IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH,
SHIMLA

Cr. MMO No. 993 of 2022

Sumehar Chand Narwal and others

Vs

State of H.P. and others

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Date of Decision: 10.01.2024.

The informant-respondent No. 2 made a complaint to the police stating that she is residing in a house constructed by her father-in-law. Petitioner No.1 Sumer Narwal has constructed a house on the upper side of the informant’s house.

The house of the petitioner No.1 has 4-5 storeys. He has installed a CCTV camera in the courtyard of his balcony which is facing the lintel of the house of the informant. The informant keeps her clothes, undergarments etc. on the lintel for drying them. She suspected that Sumer Narwal and his sons were watching her with a CCTV camera due to which she could not go to the roof of her house. The informant’s husband asked the petitioner Sumer Narwal to remove the CCTV camera or to change its direction to his house. Complaints were made to the police and the police had also asked Sumer Narwal to remove the CCTV camera. He was also asked to show the focus/footage in the control panel/mobile but Sumer Narwal refused to do so.

Police registered FIR No. 213 of 2020 and conducted the investigation. After the completion of the investigations, the challan was prepared and presented before the Court. 2. The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of the FIR and the challan pending before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class-V, Shimla. It was asserted that the FIR was filed to harass the petitioners.

Petitioner No.1 is a respectable member of the family and his relatives hold respectable positions in the society. Petitioners No.2 and 3 are the sons of petitioner No.1. The FIR was lodged to harass them and spoil their careers. A civil dispute is pending between the parties regarding the boundaries of the land. A civil suit No. 119 of 2020 was filed by the wife of petitioner No.1, titled Manjusha Narwal Vs. Munshi Ram in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Court No.1, Shimla. This dispute arose in the year 2012 and was settled by way of a Compromise Deed, dated 21.3.2013. The informant filed the present FIR after violating the terms of the compromise. The wife of petitioner No.1 also sent a legal notice to the informant’s family members. She had also served another notice in which she apprehended that she and her family members would be falsely implicated.

The police did not conduct the proper investigation as is apparent from the entries in the Daily Diary annexed to the petition. The construction work was going on at the time of the registration of the FIR and the CCTV camera was installed to monitor the same. The allegations in the FIR do not constitute any offence. The witnesses are making false statements to help the informant. Petitioner No.1 is the owner of the building where the camera is installed. The camera was installed by petitioner No.1’s wife for the surveillance of the entrance gallery six months before lodging of the FIR. Petitioner No. 1 and his wife have two residences and their stay in the building is casual. Hence it became necessary to have surveillance of the building.

The petitioners would have hidden the camera had they got any bad intentions. The police conducted a biased investigation. The complaint was the counterblast to teach the petitioners a lesson for filing the civil suit. Therefore, they prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequent proceedings arising out of the same be quashed.

3. Respondent No.1 filed a reply making preliminary submissions regarding lack of maintainability and the petitioners having not come to the Court with clean hands. It was asserted that a cognizable offence was disclosed and FIR No. 213 of 2020, dated 11.10.2020 was registered for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 354-D of IPC. The police recorded the statement of witnesses and added Sections 504, 506 and 509 of IPC. The petitioners did not produce the CCTV camera and the device, therefore, Section 201 of IPC was added.

The challan has been filed and is pending trial before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class-5, Shimla. The offences are punishable under Sections 354-D, 504, 506, 509 and 201 of IPC which are heinous and serious in nature and are against the public at large. The investigation was done properly and there was no bias. The petitioners have not come to the Court with clean hands. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

4. Respondent No.4 filed a separate reply denying the contents of the petition. It was asserted that respondent No. 4 has been unnecessarily arrayed as a party. Fair accurate reporting of the FIR is privileged. The newspaper report does not disclose the name and identity of the petitioners. FIR is a public document available in the public domain. The Press and Media are free to comment on the same. There was no bias against any person. No notice was ever served upon the respondent. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5. Separate rejoinders denying the contents of the replies and affirming those of the petition were filed.

6. I have heard Mr Sunil Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioners, Mr R.P. Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondents No. 1 and 3-State, Ms Meera Devi, Advocate, learned Legal Aid Counsel for respondent No.2 and Mr. Prince Chauhan, learned counsel for respondent No. 4. 7. Mr. Sunil Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the ingredients of Section 354-D of IPC are not satisfied in the present case. The CCTV camera was installed for the protection of the petitioner’s property. Civil disputes are pending between the parties. The reports were made to the police regarding unauthorized construction which is evident from the entries in the daily diary. However, the police did not take any action which shows its biased attitude towards the petitioners. The continuation of the proceedings will amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Hence, it was prayed that the FIR and present proceedings be quashed.

