with police station at Jallandhar, as all the incidents
happened/occurred at Jallandhar (Punjab) and not at
Nalagarh (Himachal Pradesh). Since respondent-wife before
16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
36
lodging FIR at Nalagarh had lodged complaint at Women
Cell, Jallandhar, she could pursue the same at Jallandhar
and definitely, on the basis of allegations contained in FIR in
.
question lodged at Nalagarh, no case could be registered
against the petitioners at Nalagarh.
36. As far as another contention of Shri Ramakant
Sharma, learned Senior Counsel that since the proceedings,
consequent to lodging of FIR in question at Nalagarh, are
pending adjudication before competent Court of law at
Nalagarh, the instant petition, is not maintainable, also
deserves to be rejected because once it stands established on
record that Police Station, Nalagarh, has/had no territorial
jurisdiction to inquire into the contents of FIR lodged at the
behest of respondent-wife, no consequential proceedings
pursuant to the investigation carried out by Police at
Nalagarh in the FIR can be allowed to sustain. Since, this
Court has arrived at definite conclusion that Police has/had
no territorial jurisdiction to investigate contents of impugned
FIR, Court at Nalagarh is/was not competent to take
cognizance of investigation/challan filed by the police and as
such same also deserves to be quashed and set aside.
37. Reliance placed upon judgment of Hon’ble Apex
Court in State of Bihar and another etc. etc. vs. Shri P.P.
Sharma and another etc. etc., AIR 1991 SC 1260 is wholly
mis-placed and it does not fit into the present facts and
16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
37
circumstances of the case and as such same cannot be
applied.
38. In the case supra, Hon’ble Apex Court observed
.
that mere allegations of mala-fide against the informant
based on the facts after the lodging of the FIR were of no
consequence and could not be made basis for quashing the
proceedings. Hon’ble Apex Court further held that simply
because the Investigating Officer, while acting bonafidely
ruled out certain documents as irrelevant, cannot be ground
to assume that he acted malafidely. No doubt, in the present
case Hon’ble Apex Court held that when the police report
under Section 173 Cr.P.C. is forwarded to the Magistrate
after completion of investigation and the material collected
by the investigating officer is under the gaze of judicial
scrutiny, the High Court would do well to discipline itself not
to undertake quashing proceedings at that stage in exercise
of its inherent jurisdiction, but the aforesaid observation
made by the Hon’ble Apex Court is altogether in different
context and in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.
39. In the case before Hon’ble Apex Court there were
allegations of malafide against the informant and
investigating officer and Hon’ble Apex Court held that the
same cannot be basis for quashing the proceedings because
non-annexing of certain documents being irrelevant by the
investigating officer cannot be a ground to assume that he
16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
38
acted malafidely. Hon’ble Apex Court, on the basis of
material before it, arrived at a conclusion that the dominant
purpose for registering the case against the respondents was
.
to have an investigation done into the allegations contained
in the FIR and in the event of there being sufficient material
in support of the allegations to present the charge sheet
before the court. Similarly, there is no material to show that
the dominant object of registering the case was the character
assassination of the respondents or to harass and humiliate
them. Hon’ble Apex Court set aside the judgment passed by
High Court
r of Patna, wherein it had quashed the
proceedings. But, in the present case when it is quiet
apparent that police at Nalagarh had no jurisdiction to look
into the allegations contained in the FIR, consequential
proceeding, if any, initiated pursuant to report presented
under Section 173 Cr.P.C. by the police at Nalagarh cannot
be allowed to sustain, hence aforesaid judgment relied upon
by the learned Senior Counsel has no application. Had the
Police at Nalagarh(HP) jurisdiction to look into the contents
of FIR lodged at the behest of respondent-wife and on the
basis of investigation carried out by the police challan was
presented in the competent Court of law, definitely aforesaid
judgment could be applied and it could be concluded that
since challan stood filed, Court cannot interfere while
exercising powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. But in the
16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
39
present case facts are otherwise as has been discussed
hereinabove and as such this case has no application.
40. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Shri P.P. Sharma’s
.
case supra held as under:-
“33. The above order was brought to the notice of
the Patna High Court but the High Courtrefused to be persuaded to adopt the same
course. We are of the considered view that at
a stage when the police report under S.173
Cr. P.C. has been forwarded to the Magistrate
after completion of the investigation and thematerial collected by the investigating officer
is under the gaze of judicial scrutiny, the
High Court would do well to discipline itself
not to undertake quashing proceedings at
that stage in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction. We could have set aside the High
rCourt judgment on this ground alone butelaborate argument having been addressed by
the learned counsel for the parties we
thought it proper to deal with all the aspects
of the case.”
41. There cannot be any quarrel with the argument
advanced by Mr.Ramakant Sharma, learned Senior Counsel
that by now it is well settled that High Court while exercising
power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. though has wide powers
but those are to be exercised sparingly, carefully or with
caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests
specifically laid down under Section 482 Cr.P.C. itself.
Mr.Sharma in support of aforesaid submission also placed
reliance upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court
in Ghanshyam Sharma vs. Surendra Kumar Sharma and
Others, (2014)13 SCC 401 (para-8), Suresh Chandra Swain vs.
16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
40
State of Orissa, 1988 Crl.L.J. 1175 (para-11(3)) and Varala
Bharath Kumar vs. State of Telangana and Another, (2017)9
SCC 413 (para-7). Since in all the judgments referred
.
hereinabove similar principle of law has been laid down by
the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court would only be dealing
with the latest judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in
Varala Bharath Kumar’s case supra.