8. Mr R.P. Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondents No.1 and 3-State submitted that the police conducted the investigation fairly. The challan has been filed before the learned Trial Court and the remedy of the petitioners lies in approaching the learned Trial Court seeking their discharge. The petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is not maintainable after filing of the charge sheet. The contents of the FIR prima facie satisfy the ingredients of Section 354-D of IPC. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. Ms. Meera Devi, learned Legal Aid Counsel for respondent No. 2 adopted the submissions of Mr. R.P. Singh and submitted that the act of the petitioners fell within the definition of the stalking and learned Trial Court had rightly taken action against the petitioners. Hence, she prayed that the petition be dismissed.

10. Mr Prince Chauhan, learned counsel for respondent No. 4 submitted that respondent no. 4 is a newspaper which has no concern with the private dispute pending between the petitioners and the informant. It was wrongly impleaded as a party. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

12. The principles of exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. were laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 :

(2023) 7 SCC 711 wherein it was observed at page 716:-

17. The principles to be borne in mind with regard to the quashing of a charge/proceedings either in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397CrPC or Section 482CrPC or together, as the case may be, has engaged the attention of this Court many a time. Reference to each and every precedent is unnecessary. However, we may profitably refer to only one decision of this Court where upon a survey of almost all the precedents on the point, the principles have been summarised by this Court succinctly.

In Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], this Court laid down the following guiding principles : (SCC pp. 482-84, para 27) “27. …27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers.

The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.

27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not.

If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.

27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.

27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in the exercise of its inherent powers.

27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused.

27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender.

27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose.

27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise to and constitute a “civil wrong” with no “element of criminality” and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence.

27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.

27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction.

27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained.

27.12. In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was the possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution.

27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit a continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to deciding the admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.

27.14. Where the charge sheet, reported under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge.

27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to an abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist.

27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court.

Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence.”

13. Similar is the judgment in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Karnataka, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 603 wherein it was observed:- 26. Although we are not for verbosity in our judgments, a slightly detailed survey of the judicial precedents is in order. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, this Court held:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.” (emphasis supplied)

14. It was laid down in CBI v. Aryan Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379, that the High Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The allegations are required to be proved during the trial by leading evidence. It was observed:

10. From the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has dealt with the proceedings before it, as if, the High Court was conducting a mini-trial and/or the High Court was considering the applications against the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court on conclusion of trial. As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. The High Court in the common impugned judgment and order has observed that the charges against the accused are not proved. This is not the stage where the prosecution/investigating agency is/are required to prove the charges. The charges are required to be proved during the trial based on the evidence led by the prosecution/investigating agency. Therefore, the High Court has materially erred in going into detail in the allegations and the material collected during the course of the investigation against the accused, at this stage. At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider “whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not”.

11. One other reason pointed out by the High Court is that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the investigation was handed over to the CBI pursuant to the directions issued by the High Court. That thereafter, on conclusion of the investigation, the accused persons have been charge-sheeted. Therefore, the High Court has erred in observing at this stage that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. Whether the criminal proceedings was/were malicious or not, is not required to be considered at this stage. The same is required to be considered at the conclusion of the trial. In any case, at this stage, what is required to be considered is a prima facie case and the material collected during the course of the investigation, which warranted the accused to be tried.

15. This position was reiterated in Abhishek v. State of M.P. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1083 wherein it was observed: 12. The contours of the power to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. are well defined. In V. Ravi Kumar v. State represented by Inspector of Police, District Crime Branch, Salem, Tamil Nadu [(2019) 14 SCC 568], this Court affirmed that where an accused seeks quashing of the FIR, invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, it is wholly impermissible for the High Court to enter into the factual arena to adjudge the correctness of the allegations in the complaint.

In Neeharika Infrastructure (P). Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [Criminal Appeal No. 330 of 2021, decided on 13.04.2021], a 3-Judge Bench of this Court elaborately considered the scope and extent of the power under Section 482 Cr. P.C. It was observed that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases, such standard not being confused with the norm formulated in the context of the death penalty. It was further observed that while examining the FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made therein, but if the Court thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, and more particularly, the parameters laid down by this Court in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (AIR 1960 SC 866) and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [(1992) Supp (1) SCC 335], the Court would have jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint.

16. It is apparent from these judgments that power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can be exercised to prevent the abuse of process or secure the ends of justice. The Court can quash the F.I.R. if the allegations do not constitute an offence or make out a case against the accused. However, it is not permissible for it to conduct a mini-trial to arrive at such findings.

17. Section 354-D of IPC reads as under:-

354-D. Stalking.—(1) Any man who—

(i) follows a woman and contacts, or attempts to contact such woman to foster personal interaction repeatedly despite a clear indication of disinterest by such woman; or

(ii) monitors the use by a woman of the internet, email or any other form of electronic communication, commits the offence of stalking:

Provided that such conduct shall not amount to stalking if the man who pursued it proves that—

(i) it was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime and the man accused of stalking had been entrusted with the responsibility of prevention and detection of crime by the State; or

(ii) it was pursued under any law or to comply with any condition or requirement imposed by any person under any law; or

(iii) in the particular circumstances such conduct was reasonable and justified.

(2) Whoever commits the offence of stalking shall be punished on the first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine; and be punished on a second or subsequent conviction, with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine.

18. It is apparent from the bare perusal of the Section that a person should have followed a woman or contacted such woman to foster personal interaction or should have monitored the use by the woman of the internet, email or any other form of electronic communication. The case of the informant is that petitioner No.1 has installed a CCTV camera and she suspects that petitioner No.1 and his son are watching her with the help of the CCTV camera. There is no proof that the CCTV Camera is directed towards the house of the informant and it is merely a suspicion. Further, there is no proof that the petitioners/accused had contacted the informant to foster a personal relationship.

The petitioner nowhere stated any attempt was made to contact her to foster any personal relationship with her. The informant did not state that she was using the internet, e-mail or any other form of electronic communication and petitioner No.1 was monitoring such activity. Therefore, the contents of FIR do not satisfy the ingredients of Section 354-D of IPC. It was laid down by Kerala High Court in Jai Prakash Vs. Shiva Devi 2023 Kerala 37594 that merely calling a woman on the phone does not satisfy the ingredients of Section 354-D unless there is an attempt to foster personal interaction.

19. The police added Section 201 of IPC because the accused did not supply the recording of the CCTV, which was required in connection with the commission of an offence punishable under Section 354-D of IPC. Since no offence punishable under Section 354 D of the IPC is made out as per the allegations in the FIR; therefore, no offence punishable under Section 2o1 of the IPC is made out against the petitioners.

20. Mr. Sunil Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon various documents annexed to the petition to submit that the litigations are pending between the parties and complaints were made against the Investigating Officer; however, it is not permissible to look into the documents annexed to the petition seeking quashing of the FIR. It was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1: 1983 SCC (Cri) 115, that the proceedings can be quashed if on the face of the complaint and the papers accompanying the same no offence is constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract anything. It was observed:

“10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.”

21. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram, 1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018, that the fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the proceeding under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed: “Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri Maheshwari filed a photostate copy of an order dated 28.7.1983, passed in Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to which the present petitioner was not a party. Fresh evidence at this stage is neither permissible nor desirable. The respondent by filing this document is virtually introducing additional evidence, which is not the object of Section 482, Cr.P.C.”

22. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G. K. Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP, and held:

“9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the documents filed along with it and the sworn statements of the witnesses if any recorded. While judging the correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the documents, which are not filed before the lower Court.

Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court to look into fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:

“The complaint has to be read as a whole. If itÿappears that on consideration of the allegations, inÿthe light of the statement made on oath of theÿcomplainant that the ingredients of the offence orÿoffences are disclosed and there is no material toÿshow that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous orÿvexatious, in that event there would be noÿjustification for interference by the High Court.ÿWhen information is lodged at the Police Stationÿand an offence is registered, then the mala fides ofÿthe informant would be of secondary importance. Itÿis the material collected during the investigationÿand evidence led in Court, which decides the fate ofÿthe accused person. The allegations of mala fidesÿagainst the informant are of no consequence andÿcannot by itself be the basis for quashing theÿproceedings”. 23. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401 wherein it was observed at page 142:

“16. … the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the complaint as they stand, without adding or detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the veracity of the allegations nor for that matter can it proceed in the manner that a judge conducting a trial would, on the basis of the evidence collected during the course of the trial.”

24. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 wherein it was held:

13. All these documents which the petitioner seeks to rely on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the trial but the same are not material at the stage of deciding whether quashing as prayed for by her before the High Court was warranted or not. We, therefore, see no reason to place any reliance on these three documents.