42. In the aforesaid judgment Hon’ble Apex Court
has held that extra ordinary power under Article 226 or
inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure can be exercised by the High Court, either to
prevent abuse of process of the court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice. Hon’ble Apex Court though in the
aforesaid judgment has observed that while exercising power
under Section 482 or under Article 226 in such matters, the
court does not function as a Court of Appeal or Revision but
held that inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code
though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully or with
caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests
specifically laid down under Section 482 itself. It is to be
exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial
justice, for the administration of which alone courts exist.
The Hon’ble Apex Court further held that the Court must be
careful and should see that its decision in exercise of its
power is based on sound principles. The inherent powers
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41
should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution.
But, on the top of everything, Hon’ble Court has categorically
held that no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to
.
cases in which the High Court will exercise its extra ordinary
jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage. It
would be profitable to take note of following paras of the
aforesaid judgment:-
“6. It is by now well settled that the
extraordinary power under Article 226 or
inherent power under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure can be exercised by the
High Court, either to prevent abuse of processof the court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice. Where allegations made in the FirstInformation Report/the complaint or the
outcome of investigation as found in the
Charge Sheet, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do
not prima facie constitute any offence ormake out the case against the accused; where
the allegations do not disclose the
ingredients of the offence alleged; where the
uncontroverted allegations made in the FirstInformation Report or complaint and the
material collected in support of the same do
not disclose the commission of offencealleged and make out a case against the
accused; where a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala fide and/or
where the proceeding is maliciouslyinstituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with
a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge, the power under Article 226
of the Constitution of India or under Section
482 of Code of Criminal Procedure may be
exercised.
7. While exercising power under Section 482 or
under Article 226 in such matters, the court
does not function as a Court of Appeal or
Revision. Inherent jurisdiction under Section
482 of the Code though wide has to be
exercised sparingly, carefully or with caution16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP
42and only when such exercise is justified by
the tests specifically laid down under Section
482 itself. It is to be exercised ex debito
justitiae to do real and substantial justice,
for the administration of which alone courts.
exist. The court must be careful and see that
its decision in exercise of its power is based
on sound principles. The inherent powers
should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate
prosecution. Of course, no hard and fast rulecan be laid down in regard to cases in which
the High Court will exercise its extra
ordinary jurisdiction of quashing the
proceedings at any stage.”
43. Before considering application of aforesaid law
laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the present facts and
circumstances of the case, it may be observed that in the
case at hand this Court has not examined the material
available on record with a view to ascertain the correctness
of allegation contained in the FIR, rather attempt, if any, by
this Court is to arrive at conclusion that “whether, in view of
allegation contained in the FIR, Police at Nalagarh has
jurisdiction or not?” In the earlier part of the judgment, it is
made clear that second prayer for quashing of FIR would
depend upon answer to the first question.
44. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case, as has been discussed above, this Court has arrived at
a conclusion that Police at Nalagarh has/had no jurisdiction
to enquire into the contents of FIR and as such there is no
occasion for this Court to go into the correctness of the
allegation as well as sustainability of charge, if any, framed
against the petitioners. As has been noticed hereinabove,
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43
inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is to be exercised
sparingly, carefully or with caution and only when such
exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down under
.
Section 482 Cr.P.C. itself. True, it is, that it should be
exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial
justice. Judgment referred to hereinabove nowhere suggests
that power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised by
the Court at all, rather exercise of it would depend upon the
facts of the case before it. Hon’ble Apex Court in the
aforesaid judgment has held that inherent power should not
be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. But, what is
legitimate prosecution depends upon facts of the particular
case. In the case at hand, as has been, elaborately
discussed hereinabove clearly suggests that Police at
Nalagarh has/had no authority/jurisdiction to investigate
into allegations contained in FIR, which admittedly took
place at Jallandhar and as such Courts at Nalagarh
have/had no jurisdiction to continue with the proceedings,
which are apparently based upon the investigation carried
out by police at Nalagarh and as such same cannot be
allowed to sustain. Since police at Nalagarh had no
jurisdiction, as has/had been held hereinabove, proceedings
if any pending before Courts at Nalagarh cannot be allowed
to sustain.
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44
45. Consequently, in view of above, present petition
is allowed and the FIR dated 7.10.2014 as well as
consequent proceedings are quashed and set aside, however,
.
respondent-wife is at liberty to initiate action, if any, against
the petitioners, on account of allegations contained in
impugned FIR but at Jallandhar(Pb), either by lodging fresh
FIR or by pursuing complaint filed by her at Women Cell
Jallandhar.
46. Needless to say that this Court has only
examined/analyzed material adduced on record by the
respective parties to ascertain whether Police at Nalagarh
has/had jurisdiction to investigate into contents of FIR and
as such this Court may not be understood to have returned
findings, if any, qua the sustainability of offence/charge, if
any, made out against the petitioners under Sections 498-A,
406 and 506 IPC which shall be considered and decided by
the Court of competent jurisdiction, if required and desired.
47. Interim order, if any, is vacated. All the
miscellaneous applications are disposed of.
August 10, 2018 (Sandeep Sharma)
(aks) Judge.
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A very good judgement by the HOn’ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh. Very well explained as well to avoid any chances of doubt. It is a must for the society, when the misuse of such laws has risen to a great extent, which is subsequently damaging the family structure of India. It has been remarked by the Hon’ble Apex court at many instances about the same and has been recommended to the Parliament as well for considering to bing about somechanges in such laws, but Parliament and other administrative oraganisation are hardly paying any heed to the importance of changes much needed.