25. A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein it was observed:

55. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under section 482, Cr. P.C., in a case where the offence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have not been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a prayer for quashing, is made, the law seems to be well settled that the High Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not there before the Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We may not be understood to undermine the High Courts’ powers saved by section 482, Cr. P.C.; such powers are always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e., to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the High Courts exist. However, the tests laid down for quashing an F.I.R. or criminal proceedings arising from a police report by the High Courts in the exercise of jurisdiction under section 482, Cr. P.C. not being substantially different from the tests laid down for quashing of a process issued under section 204 read with section 200, the High Courts on recording due satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of the complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary evidence as produced, no offence is made out and that proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an abuse of the legal process. This too, would be impermissible if the justice of a given case does not overwhelmingly so demand.” (Emphasis supplied) 26. Therefore, it is not permissible to look into the material filed by the petitioners with the petition and the Court has to rely upon the FIR and the report submitted by the police.

27. The police conducted the investigation. The statement of the informant was recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. and Sections 504, 506, and 509 of IPC were added. It was submitted that the statement of the informant amounts to an improvement because no such allegations were made in the FIR.

It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Maroti, (2023) 4 SCC 298: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1503 that the High Court exercising the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot examine the truthfulness, sufficiency and admissibility of the evidence. It was observed:

21. If FIR and the materials collected disclose a cognizable offence and the final report filed under Section 173(2)CrPC on completion of investigation based on it would reveal that the ingredients to constitute an offence under the POCSO Act and a prima facie case against the persons named therein as accused, the truthfulness, sufficiency or admissibility of the evidence are not matters falling within the purview of exercise of power under Section 482CrPC and undoubtedly they are matters to be done by the trial court at the time of trial. This position is evident from the decisions referred to supra.

22. In the decision in M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita [M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita, (2023) 12 SCC 821: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 1300: JT (2002) 3 SC 89], this Court held that while considering the question of quashing of FIR the High Court would not be entitled to appreciate by way of sifting the materials collected in course of investigation including the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC.

23. In the decision in Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab [Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, (2020) 3 SCC 317 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 51], a two-judge Bench of this Court dealt with the question as to the matters that could be considered by the High Court in quashment proceedings under Section 482CrPC. It was held therein that statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161CrPC being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not be taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. In that case, this Court took note of the fact that the High Court was aware that one of the witnesses mentioned that the deceased victim had informed him about the harassment by the accused, which she was not able to bear and hence wanted to commit suicide. Finding that the conclusion of the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings, in that case, was on the basis of its assessment of the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC, it was held that statements thereunder, being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not have been taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. It was also held that the High Court committed an error in quashing the proceedings by assessing the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC.

28. Similar is the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manik B. Vs. Kadapala Sreyes Reddy and another 2023 LiveLaw(SC) 642, wherein it was observed:

“6. Whether the testimony of the witnesses is trustworthy or not has to be found out from the examination-in-chief and cross-examination of the witnesses when they stand in the box at the stage of such trial.

7. Such an exercise, in our considered view, is not permissible while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.

8. The scope of interference, while quashing the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and that too for a serious offence like Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code is very limited. The Court would exercise its power to quash the proceedings only if it finds that taking the case at its face value, no case is made out at all.

9. At the stage of deciding an application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. it is not permissible for the High Court to go into the correctness or otherwise of the material placed by the prosecution in the charge sheet. The High Court by the impugned order has done exactly the same.”

29. In the present case, the charge sheet has been filed and it is for the learned Trial Court to see the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed:

“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and charge-sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence more particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, yet we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any case for discharge is made out or not.”

30. Therefore, it is not permissible for the Court to say at this stage that no offences punishable under Sections 504, 506 and 509 of IPC have been made out against the petitioners.

31. The petitioners have also impleaded Amar Ujala as respondent No.4. It was submitted that respondent No.4-Amar Ujala has published a news item related to the incident and the same is defamatory of the petitioners. Simply because the petitioners feel aggrieved by the publication of a news item is no reason to implead them in a petition seeking quashing of FIR.

Respondent No.4 do not have any interest in the quashing of the FIR or otherwise. Hence, respondent No.4 was arrayed unnecessarily before the Court and is entitled to be compensated for making an appearance in the Court and defending itself.

32. No other point was urged.

33. Hence, the present petition is partly allowed and the FIR No. 213 of 2020, dated 11.10.2020, under Sections 354-D, and 201 of IPC, registered with Police Station Shimla West (Boileauganj) and consequent proceedings for the aforesaid Sections are ordered to be quashed qua the petitioners. However, the proceedings will continue against the petitioners for the commission of offence punishable under Sections 504, 506 and 509 of IPC. The petitioners shall pay a cost of ?5,000/- to respondent No. 4 for unnecessarily dragging it into the litigation within one month from today.

34. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.

(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
10th January, 2024